Protestant Exiles from France/Book Second - Chapter 3 - Section XIV
Sec. 14.— Lord Galway’s Misfortunes in Spain.
Lord Galway got no more glory in Spain. It will be easy to show that his conduct was as meritorious as ever, and that he was the victim of mismanagement by other persons over whom he had no control.
On first arriving at Madrid, Lord Galway felt that his project had been realized only in appearance, and therefore sent home, along with his despatches, a request that he might retire from the service. The question which must arise on Spanish ground, whether to continue him as the British General, or to supersede him in favour of his junior, Lord Peterborough, was therefore anticipated by his waiting upon the latter Earl at Guadalaxara, and offering to serve under him until released himself. But Peterborough declined the offer, unless the Portuguese General also would consent to be under him, which was, of course, impossible. The British Government (as indicated in my last quotation from Marlborough’s correspondence) were, from the first, determined that Lord Galway should not be superseded. Sir Charles Hedges had written to him on the 2d July:—
“It is a great happiness to the common cause that your Excellency will, in all probability, be with the King of Spain, since it may receive great advantage by your good advice in settling affairs with him, as it has d me from your great care and prudent conduct, by which you surmounted difficulties with the Portuguese, which were thought impracticable.”
And the opinion, which Marlborough endorsed, is in Lord Godolphin’s letter of July 30:—
“Upon the joining of our Portugal and Catalonian troops with the King of Spain at Madrid, it has been thought proper for preventing disputes to settle in whom the superior command of the Queen’s troops should be lodged. The lords here have been unanimously of opinion that it ought to be in my Lord Galway, as having the elder commission from the Queen, and that the King of Spain’s commission to my Lord Peterborough ought not to interfere in this case. I think this is right for the service.”
Our Queen, confirming her advisers’ recognition, both of Lord Galway’s seniority and of his greater local experience, sent him a commission giving him the rank of Captain-General of her forces in Spain and Portugal. This commission and promotion his lordship would, if he could, have humbly declined, for he adhered to his conviction that Lord Peterborough should be preferred for the command. Peterborough, however, took his departure from Guadalaxara, “pretending [says Godolphin] that he had the Queen’s orders to go to Italy.” And besides this, Charles, who had extolled his former exploits in letters to Queen Anne, had now cast him off, and afterwards desired the Count de Gallas to lay before the British Queen a series of complaints against him. When Lord Peterborough returned home, the Queen refused to see him till these charges were refuted. The House of Commons found the case so complicated, that they indefinitely adjourned it. Peterborough thirsted for revenge, and, at a later date, recklessly retaliated upon Lord Galway.
“The Portuguese,” said Lord Galway in reply, “staid no longer time at Madrid than was necessary to get the king proclaimed there, which did not exceed ten days — then advanced as far as Guadalaxara, and afterwards to Guadaraxa, about 60 miles beyond Madrid, where we obliged part of the Duke of Anjou’s troops to repass the river, but were not willing to engage them, at a time when we had reason to expect we should have been joined in a few days by the forces with the King of Spain and Earl of Peterborough, which was the only secure method left us to augment our troops. For it would have been very imprudent to have attempted to have formed corps of the Castilians, who were entirely devoted to the Duke of Anjou’s interest. But all the officers of the army know, we were so far from wanting provisions ourselves, that we sent a convoy of 8000 loaves to meet the King and the Earl of Peterborough, which (by their delay in not advancing fast enough) grew mouldy, and was afterwards pillaged by the peasants. His lordship’s information of our want of intelligence of the enemy’s motions and of our disorder upon the retreat, are as great mistakes as the former. For the occasion of our advancing to Guadaraxa was purely to post ourselves in such a manner as to prevent the enemy from marching or sending detachments to intercept the King of Spain ; and when we had reason to believe him out of danger, we returned to Guadalaxara, there to be joined by the King and the Earl of Peterborough. Nor was it possible for his lordship to have seen our disorder, if there had been any, because (as I have already observed) he came not to Guadalaxara himself, till some days after we had been encamped there.
“Notwithstanding the Earl of Peterborough is pleased to say, ‘that we lost 5000 men in the retreat to Valencia without a blow, and entirely ruined our whole cavalry.’ ’Tis certain our loss upon that occasion was very inconsiderable, if any, and the retreat made in so good order that the enemy (superior as they were in number) never durst venture to attack us after the warm reception twenty-two of their squadrons met with from two battalions under the command of Colonel Wade in the town of Villa Nova, notwithstanding we were obliged to cross plains and rivers in their view.
The contemporary “annals” describe this retreat as a masterly one:—
“The Duke of Berwick being informed that the allies were to march through a plain to come to Yniesta and draw near to Xabriel, drew all his forces together, and advanced with so great diligence in the night, that his van appeared in the plain just as they began their march. Hereupon my Lord Galway, with wonderful presence of mind, made the necessary dispositions for a battle, causing all the cavalry of the first line, which made a column opposite the enemy, to advance, and giving the command of the foot to Sir Charles O’Hara, and ordering the second line to march in battalions behind the infantry of the first. This disposition was made, that which way soever the enemy should approach them, they should have a sufficient front to oppose them. And at the same time the allies marched on in such a manner, that the enemy never found an opportunity to come to a general engagement with advantage. On the contrary, all the squadrons that advanced towards them were very vigorously repulsed with loss. And the confederates had time to arrive at Yniesta, where they posted their right, and the army was drawn up in order of battle, having a little rivulet before their front. The king himself led the columns, and posted the troops on the other side of the rivulet, the Earl of Galway taking care to see them all pass in good order. The horse the enemy sent to disturb them was routed, and some Portuguese squadrons, that were very weak, defeated several of the enemy’s that appeared much stronger. The Marquis das Minas continued all the while in the rear, and when the whole army was passed they expected the enemy in order of battle. But though all their infantry was come up, yet they found the allies in so good a posture that they never durst attempt to attack them. The baggage continued their march, and afterwards the whole army began to move in the day time, and in sight of the enemy, and passed the Xabriel without the least opposition.”
