and of ſet purpoſe, though done upon a ſudden occaſion. Next, in order of time, is the ſtatute 37 Hen. VIII. c. 6. which directs, that if a man ſhall maliciouſly and unlawfully cut off the ear of any of the king's ſubjects, he ſhall not only forfeit treble damages to the party grieved, to be recovered by action of treſpaſs at common law, as a civil ſatisfaction; but alſo 10. l. by way of fine to the king, which was his criminal amercement. The laſt ſtatute, but by far the moſt ſevere and effectual of all, is that of 22 & 23 Car. II. c. 1. called the coventry act; being occaſioned by an aſſault on ſir John Coventry in the ſtreet, and ſlitting his noſe, in revenge (as was ſuppoſed) for ſome obnoxious words uttered by him in parliament. By this ſtatute it is enacted, that if any perſon ſhall of malice aforethought, and by lying in wait, unlawfully cut out or diſable the tongue, put out an eye, ſlit the noſe, cut off a noſe or lip, or cut off or diſable any limb or member of any other perſon, with intent to maim or to disfigure him; ſuch perſon, his counſellors, aiders, and abettors, ſhall be guilty of felony without benefit of clergy[1].
- ↑ On this ſtatute Mr. Coke, a gentleman of Suffolk, and one Woodburn, a labourer, were indicted in 1722; Coke for hiring and abetting Woodburn, and Woodburn for the actual fact, of ſlitting the noſe of Mr. Criſpe, Coke's brother in law. The caſe was ſomewhat ſingular. The murder of Criſpe was intended, and he was left for dead, being terribly hacked and disfigured with a hedge bill; but he recovered. Now the bare intent to murder is no felony: but to disfigure, with an intent to disfigure, is made ſo by this ſtatute; on which they were therefore indicted. And Coke, who was a diſgrace to the profeſſion of the law, had the effrontery to reſt his defence upon this point, that the aſſault was not committed with an intent to disfigure, but with an intent to murder; and therefore not within the ſtatute. But the court held, that if a man attacks another to murder him with ſuch an inſtrument as a hedge bill, which cannot but endanger the disfiguring him; and in ſuch attack happens not to kill, but only to disfigure him; he may be indicted on this ſtatute: and it ſhall be left to the jury whether it were not a deſign to murder by disfiguring, and conſequently a malicious intent to disfigure as well as to murder. Accordingly the jury found them guilty of ſuch previous intent to disfigure, in order to effect their principal intent to murder, and they were both condemned and executed. (State Trials. VI. 212.)
