Philosophical Works of the Late James Frederick Ferrier/Philosophical Remains (1883)/Lecture on Imagination, 1847
LECTURE ON IMAGINATION.
1847.
1. Before entering on the consideration of the representative faculty, or what is usually termed imagination, I shall in to-day's lecture discuss a somewhat singular opinion advanced by Mr Stewart regarding this faculty, and which such of you as are acquainted with his works must be familiar with, and may have been puzzled by. I allude to his opinion that "the exercise of the Imagination (I use his own words) is always accompanied with a belief that the objects of the imagination exist." I propose to consider how far this doctrine is consistent with truth, and to what extent and upon what grounds it may be rationally vindicated. I shall first refer to the passage in which Mr Stewart propounds his opinion. He commences by stating the counter-opinion of Dr Reid, who holds that "imagination is attended with no belief in the existence of its object" ('Elements,' i. 140-43.) Mr Stewart is at some pains to illustrate his opinion by pointing out a variety of ocular deceptions, in which, although we know that we are imposed upon by the appearances of things, we may nevertheless be said to believe for the moment that the things are as they appear. But he has merely illustrated his opinion, he has not attempted to vindicate or establish it upon rational grounds, or to explain it by means of any law of our intelligence. These grounds and this law I shall now endeavour to lay before you; for Mr Stewart's opinion, singular and somewhat paradoxical though it be, appears to me to be founded in truth, and to be susceptible of a satisfactory explanation. I think that Dr Reid's opinion may also be justified; in short, that the doctrines of the two philosophers on this point may be reconciled with one another by means of the principle which I am about to point out to you.
2. In proceeding to point out to you the grounds on which I think the soundness of this opinion may be upheld, I commence by remarking that there is a particular circumstance connected with the exercise of Perception and of Imagination to which your attention must be directed. This circumstance I would call the law of contrast between perception and imagination, and between the objects of perception and the objects of imagination. This law may be either present or absent when these faculties are at work, When this law is present, and when the imagination is at work, then I hold with Dr Reid that the objects of the imagination are accompanied with no belief in their reality; for we believe these objects to be unreal, we pronounce them to be unreal by means of the comparison which we draw between them and the more permanent and real objects of perception. In this case, that is to say, when the law of contrast is supposed to be present, or when comparison between perceived objects and imagined objects is drawn, Dr Reid is quite right in holding that imagination is attended with no belief in the existence of its object. But this law of contrast is not always present; far from it, it is sometimes, it is frequently, perhaps it is in most cases, absent when the imagination is at work; in which case I hold that its objects, not being contrasted or in any way compared with those of perception, are accompanied at any rate with no disbelief in their existence. And being accompanied with no disbelief in their existence, I think we may go a step further, and say with Mr Stewart that these objects, the objects of the imagination, are accompanied with a belief, momentary though it be, of their existence. It appears to me that though the belief may not be of an express or positive character, still there is a tacit and virtual belief in the real existence of these imaginary objects when the law which I have called that of contrast between perception and imagination is not in force.
3. To illustrate more fully the effect which the absence of this law would have in bringing about a belief in the reality of the objects of the imagination, let us suppose two cases in which this law must necessarily be absent. To suppose two such cases, we must conceive two individuals, the one of whom possesses imagination to the entire exclusion of perception, and the other perception to the entire exclusion of imagination. Let us suppose that the one man has the faculty of external perception, but is totally destitute of the faculty of imagination, or of the power of forming representations of objects not actually present to his senses. No imaginary form, we shall say, ever crossed or ever can cross this person's brain. And let us suppose that the other man has the faculty of imagination vigorously developed; that he lives in a reverie of vivid pictures, but is altogether devoid of the external senses. The phantasmagorias of the imagination are his, but he is cut off by an impassable barrier from all communication with what we call real things.
It is obvious that these two faculties being, according to our supposition, the property of different individuals, no contrast or comparison can be instituted between them and their respective objects. Here the law of contrast must necessarily be absent. Now, this law being absent, I am of opinion that the man of imagination would hold his world to be just as real as the man of perception would hold his to be. Neither of them would have any disbelief in the existence of the objects before them; and where no disbelief dwells, I conceive that a vital, though it may be an obscure belief, is always present.