Both Lord (now the Earl of) Godolphin and Queen Anne herself had written to King Charles, strongly advising him “to keep Lord Galway near him,” as a sagacious and trusty councillor. But a Dutch General had come into the camp, and had made himself more agreeable to the unreasoning king. In the room of Baron Fagel (who had retired after the disappointment at Badajoz), the States-General sent the Count De Noyelles; and, according to Luttrell, he had also a military commission as Velt-Marshal-General from the Emperor of Germany. At what date this veteran general joined the army, it is difficult to ascertain. He bore a letter of introduction from Marlborough to Lord Galway, dated from London, 12th Feb. 1706, but his first recorded appearance is after Lord Peterborough’s departure. Probably on account of his great age, and of his commission from the Emperor, he claimed to be commander-in-chief; but the Portuguese absolutely vetoed the proposal; and forthwith he proceeded to trifle away both time and resources. King Charles' fault — the fault also of the deceased Emperor (his father) and of the Emperor Joseph (Charles’s brother) — had been the fault and folly of trifling. When he could have occupied the Spanish capital, Charles did not care; and still in his not too dignified retreat he laughed to scorn all observations savouring of regard or deference for Spain, Spaniards, and things Spanish. De Noyelles obtained permission to disperse the troops among garrisons; and he encouraged the king’s prejudices, in the hope that delay might serve his own ambition. Lord Galway, despairing of gaining the king’s heart, thought that now Lord Peterborough might be called in, so Godolphin wrote to Marlborough, November 12th: — “My poor Lord Galway continues so very pressing to retire and come home, that I really think it would be too great a barbarity to refuse it him. But what amazes me is that he recommends Lord Peterborough as the properest person to succeed him in the care of the whole.”
Lord Peterborough’s head was always running on Italian projects, therefore the British Government would not put the conduct of Spanish affairs into his hands. They believed that he would not carry out their instructions, however authoritative and absolute, for bending all his energies as a British General, to obtain possession of Spain proper. They, therefore, prepared matters for 1707, so that Lord Galway might either come home (if he was set upon it), or might command in Spain (as they wished). General the Earl of Rivers received a commission to make a descent upon France at the head of a considerable force; thereafter he was to go to Spain, to take the command there if Lord Galway should retire, and to reinforce the British troops. Marlborough wrote to Galway from The Hague, 22d November 1706:—
“We have been under great concern for the many disappointments your lordship has met with in Spain, but we hope that the arrival of the fleet with a considerable reinforcement of troops will soon put you in a posture to recover what you have lost. I design to embark in two days for England, where you may be sure I shall readily use my endeavours that nothing be wanting to put you in a condition to act offensively again.
“I have had the honour to write twice to your lordship concerning Prince Eugene’s coming to command in Spain, which I think not only necessary to prevent the confusion that the jealousy of some generals will occasion here, but is the only means to establish the Spanish monarchy and prevent its ruin; for his Catholic Majesty is in such very ill hands, who possess his ear, that though we should have all the success we can desire, the conduct of the court will be such that the king will never remain six months quiet on his throne after the foreign forces are embarked. The Spaniards will never bear to be governed by a set of foreigners of neither worth nor rank, who think of nothing but plunder and rapine, and keep all persons from the king that are not of their own stamp. They will infallibly call the French in again, and carry themselves to the utmost extremities. All the Spaniards that are here are under a general disgust, and see what they are to expect when those now about the king get the power of all into their own hands.
“There is another point of no small consequence that I must inform your lordship fully of. Count Noyelles expected upon his coming over, to have had the chief command of all, but finding it impracticable (as matters stand) with the Portuguese, has persuaded the king, who has no kindness for that nation, to form an army apart from them in Arragon. Count Noyelles has already sent some of the Dutch troops that way, notwithstanding the Marquis das Minas’s representation that they belong to the Portuguese army; and, if he is not prevented, he will draw the rest of the troops from that body. But what I dread most is, that he will be able to prevail with my Lord Rivers to join his troops with the army the King intends to command in person, who is already much soured against the Portuguese. If this should be done, I look upon us as entirely destroyed. The enemy is as strong as both these armies together, and will not fail to beat us both, one after the other, especially (as your lordship may imagine) as there will be little harmony in our councils and operations.
“I hope your lordship will take this into your serious consideration, and that her Majesty’s positive orders may prevent the dividing of her troops at this juncture; and in order to make my Lord Rivers the easier to serve with the Portuguese, I renew on this occasion my instances to her Majesty that I may have leave to retire, that my Lord Rivers may take upon him the command of the whole.
