Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Institutes of Metaphysic (1875)/Section 1/Proposition 17
PROPOSITION XVII.
WHAT THE SUBSTANTIAL IN COGNITION IS.
DEMONSTRATION.
Object plus subject—matter mecum—thoughts or mental states whatsoever, together with the self or subject—the ego or mind in any determinate condition, or with any thing or thought present to it,—the universal in union with the particular—these varieties of expression declare what constitutes the only synthesis which can be known or conceived without anything else being known or conceived along with it (see in particular Props. II. III. VI. IX. XIII.) Therefore this synthesis (thus variously expressed) is the substantial, and the only substantial, in cognition, conformably to the definition of substance given in Prop. XVI.
OBSERVATIONS AND EXPLANATIONS.
Seventeenth counter-proposition.1. Seventeenth Counter-proposition.—"Object plus subject—matter mecum—thoughts or mental states whatsoever, together with the self or subject—the universal in union with the particular—this synthesis, thus variously expressed, is merely the phenomenal in cognition. The substantial is rather the separate members of the synthesis, than the total synthesis itself. Thus object apart from subject—matter apart from mind—the ego apart from the non-ego, and separated from all thoughts and determinations—the non-ego divorced from the ego, and existing as it best can,—these are the substantial, not indeed in human knowledge, for human knowledge cannot lay hold of the substantial, but in reality, in rerum natura. They are the occult bases of all the phenomena, intellectual and material, which alone come before us; and among these, and equally phenomenal in its character, falls to be ranked what is called the synthesis in cognition of objects and subject—matter and me—mind with thoughts or things present to it—the universal and the particular—the ego and the non-ego."
Conglomerate character of the counter-proposition.2. This counter-proposition is a conglomeration of epistemology and ontology, with a slight tincture of common opinion, and a large menstruum of psychological doctrine. To disentangle its contents, therefore, it must be put through a refining process—first, in order to clear it from all ontological admixture, and to disengage and exhibit that part of it which psychology opposes to the proposition; and, secondly, in order to disengage and exhibit that part of it which ordinary thinking opposes to the proposition.
Elimination of its ontological surplusage.3. First, Part of this counter-proposition is obviously ontological. Although psychology professes to have no faith in ontology, and disclaims all connection with so unapproachable a department of metaphysics, she nevertheless retains such a hold over this unreclaimed province as enables her, unless vigorously withstood, to disconcert the operations of the exact reason, and to impede the progress of genuine speculation. Thus, when the question is put, What is the substantial in cognition? psychology is not content with answering that there is no substantial in cognition, and that what is supposed to be such is merely the phenomenal: she goes on to declare what the substantial in existence is; and thus people's attention is called off from the proper and only point under consideration, while the truth, which is not over-willing to be caught at any time, slips quietly away during the confusion. "We first raise a dust," says Berkeley, "and then complain that we cannot see"—a very true remark. The speculative thinker asks a question about knowledge, whereupon the psychologist instantly kicks up a turmoil about existence, so that neither of them can see what they are looking for. The question, What is the substantial in cognition? is no more answered by saying that some occult substratum of qualities is the substantial in existence, than the question, Who is the Great Mogul? is answered by the reply that her Majesty Queen Victoria is the Sovereign of England. We therefore throw overboard, in the mean time, the ontological surplusage contained in the counter-proposition, and limit it to the relevant averment "that object plus a subject is not the substantial, but is the mere phenomenal, in cognition."
4. The contradiction involved in the counter-proposition thus restricted is instantly brought to light by an appeal to the definitions of substance and Its contradictory character exposed in so far as it is psychological.phenomenon (Prop. XVI. Dem., Prop. XIV. Dem.) The known substantial is whatever, and only whatever, can be known or thought of without anything else being known or thought of along with it. Does anything else require to be known or thought of along with objects plus a subject, or along with matter mecum, or along with the universal + the particular? It is obvious that nothing else does (see Props. II. III. VI.) Does anything more require to be apprehended than the ego or oneself in some determinate condition? Nothing more requires to be apprehended (Prop. IX.) Therefore this synthesis, however it may be expressed, is the substantial in cognition, and is established as such on necessary grounds of reason; and consequently the counter-proposition is the denial of a necessary truth of reason.
