We are next to conſider thoſe branches of the royal prerogative, which inveſt this our ſovereign lord, thus all-perfect and immortal in his kingly capacity, with a number of authorities and powers; in the exertion whereof conſiſts the executive part of government. This is wiſely placed in a ſingle hand by the Britiſh conſtitution, for the ſake of unanimity, ſtrength and diſpatch. Were it placed in many hands, it would be ſubject to many wills: many wills, if diſunited and drawing different ways, create weakneſs in a government: and to unite thoſe ſeveral wills, and reduce them to one, is a work of more time and delay than the exigencies of ſtate will afford. The king of England is therefore not only the chief, but properly the ſole, magiſtrate of the nation; all others acting by commiſſion from, and in due ſubordination to him: in like manner as, upon the great revolution in the Roman ſtate, all the powers of the antient magiſtracy of the commonwealth were concentred in the new emperor; ſo that, as Gravina[1] expreſſes it, "in ejus unius perſona veteris reipublicae vis atque majeſtas per cumulatas magiſtratuum poteſtates exprimebatur."
After what has been premiſed in this chapter, I ſhall not (I truſt) be conſidered as an advocate for arbitrary power, when I lay it down as a principle, that in the exertion of lawful prerogative, the king is and ought to be abſolute; that is, ſo far abſolute, that there is no legal authority that can either delay or reſiſt him. He may reject what bills, may make what treaties, may coin what money, may create what peers, may pardon what offences he pleaſes: unleſs where the conſtitution hath expreſſly, or by evident conſequence, laid down ſome exception or boundary; declaring, that thus far the prerogative ſhall go and no farther. For otherwiſe the power of the crown would indeed be but a name and a ſhadow, inſufficient for the ends of government, if, where it’s juriſdiction is clearly eſtabliſhed and allowed, any man or body of men were permitted to diſobey it, in the ordinary courſe of law: I ſay, in the ordinary courſe of law; for I do
- ↑ Orig. 1. §. 105.