“I must again repeat to your lordship, that nothing can effectually save our affairs and even the Spanish monarchy, as the Emperor’s sending Prince Eugene hither, whose rank and character will not only prevent all the confusion we are falling into, but he will be able to remove from the king those persons who now possess him so much, and establish the Spanish affairs upon a right foot. I hope this will come in time to your lordship’s hands, not only to prevent the dividing the English troops but also the Dutch. The Portuguese are already much dissatisfied; and we may fear that more ill-treatment will induce them to accept of such advantageous terms, as the French will not fail to propose them on such an occasion. We have agreed with the Duke of Berwick to enter upon a treaty for the exchange of prisoners at Novelda. . . . I am, &c.,
“Since I have signed this letter, I have discoursed the King very fully upon his design of dividing the troops, and going himself into Arragon or Catalonia. I took the liberty to be very plain with his Majesty, and I hope I have put that design out of his head. But this will bring no alteration with the conduct of the Court, which is as I have represented to your lordship, which makes me always suspicious of alterations so that I can depend on nothing.”
Secretary the Earl of Sunderland replied in December to Lord Galway’s earnest entreaties to be recalled. The following is a portion of his letter:—
“I am commanded by her Majesty to acquaint your lordship how concerned she is at the uneasiness you are under in the service, which makes you desire so much to retire, which request her Majesty would not deny, but that she is of opinion that, besides what relates to the command of her own troops, and any influence that is necessary to be had upon the King of Spain, there is nobody but your lordship that can possibly in any sort manage the Portuguese; so that, if you shall retire, that alliance will be quite useless, and, consequently, the whole affairs of Spain irretrievable. I am confident when you reflect upon this, you have her Majesty’s service and the common cause so much at heart, that you will have patience, at least one campaign more; and your lordship may depend upon it that there is nothing in the Queen’s power to do, to make you as easy as possible, and to remove the difficulties you have hitherto struggled with, that will not be done. You will see by her Majesty’s letter to the King of Spain how much she takes this to heart, and how strongly she insists upon his having an entire confidence in your counsels and advice.
“I will not say any more upon this subject; you will have it so much more strongly represented to you by my Lord Treasurer in his letter, and by Monsieur de Montandre when you see him. I must also acquaint you that the Queen has ordered my Lord Peterborough’s commission of Ambassador to be recalled, which I hope will contribute to make all that matter more easy. Since her Majesty is willing to consent that the troops with the Lord Rivers should join the King of Spain and the troops in Valencia, it is expected that they should be kept together in one corps and under one general, that they may march straight to Madrid, without dividing themselves or amusing themselves in taking inconsiderable places, and such little projects, — the doing of which before was one great reason that this last campaign you was not joined by any body of troops sufficient to keep you in possession of Madrid. This makes it yet more necessary for your Lordship to stay. I am sure nobody but yourself will have influence or credit enough to keep them together. And to enable you the better to do this, the most effectual measures will be taken to persuade the Portuguese to make the diversion they have promised by the way of Toledo; and in order to it, they will be assured that the troops from Ireland, that were to follow the Lord Rivers, shall be sent as soon as possible to join them and enter Spain that way. I must also acquaint you that such measures are now taking with the Duke of Savoy for the next campaign as will effectually prevent the French sending any considerable force more into Spain.”[2]
In January 1707 the Earl of Rivers arrived. Councils of war were held in the presence of King Charles during this month and the next. Lord Peterborough appeared as an ambassador, and the king now liked him better. Another ambassador was Major-General Stanhope, a great friend and admirer of Lord Galway (unlike the noble historian, his direct descendant). Sir Charles O'Hara had been raised to the peerage as Lord Tyrawley, and was on the same side. Lord Peterborough argued for a defensive warfare in Spain. Lord Galway led on the other side. Stanhope vigorously supported Galway, and with great warmth spoke to the following effect:— “Her Majesty spends such vast sums, and sends such numbers of forces, not to garrison some towns in Catalonia and Valencia, but to make King Charles master of. the Spanish monarchy; therefore if it is insisted upon to divide the forces, and to put ourselves on the defensive, I shall in her Majesty’s name protest against such measures.” This decided the programme, and Peterborough left the country.
Lord Sunderland, in a letter to Stanhope, dated February 13, wrote, “that he sent him a letter for the Earl of Rivers, which he desired Mr Stanhope to deliver to him if he took upon him the command of the army by the Lord Galway’s giving it up. Which, however, the Earl of Sunderland hoped he would not do. In which case Mr Stanhope was desired to burn that letter.”
Lord Rivers was disposed to take the command, and endeavoured to ingratiate himself with King Charles. But the difficulties of the post soon became apparent to him, and basing his decision on the grounds that the British Government preferred Lord Galway, and that he himself could serve under no general but the Duke of Marlborough, he declared that he would retire. The following is the substance of the document which the two earls signed:—
“It was agreed upon by the Earls of Galway and Rivers, Mr Stanhope being present, that it would be better for her Majesty’s service that there should be no more than one general. The Earl of Galway generously offered the command to Earl Rivers, which he refused in consideration of the Earl of Galway’s greater experience, more especially in the affairs of Spain and Portugal.”