Again: The phenomenal is whatever, and only whatever, can be known or thought of only when something else is known or thought of along with it. Can object plus a subject—or can matter mecum—or can the universal + the particular—or can the ego or oneself in some determinate condition—can the synthesis of these be known only when something else is known along with it? No indeed. The synthesis can be known by itself, and unsupplemented by anything further. Therefore this synthesis is not the phenomenal in cognition, and is proved not to be this on necessary principles of reason; and consequently the counter-proposition is an affirmation which contradicts a necessary truth of reason. Thus it involves a mental contradiction, whether looked at in its negative or in its affirmative aspect
The counter-proposition considered in so far as it is the product of natural thinking.5. Secondly, We have now to consider what part of the counter-proposition stands opposed to the proposition as the product of natural, and not of psychological, thinking. It is sometimes difficult to determine what is a spontaneous mode, and what is an acquired habit, of thought, because psychological doctrine frequently mingles its contaminating waters with the not over-clear current of popular thinking, until men imagine that they are entertaining naturally, and of their own accord, some dogma for which they were indebted to a perverse training in what is called "mental philosophy." In the present instance, however, it is not difficult to distinguish the natural from the psychological judgment Psychology tries to persuade people that in all their dealings with themselves and the universe, they never come across anything substantial—that mere qualities or phenomena are the objects of their contemplation. But the world has not been imposed upon by this consecrated nonsense, against which it is unnecessary to argue; for, let psychologists preach, and let their followers believe as they will, it is certain that no man, in sober earnest, and if put upon oath, would ever say that he had got down, and fairly digested, that stone.
The exact point in the counter-proposition which natural thinking opposes to the proposition.6. In the counter-proposition it was stated that "the substantial is rather the separate members of the synthesis of objects plus a subject (matter mecum) than the total synthesis itself; but that these were not the substantial in cognition, but only in existence." To find the exact part of the counter-proposition which natural thinking adopts and sets up in antagonism to the proposition, we have merely to leave out the word "rather," and to affirm that "the substantial is the separate members of the synthesis, or, at any rate, is one of the factors of the synthesis—that, namely, which we call objects or matter—and this is the substantial both in cognition and in existence." Or, stated more shortly, the exact point of the counter-proposition, which is conformable to ordinary opinion, is this: "mere material objects are known substances."
Cotradiction in the counter-proposition, in so far as it is the product of natural thinking.7. The test of the truth of this statement is, as before, the definition of known substance. Can material things be known without anything else being known along with them? No, they cannot; because the "me" must always be known along with them (by Prop. I.) Therefore material things are not known substances—they are not the substantial in cognition, whatever they may be in existence; and consequently natural thinking, which declares that they are this, is convicted of entertaining a contradictory inadvertency. Thus the question, as to what is and what is not the substantial in thought is brought to a short but very decisive issue. The synthesis so often referred to, and which henceforward, for the sake of brevity, shall be generally denominated object-plus-subject, is the substantial, and the only substantial, in knowledge and in thought.
Psychological opinion as to existing substance.8. The psychological opinion as to existing substance is, that this is the occult substratum of qualities Such an opinion is quite harmless, if taken along with the two following explanations: first, that the substance for which it contends does not answer its purpose; and, secondly, that this substance is merely the phenomenal. A word must be said on each of these points, in order to expose the hollowness of the psychological doctrine, for its plausibility causes it to be a trap to unwary or inexact thinkers.
First, It does not answer its purpose.9. First, This opinion does not answer its purpose. Qualities, says psychology, must have a support, phenomena must have something to inhere in; they cannot be conceived as subsisting by themselves, therefore they have an occult substratum, and this occult substratum is substance. Well, let this postulation be granted. Can the qualities, together with their substance, be now conceived as subsisting by themselves? Not one whit better than before. They still (that is, the qualities and the substance together) require an additional supplement before they can be conceived as subsisting; they require to be supplemented in knowledge, or in thought, by the known or conceived "me" before they can be known or thought of at all (Props. I. and XIII.) It is thus obvious that psychological substance does not answer the purpose for which it was intended. It was postulated because the qualities could not be conceived as standing alone; but just as little can the qualities plus the substance be conceived as standing alone; therefore the hypothesis is good for nothing. It offers to the material qualities a support which breaks down under them—a very questionable kindness.
