Southern Historical Society Papers/Volume 04/August/Letter from General Fitz. Lee
[Copy.]
General J. A. Early:
Dear Sir: General Lee and staff arrived on the field at Gettysburg near the close of the battle on the afternoon of July 1st soon after Anderson's division arrived, but too late to participate in the action. About the same time Longstreet arrived in person, leaving his troops a few miles behind.
The only troops that were on the ground were four divisions, which had just been engaged, and Anderson's division, which, in addition to a day's march, had just made a forced march from Cashtown.
While discussing the question of renewing the battle, General Lee directed me to reconnoitre the position to which the enemy had retired.
I found Cemetery Hill occupied by a considerable force, a part strongly posted behind a stone fence near its crest, and the rest on the reverse slope.
In my opinion an attack at that time, with the troops then at hand, would have been hazardous and of very doubtful success. After making my report no mention was made of a renewal of the attack that evening. The plan of battle was then decided upon for the ensuing day. I believe Longstreet was still on the field when I delivered my report. Two of his divisions bivouaced that night in four miles of the position he was to occupy the next day. When I sought my bivouac for the night, it was with the firm belief that the battle would be renewed early the next morning. As an evidence that General Lee anticipated an early commencement of the battle, he breakfasted and was in the saddle before it was fairly light. At that early hour, on visiting Hill's headquarters, everything exhibited signs of preparation for action.
General Lee directed me to assist Colonel Walker in disposing of the artillery of Hill's corps, and afterward to examine and correct, if necessary, the position of the artillery on other parts of the line. I understood the plan of battle to be, that Longstreet, on the right, should commence the attack, while Hill, in the centre, and Ewell, on the left, should co-operate by a vigorous support.
On reaching Hill's position, about sunrise, I discovered that there had been considerable accession to the enemy's force on Cemetery Hill during the night; but it was chiefly massed to his right, leaving much of his center and almost his entire left unoccupied.
When calling the attention of Colonel Walker to the importance of occupying a ridge springing obliquely from the right of Hill's position, and extending in a direct line towards Round Top mountain, General Pendleton offered his services to Walker; and I proceeded to our left, more than a mile, on the opposite side of Gettysburg. As I examined the position of the artillery on the left, I momentarily expected to hear the guns on the right announce the opening of the battle. As the morning advanced, I became anxious lest the day might lose us the opportunity of defeating the enemy in detail.
When returning to the right, I found General Lee at Ewell's headquarters, on the outskirts of Gettysburg, and accompanied him through the town and along Hill's line. On arriving at the point where I left Walker a few hours before, the ridge to which his attention had been called in the morning was still unoccupied; but as this ground was to be the position of Longstreet's corps, and as the withdrawal of troops for its occupation from the corps already in position would change the order of battle, and might produce disastrous consequences by precipitating the attack before the arrival of Longstreet's troops, its occupation was therefore delayed until the occurrence of that event. It was now about ten o'clock, and the Federals had considerably increased in numbers and extended their left.
Perceiving the great value of time, General Lee's impatience became so urgent that he proceeded in person to hasten the movement of Longstreet. He was, however, met on the way with the welcome tidings that Longstreet's troops were in motion. Finding a convenient point, General Lee waited a reasonable time for Longstreet to reach his destination, and then set out to meet him, but, on arriving at the point of action, it was found that Longstreet was still absent. While waiting a Federal sergeant was captured, who was found, on examination, to belong to a division which had taken position in the peach orchard at the further end of the ridge before mentioned.
It was now apparent that the advantage of position had been lost by delay, and the enemy had been permitted to concentrate a greater part of his forces. It was now after one o'clock, and General Lee's impatience again urged him to go in quest of Longstreet. After proceeding about a mile, we discovered Hood's division at a halt; it was said, waiting for McLaws, whose division had taken a wrong direction. It was four o'clock before Longstreet was in position to attack.