Lord Rivers’ men, greatly reduced by disease, then passed under Lord Galway’s command. Our Queen had issued an ordinance, dated 18th January 1707, giving directions for the reduction of the several trains of artillery (formerly under the direction of the Earls of Galway, Peterborough, and Rivers) into one field train, in accordance with the “schedules and list transmitted to us by our trusty and wellbeloved cousin, the Earl of Galway, Captain-General of our Forces in Spain.”[3]
Although he had no enjoyment of life in Spain, for (as he said himself) according to old Lord Bedford’s view, he had lost his best friend there, namely, his appetite,[4] yet Lord Galway could not but acknowledge the gratifying testimony to his conduct borne by the able statesmen who had written to him. I refer to his letter to the Earl of Godolphin (Valencia, Feb. 22, 1707), in which, after expressing his gratitude for the gracious orders of the Queen to continue in her service, and for the new commission appointing him commander-in-chief of all the British forces in Spain, he says:—
“When I was so pressing for leave to retire, it was not so much on account of my own infirmities and the disquiet of the service, as of so many difficulties that made it impossible for me to serve the Queen as I ought; but seeing her Majesty, the ministry, and my friends believe I can still be serviceable, I submit to their better judgment. But they must answer to the public for the faults I may commit; though I’ll do my utmost to save them from any reproach, if fidelity, application, and vigilance can do it; but I cannot answer for my capacity in affairs so very difficult to manage.
“I am extremely sensible of the encouragements her Majesty is pleased to give me. I wish her letter to the king, so much to my advantage, may produce a good effect. He has taken no notice yet of it to me. It would not be easy to represent to you that prince’s character. He cannot but have so much respect for the queen, that he will always outwardly show me a great regard. He always agrees with me when I represent anything to him, but never does what I advise him to do. He has now lately made a German chamberlain of his household, which is one of the greatest offices in Spain, and has shown very little countenance to the Spaniards he is most obliged to. I have already had the honour to tell your Lordship how necessary it would be, that Prince Eugene came hither to prevent the disorders of the court, as well as those of the field. The king sends Don Pedro Moraes to him. I enclose the copy of the letter I sent him, believing his presence here of absolute necessity. — I am, &c,“Gallway.”
The confederates adhered to their instructions, which were also their own sentiments, that the war should be actively carried on. To act on the offensive, they had to march towards Madrid. The defensive could not be maintained in Valencia, where they had eaten up all the provisions. The proposal to stand on the defensive implied that first they should retreat into Catalonia; but it was not to swell a retreat that reinforcements had been sent out to them.
King Charles and his brother, the emperor, marred all the design. The latter, in order to get rapid possession of Lombardy, did not wait to make prisoners of the French forces there, but by a capitulation, enabled them to flock into Spain. He also neglected the urgent request to send Prince Eugene or some highly qualified general to command in Valencia. King Charles, under the bitter influence of Noyelles, took the Spanish regiments into Catalonia, alleging some temporary exigency, and promising a speedy return. “And,” says Lord Galway, “it is notoriously known that the reasons for that journey were thought so insufficient, that not only all the foreign generals and ministers, but even the city and kingdom of Valencia, by their deputies, protested against it.”
It was soon evident that Charles would not come back. The Valencia troops were besieging the castle of Villena; but they found it would hold out for a time, and they were informed that the Duke of Orleans was immediately expected by the enemy with a further reinforcement of 8000 or 10,000 men. It seemed advisable to bring on a battle immediately with Marshal Duke of Berwick. To this proposal a council of war unanimously agreed. Accordingly the battle of Almanza was fought on the 25th April 1707. The Portuguese cavalry were on the right wing, and the British horse and dragoons on the left — the latter commanded by the gallant Lord Tyrawley. The infantry occupied the centre — except two brigades interlined with the cavalry. The whole issue depended on the bravery and ardour of the confederate soldiers, for the Duke of Berwick’s army was fully double in numerical strength. The order of battle was that our left wing should charge the right wing of the French, and that when our centre was engaged with the enemy’s, the Portuguese cavalry should charge forward. Lord Galway led off the battle at the head of the dragoons, and the charge was a spirited one. The English, Dutch, and Portuguese infantry carried all before them. But the Portuguese horsemen had witnessed a sight which confused and alarmed them. Lord Galway, the only bond of union between them and King Charles, was carried off the field wounded — what if the wound was mortal? and what could they gain for their own king by uselessly exasperating the French, who were not indisposed to a separate peace with Portugal? Accordingly the right wing did not charge. This was the first hope of the French; they rode up to attack the stationary Portuguese cavalry, which fled precipitately. Lord Galway had been wounded in the eye; in fact, he had lost the sight of it. When he returned to the field he made every exertion to remedy the confusion which had arisen in his absence. The infantry continued to gain advantages. Their opponents, beaten in detail, would not return to the charge. But Berwick’s vastly superior numbers enabled him to bring up fresh regiments to the fight. Thus the exhausted infantry, unsupported by cavalry, were overpowered.
Complete as was the defeat, and dreadful the slaughter, the great disaster was not the loss of the battle, but the surrender of our surviving infantry next day. The Annalist says, that the victory would have given the enemy comparatively little reason for boasting, “had the infantry that retired to the hills of Caudete marched off in the night, as they might securely have done. But Count Dhona and Major-General Shrimpton, upon a false report that the enemy were surrounding them, sent Majors Alexander and Petit to the enemy’s camp, with a proposal to surrender themselves prisoners at discretion, which the Duke of Berwick readily accepted. Don Emanuel, brother to the Count de Atalaja would have no share in so dishonourable a capitulation, and (to show how easily it might have been avoided) retired with a few Portuguese Horse; as also did a Serjeant of Visonse’s Regiment with about eighty men.”
