The Last Will and Testament of Cecil Rhodes/Part 2/Chapter 3

CHAPTER III.—HIS CORRESPONDENCE.

Mr. Rhodes was not a great letter-writer. A few of his friends, such as Mr. Rudd, his partner in his early days, have a copious collection of letters from Mr. Rhodes, but few public men were ever so sparing in their correspondence. Of his published letters there are two series which cannot be omitted from any attempt to represent the Rhodesian ideas. The first is the Parnell correspondence of 1888, and the other the Schnadhorst correspondence of 1891. These are the only two occasions on which Mr. Rhodes took a direct hand in Imperial politics outside his own particular sphere. In both he operated in the same way, namely, by using his wealth to put a premium upon certain policies or offer a reward for the repudiation of certain heresies. It is unnecessary here to go minutely into the genesis of the famous donation to the Irish National funds. It is well, however, to remember that, like almost every other colonist, Mr. Rhodes was a Home Ruler long before the adoption of Home Rule as the official creed of the Liberal Party. From 1882–84 Mr. Rhodes seems to have dallied with the idea of standing for a seat in Parliament, nominally as member of the Conservative Party, but really as member for South Africa. The idea had gained sufficient substance for Sir Charles Warren to write to Mr. Rhodes’s brother (March 4th, 1884), saying, “Your brother has great mental power for organising, and will be a most valuable addition to the Conservative ranks.”

In 1885, when Mr. Gladstone had taken the plunge for Home Rule, Mr Rhodes seriously contemplated standing for Parliament as Liberal candidate for the constituency in which the Dalston property of his family was situated. On looking at the matter more closely, however, he found that Parliamentary attendance would be too great a tax upon his time. It would be impossible for him to alternate between Westminster and South Africa, as in the old days he divided his life between Kimberley and Oriel College. He returned to Africa, but continued to follow with the keenest interest the course of Imperial politics.

His sympathies being well known, overtures were made to him on the part of some sympathisers with the Irish National Party as to whether he could not be induced to contribute to their funds. Mr. Swift MacNeill was employed as an intermediary, and the result of the communications was that Mr. Rhodes intimated his readiness to subscribe to the Home Rule funds on condition that Mr. Parnell assented to the retention of the Irish members at Westminster. Mr. Rhodes held that Mr. Gladstone’s first Home Rule Bill simply proposed to convert Ireland into a taxed republic, without representation in the central governing body of the Empire, thus making Home Rule lead direct to disruption, instead of making it a stepping-stone to federation. Mr. Rhodes entirely accepted the formula so succinctly stated by Lord Rosmead, when he declared that “as an Empire we must federate or perish, and the one hope of the Empire is that the Irish may compel us to federate, even against our will.”

When Mr. Gladstone, therefore, instead of seizing the opportunity presented by the concession of Home Rule to introduce the principle of federalism of the British Constitution, took the fatal and false road of proposing to banish the Irish members altogether from the assembly which still retained the right of exacting heavy tribute from the Irish taxpayer, Mr. Rhodes felt that an important crisis had been reached in the history of the Empire. It was necessary for him to act, and to act with decision. Mr. Swift MacNeill’s conversations had revealed to him the nakedness of the Nationalist treasury. He was solicited to subscribe to keep the Home Rule agitation going. He saw the situation, and seized it with his characteristic promptitude. On his return to England, Mr. Parnell called upon Mr. Rhodes at the Westminster Palace Hotel, and a transaction took place between them, which Mr. Rhodes always regarded as very good business for the Empire. In his belief he succeeded in pledging Mr. Parnell to the abandonment of the old disruptive idea of the first Gladstonian Home Rule Bill, and his loyal acceptance of the principle of federalism. By this arrangement Mr. Parnell, instead of accepting the exclusion of Irish members from Westminster and the conversion of Ireland into a taxed republic, which would be furnished in advance with an excuse for revolt by the familiar maxim “taxation without representa
Photograph by][E. H. Mills.