Secondly, It places before us the mere phenomenal.10. Secondly, This opinion is, moreover, misleading; it places before us the mere phenomenal and calls it the substantial. Whatever can be known or thought of only when something else is known or thought of along with it is the phenomenal (see Definition). Phenomena, with the addition of the substratum, which psychology calls substance, can be known or thought of only when the ego is known or thought of along with them (Props. I. and XII.) Therefore the synthesis of phenomena and psychological substance is the mere phenomenal. With this proviso, then, that the psychological hypothesis does not answer its purpose, and that, while professing to give us some conception, however inadequate, of the substantial, it places before us the mere phenomenal, strict speculation can have no objection to concede to psychology as many occult substrata of qualities as she may choose to demand. One or one thousand is a matter of absolute in-difference.
The Institutional conception of known substance.11. Lest it should be supposed that these Institutes are obnoxious to the same sentence of reprehension which has just been pronounced upon psychology, inasmuch as it may be said that they too represent substance as constituted by a synthesis of phenomena (object + subject), the following difference must be pointed out and carefully borne in mind. The charge against psychology is, that the substance for which she contends is no substance at all, but is the mere phenomenal, because it requires to be supplemented in thought by something more—namely, by the "me;" whereas the substantial, for which strict speculation contends, is undoubtedly a substance in cognition (whatever it may be in existence); because, although it may be an aggregate of mere phenomena, it can and does, nevertheless, subsist in thought without any else subsisting there along with it; and thus it corresponds to the definition of known substance, which is all that is required to bear out the truth of the statement advanced in Proposition XVII. Any one may convince himself, without much difficulty, that he can think of things plus himself without thinking of anything more (and can therefore conceive the substantial); and also that he cannot think of anything less than this without thinking of something more; and, consequently, that whatever he thinks of as less than this completed synthesis, is thought of as the phenomenal, in conformity with the definition of phenomenon.
History of distinction between substance and phenomenon—its terms have been reversed.12. This article may be appropriately concluded by some brief notices of the history of this distinction between substance and phenomenon. In the first place, the most remarkable circumstance connected with it—as may have struck the reader from what has been already said—is the direct transposition of its terms which the distinction, as originally propounded, has sustained at the hands of psychology. The synthesis of object-plus-subject is the substantial (the substantial at least in cognition); while its constituents—object on the one hand, and subject on the other—are the mere phenomenal in cognition: this is undoubtedly the true, the intelligible, and, moreover, the ancient doctrine in regard to substance and phenomenon. But psychology holds that this synthesis is the mere phenomenal, and that its constituents—object on the one hand, and subject on the other—are the substantial, in existence. But, inasmuch as psychology can scarcely be supposed to maintain that something of which we have no sort of conception, either adequate or inadequate, is the existing substantial, psychology must be held to teach that we have some vague and glimmering kind of notion of these in their separation, as the substantial in cognition, as well as in existence. And thus, as has been said, the distinction has been directly reversed. Psychology declares that to be the phenomenal which speculation declares to be the substantial, and conversely. No transposition can be more exact, in spite of the psychological asseveration that the substantial lies altogether beyond the limits of knowledge and of thought. That must be taken as a mere façon de parler. There cannot be a doubt that the psychologist regards solidity as convertible with substance,—as we all do in our ordinary or unspeculative moments.
Errors caused by this reversal.13. Irrespective of the inconvenience caused by the reversal of the terms of an important philosophical distinction, this psychological doctrine, as has been already sufficiently shown, is erroneous and contradictory. Objects, whatever they may be, are not the substantial in cognition, because they cannot stand in cognition by themselves, or per se (Props. I. II.) The subject is not the substantial in cognition, because it cannot stand in cognition by itself, or per se (Prop. IX.) Therefore these are the phenomenal in cognition. But the synthesis of object-plus-subject is the substantial in cognition, because this, and this alone, will stand in cognition by itself, or per se. This alone can be known without anything more being known. The reader may thus perceive at a glance how flagrantly erroneous a system that must be which teaches (as all psychology does) a doctrine directly the reverse of this.
