- iii. Due Process
For the same reasons, Wood also does not have standing to pursue his due process claim. Wood asserts that various election monitors appointed by the Republican Party “have been denied the opportunity to be present throughout the entire Hand Recount, and when allowed to be present, they were denied the opportunity to observe the Hand Recount in any meaningful way.”[1] Yet, Wood does not allege that he attempted to participate as a designated monitor. Nor does he allege that, on behalf of the Republican Party, he himself designated monitors who were ultimately denied access. Wood’s broad objection is that Defendants failed to conduct the Audit fairly and consistently under Georgia law. This is a generalized grievance.[2] Lance, 549 U.S. at 440–41. See also Nolles v. State Comm. for Reorganization of Sch. Dists., 524 F.3d 892, 900 (8th Cir. 2008) (voters lacked standing because substantive due process claim that delay of implementation of new statute
- ↑ ECF 6, at 21.
- ↑ To the extent Wood attempts to rely on a theory of third party standing, the Court disagrees; the doctrine is disfavored and Wood has not alleged or proven any of the required elements—that (1) he “suffered an injury-in-fact that gives [him] a sufficiently concrete interest in the dispute”; (2) he has “a close relationship to the third party”; and (3) there is “a hindrance to the third party’s ability to protect its own interests.” Aaron Private Clinic Mgmt. LLC v. Berry, 912 F.3d 1330, 1339 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted).