I here conclude a brief and I hope impartial statement, from which you may make your own deductions.
| Very respectfully, &c., | |
| (Signed) |
A. L. Long.
|
Letter from General Fitz. Lee.
March 15th, 1877.
Rev. J. Wm. Jones,
Secretary Southern Historical Society:
My Dear Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter enclosing a copy of a communication from ———— in which he requests information to be used in a forthcoming work, upon certain points connected with the battle of Gettysburg.
Upon them he expresses his convictions as follows: " At present, as far as my studies of this period go, my opinion on the question is this: The mistakes which brought upon the Confederate arms the repulse at Gettysburg, with its fatal consequences, were the following:
"1st. It was a mistake to invade the Northern States at all, because it stirred up their military spirit. The best chance of the Confederacy was the pecuniary exhaustion of the North, and not the exhaustion of its resources in men. The invasion was the death blow to what has been called the Copperhead party. It called under arms thousands of men who would never have enrolled otherwise, and who became experienced soldiers in ''64'; and, moreover, it diminished for one or two years the resisting powers of the Confederate army.
"2d. If the invasion was to be undertaken, only raiding parties should have been sent until the Army of the Potomac should have been defeated. It was a great mistake to bring her on the Northern soil, where she fought ten times better than in Virginia. A real invasion—viz: the establishment of the Confederate army in Pennsylvania, with its communications well secured, was an impossibility as long as the Federal army was not crushed. The proof is, that as soon as the latter began to move, Lee, who had undertaken nothing but a raid on a too large scale, found himself so much endangered, that he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on the ground where Meade chose to wait for him. He ought to have manoeuvred in Virginia so as to bring on a battle before crossing the Potomac.
"3d. The way in which the fights of the 2d of July were directed does not show the same co-ordination which insured the success of the Southern arms at Gaines' Mill and Chancellorsville.
"4th. I do not understand why Lee, having gained some success on the 2d, but found the Federal position very strong, did not attempt to turn it by the south, which was its weak place, by extending his right so as to endanger Meades' communications with Washington.
"5th. The heroic but foolish attack of Pickett on the 3d should never have been made. Longstreet seems to think that it was imposed upon him against his will by Lee. General Early says distinctly, in a paper published by the Southern Historical Society, that Longstreet deferred it so long that the Second corps could not co-operate with it as it would have done had the attack taken place early in the morning. I hesitate very much between these two opinions."
I respond seriatim, and as concisely as I can, to his questions.
To the first and second, I may say, as far as I know and believe, the invasion of the North, at the time referred to, resulted from four reasons-viz: 1st. The difficulties lying in the path of an attack upon the Federal army in its chosen position in this (Stafford) county after Chancellorsville. 2d. The desire to manoeuvre it to a safer distance from the Confederate capital. 3d. The knowledge that a decisive battle fought in Maryland or Pennsylvania would in all probability have given us the former State with large accessions to our ranks from a sympathizing population, while Washington, the capital of our opponents, would have necessarily fallen—a prize the moral effect of which cannot be overestimated. I believe it was General Lee's original plan to strike the Federal army at the most favorable point as soon as he heard they had crossed the Potomac, and not so far from his base as Gettyburg; indeed he said so, but the absence af his cavalry, under Stuart, prevented its movements and the time of its crossing from being definitely known to him. In the language of the official report of the Commander of our army, we find it stated that "the movements of our army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of cavalry." And again: It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous." Finally, in the fourth place: The great relief to this country the withdrawal of the Federal army would have caused, as well as the immense relief given to the Commissary of the Confederate States, by the absence of the Army of Northern Virginia from the soil of Virginia—the question of supplies for man and beast being even at that time a troublesome one.
