== XII. THE PUBLIC AND DIPLOMACY ==
IN consequence of the startling developments in diplomacy which preceded and accompanied the great war, the relation of democracy to diplo- macy has been earnestly discussed of late, par- ticularly in Great Britain.
When considering this important matter, the distinction between the methods of diplomacy and diplomatic policies should be borne in mind for /the sake of clearness of thought. The develop- ment of public opinion, the disappearance of purely dynastic aims of state action, and the con- stantly broadening outlook of political life, have led to the elimination of most of the cruder meth- ods of deception and intrigue. But two questions still remain: Should diplomatic negotiations be carried on in the public view, that is with con- stant and full information given to the public or parliament, on all important details? and, Should the diplomatic policy of a democratic government at all times be kept fully before the representative bodies, and the public?
Most discussions which favor the use of secret diplomacy, refer to the presumed necessity of confidential methods of negotiation. But there are some publicists and statesmen who believe that the policy of foreign affairs itself can best be handled by responsible statesmen keeping their own counsel and giving to the public only a gen- eral adumbration of the trend of policy. These two questions are constantly mixed up in current discussion; and their absolute separation is in- deed difficult. Thus, a strictly secret diplomatic policy will naturally accentuate the secrecy of the methods employed. Abstractly considered, it would be quite possible to have the foreign policy of a country determined by public action, and still to surround diplomatic negotiations with se- crecy. But if the substance of the policy were definitely known in detail, the secrecy of methods would lose much of its effectiveness.
The use of such methods is defended from two points of view; from that of the trader who looks for a better bargain through not having given away his entire hand at the beginning; and from that of the builder who desires to work quietly without interruptions from an excitable public, who desires to avoid difficulties and smooth away
contrasts which publicity would tend to exag- gerate.
There is an ex post facto publicity of diplomatic policy. If this is afforded as soon as a new situ- ation has arisen or a new agreement has been cre- ated, some of the harm of secrecy is avoided. In such a case the statesmen, cabinet, or conference, practically give assurance that, if allowed to work quietly on a certain problem, they will produce a solution which will commegid itself in general to the sense of equity of the nation or nations con- cerned; although the sum total of the arrangement may contain details which, considered by them- selves, would be unacceptable and which might have interfered with the making of an accord, if unduly emphasized or given publicity during the negotiations.
Mr. Balfour in his speech of March 19, 1918, which has already been referred to, indeed speaks quite convincingly of the advantage of confiden- tial relations and of secrecy in negotiations, but he goes so far as strongly to deprecate a demand for information on the part of Parliament. In that he certainly shows a measure of anti-demo- cratic bias, as when he says, "Do not suppose that we can do the work better by having to ex- plain it to a lot of people who are n ot responsible. That is not the way to get business properly done." He therefore rejects the idea of a par- liamentary committee of control in the matter of foreign relations. He agrees, however, that the existence of secret treaties is an evil, although he thinks that it may be at certain times necessary, because the associated treaty power may desire it. He is mildly deprecatory, at best.
Count Czernin, speaking to the Austrian dele- gations on June 24, 1918, concerning President Wilson's fourteen points, stated that he has no ob- jection to the introduction of the principle of "open covenants," although he confesses that he does not know by what means effective adherence thereto can be assured. Concerning diplomatic negotiations, which he treats simply as a matter of business, he points out the advantages of se- crecy from the point of view of trading. More- over, if there were full publicity, the general pub- lic might passionately oppose every action involv- ing any concession as a defeat. This would not be conducive to peaceable relations.
There are those who believe that the chief evils of secret diplomacy would be avoided if ample opportunity were given for discussion in repre- sentative assemblies, if there were a parliamen- tary committee keeping constantly in touch with
the conduct of foreign relations, and if treaties and declarations of war could not be made with- out the consent of the national legislature. Some advocates of democratic control go so far as to reason that a decision to make war and thereby to order the shedding of human blood, should not be made without a national referendum vote.
On the other hand, those opposed to all public- ity of diplomatic affairs argue that international policies cannot be determined in the market place. They hark back to DeTocqueville, who holds that as democracy cannot be expected to regulate the details of an important undertaking, it is particu- larly unqualified to deal with international mat- ters where secrecy, discretion, and patience are required. Followers of this opinion believe that the conduct of foreign affairs is best placed quite unreservedly in the hands of responsible states- men, who have greater information, larger experi- ence and more self-control than the average of humanity. They generally have in view the pres- ervation of national interests, under conditions of peace if possible; they will not be inflamed by exciting incidents, but will keep these in proper subordination to the general plan. Such details, if made public, would easily lead to occurrences that would upset the results of wise planning.
