Page:William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (3rd ed, 1768, vol I).djvu/174

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158
The Rights
Book I.

wiſe regulator, may be directed to any beneficial purpoſe; and thereby every individual may be made ſubſervient to the public good, while he principally means to promote his own particular views. A body of nobility is alſo more peculiarly neceſſary in our mixed and compounded conſtitution, in order to ſupport the rights of both the crown and the people, by forming a barrier to withſtand the encroachments of both. It creates and preſerves that gradual ſcale of dignity, which proceeds from the peaſant to the prince; riſing like a pyramid from a broad foundation, and diminiſhing to a point as it riſes. It is this aſcending and contracting proportion that adds ſtability to any government; for when the departure is ſudden from one extreme to another, we may pronounce that ſtate to be precarious. The nobility therefore are the pillars, which are reared from among the people, more immediately to ſupport the throne; and if that falls, they muſt alſo be buried under it’s ruins. Accordingly, when in the laſt century the commons had determined to extirpate monarchy, they alſo voted the houſe of lords to be uſeleſs and dangerous. And ſince titles of nobility are thus expedient in the ſtate, it is alſo expedient that their owners ſhould form an independent and ſeparate branch of the legiſlature. If they were confounded with the maſs of the people, and like them had only a vote in electing repreſentatives, their privileges would ſoon be borne down and overwhelmed by the popular torrent, which would effectually level all diſtinctions. It is therefore highly neceſſary that the body of nobles ſhould have a diſtinct aſſembly, diſtinct deliberations, and diſtinct powers from the commons.

The commons conſiſt of all ſuch men of any property in the kingdom, as have not ſeats in the houſe of lords; every one of which has a voice in parliament, either perſonally, or by his repreſentatives. In a free ſtate, every man, who is ſuppoſed a free agent, ought to be, in ſome meaſure, his own governor; and therefore a branch at leaſt of the legiſlative power ſhould reſide in the whole body of the people. And this power, when the territories of the ſtate are ſmall and it’s citizens eaſily known,

ſhould