Mr. C. D. Rudd.

tion is tyranny,” undertook to accept a Home Rule Bill based upon the opposite principle of the retention of Irish members. Mr. Rhodes wished the numbers of the Irish to be reduced from their present figure of 103 to 34, at any rate unless he was guaranteed the full control of the Irish police and judiciary. At that time he was willing that the question of the reduction of the Irish representation at Westminster to the figure corresponding to the extent of their contribution to Imperial taxation should be debated as an open question. He also agreed that he would not make any opposition to a clause permitting any self-governing colony to send representatives to the House of Commons on the basis of the amount of their annual contribution to the Imperial exchequer.

Mr. Parnell himself said he was prepared to accept this cheerfully, but when pressed by Mr. Rhodes to move an amendment he demurred on the ground that some of his party might object. The deal having thus been arranged in personal interview, from which both parties emerged with a profound respect for each other, Mr. Rhodes proceeded to embody the substance of their bargain in the following letter[1] to Mr. Parnell:—


Westminster Palace Hotel,
London, S.W.
June 19th, 1888.

Dear Sir,—On my way to the Cape last autumn I had the opportunity of frequent conversations with Mr. Swift MacNeill upon the subject of Home Rule for Ireland. I then told him that I had long had a sympathy with the Irish demand for self-government, but that there were certain portions of Mr. Gladstone’s Bill which appeared open to the gravest objections. The exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster seemed rightly to be considered, both in England and the Colonies, as a step in the direction of pure separation; while the tribute clauses were, on the face of them, degrading to Ireland by placing it in the position of a conquered province, and were opposed to the first principles of constitutional government by sanctioning taxation without representation. It has been frequently stated that the hearty acquiescence of the Irish members in these proposals gave good grounds for believing that they were really working for complete separation from England. Mr. MacNeill assured me that this was not the case; that naturally the first object of the Irish members was to obtain self-government for Ireland; and that when this, their main object, was secured, it did not become them to criticise or cavil at the terms of the grant made to them. Moreover, he said he believed that the Irish members were only too anxious to support Irish representation at Westminster, should a suitable scheme containing the necessary provisions be brought forward.

Lord Rosebery, in his recent speech at Inverness, has suggested a possible solution. He there proposes a reduced Irish representation at Westminster; this representation could be based upon the amount of the Irish contribution to the Imperial revenue. And though it seems illogical that Irish members should vote on English local matters, still, taking into constderation the large indirect contribution that Ireland would make in connection with trade and commerce, and that the English people are not prepared at present to accept any vital change of their Constitution, it would appear more workable that this reduced number of Irish members should speak and vote even on purely english local questions than that at doubtful intervals they should be called upon to withdraw into an outside lobby.

With (some such) safeguards—and they must be effective safeguards for the maintenance of Imperial unity—I am of the opinion that the Home Rule granted should be a reality, and not a sham.

If the Irish are to be conciliated and benefited by the grant of self-government, they should be trusted, and trusted entirely. Otherwise the application of popular institutions to Ireland must be deemed impracticable, and the only alternative is the administration of the country as a Crown colony, which plan in the present state of public opinion is totally impossible.

My experience in the Cape Colony leads me to believe that the Ulster question is one which would soon settle itself.

Since the Colonial Office has allowed questions at the Cape to be settled by the Cape Parliament, not only has the attachment to the Imperial tie been immeasurably strengthened, but the Dutch, who form the majority of the population, have shown a greatly increased consideration for the sentiments of the English members of the community.

It seems only reasonable to suppose that in an Irish Parliament similar consideration would be given to the sentiments of that portion of the inhabitants which is at present out of sympathy with the national movement.

I will frankly add that my interest in the Irish

Photograph by][E. H. Mills.

Dr. Jameson and Mr. Boyd.

question has been heightened by the fact that in it I see the possibility of the commencement of changes which will eventually mould and weld together all parts of the British Empire.

