What you say under the first head proves (I think) to a very great probability, though not to me with the evidence of demonstration; but your arguments under the second, I am not able to see the force of.
I am so far from being pleased that I can form objections to your arguments, that, besides the satisfaction it would have given me in my own mind, I should have thought it an honour to have entered into your reasonings, and seen the force of them. I cannot desire to trespass any more upon your better employed time: so shall only add my hearty thanks for your trouble on my account, and that I am, with the greatest respect,
Reverend Sir,
Your most obliged humble Servant.
December 5, 1713.
THE ANSWER TO THE THHID LETTER.
Sir,—Though, when I turn my thoughts every way, I fully persuade myself there is no defect in the argument itself; yet in my manner of expression I am satisfied there must be some want of clearness, when there remains any difficulty to a person of your abilities and sagacity. I did not mean that your saying a necessary Being exists somewhere does necessarily suppose it to be finite; but that the manner of expression is apt to excite in the mind an idea of a finite being, at the same time that you are thinking of a necessary Being, without accurately attending to the nature of that necessity by which it exists. Necessity absolute, and antecedent (in order of nature) to the existence of any subject, has nothing to limit it; but, if it operates at all, (as it must needs do,) it must operate (if I may so speak) everywhere and at all times alike. Determination of a particular quantity, or particular time or place of existence of anything, cannot arise but from somewhat external to the thing itself. For example: why there should exist just such a
