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WILKINS v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

indicates, the Court did not pause over its passing remark. Nor did the Court mention this again. Further, even if the Court had secretly considered forfeiture, there were nonjurisdictional reasons the Court could have concluded forfeiture did not apply.[1] Speculating about what this Court might have thought about arguments it never addressed needlessly introduces confusion. This Court looks for definitive interpretations, not holdings in hiding.

Finally, there is United States v. Beggerly, 524 U. S. 38 (1998). The Court in Beggerly addressed whether §2409a(g) could be equitably tolled. Id., at 48–49. Subject-matter jurisdiction, as noted, is never subject to equitable tolling. If Block and Mottaz had definitely interpreted §2409a(g) as subject-matter jurisdictional, the Court could have just cited those cases and ended the matter without further discussion.[2] Instead, the Court parsed the provision’s text and context, concluding that “by providing that the statute of limitations will not begin to run until the plaintiff ‘knew or should have known of the claim of the United States,’ ” the law “has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling.” Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48. Also relevant were “the unusually generous” time limit and the importance of clarity when it comes to land rights. Id., at 48–49. This careful


  1. For example, the Court might have concluded forfeiture did not apply because of the confusing way the case had been pleaded, see Brief for United States in United States v. Mottaz, O. T. 1985, No. 85–546, p. 22, n. 11, or that any forfeiture argument had itself been forfeited. Or the Court might have, on reflection, agreed with the Government that it had sufficiently raised the Quiet Title Act prior to rehearing. Ibid. The dissent, post, at 8, n. 3, mistakes these observations as a suggestion that Mottaz actually took one of those approaches. Far from it. This Court is merely declining to read tea leaves to divine lost meanings about what the Mottaz Court might have thought about a forfeiture argument it never raised and over which “the parties did not cross swords.” Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 512 (2006).
  2. The Court was not unaware of Block, quoting it for a different point in the very same section. Beggerly, 524 U. S., at 48.