The English are a conservative people, and like to move slowly, and as it were experimentally. At present there can be no doubt that the time of Parliament is overcrowded with the discussion of trivial and local affairs. Imperial matters have to stand their chance of a hearing alongside of railway and tram bills. Evidently it must be a function of modern legislation to delegate an enormous number of questions which now occupy the time of Parliament, to District Councils or local bodies.

Mr. Chamberlain recognised this fact in his Radical programme of 1885, and the need daily grows more urgent. Now the removal of Irish affairs to an Irish Legislature [Council] would be a practical experimental step in the direction of lessening the burden upon the central deliberative and legislative machine.

But side by side with the tendency of decentralisation for local affairs, there is growing up a feeling for the necessity of greater union in Imperial matters. The primary tie which binds our Empire together is the national one of self-defence. The Colonies are already commencing to co-operate with and contribute to the mother country for this purpose.

But if they are to contribute permanently and beneficially they will have to be represented in the Imperial Parliament, where the distribution of their contributions must be decided upon.

I do not think that it can be denied that the presence of two or three Australian members in the House would in recent years have prevented much misunderstanding upon such questions as the New Hebrides, New Guinea, and Chinese immigration. Now an [reduced] Irish representation at Westminster (with numbers proportionate to Ireland’s Imperial contribution) would, without making any vital change in the English Constitution, furnish a precedent by which the self-governing Colonies could from time to time, as they expressed a desire to contribute to Imperial expenditure, be incorporated with the Imperial Legislature. You will perhaps say that I am making the Irish question a stalking-horse for a scheme of Imperial Federation; but if so, I am at least placing Ireland in the forefront of the battle.

The question is, moreover, one in which I take a deep interest, and I shall be obliged if you can tell [assure] me that Mr. MacNeill is not mistaken in the impression he conveyed to me, and that you and your Party would be prepared to give your hearty support and approval to a Home Rule Bill containing provisions for the continuance of Irish representation at Westminster. Such a declaration would afford great satisfaction to myself and others, and would enable us to give our full and active support to your cause and your Party.

I shall be happy to contribute to the funds of the Party to the extent of £10,000. I am also, under the circumstances, authorised to offer you a further sum of £1,000 from Mr. John Morrogh, an Irish resident at Kimberley, South Africa.—Yours faithfully, C. J. Rhodes.

Note.The portions of this letter printed in italics are the omissions made by Parnell from the original draft submitted to him. The word “Council” on page 124, in brackets, and the word “assure” on page 125, in brackets, were omitted in favour of mere verbal alterations.

To this Mr. Parnell replied as follows:—


House of Commons,
June 23, 88.

Dear Sir,—I am much obliged to you for your letter of the 20th inst., which confirms the very interesting account given me at Avondale last January by Mr. Swift MacNeill as to his interviews and conversations with you on the subject of Home Rule for Ireland.

I may say at once and frankly that I think you have correctly judged the exclusion of the Irish members from Westminster to have been a defect in the Home Rule measure of 1886, and further, that this proposed exclusion may have given some colour to the accusations so freely made against the Bill, that it had a separatist tendency. I say this while strongly asserting and believing that the measure itself was accepted by the Irish people without any afterthought of the kind, and with an earnest desire to work it out in the same spirit in which it was offered, a spirit of cordial goodwill and trust, a desire to let bygones be bygones, and a determination to accept it as a final and satisfactory settlement of the longstanding dispute and trouble between Great Britain and Ireland.

I am very glad to find that you consider the measure of Home Rule to be granted to Ireland should be thoroughgoing, and should give her complete control over her own affairs without reservation, and I cordially agree with your opinion that there should be at the same time effective safeguards for the maintenance of Imperial unity. Your conclusion as to the only alternative for Home Rule is also entirely my own, for I have long felt that the continuance of the present semi-constitutional system is quite impracticable.

But to return to the question of the retention of the Irish members at Westminster, my own views upon the point, the probabilities of the future, and the bearing of this subject upon the question of Imperial Federation. My own feeling upon the matter is, that if Mr. Gladstone includes in his next Home Rule measure provisions for such retention, we should cheerfully concur in them, and accept them with good will and good faith, with the intention of taking our share in the Imperial
Photograph by][E. H. Mills.

