Alito, J., dissenting
step, I would dismiss the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted.
I
We granted certiorari “to resolve [a] Circuit split” between, on the one hand, the Third and Ninth Circuits, which embrace a totality-based inquiry like the one the Court adopts here, and, on the other hand, the Seventh Circuit, which has held that RICO injuries to intangible property are sited at the plaintiff’s residence. Ante, at 5; compare Humphrey v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 905 F. 3d 694, 706–707 (CA3 2018), and 37 F. 4th 562, 567–568 (CA9 2022) (case below), with Armada (Sing.) PTE Ltd. v. Amcol Int’l Corp., 885 F. 3d 1090, 1094–1095 (CA7 2018).[1] The Seventh Circuit’s decision, however, contains little analysis and simply declares that “[i]t is well understood that a party experiences or sustains injuries to its intangible property at its residence.” Id., at 1094; see also Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U. S. 451, 471 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to a dearth of “reasoned opinions … from the courts of appeals” regarding “a novel and important question”). The Third and Ninth Circuits, for their parts, did not coalesce around any common set of factors to guide the civil RICO domestic-injury inquiry for intangible-property claims. See Humphrey, 905 F. 3d, at 706–707; 37 F. 4th, at 567–568. And no court of appeals has even broached the possibility that different categorical rules might be available for different types of intangible property (e.g., perhaps there could be a rule that injuries to trademark rights should be sited in the country that provided the trademark). “[W]e would greatly benefit from the views of
- ↑ The Second Circuit has adopted a bright-line rule that RICO injuries to tangible property are sited at the location of the property. Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 874 F. 3d 806, 818–824 (2017). The Second Circuit’s holding is not implicated in this split, nor did that court offer any analysis of intangible property relevant to these cases.
