the most prevalent, and, usually, the cost durable governments. Among them, the leading one is, they are the most susceptible of improvement — that is, they can be more easily and readily modified, so as to prevent, to a limited extent, oppression and abuse of power, without assuming the constitutional form, in its strict sense. It slides, almost naturally, into one of the most important modifications. I refer to hereditary descent. When this becomes well defined and firmly established, the community or kingdom, comes to be regarded by the sovereign as the hereditary possession of his family — a circumstance which tends strongly to identify his interests with those of his subjects, and hereby, to mitigate the rigor of the government. It gives, besides, great additional security to his person; and prevents, in the same degree, not only the suspicion and hostile feelings incident to insecurity — but invites all those kindly feelings which naturally spring up on both sides, between those whose interests are identified — when there is nothing to prevent it. And hence the strong feelings of paternity on the side of the sovereign — and of loyalty on that of his subjects, which are often exhibited in such governments.
There is another improvement of which it is readily susceptible, nearly allied to the preceding. The hereditary principle not unfrequently extends to other families — especially to those of the distinguished chieftains, by whose aid the monarchy was established, when it originates in conquest. When this is the case — and a powerful body of hereditary