Sir Harry Johnston.

partnership. I believe also that in the event stated this will be the case, and that the Irish people will cheerfully accept the duties and responsibilities assigned to them, and will justly value the position given them in the Imperial system.

I am convinced that it would be the highest statesmanship on Mr. Gladstone’s part, to devise a feasible plan for the continued presence of the Irish members here, and from my observation of public events and opinion since 1885, I am sure that Mr. Gladstone is fully alive to the importance of the matter, and that there can be no doubt that the next measure of autonomy for Ireland will contain the provisions which you rightly deem of such moment. It does not come so much within my province to express a full opinion upon the question of Imperial Federation, but I quite agree with you that the continued Irish representation at Westminster will immensely facilitate such a step, while the contrary provision in the Bill of ’86 would have been a bar. Undoubtedly this is a matter which should be dealt with in accordance with the opinion of the Colonies themselves, and if they should desire to share in the cost of Imperial matters, as certainly they now do in the responsibility, and should express a wish for representation at Westminster, I quite think it should be accorded to them, and that public opinion in these islands would unanimously concur in the necessary constitutional modifications.—I am, dear sir, yours truly, Charles Stewart Parnell. C. J. Rhodes, Esq.


Mr. Rhodes confirmed the bargain by the following letter:—


Westminster Palace Hotel, London.
June 24, 1888.

Dear Mr. Parnell,—I have to thank you for your letter of the 23rd inst., the contents of which have given me great pleasure.

I feel sure that your cordial approval of the retention of Irish representation at Westminster will gain you support in many quarters from which it has hitherto been withheld.

As a proof of my deep and sincere interest in the question, and as I believe that the action of the Irish party on the basis which you have stated will lead, not to disintegration, but really to a closer union of the Empire, making it an Empire in reality, and not in name only, I am happy to offer a contribution to the extent of £10,000 to the funds of your party. I am also authorised to offer you a further sum of £1,000 from Mr. John Morrogh, an Irish resident in Kimberley, South Africa.—Believe me, yours faithfully, C. J. Rhodes.

P.S.—I herewith enclose a cheque for £5,000 as my first instalment.

A year after this, Mr. Parnell went down to Hawarden to settle the details of the next Home Rule Bill with Mr. Gladstone. In the beginning of 1890 he wrote to Mr. Rhodes to say that the retention of the Irish Members at Westminster had been agreed upon, but that Mr. Gladstone insisted on reducing the representation in order to conciliate English public opinion. Mr. Rhodes, characteristically enough, had lost Mr. Parnell’s letter, and the evidence as to its contents is a report of Mr. Parnell’s speech in 1891.

When the unfortunate breach between Mr. Parnell and the majority of the Irish Party took place at the beginning of 1891, Mr. Parnell so far forgot the rôle which he had marked out for himself as to address to a meeting at Navan a declaration that “some day or other, in the long-distant future, someone might arise who may have the privilege of addressing you as men of Republican Meath.” Mr. Rhodes, on seeing a report of this speech, at once wrote to expostulate with Mr. Parnell, pointing out how inconsistent was this declaration about Republican Meath with the loyal maintenance of Imperial unity on a federal basis. Instead of resenting being thus recalled to the letter of his contract, Mr. Parnell wrote promptly and admitted his mistake. He said he regretted the words he had used; he had gone further than he intended, and, as a matter of fact, the words in question were contradicted by other passages of the same speech, as, for example, when he said: “We are willing to show that the existence of Irish autonomy is compatible with Imperial prosperity and progress.”

Neither Mr. Rhodes’s letter of expostulation nor Mr. Parnell’s letter of explanation and apology is in existence, Mr. Parnell’s letter having been burnt in the fire that destroyed Groote Schuur.

