Southern Railway Company v. St. Louis Hay & Grain Company/Opinion of the Court

by David Josiah Brewer

United States Supreme Court

214 U.S. 297

Southern Railway Company  v.  St. Louis Hay & Grain Company

 Argued: March 8, 9, 1909. --- Decided: June 1, 1909

This case rests on the findings and conclusion of the Interstate Commerce Commission; for while, on the trial in the circuit court, testimony in addition to that which was produced before the Commission was received, yet the finding of the court was that, 'from all the evidence heard and adduced on the trial of this cause in this court, the court finds that the said findings of fact by the said Interstate Commerce Commission are supported and justified by the said evidence, and it is ordered that the said findings of fact, as above recited and set out, be and the same are adopted as the special findings of fact of the court, and that the same be set out in the records of this court accordingly.'

Nothing was, of course, added in the circuit court of appeals, which merely affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. We turn, therefore, to the proceedings before the Commission, and there is this finding of fact:

'While the question is perplexing, and while we may not have apprehended all the material points involved, we are strongly of the opinion and find that, taking everything into account, the average additional expense to southern lines in case of reconsigned hay will not exceed that of direct through shipments by more than from $2 to $2.50 per car, which is equivalent upon the average loading of hay to about 1 cent per hundred pounds.'

The conclusions, so far as material to this controversy, are thus stated:

'The stopping of a commodity in transit for the purpose of treatment or reconsignment is in the nature of special privilege which the carrier may concede, but which the shipper cannot, in the present state of the law, demand as a matter of lawful right. Diamond Mills v. Boston & M. R. Co. 9 Inters. Com. Rep. 311. Carriers may not, however, discriminate between markets nor between individuals in the granting of such privileges. If this right is given to the markets which compete with East St. Louis in this business by these defendants, it should, prima facie, also be granted to that market. If these defendants allow this privilege to the competitors of the complainant at East St. Louis, they should accord it the same privilege.

'The case shows, although not very clearly, that the defendants concede this privilege at other competing markets, and that a track buyer in East St. Louis itself can send along a car load, which he purchases, but does not unload, without the payment of this charge. It further shows, however, that the right to unload this hay and handle it at its warehouse is of value to the complainant, and that it costs these defendants something to accord that privilege.

'Under these circumstances, we think it is not an undue preference against this complainant if the railroads charge for the privilege what it actually costs them, but we do not think that they should charge more than the actual cost. The case finds that the fair average cost when the complainant handles its hay through its warehouse, over and above the cost of a through shipment, is from $2 to $2.50 per car, or approximately 1 cent per hundred pounds. We think, therefore, that this reconsignment charge ought not to exceed the proportional rate by more than one cent, and that the complainant is entitled to recover whatever it has paid in addition to that sum.'

It thus appears that the Commission was of the opinion that the shipper could not demand, as a matter of right, the stopping of the hay for the purposes of treatment or reconsignment unless the same privilege was given to other shippers; and that, in granting this privilege, the railway company could only charge the shipper the actual cost. But this privilege involved to the railway company the cost of hauling to and from the warehouses and the use of the car for some hours, perhaps days. The Commission found that $2 or $2.50 per car, or approximately 1 cent per hundred pounds, was the actual cost to the railway company.

We are unable to concur with the Commission. If the stopping for inspection and reloading is of some benefit to the shipper and involves some service by and expense to the railway company, we do not think that the latter is limited to the actual cost of that privilege. It is justified in receiving some compensation in addition thereto. A carrier may be under no obligations to furnish sleeping or other accommodations to its passengers, but, if it does so, it is not limited in its charges to the mere cost, but may rightfully make a reasonable profit out of that which it does furnish. Especially is this true when, as here, the privilege is in no sense a part of the transportation, but outside thereof. Whether the conclusion of the Commission that the carrier is under no obligations to permit the interruption of the transit is right, and whether it is or is not under such obligation, it is entitled to receive some compensation beyond the mere cost for that which it does.

We have been particular to copy the exact language used by the Commission, for, in another case between the same plaintiff and other railroad companies, involving the charges in a case of reconsignment of hay, decided on December 20 of the same year (St. Louis Hay & Grain Co. v. Illinois C. R. Co. 11 Inters. Com. Rep. 486), the Commission made an order dismissing the complaint. It is true that the facts are not precisely like those in this case, but, at the same time, the difference in the conclusions of the Commission is such as seem to suggest that perhaps, on further examination, the Commission had come to a different conclusion.

The testimony taken before the Commission is not preserved in the record, hence it would be impossible, even if proper, with all the testimony before us, to fix the amount which would be a fair and reasonable charge. All we can do is to reverse the judgments of the Circuit Court and Circuit Court of Appeals, and remand the case to the former court with instructions to send the matter back to the Commerce Commission for further investigation and report.

Reversed.

Notes