Substance and phenomenon originally bore the signification assigned to them here.14. There was, however, unquestionably a time when the terms of this distinction were kept in their proper places, and understood in their correct signification. Allowance being made (see Prop. X. Obs. 10) for the vagueness and ambiguity which pervade the older speculations, it may be confidently affirmed that Plato and his predecessors understood the terms substance and phenomenon in the retrieved sense which these Institutes have assigned to them. To bear out this assertion, we must show what the older philosophers understood by phenomenon and by substance: first, in reference to cognition; and, secondly, in reference to existence, although it is only in reference to the former that we are at present concerned critically with their opinions.
The known phenomenal according to the older systems.15. In the older systems, the phenomenal (φαινόμενον) was a synonym for the sensible (αἰσθητόν), and both of these were exactly equivalent to inchoate—that is, begun, but not completed cognition; in other words, to cognition, which was not cognition, until supplemented by the element (εἶδος) or (ἰδέα) required to complete it. Thus the phenomenal was laid down as that which could be known or conceived only when something else was known or conceived along with it. But this is precisely the definition of phenomenon given in these Institutes. And thus there is an exact coincidence of opinion between the older systems and the present work, in so far as the conception of the phenomenal is concerned.
The known substantial according to the older systems.16. The same coincidence may be easily shown in regard to the conception of known substance. In the older systems, the substantial in cognition (τὸ ὄν) was a synonym for the intelligible (νοητόν), and both terms were equivalent to completed cognition; that is, to whatever could be known or thought of without anything else being known or thought of along with it. But this is precisely the definition of known substance given in these Institutes.
A word upon existing substance and phenomenon.17. So in regard to the phenomenal, not simply in cognition, but in existence. In the older systems, the usual synonym for this was the Becoming (τὸ γιγνόμενον); that is, inchoate existence (just as the sensible, αἰσθητόν, stood for inchoate cognition): in other words, existence which is not existence until supplemented by something else. And thus, in the intention, at least, of the older systems, the definition of the existing phenomenal was this: The existing phenomenal, or phenomenal existence, is whatever can exist only along with something else. In like manner, the substantial, considered not simply in cognition, but in existence, had for its synonym true Being (τὸ ὄντως ὄν), and was held to be equivalent to completed existence (just as the intelligible, νοητόν, εἶδος, or ἰδέα, stood for completed cognition); so that the definition of the existing substantial would be this: The existing substantial, or substantial existence, is whatever can exist without anything else existing along with it. There was thus an exact harmony or parallelism between the old conceptions of known substance and existing substance, and between the old conceptions of known phenomenon and existing phenomenon. With these conceptions or definitions, in so far as they refer to existence, we have, at present, no concern. That point has been touched upon, because even this incidental mention of it may help to clear up a very obscure topic in ancient philosophy, and one on which no light is thrown in any history of speculation—the question, namely, What did Plato and his predecessors understand by the substantial in existence? They understood by this expression whatever could exist without anything else necessarily existing along with it. What can only so exist is a point which can be properly enucleated only in the ontology.
Two main ambiguities in the old systems.18. The ambiguities of language which pervade the old philosophies, and have thus prevented their truth from being appreciated or understood, are mainly these two: First, The term τὸ ὄν (true Being) is used both in an epistemological and in an ontological acceptation; this is to say, it is employed to designate both the substantial in cognition and the substantial in existence. This twofold use of the term would have been quite legitimate, had any critical argumentation been employed to prove the coincidence of the known substantial and the existing substantial; but no such reasoning having been resorted to, this double signification could not but be perplexing. In the same way) the term γιγνόμενον is also used indiscriminately to signify both the phenomenal in existence and the phenomenal in cognition, the proper term for the latter being the sensible (τὸ αἰσθητόν). Secondly, A still more serious ambiguity was this: The term τὸ ὄν whether applied to cognition or to existence, was used indiscriminately to signify one member only (that is, the universal part) of the total synthesis, whether of knowledge or of existence, and also to signify the total synthesis, consisting of the two members, universal and particular. And in like manner, the words εἶδος, ἰδέα, νοητόν, seem sometimes to have stood for the one member only in the total synthesis of cognition (that is, for the universal part), and sometimes for the total synthesis, embracing the two factors, universal and particular. And thus the same terms came to be somewhat abusively employed to signify both the substantial (that is, the completed synthesis, consisting of the universal and the particular,—our "subject-plus-object") and the phenomenal (that is, a mere part of the synthesis—to wit, the universal part, or our "subject"). This ambiguity has undoubtedly been the occasion of much of the perplexity of thought and confusion of exposition which abound in the histories of philosophy.
