The Book of the Apple, ascribed to Aristotle/Remarks on the Arabic version of the Metaphysics of Theophrastus

4460687The Book of the Apple, ascribed to Aristotle — Remarks on the Arabic version of the Metaphysics of TheophrastusDavid Samuel Margoliouth


The MS. from which this text has been copied (Ouseley 95) bearing the title “Translations from Greek Philosophers,” among others, contains a variety of interesting matter, which has been catalogued by Dr. Ethé with his ordinary thoroughness.[1] Perhaps the only tract in the Miscellany which can properly be called a translation of a Greek philosophical work is No. xvi., consisting of four torn leaves which originally contained an Arabic translation of the fragment of Theophrastus ordinarily known as his Metaphysics. We learn from Wenrich's authorities that Yahya ibn Adi (ob. 363 a.h. = 973 a.d.) rendered this treatise into Arabic from Syriac; the present translation is probably by him, though it might seem to have come directly from the Greek. Although the MS. is perfect at the commencement — for the obverse page is blank — the copy from which it was made must have contained more; for the present MS. commences in the middle of a sentence, viz. at the word ἑκάτερα, p. 410, l. 15, ed. Didot, p. 308, §2, Brandis, p. iv, a. 12, Usener. The fragments — counting any line in which a word or more has been preserved as a whole line; owing to the pages having been torn obliquely, very few of the lines are complete — cover the following portion of Usener's edition (Bonn, Index Scholarum, 1890–1).

Fol. 1. U. iv. a. 12, §2 — v. a. 2, §5, κρείττονι.
2. U. v. b. 11, §9, ἐπιζητήσειεν — vi. a. 19, §11, Ἀρχύτας.
3. U. vi. a. 19, §11 — vii. a. 16, §15, λαμβάνουσιν.
4. U. viii. a. 8, §17, πῶς ποτε — viii. b. 21, §20, ἰδίων.
5. U. viii. b. 21 — i. b. 11, § 25, δυνάμεθα.
6. U. x. a. 25, §28, ἄρξασθαι — xi. a. 10, § 31, οἰσοφάγου.
7. U. xi. a. 10 — end.

The following passage, which is fairly well preserved, will serve as a specimen of the translation (cf. U. p. xi. a. 2, § 31).

فان لم یکن هذه من قبل شی قصد به الامر الافضل فقد ینبغی ان نقف على حدودها ولا نضع هذا القول على جمیع الاشیاء مطلقا وذلک ان هذه الاشیاء کانه [کانّ read] القول فیها یمیل الى الجهتین اذا قیلت على الاطلاق واذا قیلت على واحد واحد اعنی بالقول على الاطلاق ان الطبیعة فی کل شی تتشوق الى الافضل وانها فیها جحتمج ذلک تفیده النظام والدوام وکذلک یجری الامرء . . والحیوانات وذلک انها حیث یمکن . . . لیس تقصر فی موضع من المواضع ومثال ذلک ان الحنجرة جعلت من مقدم المری . . . . وکذلک جعل . . . . . کانت الشهوة تجری هذا المجری الا انه قد یظهر ان ما لا ئواتیها ولا یقبل الامر الافضل کثیر بل هو اکثر کثیرا مما یقبله وذلک ان ذا النفس قلیل قما لا نفس لا ولا یحصی کثرة واسرع تکونا مما له نفس واجود وجودا وبالجملة فان الجید یسیر وفی اشیاء یسیرة والردی کثیر العدد وخروج هذا عن الحد فقط هو بمنزلة ما یکون فی طبیعة غایة الجهل فان الذین تکلموا فی الجواهر باسره مثل سپوسیپس جعلوا الشریف فی الموضع الوسط ینبغي فاما افلاطون وشیعة فوثاغورس فانهم باعدوا الامر بعدا کثیرا بما راوه

