ſoon be an end of our conſtitution. The legiſlature would be changed from that, which was originally ſet up by the general conſent and fundamental act of the ſociety; and ſuch a change, however effected, is according to Mr Locke[1] (who perhaps carries his theory too far) at once an entire diſſolution of the bands of government; and the people would be reduced to a ſtate of anarchy, with liberty to conſtitute to themſelves a new legiſlative power.
Having thus curſorily conſidered the three uſual ſpecies of government, and our own ſingular conſtitution, ſelected and compounded from them all, I proceed to obſerve, that, as the power of making laws conſtitutes the ſupreme authority, ſo wherever the ſupreme authority in any ſtate reſides, it is the right of that authority to make laws; that is, in the words of our definition, to preſcribe the rule of civil action. And this may be diſcovered from the very end and inſtitution of civil ſtates. For a ſtate is a collective body, compoſed of a multitude of individuals, united for their ſafety and convenience, and intending to act together as one man. If it therefore is to act as one man, it ought to act by one uniform will. But, inaſmuch as political communities are made up of many natural perſons, each of whom has his particular will and inclination, theſe ſeveral wills cannot by any natural union be joined together, or tempered and diſpoſed into a laſting harmony, ſo as to conſtitute and produce that one uniform will of the whole. It can therefore be no otherwiſe produced than by a political union; by the conſent of all perſons to ſubmit their own private wills to the will of one man, or of one or more aſſemblies of men, to whom the ſupreme authority is entruſted: and this will of that one man, or aſſemblage of men, is in different ſtates, according to their different conſtitutions, underſtood to be law.
Thus far as to the right of the ſupreme power to make laws; but farther, it is it’s duty likewiſe. For ſince the reſpec-
