myſteries of the bona dea, was not ſuffered to be pried into by any but ſuch as were initiated in it's ſervice: becauſe perhaps the exertion of the one, like the ſolemnities of the other, would not bear the inſpection of a rational and ſober enquiry. The glorious queen Elizabeth herſelf made no ſcruple to direct her parliaments to abſtain from diſcourſing of matters of ſtate[1]; and it was the conſtant language of this favorite princeſs and her miniſters, that even that auguſt aſſembly “ought not to deal, to judge, or to meddle, with her majeſty’s prerogative royal[2].” And her ſucceſſor, king James the firſt, who had imbibed high notions of the divinity of regal ſway, more than once laid it down in his ſpeeches, that “as it is atheiſm and blaſphemy in a creature to diſpute what the deity may do, ſo it is preſumption and ſedition in a ſubject to diſpute what a king may do in the height of his power: good chriſtians, he adds, will be content with God’s will, revealed in his word; and good ſubjects will reſt in the king’s will, revealed in his law[3]."
But, whatever might be the ſentiments of ſome of our princes, this was never the language of our antient constitution and laws. The limitation of the regal authority was a firſt and eſſential principle in all the Gothic ſyſtems of government eſtabliſhed in Europe; though gradually driven out and overborne, by violence and chicane, in moſt of the kingdoms on the continent. We have ſeen, in the preceding chapter, the ſentiments of Bracton and Forteſcue, at the diſtance of two centuries from each other. And ſir Henry Finch, under Charles the firſt, after the lapſe of two centuries more, though he lays down the law of prerogative in very ſtrong and emphatical terms, yet qualifies it with a general reſriction, in regard to the liberties of the people. “The king hath a prerogative in all things, that are not injurious to the ſubject; for in them all it muſt be remembered, that the king’s prerogative ſtretcheth not to the doing of any wrong[4].” Nihil