Translation: “And if these things are not because of anything in which the better was intended, then it is necessary that we should understand its limits and not assert this proposition of everything absolutely. For in these things the statement as it were sways to two sides, when they are stated absolutely, and when they are stated individually. I mean by the absolute statement, that nature in everything desires the better, and that she, wherever possible, bestows order and persistence. The same is the case with . . . and animals. For where it is possible . . . she does not fail in any single place. An example of that is how the throat is placed in front of the œsophagus . . and likewise there is placed . . . The desire follows the same course; only it appears that what does not obey it nor accept the better matter is abundant, nay, it is far more abundant than what does accept it. For that which is possessed of soul is of small number, whereas what has no soul is innumerable and comes quicker into existence than what has a soul, and is better in existence. And in general the good is little and in few things; and the bad large in number. And the fact that this only exceeds limit is like what is in the nature of the extremity of folly. For those who talked of substance as a whole like Speusippus made the honourable in the middle place small and rare, whereas the extremes on either side of the middle are according to them as they should be. Plato and the Pythagoreans however carried the matter very far in what they held.”

It is to be regretted that the passage breaks off here.

The following readings would seem to be of some interest (cf. Usener, Rheinisches Museum, xvi. 264 sqq.).

iv. a. 16, §2, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἀίδια τῶν φθαρτῶν: the beginning of the line is lost; the Arabic, however, has

كتقدم الاشياء الازلية للاشياء القابلة للفساد

like the priority of eternal things to things which are corruptible.

iv. a. 20, §3, οὔθ’ ὅλως ἀξιόχρεα φαίνεται παντός:

ولا هی فی الجملة مما جحتاج اليه وينتفع به فی الكل

nor are they altogether such as are needed or can be useful in all or on the whole. This would represent πάντως.

23, αὐτὰ δὲ δι’ αὑτῶν οὐδεμίαν ἔχει φύσιν:

انما هی بمنزلة ما نخترعه فنضعه وضعا واما هي فی انفسها فليست لهل طبيعة قائمة

They are merely likely what we invent and set up ourselves, and as for them in themselves, they have not any abiding nature.

Owing to the loss of the preceding words, it is difficult to say whether ἔχει or ἔχειν was read; nor can we be sure that abiding was a supplement of the translator.

The next words εἰ δὲ μή, οὐχ ὥστε συνάπτει τοῖς τῆς φύσεως ὥστ’ ἐμποιῆσαι καθάπερ ζωὴν καὶ κίνησιν αὐτοῖς are represented by fragments:

وان لم تكن لهل [طبيـ]ـعة قائمة فليس . . . تتصل . . . [طـ]ـبيعة حتى تحدث فيها حياة وحركة مثلا

And if they have no permanent nature; the stroke that remains of the last word seems to me to point to يمكنها ان [they cannot] be connected with the [things appertaining to] nature so as to create in them life and motion as it were.

This would be in favour of the conjecture οἷα τε for ὥστε (Hoffmann). The Arabic continues:

وذلک ان العدد نفسه فضلا عن غيره وهو الذی يعتقد [فيه النا]س انه . . . . طـ . . . [طبـ]ـيعة قائمة وان كان ههنا جوهر ما اخر اشد تقدما وفضلا فقد ينبغی ان نروم القول فيه هل هو واحد فی العدد [او وا]حد فی النوع او واحد فی الجنس والاولی اذا كانت طبيعتها طبيعة مندا ان يكون وجودها فی اشياء كثيرة زايدة اللهم الا ان تكون الائل وجودها

for even number itself, much less anything else, which people believe . . . . has not an abiding [nature]. And if there be here any other substance of greater priority and excellence, we should endeavour to speak about it, whether it be one in number or [one] in species or one in genus. And it is most probable, since its nature is the nature of a beginning, that its existence is in many, abundant things, unless the first parts of its existence . . . .

p. v. a, §5, ἡ κυκλικὴ κίνησις. Usener’s insertion of the word κίνησις; is distinctly confirmed by the corresponding fragment,

هی طبيعة السوب [التشوق read] التی عنها تكون حركة الدور

the nature οf . . . from which there comes the circular motion.