Lord Galway sent the following despatch to Lord Sunderland:—
“Alegre, April 27. — My Lord, your lordship will have heard by my letters, as well as by Mr. Stanhope’s, that in all the councils held at Valencia this winter, it was resolved we should march to clear this frontier, ruin the enemy’s magazines, and destroy the country between them and us, in case they retired, thereby to secure this kingdom [Valencia] and our march into Arragon; but that if the enemy did assemble upon this frontier, we should fight them. Accordingly, our forces removed from their garrisons the 6th instant: we were all joined the 10th. We marched to Yecla, and from thence to Montealegre, the enemy’s troops retiring before us. We consumed and destroyed their magazines in both these places. We afterwards marched to Villena; the enemy in the meantime joined all their force and marched to Almanza. All the generals were of opinion to attack them there, our army being then in a better condition than it would be any time during the campaign, for it daily weakened by sickness. So we marched the 25th, and fought the enemy close to Almanza.
“I am under deep concern to be obliged to tell your lordship we were entirely defeated. Both our wings were broke, and let in the enemy’s horse, which surrounded our foot, so that none could get off. I received a cut in the forehead in the first charge. The enemy did not pursue their advantage, so that all the baggage got off. Major-General Shrimpton, Count Dhona, and some other officers got into the mountains with a body of English, Dutch, and Portuguese foot, where they surrendered the day after the battle, being, I suppose, surrounded by the enemy’s horse. I have sent a trumpet to enquire after the prisoners.
“I cannot, my Lord, but look upon the affairs of Spain as lost by this bad disaster: our foot, which was our main strength, being gone, and the horse we have left being chiefly Portuguese, which is not good at all. Most of our English horse that got off were of the two new-raised regiments of dragoons, who did not do their duty. All the generals here are of opinion that we cannot continue in this kingdom (Valencia), so I have desired Sir George Byng to take on board again the recruits he had just landed at Alicante, and to call at Denia or Valencia (city) for our sick, wounded, and baggage, and have sent all to Tortosa, where we shall march with the remnant of our horse. — I am, &c,
Major-General Stanhope, being at Barcelona with King Charles’ court, wrote to Marlborough on the 3rd of May:—
“My Lord, — It is with the greatest affliction imaginable that I am obliged to give your Grace an account of the melancholy state of our affairs here by the defeat of our army on the 25th of last month at Almanza. The enclosed paper is the copy of what my Lord Galway writes to me. By other advices more fresh, we hear that Count Dhona, with the body of men he had got together with Major-General Shrimpton, has been forced to surrender; so that I cannot learn that five hundred men are escaped out of the whole body of foot, which consisted of forty-three battalions, whereof I know not whether sixteen or seventeen were English, nineteen Portuguese, and the remainder Dutch. Of our horse about 3,500 are come off, but very few English and Dutch. . . . There was not at the army one horse or foot soldier of this king’s [Charles III.]. My Lord Galway was wounded with a sword over the eye, at the beginning of the action, charging with the horse. This accident contributed much to the confusion that followed. Our foot is by everybody said to have done wonders, which makes the loss of it so much the more sensible Count Noyelles is for dispersing up and down in holes the poor remainders we have left, where they must be lost as soon as the enemy think fit to show themselves.”
As to Lord Galway’s personal behaviour in the fight, it was (as usual) most brave and spirited. The flight of the Portuguese horse during his enforced absence had put everything in great confusion, and the Marquis das Minas very soon quitted the field. This Lord Galway was most earnestly averse to do; the battle under his command continued to be fought ardently and stedfastly, and he was almost surrounded by the enemy when a party of Guiscard’s and Carpenter’s dragoons insisted on his withdrawing along with them. Our hero has been blamed for fighting when the army of the enemy was in numbers at least double. But the ideas of that age rather favoured a daring attack in such circumstances. The Observator (an English paper), for August 26, 1704, expresses the English feeling:— “Don't tell me of numbers; they are cowards that tell noses. The Duke of Marlborough is none of those reckoning generals. Pray, had not the French twice the number at Donawart? — and did not the duke there thrash their jackets to their hearts’ content?” Bishop Burnet, in his thanksgiving sermon on 27th June 1706, thus panegyrized British soldiers:— “They run to battles with so bold an intrepidity that we seem to be near the state promised that one shall chase a thousand. Our men go to action as assured of victory, being resolved to conquer or die.” The general opinion as to Almanza was that if the Portuguese cavalry had not stood still, and then decamped, the day would have been ours; in which case Lord Galway’s glory would have been uppermost, and have overborne military criticism.
King Charles and Noyelles at first exulted over Lord Galway’s misfortune. The “great misfortune” (according to the British Government’s opinion) included the cause of the defeat, namely, the dispersion of all the Spanish troops and some others in garrisons throughout Arragon and Catalonia, and the consequent weakening of the confederate army in Valencia. Once more the Emperor and his brother’s waywardness and neglect had led them to disdain to fight for Spain.
Letters reached Marlborough with insinuations to the effect “that there is a general contempt and anger towards Lord Galway,” “that he is neither an officer nor zealous” — “that he has also grown very proud and passionate, which (says the Duke to Godolphin) you know is very different from the temper he formerly had.” None, however, felt this contempt and anger, but men who had nursed it before — his rivals and personal enemies, — men, whose consciences told them that they themselves were to blame, and whose tongues had a brief opportunity of rancorously speaking out, when silence best expressed the grief of true British and Christian patriots. But Stanhope and Tyrawley, and the majority of good officers felt towards him, as did their younger comrade, Captain (afterwards Sir Thomas) De Veil, who, though hearing those expressions of contempt, cherished and recorded the opinion that Lord Galway was “very brave in his person, and had all the abilities requisite to fill his employments.”