In the first place, then, let us consider more particularly the case of the man limited to perception; and for simplicity's sake, let us suppose him limited to the perceptions of sight. An object is before him, St Paul's Cathedral; he sees it. Now, suppose we ask him whether he believes in the existence of this object, whether he believes it to be real? To this query it is plain that he could return no answer which would properly meet the question. For before a man can say that he believes a thing to be real, he must be able to conceive something unreal; but this is what the person under consideration is, according to the supposition, unable to do. But, nevertheless, his very perplexity and his inability to understand and answer the question as we could answer it, would prove that he virtually believed in the existence of the object with a most unhesitating faith. He would say simply: There St Paul's is; I see it. If you choose to call that statement a belief on my part that it is a real object, I have no objection to your doing so, only it appears to me to be a circuitous mode of stating a very simple truth. I hold that this man's belief would be all the more vital and profound because he would not, properly speaking, know what belief meant.
4. In the second place, I now turn to the man whom we supposed to be living exclusively in the world of imagination, and I address myself to him with a view of ascertaining what kind or degree of faith he must necessarily attach to the reality of the pictures that come before him. We shall suppose that these representations are very vivid, but that in the formation of them he does not exert any power of will; that they come and go like images in a dream or in a waking reverie, independently of all control. We shall suppose then, as in the former case, that a representation of St Paul's Cathedral arises before this man's imagination, and that the question, Do you believe that this object is a real object, that it really exists? is put to him. The man would be perplexed just as much as the other individual was, and his answer would be of precisely the same character. He would not, strictly speaking, know what belief meant, because he would have no notion of unbelief, the law of contrast between the real and the unreal, between imagination and perception, being altogether absent from his mind. But he would simply say, There the object is, I have it vividly before me, I apprehend it distinctly; and in speaking thus he would show that he had just as little doubt and just as vital a belief in the existence of the object, as the other man had who was limited to the exercise of external perception.
5. In both of these cases, then, the belief in the real existence of the objects would be unhesitating and profound. The man of perception could not disbelieve the existence of the objects of sense, because, never having had any of the less substantial objects of the imagination before him, having no conception of these, he could not be betrayed into the scepticism of thinking that the object before hint might possibly be no more real than they, and hence, not being able to disbelieve the existence of the objects of sense, indeed not being able to form any conception of disbelief, he would necessarily believe in their existence.
Again, the man of imagination could not disbelieve the existence of the objects of his one faculty, because, never having had any of the more substantial objects of sense before him, never having contrasted or compared the objects of imagination with, those of sense, he could not be betrayed into the scepticism of thinking that the objects of the imagination were unreal and precarious, while those of sense were real and permanent; and hence, not being able to disbelieve the existence of the objects of the imagination, not being able any more than the other man to form any conception of disbelief, he would necessarily believe in the existence of the objects of the imagination, just as his neighbour believed in the existence of the objects of perception.