U. v. b. 18, §10, ὥσπερ ἄδεκτόν τι καὶ ἀσύνθετον εἶναι.

Arab. fragment غير قابل ولا محتمل للارتباط

not receiving nor enduring to be tied together.

This confirms Usener’s conjecture ἀσύνδετον which the Arabic exactly represents.

U. v. b. 23, συμβαίνει γὰρ οἷον κατὰ συμβεβηκός κτλ.

كانها عرض لزمها عن الحركة الدورية

it is like an accident which attends her from the circular motion.

The words καὶ εἰς τοῦς τόπους μεταβολάς were omitted by the translator.

U. v. b. 27, κάλλιον ἄν τι παρὰ τοῦ πρώτου δέοι τῆς κυκλοφορίας κτλ.

فقد يحتاج من ال . . . . . . . م سی يلى الوسط الى شی هو افضل من الحركة الدورية

It would require . . . . . . . which comes near the middle something better than the circular motion.

U. vi. a. 14, §11, καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὥσπερ ἑτέρων λόγων κτλ.

واخلق لقائل ان يقول ان الكلام فی هذا المعنی ليس هذا موضعه لكن ليت شعری للانسان ان يعتقد من هذا المبدا او من هذه انما . . . ثم ينقطع

And it is fitter for the speaker [i.e. any one] to say that this is not the place for the discussion of this subject. Only would I knew whether a man should believe from this beginning or from these beginnings or from the rest of the beginnings existing together at one time.

Wimmer conjectured in l. 17 ἄλλων ἀρχῶν, which is perhaps confirmed.

vi. b. 3, §12, χρόνον δ’ ἅμᾳ καὶ οὐρανόν.

These words occur at the end of a line in the Arabic والزمان مع السماء which is not therefore in favour of U.’s athetesis.

vi. b. 5, οὐδεμίαν ἔτι ποιοῦνται μνείαν,

لم يذكروه اصلا فضلا عن ان يشرعوا فيه

they did not mention them at all, not to speak of dealing with them; شرع is used below for ἅπτεσθαι.

vi. b. 10, §13, Πλάτων μέν — μόνον:

[واما] افلاطون فانه عند رده الى المنادی قد يظن انه قد شرع فی سائر الاشياء بانه رد الاشياء [الى] الصور الى الاعداد وترقی من الاعداد الى المبادی فلما اخذ فی الكلام فی التولد بلغ الى الصور

As for Plato, when reducing [things] to the beginnings he might be thought to have dealt with the rest of things, inasmuch as he reduced things to the forms and the forms to the numbers and ascended from the numbers to the beginnings; and when he began to discuss generation he reached the forms.

This does not seem in favour of Usener’s emendation κατἀγειν for κατά.

vii. a. 15, § 15. The words على ما قال اروس according as Heraclitus said appears as a solitary fragment. But the word يستعملون for λαμβάνουσιν shows that Yahya read the following paragraph.

viii. b. 4, §18, καὶ μέλανα ἐν αὐτοῖς: the remnant of a line begins الاسود فيها the black in them.

§§19 and 20 are fairly well preserved in the Arabic.

viii. b. 24, §20, ὅλως is represented by the Arabic بالجملة in general.

viii. b. 26, §20, οἷον ἀριθμοῖς ζῴοις φυτοῖς:

بمنزلة ما يقال فی الاعداد وفی الخطوطـ الخ

like that which is said about numbers and about lines, etc.

Usener’s conjecture (Rh.M. p. 274) that ἐν should be inserted seems confirmed.

viii. b. 27, §20, τέλεος δ’ ἑ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔστιν δ’ ἔνια (ἔνθα Usener) τῶν μὴ καθόλου τέλος κτλ:

والمعرفة الكاملة هی من الامور الكلية كالغاية والمقصود اليها [اليه read] فان السبب انما وجوده فی هذه وهی من الامور الجزئية بقدر القسمة الى اشخاص

And perfect knowledge is in respect of universal things like the

end and the goal; for the existence of the cause is in these only; but in respect of particular things it is to the extent of the division into individuals.

