Syllabus
Block is a textbook “drive-by jurisdictional rulin[g].” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 511. The Government points to a statement in that opinion’s conclusion that if the Quiet Title Act’s time limit applied, “the courts below had no jurisdiction to inquire into the merits,” Block, 461 U. S., at 292. Yet there is no discussion in Block about whether the provision is “ ‘technically jurisdictional’ ”—just a mere statement that a “threshold fact” must “b[e] established” for there to be “jurisdiction.” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512. While Block did describe the Act’s time limit as “a condition on the waiver of sovereign immunity,” 461 U. S., at 287, Block never addressed whether the Act’s time limit was truly a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction, nor did anything in the case turn on this question. Contrary to the Government’s contentions, even in that era, time limits in suits against the Government were not necessarily subject-matter jurisdictional under this Court’s caselaw.
Like Block, Mottaz contains no discussion of whether the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year time bar was technically jurisdictional. Instead, the Court decided which of two possible time bars applied and, having determined it was the Quiet Title Act’s 12-year limit, concluded that the plaintiff had notice over 12 years before she sued. Neither step in the Court’s analysis “turn[ed] on” whether any time limits were “ ‘technically jurisdictional.’ ” Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 512. Once again, general statements in the opinion about waivers of immunity cannot change this basic fact.
Finally, in Beggerly, the Court carefully analyzed whether the text and context of §2409a(g) were consistent with equitable tolling. This would have been a mere waste of words if the Court had already held in Block and Mottaz that §2409a(g) was jurisdictional.
These three cases point in one direction: This Court has never definitively interpreted §2409a(g) as jurisdictional. The Government’s argument about legislative acquiescence is unavailing given the absence of any definitive judicial interpretation to which Congress could acquiesce. Pp. 5–12.
13 F. 4th 791, reversed and remanded.