6. Now, the same thing which we have supposed to take place in two separate minds, may take place in one mind. We supposed one mind endowed with perception alone, and another mind endowed with imagination alone, and no contrast between the objects of these two faculties being upon such a supposition possible, our conclusion was that the objects in both cases would be believed by those two minds to stand on a footing of equality in regard to their real existence. Now, let us suppose that these two faculties, perception and imagination, are possessed by one and the same mind, and that the law of contrast is absent or inoperative, that no comparison takes place, and I maintain that the result will be precisely the same as it was in the case of the two separate minds. The objects of imagination will stand on the same footing with the objects of perception in regard to our belief in their existence. When we actually see an object, and do not contrast this object even in the remotest manner with some imaginary object, we cannot, strictly speaking, be said either to believe or disbelieve in its existence; but we certainly do virtually, though perhaps not very consciously, believe, and vitally believe, in its existence. In the same way, when we are plunged in a reverie, and a succession of objects, i.e., visionary pictures, arises before our imagination, which we do not contrast even by the remotest implication with any of the objects of sense, we cannot, strictly speaking, be said either to believe or disbelieve in their existence; but I agree with Mr Stewart in holding that we do virtually, though not very consciously, believe in their existence, and they are really present to our minds. For if the law of contrast between perception and imagination be entirely inoperative, as it often is, it is certain that we have no positive or conscious disbelief in the existence of these objects; and, having no disbelief in their reality, I think we are entitled to say, without stretching the doctrine too far, that we actually believe in their existence, and in their real presence to the mind, though this belief is but momentary, and is constantly broken in upon by the operation of the law of contrast between perception and imagination. You will of course find it impossible to verify the truth of this doctrine by setting yourselves voluntarily to call up imaginary scenes, and then by appealing to your consciousness to ascertain whether you believe in their reality or not. Such an attempt would necessarily defeat itself, because, in endeavouring to banish all contrast between the objects of sense and the objects of imagination, you would of necessity call into play the very law of contrast which you were desirous of suspending. But let me ask you whether, even when you have been sitting in this room, imaginary pictures of your own homes and friends have not sometimes arisen before you? and let me further ask you, whether your minds were then impressed with a distinct disbelief in the reality of these scenes? You will perhaps say that had you been asked whether you believed the scenes to be real, you would at once have answered, No; of course you would, because the spell of your reverie would have been broken, the law of contrast would have come into instantaneous operation, you would have contrasted the objects of sense with those of the imagination, and out of the comparison you would have affirmed the former to be real, the latter unreal. But the question is, Were you distinctly sensible of the unreality, did you disbelieve in the real presence of the objects when the objects were flitting before your mental eye? If I may judge from my own experience, I think your answer must be that you entertained no disbelief in the presence and reality of the objects. I hope, indeed, that in this room you have seldom indulged in such reveries; but in spots better fitted for your day-dreams, by your own fire-sides, on the banks of a running stream, have you never lived for a time in an imaginary landscape and among imaginary faces, entertaining at the same time no clear disbelief in the reality of such scenes? If you have yielded yourselves up to such trains of thought, and if you have not been impressed every instant with a conviction of their unreality, with a belief in the non-existence of all that came before you, then I conceive that you had a virtual and a vital, though not a very distinct or conscious, belief in the existence and in the reality of the objects in the contemplation of which you were absorbed.
7. I think, then, in conclusion, that you must become converts to Mr Stewart's opinion that the exercise of the imagination is in certain circumstances, and under certain conditions, accompanied with the belief that its objects exist. Mr Stewart says that the exercise of the imagination is always accompanied with this belief. But it appears to me that this is the case only when there is a total suspension of all contrast between perception and imagination. You cannot bring about this suspension by any voluntary effort, but I think you may without difficulty catch yourselves in cases where it has been spontaneously suspended; those cases, I mean, which are called Reverie. Then ask yourselves whether, when you were plunged in your reverie, you positively disbelieved in the existence of the objects that were passing before you. If you find, as I think you will find, that you did not positively disbelieve in that existence, then you must virtually have believed in it. This is what I understand Mr Stewart to contend for; and I think that his somewhat singular opinion may be explained and upheld in a satisfactory manner by means of the absence or suspension of the law of contrast between perception and imagination, a law the presence of which destroys our waking dreams, and teaches us that the world of perception is more real than the world of imagination. We may sum up these observations, then, by remarking that both of our philosophers are right in their opinions on this subject, although their opinions are opposed to each other; that Mr Stewart appears to be right in maintaining that imagined objects are always believed to have a real existence, that is, they are always believed to have a real existence so long as they are not in any way contrasted or compared with perceived objects; and that Dr Reid is also right in maintaining that imagined objects are never believed to have a real existence, that is, they are never believed to have a real existence when we compare or contrast them, even in the slightest degree, with perceived objects. It is in this way that I would reconcile the opinions of the two philosophers respecting the belief which the one of them attaches, and the other of them denies, to the existence of imaginary objects.