Chapter the third.
Of COURTS in general.
THE next, and principal, object of our enquiries is the redreſs of injuries by ſuit in courts: wherein the act of the parties and the act of law co-operate; the act of the parties being neceſſary to ſet the law in motion, and the proceſs of the law being in general the only inſtrument, by which the parties are enabled to procure a certain and adequate redreſs.
And here it will not be improper to obſerve, that although, in the ſeveral caſes of redreſs by the act of the parties mentioned in a former chapter[1], the law allows an extrajudicial remedy, yet that does not exclude the ordinary courſe of juſtice: but it is only an additional weapon put into the hands of certain perſons in particular inſtances, where natural equity or the peculiar circumſtances of their ſituation required a more expeditious remedy, than the formal proceſs of any court of judicature can furniſh. Therefore, though I may defend myſelf, or relations, from external violence, I yet am afterwards entitled to an action of aſſault and battery: though I may retake my goods if I have a fair and peaceable opportunity, this power of recaption does not debar me from my action of trover or detinue: I may either enter on the lands, on which I have a right of entry, or may demand poſſeſſion by a real action: I may either abate a nuſance by my own authority, or call upon the law to do it for me: I may diſtrein for rent, or have an action of debt at my own option:
- ↑ ch. 1.