The translator might seem to have read τέλος δὲ τῶν μὲν καθόλου τέλος, τῶν δὲ ἐν μέρει.

ix. a. 7, §21, διὰ πλείστου δὲ τὸ κατ’ ἀναλογίαν:

Usener’s conjecture τῷ is distinctly confirmed:

الا ان اكثر ما يقف [نقف .l] به على ذلک بالمقايسة

except that most of what we understand it by is by analogy.

ix. a, 14, §22, τὰ ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ τὰ ἑπόμενα:

وما من هذه فی المبادی وما منها لواحق

and what of these things are in the beginnings and what of them are following.

ix. b. 1, § 24, τοῖς πλεοναχῶς λεγομένοις ἤ καὶ τοῦτ’ ἄπορον.

الاشياء التی تقال من جهات شتی ولعل هذه . . . . .

the things which are said in different ways; and perhaps this.

x. l. 4, §29, ἧ αἳ μὲν ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ κτλ.

The words وكذلک نسل عما and likewise we shall ask concerning what, correspond with the beginning of this sentence; after a loss of two-thirds of a line then follows ـ [اشـ]ـياء اخر ليست باليسيرة other things not a few = x. b. 6, καὶ ἕτερα οὐκ ὀλίγα. Yahya must have either read the passage bracketed by Usener, or some substitute for it.

x. b. 12, §29, κινήσει καὶ παραιωρήσει is rendered فی الحركة والا ستقلال, the first of which represents κινήσει.

x. b. 13, § 29. The sentence καὶ ὥς ἔνια — τοιαῦτα is omitted.

x. b. 16, §30. The words καὶ τὸ μέγιστον δὴ καὶ μάλιστα δοκοῦν are rendered:

واعظم ما يدخل الشک فيه من ذلک واخصه له

the greatest point of this into which the doubt enters and the point to which it especially belongs.

x. b. 19, §30, εἴπερ τούτων χάριν: Arab. من اجل شئ on account of anything, confirming Usener’s conjecture του χάριν. The last word is almost obliterated, but can from the diacritic points have been nothing else.

The next sentence is

وللانسان ايضا ان يبحث من امر النبات بل من امر الانفس عن السبب الذی له صار

and a man may also inquire, concerning plants, nay, concerning the souls [read the soulless] of the cause for which there became . .

For p. xi. a. 1, §31 to xi. b. I, § 33 see above. The place would have corresponded to μιμεῖσθαι γ’ ἐθέλειν ἅπαντα is unfortunately obliterated; the word which remains is apparently يتقبله will receive it. The text contains:

هذا على انهم وضعوا سببها بالتضادّ الاثنوة الغير المحدودة وللواحد يدخل فيه الخروج عن التناهی والنظام

although they made its cause to consist in the contrariety between the infinite dyad and the one, wherein enters infinitude and disorder.

xi. b. 5, § 33, ἄνευ ταύτης: خلوا من تلک يهنی الرداوة free from this, i.e. mischief; similarly after ἑτέρας; a gloss يعنی الخيرورة meaning goodness.

xi. b. 12, ἐξ ἐναντίων γε καὶ ἐν ἐναντίοις οὖσαν.

έν was added by Sylburg; Yahya must have read it, as appears from the rendering

من قبل انه من اشياء متضادة وفی اشياء متضادة

since it is of contraries and in contraries.

xi. b. 15, §34, οὔτε γὰρ τὸ βέλτιον οὔτε τὸ τινὸς χάριν:

فان هذه تقصد . . . الافضل وان جعلت من . . . ويبعث اماما ضروريا

for these things intend . .. the better, and if they are regarded . .

The MS. represented by Yahya was clearly better than any existing.

Although the amount to be obtained from these fragments is not as great as might be wished, it is still interesting to find them confirm some scholars’ conjectures.

No. xxiii. Plato’s de legibus is of course wholly spurious; the passages quoted by Dr. Ethé show this.

  1. Persian MSS. of the Bodleian Library, pp. 861-875.