Thomas, J., dissenting
trial or to be sued on an adverse possession theory. Similarly, and just as critically, it has not consented to be sued (except by a State) once the 12-year statute of limitations has passed.
The majority acknowledges that these restrictions must be strictly construed. See ante, at 8. Yet, it concludes that the time bar should not be considered jurisdictional. In another context, the majority’s conclusion is arguably plausible. But, in this context, it is simply incorrect. As a condition on the United States’ limited waiver of sovereign immunity in the Quiet Title Act, the Act’s statute of limitations is jurisdictional. Moreover, in light of this Court’s longstanding case law, the jurisdictional character of the time bar would have been well understood by the 1972 Congress. See ante, at 3 (suggesting that the Court should “avoid judicial interpretations that undermine Congress’ judgment” when interpreting arguably jurisdictional provisions).
With no answer to the Court’s longstanding view that conditions on waivers of sovereign immunity are jurisdictional, the majority seeks refuge in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990). Ante, at 7–8. Irwin considered whether equitable tolling should apply to the time to file an employment-discrimination lawsuit against the Government under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. There, the Court reasoned that “[t]ime requirements in lawsuits between private litigants are customarily subject to ‘equitable tolling,’ ” and that “[o]nce Congress has made … a waiver [of sovereign immunity], … making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver.” Irwin, 498 U. S., at 95. It thus concluded that “[s]uch a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation.” Ibid.