I fully agree with ——— in his opinion, expressed in his third declaration, as to a want of co-operation during the battle of the 2d July, 1863. I am decidedly of the opinion that the failure of co-operative effort, so visible upon that day, was the result of the different degrees of promptness with which General Lee's orders for attack were carried out by his subordinate commanders. It is difficult to conceive why, with two out of the three army corps of the Army of Northern Virginia in close contact with the enemy's position on the night of the 1st July, and two-thirds of the remaining corp in camp only four miles in rear, an attack upon the Federal force, not yet wholly concentrated on the 2d, but whose numbers were hourly growing stronger and whose position was hourly rendered more impregnable by the work of thousands of men, should have been delayed until 4 P. M.
I am satisfied that any military man, reading the sworn testimony of the leading Federal participants in that battle, before the Committee of Congress on the Conduct of the War, would agree in the conclusion I have reached, that an attack made upon the Federal position at Gettysburg any time before 12 o'clock on the morning of July 2d, 1863, would have embraced many elements of success; and from all I have heard and believe, such an attack was ordered.
In noticing the fourth and fifth proposition submitted, I begin by quoting General Lee's official report, in which he says: "The result of this day's (2d) operations induced the belief that with proper concert of action (rather a confession of its absence the day before) and with the increased support that position gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack."
The general plan of that attack was unchanged. Ewell, commanding on the extreme left, promptly attacked the enemy's right on the morning of the 3d, with Johnson's division of his corps, reinforced with two of Rodes', and one of Early's brigades, but was driven back and forced to retire to his original position about one in the afternoon; and here I quote General Lee's report: "The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to General Johnson's." General Lee adds, though, that this attack " was delayed by a force occupying the high rocky hill on the enemy's extreme left" When at last it -was made, the attacking column consisted of Pickett's and Heth's divisions, the latter under Pettigrew, (Heth having been wounded two days before). Behind Pickett's right marched Wilcox's brigade, and Pettigrew's support consisted of Lane's and Scales', brigadiers under General Trimble. This force moved to the attack some two hours after the cessation of the attempt by Ewell upon the enemy's right, and not coexistent with it, as contemplated. It has been said by military critics that General Lee did not make this assaulting column—charging beneath the eyes, as it were, of two armies, upon which their fate and the fate of their respective nations trembled—strong enough. Without going into that, I may say, the point in the enemy's lines to be seized was most admirably selected, and could it have been successfully held their line would undoubtedly have been forced back, General Meade, the Federal commander, admitting it was the key to his position. The prosecution of the attack on our part upon the 3d, was not in accordance, I believe, with the sound judgment of General Lee, though he admits a belief that it might have succeeded. He told the father of the writer (his brother) that he was controlled too far by the "great confidence felt in the splendid fighting qualities of his people," and who begged simply "to be turned loose," and the assurances of most of his higher officers, who believed the position in his front could be carried.
I think our trouble was in not making proper allowance for the great natural strength of the Federal position, immeasurably increased by the thousands of hands unweariedly working with but short intervals from the night of the 1st to the afternoon of the 3d, and defended by an army outnumbering ours by some 30,000 soldiers. I am inclined to the opinion that after the 2d no assault we could have made would have succeeded, however wisely the dispositions for it were executed—however gallantly performed. I do not see either, how, in such close proximity to a largely superior force—skirmish line against skirmish line—"General Lee could extended his right so as to endanger Meade's communications with Washington," as suggested by———. He would have exposed himself to an attack in turn which might have proved fatal—an examination of military history showing such moves can be rarely made, save when superior to your enemy in numbers and protected by favorable ground. After the night of the 2d the alternatives presented to General Lee were to await an attack by the enemy, to attack him, or withdraw from his immediate front in the direction of his own rear.
And now, having answered the questions asked, I hope you will pardon me if I go further and say that if I should be asked "to what can the failure of that campaign on our part be properly attributed," I should answer: 1st. The absence of General Stuart's cavalry from the army. 2d. The non-occupation of the hills south of Gettysburg by General Ewell on the afternoon of the 1st July, 1863. 3d. To the delay in the attack upon the 2d.
