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ZIVOTOFSKY v. KERRY

Roberts, C. J., dissenting

when the President acts in the absence of express congressional authorization, not when he asserts power to disregard a statute, as the Executive does here. Medellín, 552 U. S., at 528; see Dames & Moore, 453 U. S., at 678–679.

In sum, although the President has authority over recognition, I am not convinced that the Constitution provides the “conclusive and preclusive” power required to justify defiance of an express legislative mandate. Youngstown, 343 U. S., at 638 (Jackson, J., concurring). As the leading scholar on this issue has concluded, the “text, original understanding, post-ratifcation history, and structure of the Constitution do not support the . . . expansive claim that this executive power is plenary.” Reinstein, Is the President's Recognition Power Exclusive? 86 Temp. L. Rev. 1, 60 (2013).

But even if the President does have exclusive recognition power, he still cannot prevail in this case, because the statute at issue does not implicate recognition. See Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U. S. 189, 210 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring in judgment); post, at 71–76 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The relevant provision, § 214(d), simply gives an American citizen born in Jerusalem the option to designate his place of birth as Israel “[f]or purposes of ” passports and other documents. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, 116 Stat. 1366. The State Department itself has explained that “identification”—not recognition—“is the principal reason that U. S. passports require `place of birth.' ” App. 42. Congress has not disputed the Executive's assurances that § 214(d) does not alter the longstanding United States position on Jerusalem. And the annals of diplomatic history record no examples of official recognition accomplished via optional passport designation.

The majority acknowledges both that the “Executive's exclusive power extends no further than his formal recognition determination” and that § 214(d) does “not itself constitute a formal act of recognition.” Ante, at 30. Taken together, these statements come close to a confession of error. The