The malcontent officers, some of whom (like the Earl of Peterborough) were interested rivals and opponents, others (like the Duke of Ormond) being Jacobites and sympathisers with the Duke of Berwick, toasted this fitz-regal duke as “the brave English general who had beaten the French [i.e., Ruvigny].” They formed a party, in which were some young officers, strangers to Lord Galway, and unacquainted with the secrets of their commanders. As the youthful soldiers grew to be oracles among a still younger generation, a tradition arose that the Duke of Berwick obtained a ludicrously easy victory at Almanza. In confutation of this, I can say that I have read the Duke’s narrative, and that that was not his opinion — (the narrative which ends with the statement, that “Milord Galloway, General des Anglois, y perdit un oeil; il devoit meme etre pris, mais il trouva moyen de s’échapper.”) He evidently considered it an immense effort both in plan and in execution. “According to Berwick’s own account,” says Macfarlane [" Pictorial History of England,” vol. iv., p. 202], “his horse was repeatedly repulsed by those steady columns of foot, and even when the French and Spaniards seemed victorious on both wings, their centre was cut through and broken, and the main body of their infantry completely beaten.” In the “Military Memoirs of the Marquis de Fouquiere, containing Maxims of Warfare, illustrated by Instructive Examples”, the “Bataille d'Almanza” is methodically described as a good, well-fought battle. Petavius in his “Rationarium Temporum,” has chronicled the same opinion, and has immortalized Lord Galway by the name of “Gallovidius” in the classical tongue of Caesar [p. 489], “Anno 1707, Infelicior hujus anni expeditio Foederatis in Hispania fuit. Gallovidio enim, A.D., 7, Kalendas Maii ad Almanzam cum Gallis signa conferente, acerrime quidem pugnatum est, sed cessit ille tandem loco, et in Catalaumiam se subduxit, amissa exercitûs magna parte.”
The fool’s laugh of Noyelles was soon exchanged for stupid amazement; and Lord Galway, by his defence of Catalonia, and by recruiting the army — achievements which were left to his management — showed who was the best officer and general. The Duke of Berwick’s pursuit, instead of completing his victory, subtracted from it. Lord Galway had caused the Bridge of Tortosa to be so well fortified, and it was so well defended by the forces he left there for that purpose, that the Duke of Berwick’s army was twice repulsed with considerable loss. Catalonia was thus saved. The “Annals” testify that “the preservation of that province was in a great measure due to the vigilance and activity of the Earl of Galway, who put the places most exposed in a good posture of defence.” The same authority records Lord Galway’s “indefatigable industry and application” in providing subsistence for the troops, and in forming regiments of Catalans. Lord Galway, being so fiercely criticised at every opportunity, could not help praising himself on this occasion. He says, “With great expedition I gathered the broken remains of the foot (out of which I formed five battalions) and raised four more of Catalans, with which we made a stand against a victorious enemy, and preserved the principality of Catalonia entire (except Lerida).” Stanhope wrote to Marlborough from Barcelona, 6th June 1707:—
“My Lord Galway is raising some Spanish regiments of foot, and does indeed use all application possible to prevent their [the French and Philip] reaping those advantages from the battle which they might have done had they followed their victory instead of amusing themselves as they have done. I wish I could do the same justice to the court.”[5]
The French were mainly employed at home in defending Toulon, and the Duke of Berwick’s services were demanded there. In Catalonia the only French operation was to besiege Lerida, which was resolutely defended by the Prince of Hesse-Darmstadt, Lord Galway constantly harassing and alarming the besiegers. Philip of Anjou had given a grant of Lerida and its environs to Berwick as a reward for the victory of Almanza, and the siege was conducted with more earnestness, when the ducal grantee returned from Toulon. The writer in the “Biographie Universelle” says: “Galway having recruited the remnants of his army applied himself to repair the disaster of Almanza with incredible activity. He proposed to the ministers of Charles III. to withdraw from the garrisons all the disposable troops to form an army capable of resisting the Duke of Orleans. His counsel was not followed. The loss of Lerida was the result of that error.” Burnet says, “When the besieged saw how long they could hold out, they gave the Earl of Galway notice, upon which he intended to have raised the siege. And if the King of Spain would have consented to his drawing out of the other garrisons such a force as might have been spared, he undertook to raise it, which was believed might have been easily done; and if he had succeeded, it would have given a new turn to all our affairs in Spain. But Count Noyelles, who was well practised in the arts of flattery, and knew how much King Charles was alienated from the Earl of Galway for the honest freedom he had used with him in laying before him some errors in his conduct, set himself to oppose this, apprehending that success in it would have raised the Earl of Galway’s reputation again, which had suffered a great diminution by the action of Almanza. He said this would expose the little army they had left them to too great a hazard; for if the design miscarried, it might occasion a revolt of the whole principality. Thus the humours of princes are often more regarded than their interest; the design of relieving Lerida was laid aside. The French army was diminished a fourth part, and the long siege had so fatigued them, that it was visible the raising it would be no difficult performance; but the thoughts of that being given over, Lerida capitulated in the beginning of November.” Both armies then went into winter quarters.