As Lord Cromer has said, it is such untoward chance incidents which cannot be controlled that are to be feared, rather than any deliberate plot- ting on the part of diplomats. Such responsible statesmen always remain accountable for the gen- eral results of their policy; they are conscious of the importance of their trust, and therefore are a safer repository of discretionary powers than a general committee.
Back of these arguments, however, there usually lies the conviction that the public is su- perficial, easily swayed, excitable and altogether delighting more in the hurrah of war than in the humdrum of peace. It might be remarked that if such had actually been the case, the most re- cent experience of the people with war has prob- ably given them a different idea of the attractive- ness of that kind of excitement; unless indeed the mass of humanity are irremediably and forever fools, when taken in the aggregate.
The sensational character of the daily press must be considered in this connection. The news value of normal, peaceable developments is very small. It is therefore a godsend to the news- papers when something extraordinary happens, particularly in international affairs. For this reason, the daily news frequently presents an un
true or warped picture of the actual situation. Gilbert Murray asks what people are referred to by those who demand popular control of diplo- macy; are they the people of educational socie- ties, or of the music halls? The public is not homogeneous, or so organized as to give expres- sion to convictions on current affairs which have been maturely considered. It lacks the leisure and training for penetrating superficialities and going to the bottom of difficult questions. Lord Cromer believes in general that democracies are not peaceful, and he refers particularly to the American democracy for proof; Lord Lytton said, "Governments are generally for diplomacy, the people for war."
Men of all shades of opinion are agreed that the people are not greatly interested in foreign affairs, and the opponents of proposals of demo- cratic control argue, that it would be useless to create machinery for action where there exists no interest, nor purpose to act.
It is quite true that the public during the nine- teenth century seemed less interested in foreign affairs than during the eighteenth. At the ear- lier time, diplomacy was a fascinating, personal game, about which the wiseacres in the coffee houses were eager to make their criticisms and
prognostications. When the middle class came to power in the nineteenth century, it was pri- marily interested in economic and other domes- tic questions, and was satisfied to leave the con- duct of foreign affairs to statesmen and diplo- mats. The constantly growing political con- sciousness of the public at large was concentrated chiefly on questions of internal politics and re- form. Foreign affairs, as they reached the pub- lic, were thought of still from the point of view of the onlooker, rather than of him who actually had to bear the brunt of the burden. Those who had to bleed and die when hostilities had been brought about, never had any chance, nor deter- mination, to influence the course of diplomacy leading up to wars.
With such a general apathy of the public, it was not surprising that diplomacy should cling to its caste privileges, should try to preserve its discretionary powers, and should often attempt deliberately to keep people in the dark. "In the public interest" is the curtain beyond which no one may peer. Even in the American G-overn- ment, particularly during and since the war, for- eign affairs have been handled with what would ordinarily seem insufficient information to the public; in fact, with occasional putting forth of
misleading and entirely partial information, or the refusal to furnish information even when re- quested by those having official responsibilities. This is a notable change, as up to 1914 it was substantially true that the United States had no diplomatic secrets.
"While from the point of view of traditional diplomacy, and of international relations as they were up to the Great War, it seems quite natural that democratic control should be thought by many to be unpractical; and while indeed no one can flatter himself that through a change of method the conduct of international affairs could suddenly be rendered more wise and entirely ef- fective towards the public welfare, yet I cannot avoid the conclusion that there is a wrong ori- entation in the emphasis of the need of secrecy and of the unfitness of the people to deal with problems of foreign affairs. The belief in the unfitness of the people in this matter appears to be the result of a preconceived notion as to the overpowering difficulty, complexity and almost sanctity of foreign affairs. Modern governments are based on the principle that all legislation must meet the test of public criticism and rest on public consent; certainly it cannot be argued that matters of the incidence of taxation, the
proper organization of credit, and the determina- tion of commercial policies, are less complex and intricate than are foreign affairs. It is indeed true that it is difficult for one nation thoroughly to appreciate in detail the conditions of life in another. This truth should have its greatest value in dissuading a nation from meddling with the internal affairs of another, even from good motives. Those international questions which are apt to produce war may indeed relate to in- tricate matters, but the essential point is always the contention for power, influence or commercial advantage, and it is not apparent why the public in general should be unfit to judge as to whether national treasure and life are eventually to be spent in huge quantities to bring about, or to prevent, any such shifting of power or influence. It is, however, because the motives involved are so largely connected with class interests, or sur- vivals of pride of race, that those concerned in them are eager to deny the fitness of the general public, which if called on to decide would put into the foreground the question, "How does the con- trol of this or that group of capitalists in Mo- rocco, for instance, or the greater or smaller in- fluence of Austria or Russia in Servia, affect the daily life and welfare of our people! " It is cer
tainly true that questions of peace and war have never definitely been reasoned out on that basis. There has always been the assumption that cer- tain things were essential to national prestige and could not be questioned; it is only when the actually existing broader base of national political life is organized also for active control of foreign affairs, that these considerations will have their full weight. Only the most exceptional states- men could lift themselves out of the narrow groove of tradition and precedent; and more ex- ceptional still, in fact all but impossible, is the capacity of one man to represent in himself in just proportion, all the interests and feelings of a nation.