The Parnell correspondence proves one thing conclusively, if nothing else—namely, that the suspicion and distrust excited by Mr. Rhodes’ contribution to the Irish National Fund was absolutely without justification. Nothing could have been straighter and more above-board than the bargain between the two men, and the aim and object of that deal was not, as Mr. Rhodes’s assailants pretended and still pretend, to assist in a separatist movement intended to break up the Empire; its aim was exactly the reverse—namely, to confine the movement for local self-government in Ireland within the limits of a federal system, and make it the stepping-stone to that federation which is the condition of the continued existence of our Empire.

Mr. Rhodes’s second contribution to British political funds took place three years after the subscription to Mr. Parnell. The correspondence which took place in 1891 did not appear till 1901, when it was extracted from Mr. Rhodes by the extraordinary blunder of the editor of the Spectator, who, hearing from a correspondent signing himself “C. B.” that Mr. Rhodes had given Mr. Schnadhorst a contribution to the funds of the Liberal Party, on condition that its leaders should not urge or support our retrogression from Egypt, jumped to the remarkable conclusion that this fact explained the greatest of all mysteries in regard to Mr. Rhodes, the mystery why the Liberals on the South African Committee allowed him to get off so very easily. The absurdity of this is apparent from the fact that it was not Mr. Rhodes but Mr. Chamberlain who was let off easily by the South African Committee, and that the Liberals assented to the whitewashing of Mr. Chamberlain on condition that they might be allowed to pronounce sentence of major excommunication upon Mr. Rhodes. Nevertheless, the Spectator, floundering still more hopelessly into the morass, declared that if the transactions recorded were correct, the Liberal leaders were at the mercy of Mr. Rhodes. To this Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman replied bluntly by declaring that the story was from beginning to end a lie. Mr. Rhodes then wrote a letter which appeared in the Spectator of October 12, 1901:—


Sir,—I have been appealed to upon the controversy that has arisen in your paper between a correspondent signing himself “C. B.” and Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman. I may say that the letter of “C. B.” was written without my knowledge or approval, still, as his statement has been characterised as “a lie,” it is my duty to send you the facts.

I made the acquaintance of Mr. Schnadhorst when he was visiting the Cape for his health early in 1890. I saw a great deal of him in Kimberley, and found that his political thoughts were in the direction of what would now be called Liberal Imperialism; and his views as to Empire were no doubt enormously strengthened by his visit to Africa.

I told him that my ideas were Liberalism plus Empire, and I added that I thought the Liberal party was ruining itself by its Little England policy, my thoughts being then on the point of their desire to scuttle out of Egypt.

I subsequently met Mr. Schnadhorst in London, and he asked me whether I would be willing to subscribe to the party funds. I said I was prepared to do so provided that the policy was not to scuttle out of Egypt, and that in the event of a Home Rule Bill being brought forward provision should be made for the retention of Irish Members at Westminster, as I considered the first Home Rule Bill of Mr. Gladstone’s simply placed Ireland in a subject position, taxed for our Imperial purposes without a voice in the expenditure; and it was hopeless ever to expect closer union with the Colonies if a portion of the Empire so close as Ireland had been turned into a tributary State.

It is ridiculous to suppose, as I have seen it stated, that I thought I should purchase the Liberal policy for the sum of £5,000 or any other sum, and any Liberal making such a suggestion only insults his own party; but I naturally did not want to help a party into power whose first act would be what I most objected to—namely, the abandonment of Egypt.

I understood from Mr. Schnadhorst that he would consult Mr. Gladstone, which quite satisfied me, as I looked upon Mr. Gladstone as the Liberal party. Mr. Schnadhorst accepted £5,000 from myself for party purposes, coupled with the conditions defined in letter marked “A.”

Some time after I read a speech of Mr. Gladstone’s at Newcastle—I think it was at the end of 1891—in which he expressed the hope that Lord Salisbury would take some step “to relieve us from the burdensome and embarrassing occupation of Egypt.” This naturally surprised me after what had passed between Mr. Schnadhorst and myself, and I therefore wrote to him letter “B,” and received in reply letter “C.” (You will notice that in this letter, referring to my subscription, I say:—‘‘As you are aware, the question of Egypt was the only condition I made.” I was only writing at sea from memory, but I knew the fear of losing Egypt, to which I referred in the postscript to my letter addressed to Mr. Schnadhorst marked ‘‘A,” had been the paramount thought in my mind.) I took no more trouble in the matter, as soon after I arrived in Africa Lord Rosebery joined the Ministry Mr. Gladstone was forming, and I knew that Egypt was saved.