These ambiguities accounted for.19. It is not difficult to point out the origin of these ambiguities. The first is to be attributed to the want of a clear line of demarcation between ontology and epistemology. The second is explained by this consideration, that the universal element is so much the more important member of the two in the total synthesis (whether of cognition or of existence), inasmuch as there can be no synthesis at all without this definable and definite factor, that it was regarded as almost equivalent, singly or by itself, to the whole synthesis. It swallowed up, as it were, the other or particular factor, the varieties of which, being contingent, were incessantly changing, and being inexhaustible, were, of course, not to be defined. And hence the terms referred to (εἶδος, ἰδέα, νοητόν), which properly represented only a part of the synthesis of cognition (or the phenomenal), came also to represent the whole synthesis (or the substantial).
And cleared up by a reference to the Institutional doctrine.20. If this somewhat abstruse exposition be construed into the terms which the Institutes employ to designate the substantial in cognition, the cause which has given rise to the ambiguity in question will be understood exactly. I-myself—("the universal" of the older systems)—I-myself-with-the-addition-of-some-thing-or-thought—this synthesis, and nothing less, is the substantial in cognition, because it alone can be known without anything else being known. But the part called "I-myself" is so much the more important and essential factor of the two, that it is very apt to be regarded as constituting, by itself the substantial in cognition, while the particular element, the thing or thought, is very apt to be regarded as alone constituting the phenomenal in cognition, by reason of its contingent and variable character. This, however, is obviously a mistake; because "I-myself" cannot be known unless along with some particular thing or thought, or determination of one kind or other, any more than the thing or thought can be known unless along with me. So that the term "I-myself" is an expression of the phenomenal, just as much as the term "tree" or "anger" is an expression of the phenomenal. Neither of the factors can be known without the other, consequently each of them is the phenomenal, conformably to the definition of phenomenon; but both of them can be known together without anything else being known; consequently, their synthesis is the substantial in cognition, conformably to the definition of known substance.
Coinidence of the old speculations with the Institutes.21. Notwithstanding these ambiguities, there cannot be a doubt that the doctrine of known substance propounded by the older systems has much in common—is, indeed, in its spirit, identical—with the doctrine set forth in these Institutes. According to the Platonic and pre-Platonic speculations, substance is not that which is apprehended solely by means of the senses; nor is it that which is apprehended solely by means of the intellect. It is apprehended partly by sense and partly by intellect. The sensible, particular, or material element comes through the senses, the intelligible, ideal, or universal element (the "me" of the Institutes) comes through the intellect, and their synthesis is the presentation of the substantial, or real, or concrete. This doctrine need not puzzle any one who chooses to throw his eyes on the things around him, and then to consider that he is not apprehending them to the exclusion of himself, nor himself to the exclusion of them; but that he is apprehending them and himself in a synthesis which cannot be broken up in thought without breaking up and destroying the ground of all conceivability. Each of the factors, when the attempt is made to conceive it by itself, is nonsensical: the intelligible or universal element, by itself is no less contradictory than the sensible or particular element by itself. On this point the ancient speculations appear to differ from the doctrine of the Institutes: but this may proceed merely from their being less explicit—for it is obvious that the universal without the particular is just as inconceivable as the particular is without the universal (see Prop. VI.) Again, each of the elements is phenomenal when considered as the counterpart of the other; and, again, the two together are the known substantial, when considered per se, and without anything else being taken into account along with them.