Infallibility cannot be expected in the handling of foreign affairs, whether under a broad discre- tion of statesmen or under strict democratic con- trol. There will always be an alternative of wis- dom and rashness, constructive planning and headlong action, carefulness and negligence. But past experience has certainly established beyond peradventure of doubt that secret diplomacy is not infallible, and particularly that diplomacy acting under absolutist traditions, as in Germany before the war, may make the most fatal mistakes of judgment and of policy. Balfour said: "I
do not think the Government in June, 1914, had the slightest idea that there was any danger ahead." A remarkable statement, when we con- sider the actions and reactions of secret diplo- macy during the decade preceding the war. It has been quite truly said that diplomacy is far more eminent in autopsy than in diagnosis. M. Cberadame somewhat severely observes, "The typical diplomat lives in a world of his own. His information is rarely obtained by direct observa- tion of people and facts." And while ordinarily men of exceptional talents are selected for the difficult position of Minister for Foreign Affairs, yet all considered, it is hard to believe that were decisions on the essential matters of international life made on a broader basis, and influenced more by a direct action of public opinion, the result would be less wise.
Active participation of the people in the mak- ing of momentous decisions regarding foreign af- fairs, is denied either under the assumption that the people might not be ready to face the fateful test, or, by the majority, with the thought that the people are too excitable and rash to be trusted with such far-reaching decisions. While it is in- deed easy to generate warlike excitement among the masses, it must be remembered, when such a
charge of rashness is made, that the people have never been currently informed of the develop- ment of international dangers, but usually at a critical time shreds of information have been flashed on them, designed or at least apt to stir up all their atavistic love of fight and fear of at- tack. Even thus, the greatest noise is made usually by those who do not in the event of hos- tilities actually have to risk their blood and bones. It stands to reason that if honestly kept in- formed about international relationships, the peo- ple would be far less prone to sudden excitement. Very few people indeed appear to doubt that had the decision of war or no war been laid before the peoples of Europe in 1914, with a full knowledge of the facts, the terrible catastrophe would never have come about. As Mr. Lowes Dickinson has said, if the people had been allowed to share the apprehension and precautions of the diplomats before 1914, there would have been quite a sim- ple and clear question before the English people, for one. It could have decided whether it would pursue a policy that might lead at any moment to a general European war, or to take the alterna- tive which Sir Edward Grey later spoke of, namely, "to promote some arrangement, to which Germany could be a party by which she could be
assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her by France, Russia and our- selves, jointly or separately." Without the sup- port of the people, kept in line by fear of hidden dangers, not even the militarists of Germany could have forced military action.
One of the first acts of the Russian Soviet Gov- ernment was to announce its hostility to secret diplomacy. When it first published the secret treaties and documents of the Czarist Govern- ment, its motive was, as shown by Trotsky's dec- laration made at the time, thoroughly to discredit the management of affairs under the old regime. In the same connection, it announced its own pur- pose of conducting foreign affairs in the open. Such seems indeed to have been its general prac- tice with respect to the announcement of policies, though its agents continued to use underground methods. One thing, however, the Soviet Gov- ernment is evidently trying to bring about, namely, a broad public interest in the conduct of foreign affairs. It desires the Russian people, and more particularly the members of the ruling Commu- nist Party, to be currently informed about the progress of international affairs and about ar- rangements concluded. Observers report that at the meeting of the provincial Soviets the first busi
ness ordinarily taken up is the reading and dis- cussion of a report on international relations sent by the central government. We have no means to check up the truth of these reports; but this effort to interest the broad mass of the popula- tion in the outward relations of the state is cer- tainly worth notice. The expectation is encour- aged that the reason for acts relating to foreign affairs will be explained, particularly when sac- rifices are demanded.