either of them may be supposed to exist alone in this sense of the words; bat only, that either of them may be supposed to exist without having any relation to the other, and that there will be no need of the existence of the one in order to the existence of the other. But though upon this account, were there no other principle of its existence, it might cease to exist; yet on the account of the necessity of its own nature, which is quite distinct from the other, it is an absolute absurdity to suppose it not to exist.
Thus, sir, I have proposed my doubts, with the reasons of them: in which, if I have wrested your words to another sense than you designed them, or in any respect argued unfairly, I assure you it was without design. So I hope you will impute it to mistake. And if it will not be too great a trouble, let me once more beg the feivour of a line from you, by which you will lay me under a particular obligation to be, what, with the rest of the world, I now am.
Reverend Sir,
November 4, 1713.
THE ANSWER TO THE FIRST LETTER.
Sir,—Did men, who publish controversial papers, accustom themselves to write with that candour and ingenuity with which you propose your difficulties, I am persuaded almost all disputes might be very amicably terminated, either by men's coming at last to agree in opinion, or at least, finding reason to suffer each other friendly to differ.
Your two objections are very ingenious, and urged with great strength and acuteness. Yet I am not without hopes of being able to give you satisfaction in both of them. To your first, therefore, I answer: whatever may, without a contradiction, be absent from any one place at any one time; may, also, without a contradiction, be absent from all places at all times. For, whatever is absolutely necessary at all, is absolutely necessary in necessary in every part of space