Let me turn your mind briefly to the two first, the third having already been commented upon. It is evident that General Stuart was ordered to give information of the enemy's crossing the Potomac, or why did General Lee loiter after crossing his army and wait to hear from him? Without orders it was his duty to do so as commander of his cavalry. The advance of the Army of Northern Virginia, under Ewell, entered Pennsylvania on the 22d of June. The Federal army crossed the Potomac on the 25th and 26th.
General Lee heard of that event on the night of the 28th June through a scout. Up to that period he thought their army was still in Virginia, because he had heard nothing from Stuart. Knowing as I do Stuart's strict attention to forwarding all species of information, I am bound to believe he did not fail to send the notice of this important fact. It may have miscarried. It has been charged that Stuart disobeyed orders in crossing his command at a lower point on the Potomac than that at which the Federals crossed, and making the circuit which interposed the army of the enemy between his command and the force of General Lee. I deny that. I know that he was left to the exercise of his own discretion. Indeed, General Lee says in his report that "in the exercise of the discretion given him, when Longstreet and Hill crossed into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it and Washington."
Free to act, I think the move selected was not the best under the circumstances. As soon as the Federal army began to cross the river, he should have marched to the west side of the Blue Ridge, crossed also, and moving rapidly to General Lee's front, have placed himself at once in direct communication with him. His bold activity would have developed the enemy's position, which, General Lee being no longer in ignorance of, could then have made his plans accordingly. In that event the battle would not in all probability have taken place at Gettysburg.
In justice to Stuart, it may be said that he had calculated upon the brigade of Jenkin's and White's batallion of cavalry, which accompanied Generals Ewell and Early, and Jones' and Robertson's brigades, which were left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, and were to rejoin General Lee as soon as the enemy crossed the river, to do all that was necessary. The brigade of General Jenkins, Stuart estimated at 3,800 troopers when leaving Virginia, and, referring to the complaint of the Commanding-General of a want of cavalry upon that occasion, says: "Properly handled such a command should have done everything requisite." In reference to the second point I have taken, there is evidence that a staff officer of General Lee carried an order to General Ewell on the afternoon of the 1st of July, that from where he (General Lee) was, he could see the enemy flying over the heights; to push on and occupy them. But in his official report of the operations of that day, General Lee says: " General Ewell was instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army"; and that Ewell "decided to wait for Johnson's division," of his corps, to get up, which had been left behind to guard the trains, and "did not reach Gettyburg until a late hour," and "in the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed seizing." At the beginning of the war I occupied the position of chief of staff to General Ewell, and bear too much love for his heroic memory to say more than that I believe a little more marching, perhaps a little more fighting, would have given us the coveted position, and that in such an event the battle of Gettysburg would have had another name, and possibly another result—who knows?
It must be borne in mind, however, that at the time of these operations, I was only a general officer of cavalry, serving under Stuart. My brigade accompanied his movement, and I did not reach Gettysburg until the afternoon of the 2d July, going into line on the extreme left of our army, and fighting the enemy's cavalry in my front on the third.
My personal knowledge of these events, which I fear I have criticised too freely, is not worth much. As a soldier and a graduate of the United States Military Academy, I have, however, formed my own opinions upon the important battle of Gettysburg, based conversations with other officers, including the Commanding-General himself, and the perusal of official reports and histories of both sides.
Among the soldiers now living, and who are accessible, and who know most about that campaign on our side, are Lieutenant-Generals Longstreet, Hood, Anderson and Early, and Major-Generals McLaws, Heth, Wilcox and Trimble; General Pendleton, chief of artillery; Generals Kemper, Lane and Scales; and Colonels Taylor, Marshall and Venable, of General Lee's staff.
Were I writing history, I should like to have the opinions of these officers upon this subject, from which, with the official reports in my possession, I would of course draw and write my own conclusions.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,