district court applied would stretch concepts of due process to their breaking point.”).
More specifically, federal courts have rejected the very interest Wood claims has been violated, i.e., the right to observe the electoral process. See, e.g., Republican Party of Penn. v. Cortes, 218 F. Supp. 3d 396, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“[T]here is no individual constitutional right to serve as a poll watcher… but rather the right is conferred by statute.”); Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Boockvar, No. 2:20-cv-966, 2020 WL 5997680, at *67 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2020) (same); Dailey v. Hands, No. 14-423, 2015 WL 1293188, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Mar. 23, 2015) (“[P]oll watching is not a fundamental right.”); Turner v. Cooper, 583 F. Supp. 1160, 1162 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding no authority “that supports the proposition that [plaintiff] had a first amendment right to act as a pollwatcher. Indeed, we would suggest that the state is not constitutionally required to permit pollwatchers for political parties and candidates to observe the conduct of elections.”). Without such an interest, Wood cannot establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits as to his procedural due process claim.
- b) Substantive Due Process
Wood’s substantive due process claim fares no better. The types of voting rights covered by the substantive due process clause are considered narrow.