An objection obviated.22. In case it should be objected that this doctrine represents intellect equally with sense as a faculty of nonsense, inasmuch as it declares that the universal, or "me," which is the proper object of intellect, is absurd and incognisable by itself, the following explanations must be given: Intellect is not, like sense, a faculty of nonsense, for this reason, that it is competent to take cognisance of the synthesis of oneself and things (or thoughts): it apprehends both elements together, and this union is manifestly comprehensible,—although either element, without the other, is just as manifestly incomprehensible. In so far as its own mere element (the "me" dissociated from all thoughts and things) is concerned, intellect must be pronounced a faculty of the contradictory, just as the senses are of this character. Nothing short of the completed synthesis is presentable, or comprehensible by the mind,—and what more would people have?
Mistakes of the historians of philosophy as to substance.23. To return to the consideration of substance. What, according to the expositors of the ancient opinion; was the Platonic doctrine in regard to substance? Misled by the ambiguities which have been noticed and cleared up, these commentators say or insinuate that, according to the ancient speculators, the substantial does not come to the mind through the senses at all—not even in part—but through some channel altogether independent of sense. It is apprehended by pure intellect alone. The senses have no part to play in placing it before the mind. They thus arrogate for their master and for themselves the possession of some purely intellectual intuition by which pure substance is gazed upon. Professing in this way to reach the truth by relinquishing the employment of their senses, they have advanced a doctrine which is sufficient to drive the student of philosophy out of his. He finds himself referred away from his senses and the sensible world to grope for Platonic substance in regions emptier than an exhausted receiver, and murkier than the darkness of Erebus. He finds himself gazing at abstractions without any eyes, and grasping nonentities without any hands; lifting up nothing upon the point of no fork; and filling with vacuity a faculty which he does not possess. This is what the student finds himself doing who studies Plato in any, or in all, of his expositors; and for this occupation, which is by no means a pleasurable one, he is indebted to their having mistaken for finished cognitions, data which were originally laid down as elements of cognition necessarily incognisable when considered apart from each other.
A traditional dogma about disdaining the senses.24. A hereditary dogma current in all the histories of philosophy is, that the ancient speculators were in the habit of treating the senses with disdain, and of asserting that they were in no way instrumental in placing the truth before the mind. "Magni est ingenii revocare mentem a sensibus," says Cicero, coolly platonising in the shade. Very easily said; not so easily done. And supposing it done; suppose we have shown what great geniuses we are by turning away the mind from the sense;—what then? What is the next step? Doubtless the insinuation is that we shall be rewarded by a glorious intuition of Platonic substance. But did any man, did Cicero himself, ever find it so? We may confidently answer—no. No man ever came to a good end in philosophy who tried to reach the truth by casting his senses behind him, or who strove to make his way by endeavoring to get on without them. This is one of those traditional maxims which, originally a high-flavoured, although ambiguous truth, has been handed down through a long succession of philosophic vintners, not one of whom understood its spirit, until it has come to us with all its aroma evaporated—the very refuse, or last deposit, of dregs which have been depositing dregs since ever philosophy had a name.
The true meaning of turning the mind away from the senses.25. The true meaning of turning the mind away from the senses, is not that we should turn away from the senses and their presentations (the material world), and explore utter vacuity by means of a faculty wherewith we are not endowed; but that, holding the data of sense steadily before us, we should bring ourselves to see that a non-sensible element which we had overlooked, and which we always do overlook, or attend to very slightly in our ordinary moods, is and was, nevertheless, there all the while, essentially and necessarily there, and present to our mind, along with every sensible thing that comes before it—that, namely, which Plato calls an idea—that which this system calls, perhaps more intelligibly, ourselves. When this element is found out, the whole material universe still presents to us precisely the same appearance as before; because, of course, the mere finding out this element is by no means equivalent to putting it there. It was there all along, and it was apprehended as there all along. The only difference is, that we attended hitherto so slightly to its presence, as almost actually to think that it was not there. Hence our inadvertency in supposing that we apprehended things by and in themselves—that is, things with the element of their intelligibility, the ground of their apprehensibility taken away. This cardinal contradiction philosophy corrects. And surely common sense, when enlightened by philosophy, and not blinded, as she usually is, by psychology, will adopt this correction as one of her own most genuine and undoubted children,—and to this extent at least, will become perfectly reconciled with speculation, and a convert to her ways of thinking. The universe presents exactly the same appearance to speculation which it does to common sense; only with this difference, that speculation sees clearly, and traces through all its consequences, the element essential to its cognition; while common sense sees this element only confusedly, or almost entirely overlooks it; and thus, unless instructed by philosophy, remains blind to all the important results which an attention to this element brings to light.
