Page:William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (3rd ed, 1768, vol I).djvu/140

This page has been validated.
124
The Rights
Book I.

ſidered as a mere individual, it is not to be expected that any human municipal laws ſhould at all explain or enforce them. For the end and intent of ſuch laws being only to regulate the behaviour of mankind, as they are members of ſociety, and ſtand in various relations to each other, they have conſequently no buſineſs or concern with any but ſocial or relative duties. Let a man therefore be ever ſo abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedneſs to himſelf, and does not offend againſt the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices public, though they be ſuch as ſeem principally to affect himſelf, (as drunkenneſs, or the like) they then become, by the bad example they ſet, of pernicious effects to ſociety; and therefore it is then the buſineſs of human laws to correct them. Here the circumſtance of publication is what alters the nature of the caſe. Public ſobriety is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws; private ſobriety is an abſolute duty, which, whether it be performed or not, human tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never enforce it by any civil ſanction. But, with reſpect to rights, the caſe is different. Human laws define and enforce as well thoſe rights which belong to a man conſidered as an individual, as thoſe which belong to him conſidered as related to others.

For the principal aim of ſociety is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of thoſe abſolute rights, which were veſted in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preſerved in peace without that mutual aſſiſtance and intercourſe, which is gained by the inſtitution of friendly and ſocial communities. Hence it follows, that the firſt and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate theſe abſolute rights of individuals. Such rights as are ſocial and relative reſult from, and are poſterior to, the formation of ſtates and ſocieties: ſo that to maintain and regulate theſe is clearly a ſubſequent conſideration. And therefore the principal view of human laws is, or ought always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce ſuch rights as are

abſolute,