criminal punishment". The second definition defined "liability" as "[a] financial or pecuniary obligation in a specified amount; debt". Mr Bogatz did not accept that the first definition is broader than the second, in that it is not limited to pecuniary obligations. Instead, he insisted that whether the first definition was broader in this way would "depend on the context". This is to be contrasted with the fact that Mr Bogatz was able to state what "plain meaning" the word "liability" bears in isolation, with that plain meaning denoting in Mr Bogatz's view "some type of monetary obligation". I consider that Mr Bogatz's opinion in this regard was strained.
149 A related issue arose in relation to Mr Bogatz's evidence concerning the 1969 version of NRS § 78.495. That section relevantly provided that when a merger took place, the surviving entity "shall … be subject to all the restrictions, disabilities and duties of each of the constituent corporations so merged". Mr Bogatz was asked whether the plain meaning of this version of the Nevada legislation was that the surviving entity becomes subject to all of the restrictions, disabilities and duties of the constituent corporations, in a way that is not limited to pecuniary liabilities. In response, Mr Bogatz stated that the text of the statute did not use the word "pecuniary", and that while the words of the statute did not impose such a limit, he would have to see the context. Given that Mr Bogatz was capable of explaining the plain meaning of the word "liability" isolated from context, it was not obvious why it was necessary for him to see further context in respect of this example before he could proffer the plain meaning of the words used.
150 Mr Bogatz's analysis of the meaning of "liabilities" in § 92A.250(1)(d) was to my mind superficial, and did not sufficiently explain the reasoning that led him from the uncontroversial principles of interpretation he laid out to the conclusions he reached. In my view, there were gaps in Mr Bogatz's path of reasoning, and leaps in logic that were not supported by adequate explanation.
151 Overall, I formed the impression that Mr Bogatz was knowledgeable about certain areas of practice that fell within the ambit of his experience, in particular business transactions, gaming, and perhaps liquor licensing. I was, however, surprised that Mr Bogatz appeared to be unaware of the legislative history that led to the enactment of the current Nevada law relating to corporate mergers, despite being a practising attorney in Nevada for some years. I also consider that Mr Bogatz was inclined to rely on propositions from his areas of experience in an anecdotal fashion, without explaining in a thorough way how they should inform the proper construction of the statutory provisions in issue. Without in any way impugning Mr Bogatz's desire to assist