What the ancient philosophers meant by this dogma.26. Such, then, is the whole meaning of the ancient injunction about the necessity of turning the mind away from the senses, if we would reach the truth. Doubtless we must do this, to the extent of perceiving that the truth does not come to us solely by the way of the senses, but that something else, which does not come to us through them, is necessary to make up the truth which the mind apprehends. Unless we turn away from the senses, and deny their sufficiency to this extent, they will inevitably mislead us—they will land us in a contradiction, as they always do in our ordinary moods; for, at such times, they make us fancy that what we apprehend is placed before us solely by their instrumentality; whereas the fact is, that they place before us only the inchoate or unintelligible part of the truth—only the contradictory element of known substance—the mind being the source which places before us the complemental part—the part (to wit itself, or rather ourselves) by which the contradiction is supplemented, and thereby removed. Further than this, to attempt to prosecute our researches in metaphysics by turning away from the senses, or to expect to reach the truth by disdaining them and their intimations, would be to embark on a very hopeless enterprise; and, moreover, to suppose that the ancient philosophers bad any other meaning in view than that now stated, when they inculcated this precept, would be to treat them with very great injustice.
Contrast between speculation and psychology in their views of substance and phenomenon.27. From these remarks, it must now be obvious to the reader (and this is the point which these observations are chiefly designed to bring out) that ancient philosophy and modern psychology stand diametrically opposed to each other in their views as to substance and phenomenon. According to the old systems, the synthesis of subject-plus-object (or, as they expressed it, the synthesis of the universal and the particular) is known substance, and this substance or synthesis is made up of two phenomena—two factors which are phenomenal, inasmuch as neither can be known without the other, and which are nevertheless substantial, because the two together can be known without anything else. The known substantial is thus constituted by a synthesis of phenomena. Psychology, on the other hand, holds that the synthesis of subject-plus-object is purely phenomenal, and that its factors alone are substantial—object on the one hand apart from the subject, and the subject or mind, on the other hand, apart from all objects. The substantial is thus constituted by an analysis of phenomena. Shortly stated, the distinction is this: genuine speculation finds the known substantial in the synthesis of two phenomenals, which, in the opinion of psychology, are substantials—objects, namely, on the one hand, and subject on the other; and it finds the phenomenal in the analysis of this substantial. Psychology, on the contrary, finds the known phenomenal in the synthesis of two substantials, which, in the estimation of speculation, are phenomenals—objects, namely, on the one hand, and subject on the other; and it finds the substantial in the analysis of this phenomenal. Thus speculation gives out as the substantial what nature herself has fixed as such; and, moreover, gives out as the phenomenal the elements which result when this substantial is tampered with and broken up. Psychology, on the contrary, gives out as the substantial the elements which result when the substantial is tampered with and broken up; and, moreover, gives out as the phenomenal that which nature herself has fixed as the substantial.
Speculation proved to be right even by a reference to experience.28. But dropping this somewhat technical phraseology, and looking at the question simply by the light of common sense, or experience, we may very easily see that the doctrine advocated by speculation is infinitely sounder, as well as much more intelligible, than that advanced by psychology. Let any one consider whether he does not regard the synthesis constituted by himself and surrounding things, as much more real and substantial than either himself with no objects or thoughts present to him, or than the objects or thoughts with no self in connection with them. Let him just consider that he cannot get any hold at all upon the members of this synthesis when he attempts to grasp them out of relation to each other,—indeed, that the necessities of all thinking prevent either factor from being apprehended without the other,—and he cannot but become a convert to the opinion now expressed. It seems unreasonable to regard as the substantial that which no possible intelligence can have any cognisance of. This consideration brings the question to a short and decisive settlement, and must surely procure a decision in favour of the speculative, as distinguished from the psychological, pleading. It is also to be hoped that these remarks may help to restore their proper and original signification to the philosophical terms, substance and phenomenon.