The correspondence speaks for itself, and I leave your readers to decide how far Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman was justified in characterising the statement of ‘‘C. B.” as being “from beginning to end a lie.”

According to their statement, neither Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman nor Sir William Harcourt was acquainted with the facts; but I naturally assumed Mr. Schnadhorst to be speaking with authority.—I am, sir, etc.,C. J. Rhodes.


[A.]

Monday, February 23, 1891.

My dear Schnadhorst,—I enclose you a cheque for £5,000, and I hope you will, with the extreme caution that is necessary, help in guiding your party to consider politics other than England.

I do not think your visit to Kimberley did you harm, either physically or politically, and I am glad to send you the contribution I promised. The future of England must be Liberal, perhaps, to fight Socialism. I make but two conditions; please honourably observe them—(1) that my contribution is secret (if, of course, you feel in honour bound to tell Mr. Gladstone, you can do so, but no one else, and he must treat it as confidential); (2) if the exigencies of party necessitate a Home Rule Bill without representation at Westminster, your Association must return my cheque.—Yours,

(Signed) C. J. Rhodes.

P.S.—I am horrified by Morley’s speech on Egypt. If you think your party hopeless keep the money, but give it to some charity you approve of. It would be an awful thing to give my money to breaking up the Empire.


[B.]

On board the Dunottar, April 25, 1892.

My dear Schnadhorst,—I am sorry to have missed you, but glad to hear that you are so much better, though it robs one of the chance of seeing you again in South Africa.

I gather in England that your party is almost certain to come in, though there may be subsequent difficulty as to the shape of the Home Rule Bill.

The matter that is troubling me most is your policy as to Egypt. I was horrified when I returned from Mashonaland to read a speech of Mr. Gladstone’s evidently foreshadowing a scuttle if he came in. I could hardly believe it to be true, and sat down to write to you, but thought it better to wait and see you. I have now missed you, so must trust to writing. I do hope you will do your best to check him from the mad step, which must bring ruin and misery on the whole of Egypt, whilst our retirement will undoubtedly bring it under the influence of one or other of the foreign Powers, which of course by reciprocal treaties will eventually manage the exclusion of our trade. However, if your respected leader remains obdurate when he comes into power, and adopts this policy of scuttle, I shall certainly call upon you to devote my subscription to some public charity in terms of my letter to you, as I certainly, though a Liberal, did not subscribe to your party to assist in the one thing that I hate above everything, namely, the policy of disentegrating and breaking up our Empire.

As you are aware, the question of Egypt was the only condition I made, and it seems rather extraordinary to me that the first public speech your leader should make—which sketches generally his views upon the near approach of office—should declare a policy of abandonment.

I asked you at the time I wrote to see him and tell him of my action, and I suppose you must have mentioned the Egyptian question, which was really all I cared about.

We are now one-third of the way with a telegraph through the continent from the South, only to hear of your policy of scuttle from the North. (Signed) C. J. Rhodes.

P.S.—I have to send this to be posted in England, as I have forgotten your direction.


The postscript explains how it was that this letter came into my possession. It was sent to me to be copied, and forwarded to Mr. Schnadhorst. In reporting the receipt of the letter to Mr. Rhodes I wrote as follows:—

“May 16th, 1892.

