Page:Wood v. Raffensperger (1 20-cv-04651-SDG) (2020) Opinion and Order.pdf/26

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For example, to the extent Wood relies on a theory of disparate treatment, Bush v. Gore is inapplicable. Defendants applied the Settlement Agreement in a wholly uniform manner across the entire state.[1] In other words, no voter—including Wood—was treated any differently than any other voter. E.g., Wise v. Circosta, 978 F.3d 93, 100 (4th Cir. 2020); Deutsch v. New York State Bd. of Elections, No. 20 CIV. 8929 (LGS), 2020 WL 6384064, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2020).

Wood fares no better with a vote dilution argument. According to Wood, his fundamental right to vote was burdened because the “rules and regulations set forth in the [Settlement Agreement] created an arbitrary, disparate, and ad hoc process for processing defective absentee ballots, and for determining which of such ballots should be ‘rejected,’ contrary to Georgia law.”[2] At the starting gate, the additional safeguards on signature and identification match enacted by Defendants did not burden Wood’s ability to cast his ballot at all. Wood, according to his legal counsel during oral argument, did not vote absentee during the


    address them at this stage.

  1. Wood concedes as much in the Amended Complaint. See ECF 5, ¶ 25 (alleging the Settlement Agreement “set[ ] forth different standards to be followed by the clerks and registrars in processing absentee ballots in the State of Georgia.”) (emphasis added).
  2. ECF 6, at 18.