IX. HOPES FOR IMPROVEMENT DEFERRED
editTHE world has not yet recovered from the sur- prise and disillusionment which overcame it when the secret treaties of the war became known and when it became evident that they would be made the basis of the Treaty of Peace. The secrecy of the procedure of the Peace Conference which had been heralded as an assembly of the peoples for carrying out and making permanent those great principles for which men had grimly and silently suffered and died and which had been eloquently voiced by the American President seemed to be so complete a return to the old meth- ods of diplomacy that from the day when the muzzle was clamped on, public faith in the con- ference and its results was shaken. The motives of the men who made this decision were probably good. It was their desire that the work should be rapidly accomplished and should not be con- fused by divided counsels. But again the results of the secret method are hardly apt to increase confidence in its usefulness as a procedure for
dealing with the affairs of the peoples of the world in such a manner as to place them upon a sound and lasting foundation.
The solemn document which was prepared for the information of the newspaper men on the de- cision of the peace conference to enforce secrecy, did not satisfy any one. To the public there seemed to be no larger principle at issue than that, on this occasion if ever, open covenants should be openly arrived at, and it was feared that if the peace conference did not base its action upon an appeal to public opinion, no adequate solution could be found at all. When the treaty itself had been framed, it was sedulously kept se- cret until distributed by the French paper Bon- soir. The deliberations of the Council of Five were secret beyond all precedents in public ac- tion. No secretaries were admitted and no offi- cial minutes were kept, nor were there communi- cations to the public through the press. Doctor Dillon's description of the Five as "a gang of benevolent conspirators, ignoring history and ex- pertship, shutting themselves up in a room and talking disconnectedly," unfortunately appears not entirely untrue; particularly as to the ignor- ing of history and expertship, which was quite patent, although from the nature of things we
cannot exactly know how disconnectedly the Five talked.
Unfortunately, after the war the use of secret diplomatic policy has continued without noticeable diminution. The details of certain situations make one feel as if we are after all only a genera- tion removed from the eighteenth century. These matters are so recent and still so controversial that I do not desire to enter upon them in any detail.
It is, however, surely to be regretted, that it should have been found necessary to surround the mandates with peculiar secrecy. This institution was conceived in a desire to create a trusteeship in behalf of the world in general and for the par- ticular benefit of the populations comprised in the mandates. Not only has the assignment of cer- tain mandates given rise to great popular resist- ance indicating that the local populations were far from ready to trust their interests to a for- eign mandatory, but the fact that these arrange- ments are so carefully guarded with secrecy comes near to destroying all hope that there is any intention to handle them otherwise than from the imperialist point of view and for the benefit of the mandatory.
Among the many things that have happened since the armistice, the Franco-Hungarian in- trigues are specially to be noted as emphasizing the great danger of secret methods, in which a government runs the risk of being committed by persons, irresponsible or not properly controlled, into embarrassing and harmful situations. We know of these particular facts through confiden- tial reports discovered and published, officially recognized by certain governments, though for- mally denied by the Magyar Cabinet. These papers give working details of what was already known in general terms concerning reactionary Hungarian intrigues in Czecho-Slovakia and Aus- tria, including preparations for an armed upris- ing, and other assistance to monarchists. French interests were at the same time active in Hun- gary. They made an agreement for a leasing of the Hungarian state railways for fifty years. Ac- cording to this contract, the Hungarian Govern- ment is bound to consult the diplomatic repre- sentative of the French Government concerning every measure which may have a bearing on any clause of the agreement. A political compact was simultaneously initialed in which the French Gov- ernment withdrew its opposition to universal mili- tary service in Hungary, and that country was to be assisted in boundary rectifications at the ex
pense of Czecbo-Slovakia and Roumania. A third agreement provided for the sending of a Hun- garian army against Soviet Russia under French command. These agreements were undoubtedly accepted by many people as fully concluded. The Magyar Premier in open session of the national assembly boasted of having achieved an alliance with France; the same understanding was also accepted by certain Paris newspapers. The French Government, however, did not sanction what secret negotiators had prepared in Hungary and disavowed the agreements, with the exception of the lease of the Hungarian railways. This il- lustrates how in times of unsettlement and sharp national rivalry, representatives on the spot or agents of powerful interests in close touch with the home government may by secret means try to bring about arrangements which the conscience of their nation does not approve and which serve merely to generate suspicion and distrust.
There is reason to believe that the draft of a secret treaty between France and Yugo-Slavia which was published in 1920 by the Idea Na&ionale was at the time actually being considered by the two governments concerned. One of the points of the proposed treaty was that upon the declara- tion of war between France and any Mediterra
nean power, Yugo-Slavic troops would be massed along the hostile boundary according to previ- ously determined plans. In connection with this provision the representatives of France made the following suggestion: "In case of a conflict it would be better that the Yugo-Slavic troops, in- stead of massing on the hostile frontier, should rather provoke a 'Casus Belli' on the part of the nation at war with France. Otherwise their in- tervention might bring on the interference of other powers." The proposed arrangements, even though not adopted by the two governments, nevertheless illustrate the methods acceptable to secret diplomacy, but which open public opinion would never sanction.
Whatever we may think about the exact share of the blame for having brought on the great catastrophe which should be attributed to secret methods and policies, we cannot have any doubts about their influence since the armistice. Whether or not secret diplomacy brought on the war, it certainly has not ended it. War still exists, not only when actual hostilities are going on, but in the whole temper of international affairs con- tinuing enmity, continuing armaments, 'Unending' waste of human effort. Thus, for one thing, the entire Near Eastern situation remains unsettled.
As an expert on this troubled region has said: "The principle of settlement as revealed by these treaties is fundamentally wrong. The East must be resuscitated, not exploited." But be it East or West, there is the same return to the old game of balancing off gains and changing boundaries, without consideration of the rights of the respec- tive peoples. The costly mistakes of the Con- gresses of Vienna, Paris, and Berlin are being re- peated.