During the past summer, and throughout this winter, the Courts of London and Vienna were occupied with plans for Spain, especially as to the command of the troops. Lord Peterborough visited both those capitals, and also Turin, pleading for Lord Galway’s recall. Marlborough wrote to Comte Maffei (at Turin) on 19th May, warning him as to Peterborough: “You must express yourself to him with some precaution, for he has the gift of amplifying what one says, so as to give it quite a different turn from what one intended to say.” Still, this too clever Earl managed to collect sufficient expressions of dissatisfaction to tempt Marlborough to sacrifice Galway. But Godolphin, who could appreciate administrative talent, and Sunderland, who could sympathize with honour and disinterestedness, both of them knowing his loyal motives in accepting and retaining his high command, stood by him with immoveable constancy. “What you say of Lord Galway is certainly right,” Lord Godolphin wrote to the Duke, “and considering the unjust impression of the King of Spain in his prejudice, he cannot be of use there. But who can? Everybody that is there desires to leave the service and come home.“ And Lord Sunderland wrote, “As for King Charles, it is plain that Lord Galway is very ill with him; but I am afraid that will be the case in a month’s time, of anybody else that may be sent, if they do their duty.”
Godolphin consulted with some of his leading political supporters, whether they now had any desire that Lord Rivers should be sent to Spain. He reported the result to the Duke, June 24:—
“I find Lord Halifax, Lord Somers, and their friends are pretty indifferent as to Lord Rivers, and unconcerned whether he is to return or not. But they are very uneasy to think of recalling Lord Galway, though sensible that he must be useless. For they carry that matter so much farther as to think all these misunderstandings are industriously fomented by Count de Noyelles, whom they take to be the principal occasion and contriver of Lord Galway’s misfortunes; for which reason they seem to think, unless he be called home, either before or at the same time with Lord Galway, it will look as if he had been in the right in all he suggested to the King of Spain, and all the reflections which belong to the matter must light upon Lord Galway and England.”
Godolphin concurred in the opinion that De Noyelles was the prime cause of the Spanish disaster, as we find in his letter, dated Windsor, June 26, 1707:—
“One letter of last post from the Hague tells us the Count de Noyelles has written a letter to the States, in which he is pleased to take great liberties with my Lord Galway. We think it pretty hard here, at the same time, that he who has been the visible occasion of our misfortunes in Spain for two years successively, should have the confidence to lay the blame at the doors of others, who have suffered so much, and at so great an expense.”
Godolphin’s plan, which he repeats in his letter of June 27, was as follows:— “As I have told you in my former letter, some of our friends here will be unwilling to bring home Lord Galway, while Count De Noyelles stays with the King of Spain; so the true way to make all things easy will be for the Emperor to send a good general with the troops from Italy.” This, as my readers remember, was Lord Galway’s own plan, urged before the opening of the campaign.
Marlborough, seeing the Government so steady to our hero, wrote in a more satisfactory style to Sunderland:—
“Meldert, June 27. — Nobody can have a better opinion than I have of Lord Galway; but when I consider the Court and King of Spain, I think it would be the most barbarous thing in the world to impose upon Lord Galway to stay, for I am very confident he had rather beg his bread. I am sure I would.”
And he wrote to the duchess, July 4:—
“As to what Lord Sunderland says concerning the King of Spain, that nobody will please him that does their duty, I am of his mind, and I have also as good an opinion of Lord Galway as anybody can have; but that is no argument for Lord Galway’s stay; for, as it is, it will be impossible for those two (Galway and Noyelles) to serve together.”
The Government accordingly took into consideration how they could give Lord Galway a change of command without any implied censure. Marlborough made a series of suggestions (which were adopted), namely, that the English contingent in Spain should be such as a Major-General should command, that officer taking the charge of British troops only; that the Catalan regiments raised by Lord Galway should cease to be in British pay, except indirectly by a pecuniary subsidy; and that Lord Galway should go to Portugal as Ambassador and General. Godolphin hesitated, lest the exchange should not be agreeable to Galway. The Duke replied — September 15, 1707:— “I am sorry to see that you are of opinion that Lord Galway will not care to go to Portugal, for there he might do service; and where he is, I think it is impossible.” The loss of Lerida, as already narrated, which was permitted with the view of vexing Lord Galway, confirmed Marlborough’s fears.
