State Documents on Federal Relations/61
61. Report and Resolutions of Connecticut.
May Session, 1831.Your committee have also had under consideration certain
resolutions of the Legislature of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, relative to the judicial power of the United States — a subject of sufficient importance to justify a more extended notice.
At a period when, in some portions of our country, a disposition is manifested to array the jealousies of the people against the judicial departtnent of the government of the United States, when executive officers are instructed, in all the formality of legislative enactment, to disregard the legal precepts of the Supreme Court of the United States — it well becomes those who regard a dissolution of our Union as one of the most dreadful of political evils, to interpose a mild, but firm expression of their opinion. The people by their sovereign pleasure, created by the same act the executive, legislative and judicial departments of the federal government. The inefficiency of the old confederation to secure respect and obedience, taught them the necessity of so organizing the federal government, that it could lay its hands on individuals, and thus directly enforce the laws of the Union, and protect those acting under them from injury or interruption, by the laws of any one of the states. It was the force of external circumstances only that gave to the recommendations of the old congress the authority of laws. When the outward pressure was removed, the Union was practically dissolved, and anarchy ensued. Without the judicial department, the Congress of the United States would now be but an assemblage of embassadors, whose efficiency would begin and end in advisory consulta-
tions; the people would obey, or not, as their interests and feelings might dictate. The courts of the several states partake, too readily of local jealousies and excitements, to be entrusted with the final determination of questions involving the validity or construction of the federal laws ; and questions of policy of much less importance than those that now agitate our country, would soon put an end to our ephemeral Union. The judicial department, therefore constitutes one of those peculiarities, which distinguish the present government from the old confederation — a co-ordinate branch — which, in the opinion of youi committee, is absolutely necessary for the successful organization of our government.
It being one of the first principles of a republic, that the legislative and judicial departments be kept entirely distinct, the patriot has nothing to apprehend from the power or ambition of the courts. Speaking of the three great departments, an eminent civilian says, "the judiciary is next to nothing." It has indeed no power over the wealth or strength of the nation. It has neither force nor will, but merely judgment, and can not enforce even that, without the aid of the executive. * * * An independent judiciary is absolutely indispensable, for the protection of the people in their reserved rights, and for the preservation of every department of the government in its appropriate and destined action. It is indeed the great balance wheel of the Constitution ; which from its own weakness needs, and its inestimable value deserves the constant care and vigilance of the community, to protect it from the attacks of the other departments of the government, both state and federal. * * »
Resolved, [Here follows quotation from Art. VI, § 2, of U. S. Const.]
Resolved, That we regard the judicial department of the government of the United States, as sacred in its origin, and invaluable in its purposes and objects, as either the executive or legislative departments; and we also regard the designs of any community, to destroy it, or to paralyze its influence, among the people of these states, as the manifestation of feelings, unfriendly to the permanent interests of our common country.
[From Copy in the Journal of the House of Representatives of Pennsylvania, 1831-32, 11,41-43.]