II. LEGAL STANDARD
The standard for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary injunction are identical. Windsor v. United States, 379 F. App’x 912, 916–17 (11th Cir. 2010). A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy.” Bloedorn v. Grube, 631 F.3d 1218, 1229 (11th Cir. 2011). To obtain the relief he seeks, Wood must affirmatively demonstrate: “(1) substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) [that] irreparable injury will be suffered unless the injunction issues; (3) the threatened injury to [him] outweighs whatever damage the proposed injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) if issued, the injunction would not be adverse to the public interest.” McDonald’s Corp. v. Robertson, 147 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 1998). See also Siegel v. LePore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In this Circuit, a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy not to be granted unless the movant clearly established the burden of persuasion as to each of the four prerequisites.”).
III. DISCUSSION
Wood’s motion essentially boils down to two overarching claims: that Defendants violated the Constitution by (1) executing and enforcing the Settlement Agreement to the extent it requires different procedures than the Georgia Election Code, and (2) not permitting designated monitors to have certain