Lord Peterborough’s visit to Vienna was neutralized by Lord Sunderland’s correspondence (see Cole’s “State Papers”). That Secretary of State at last succeeded in convincing Austria of the mistake of neglecting Spain Proper, and of allowing the Spaniards to detect the Imperial family’s lukewarmness and contemptuousness. Austria agreed to send a Marshal to take the chief command in Spain, and this enabled Marlborough to make the suggestions already mentioned. On the English Lord Peterborough made little impression, though he tried to work on a popular prejudice and an insular delusion — the prejudice being against a foreigner (as he insisted on calling Lord Galway), and the delusion being that, if a British General had the command of the whole allied army in Spain, he could do ever he liked, and that want of success could arise only from his want of brains. John, Lord Haversham, speaking on Lord Peterborough’s side, said, on the 21st December 1707 (or on 29th January 1708), “It was no wonder our affairs in Spain went so ill, since the management of them had been entrusted to a foreigner.” The Anti-government papers took up the cry, saying that English troops fight best under an English General. But Peterborough knew well that it was not for want of the greatest ardour in fighting on the part of the English that the Allies ever missed a victory. As to the delusion that an English commander in the Confederate War had always the ball at his foot, Peterborough knew also what it was to be thwarted by foreign generals and ministers, and that from such men’s uncontrollable misconduct Gahvay’s misfortunes had arisen. He had written, in 1705, after his visit to Lord Galway in Lisbon, “Either pride, ignorance, laziness, or disaffection make the Portuguese wholly useless;” and in 1706, “I am almost expiring under the thoughts of German folly;”[6] and yet now he spoke of Lord Galway as if neither he nor any other general could have anything but cordial co-operation from the Portuguese and Germans. Still (as I have said) Lord Peterborough made little impression on impartial Englishmen, as appears from some proceedings in Parliament, noted in Vernon’s Letters, from which I am about to quote:—
“January 13, 1708. — The Lords were again on the Spanish business on Friday last. The subject was an account given by the Post-Boy that the battle of Almanza was fought by positive orders. He was examined upon it, but could name no author. Some were inclined to suppose it, and grounded it upon the known prudence and wariness of my Lord Galway, who was loaded with commendations.” “17th January. — The preceding years ought to give them the best lights how they came to have no better success at Almanza, which was a misfortune owing to the neglect of the past year, when they lost Madrid after being in possession of it six weeks. Mr Walpole said, that the world was under a great mistake as to the great conduct of a certain lord [Peterborough] who had been mentioned in that House [of Commons] as if everything that had been well done in Spain was solely owing to him, and all misadventures were to lie at other people’s doors.” “February 24. — Major-General Stanhope and Lieut-General Erie had an opportunity to do the public good service by giving an account how matters stood in Spain, that by my Lord Galway’s conduct the enemy was kept from making that progress there was reason to fear after so great a defeat, and, if he was supported, they might hope to see a happy turn there.”
Stanhope’s and Erie’s speeches imply a plan to continue Lord Galway in Spain, to serve with his wonted public spirit under an Austrian Field-Marshal. The policy, which was now agreed to, was Lord Galway’s, and, as such, he could work it out heartily. But he knew Stanhope to be equally hearty as to the true British and Anti-Bourbon programme. And, besides, Austria was probably too late in its zeal to occupy Madrid; for not only had Philip’s steadiness somewhat pleased the Spaniards, but an heir had been born to him;[7] the people (all except the Catalans) had publicly hailed the infant as the Prince of the Asturias, and were not likely to turn again. Lord Galway had, therefore, no real opening for again attempting his original plan, the only good opportunity for which had been missed and lost by King Charles and Lord Peterborough. His personal wish was to return to England, as appears from the following letter:—
To the Earl of Manchester.
“My Lord, — I am honoured with your Lordship’s of the 29th of November, and I have delivered the Memorial enclosed to the king, having first engaged the Duke de Moles in the affair, which I hope will succeed to your lordship’s satisfaction, for the Duke says he knows the gentleman; and since he had the good fortune to be recommended by your lordship, he could not fail of the little interest I have here. This not being the season for action, we have nothing of greater importance to acquaint your lordship with, than the arrival of part of those forces from Italy we have so long expected. But our fleet, wanting both stores and provisions, cannot return to fetch the rest, till they have been to Lisbon to victual and refit. I take the opportunity of this fleet to go for Lisbon with the Marquis das Minas, and from thence, I hope shortly after, for England. But wherever I am I shall always be proud to receive your lordship’s commands. — Being, with great respect, &c.
Lord Peterborough was obliged to ride off from the field of controversy, saying that there must be vigorous action in Spain, and that he would serve in the army there, “even if it had the great misfortune of being commanded by the Earl of Galway.” His consolation for the general rejection of his own programme consisted in hearing a small chorus of voices exclaiming, “A very clever speech.”[9]
Mr. J. Chetwynd wrote to Lord Manchester from Turin, 25th February 1708:— “The queen was desirous that the Earl of Galway should have staid in Catalonia, and I did send him letters to the purpose the other day, but they would come too late.” Galway and Das Minas had sailed, with some British and Portuguese officers, and 1200 dismounted Portuguese. They arrived at Lisbon in the month of March, and found (as stated in the Gazette) that the queen had appointed the Earl of Galway Envoy Extraordinary to the Court of Lisbon, and Commander-in-Chief of the British forces in Portugal.
- ↑ “The Marchmont Papers,” vol. iii., p. 457.
- ↑ The Parliamentary History.
- ↑ MSS. Office of Board of Ordnance, 5795, Brit. Mus., p. 313.
- ↑ In a letter from Spain, Lord Galway said to Lady Russell, “J’ai perdu entitlement l’appetit que Lord Bedford appeloit son meilleur ami.” (Quoted in a note to the Devonshire Collection of Russell Letters.)
- ↑ Among the Treasury Papers in our State-Paper Office there is one [dated about 31st December 1707] which is docqueted thus:— “Memorial of Colonel Thomas Allnut to the Lord High Treasurer, representing that the clothing for his regiment had been taken by Lord Galway for his Catalan battalion.”
- ↑ Hill’s “Diplomatic Correspondence,” vol. i., p. 217; “Duchess of Marlborough’s Correspondence,” vol i., p. 62.
- ↑ “1707. Aug. 25 n.s. King Philip’s Consort was delivered of a son, who was styled the Prince of the Asturias, and who seemed to be critically born to be a prop to his father’s unsettled throne, so that there were rejoicings likewise at the Court of France on this account.” Pointer’s “Chronological History of England,” vol. ii., published in 1714.
- ↑ Cole’s “State Papers.”
- ↑ Kemble’s “State Papers,” p. 464.