neglect, any sort of disagreeable behaviour towards a person, which he thinks other than what is due to him. And the general notion of injury, or wrong, plainly comprehends this, though the words are mostly confined to the higher degrees of it.
Forgiveness of injuries is one of the very few moral obligations which has been disputed. But the proof that it is really an obligation, what our nature and condition require, seems very obvious, were it only from the consideration, that revenge is doing harm merely for harm's sake. And as to the love of our enemies: resentment cannot supersede the obligations to universal benevolence, unless they are in the nature of the thing inconsistent, which they plainly are not.
This divine precept, to forgive injuries and love our enemies, though to be met with in Gentile moralists, yet is in a peculiar sense a precept of Christianity; as our Saviour has insisted more upon it than upon any other single virtue. One reason of this doubtless is, that it so peculiarly becomes an imperfect faulty creature. But it may be observed also, that a virtuous temper of mind, consciousness of innocence, and good meaning towards everybody, and a strong feeling of injustice and injury, may, itself, such is the imperfection of our virtue, lead a person to violate this obligation, if he be not upon his guard. And it maybe well supposed, that this is another reason why it is so much insisted upon by him, who knew what was in man.
The chief design of the eleventh discourse, is to state the notion of self-love and disinterestedness, in order to show that benevolence is not more unfriendly to self-love than any other particular affection whatever. There is a strange affectation in many people in explaining away all particular affections, and representing the whole of life as nothing but one continued exercise of self-love. Hence arises that surprising confusion and perplexity in the Epicureans[1] of old, Hobbs, the author of Reflections, Sentences,
- ↑ One need only look into Torquatus's account of the Epicurean system in Cicero's first book De Finibus, to see in what a surprising manner this was done by them. Thus, the desire of praise, and of being beloved, he explains to be no other than desire of safety; regard to our country, even in the most virtuous character, to be nothing but regard to ourselves. The author of Reflections, &c., Morales, says, "Curiosity proceeds from interest, or pride; which pride also would doubtless have been explained to be self-love;" (Page 85, Ed. 1723)—as if there were no passions in mankind, as desire of esteem, or of being beloved, or of knowledge. Hobbs's account of the affections of good will and pity, are instances of the same kind.
