to exist.) Now if it proves no more than this» I cannot see that it reduces the supposition to any absurdity. Suppose I could demonstrate, that any particular man should live a thousand years; this man might, without a contradiction, be absent from one, and from all places, at different times; but it would not from thence follow, that he might be absent from all places at the same time, i.e., that he might cease to exist. No; this would be a contradiction, because I am supposed to have demonstrated that he should live a thousand years. It would be exactly the same, if, instead of a thousand years, I should say for ever; and the proof seems the same, whether it be applied to a self-existent or a dependent being.
What else I have to offer is in relation to your proof that the self-existent Being must of necessity be but one. Which proof is as follows, in Prop. VII.[1] (Edit. 2nd. p. 74.) "To suppose two or more different natures existing of themselves, necessarily and independent from each other, implies this plain contradiction; that each of them being independent from the other, they may either of them be supposed to exist alone; so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist, and consequently, neither of them will be necessarily existing." The supposition indeed implies, that since each of these beings is independent from the other, they may either of them exist alone, i.e., without any relation to, or dependence on, the other; but where is the third idea, to connect this proposition and the following one, viz., so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist? Were this a consequence of the former proposition, I allow it would be demonstration, by the first corollary of Prop, III.[2] [2nd. Edit. p. 26.] But since these two propositions [they may either of them be supposed to exist alone], and [so that it will be no contradiction to imagine the other not to exist], are very widely