“Dear Mr. Rhodes,—Received your letter for Schnadhorst, and duly forwarded it to him. I think the fault lies with Mr. Schnadhorst, not with Mr. Gladstone. I was writing to Mr. Gladstone about something else, and incidentally mentioned that you were very indignant with several speeches about Egypt, whereupon Mr. Gladstone wrote asking what were those speeches to which Mr. Rhodes took exception, as he had not the pleasure of knowing what Mr. Rhodes’s views were concerning Egypt. From this I infer that Mr. Schnadhorst has never informed Mr. Gladstone of anything that you said to him, in which case he deserves the bad quarter of an hour he will have after receiving your letter. I saw Mr. Balfour the other day, who said he did not think the difficulty was with Mr. Gladstone, but rather with Sir William Harcourt, who believed in the curtailment of the British Empire, if he believed in nothing else. Balfour was very sorry that he had not a chance of meeting you when you were here, as he had looked forward to your coming in the hope of making your acquaintance.—I am, yours very truly, “(Signed) W. T. Stead.


The following is Mr. Schnadhorst’s reply:—


[C.]

National Liberal Federation,
42, Parliament Street, S.W.
June 4th, 1892.

My dear Rhodes,—I regret very much I did not see you when you were here, as your letter places me in a position of extreme perplexity. Your donation was given with two conditions, both of which will be observed, but in a postscript you referred to John Morley’s speech on Egypt in the sense in which you have written about Mr. Gladstone’s reference to the same subject. It is eighteen months ago since I saw you, when you referred to the subject in conversation, and I told you then, as I think now, that J. M.’s speech was very unwise, and that it did not represent the policy of the party. The General Election has been coming near, and is now close at hand. Your gift was intended to help in the Home Rule struggle. It could do so only by being used before the election. Being satisfied that I could observe your conditions, and that J. M.’s speech was simply the expression of an individual opinion, I felt at liberty to pledge your funds for various purposes in connection with the election. This was done to a large extent before Mr. G. spoke at Newcastle. I am bound to say that in my view his reference to Egypt was no more than an expression of a pious opinion. It did not alter my feelings that a Liberal Government would not attempt withdrawal. Sir W. Harcourt was annoyed at Mr. G.’s reference at the time, and since I heard from you I have seen Lord Rosebery, who will become Foreign Minister, and who I am satisfied from what he said to me would not sanction such a policy. Mr. Gladstone, I expect, had been worked on by a few individuals, possibly by J. M. alone; but in my opinion it would be simply madness for him to add to the enormous difficulties with which he will have to deal by risking complications on such a subject. There is no danger; besides, the next Liberal Foreign Secretary will be a strong man who will take his own course, very different from the pliant and supple Granville. Of course, I may be wrong; time alone can show; but if I waited for that the purpose for which I asked your help, and for which you gave it, would go unaided.

You will see what a precious fix you have put me in. I will not make any further promises until I hear from you.—With all good wishes, I am, faithfully yours,

“(Signed) F. Schnadhorst.


It would seem from this correspondence that there is not a shadow or tittle of reason for attributing to Mr. Rhodes or to the Liberal leaders any corrupt contract, much less that there was any subscription to the party fund which would justify the monstrous assertion of the Spectator that the acceptance of this subscription, of the existence of which probably Mr. Gladstone was unaware, in any way influenced either the policy of the Government about Egypt or the action of the Liberal leaders on the South African Committee.

The attempt that was made in some quarters to represent Mr. Rhodes as dictating the policy of the Imperial Government by a subscription of £5,000 to an election fund is too puerile to be discussed. All that Mr. Rhodes did was to take the course which is almost invariably taken by any person who is asked to subscribe to a campaign fund. There is hardly anything subscribed to the election expenses of a candidate on either side which is not accompanied by a publicly and privately expressed opinion as to the political cause which it is hoped the candidate will support. Subscriptions are constantly given or refused every year because the donor agrees with or dissents from some particular article in the programme of the candidate he is asked to support. It is a curious thing that a great part of the outcry against Mr. Rhodes’s subscription to the Liberal Party arises from those who, when Mr. Gladstone went off to the Home Rule cause, transferred their subscriptions from the Liberal to the Unionist exchequer. The use of electoral subscriptions as a means of promoting political ideas may be as objectionable as some critics maintain, but it does not lie in the mouths of those who remorselessly used the advantages of superior wealth in order to penalise the adoption of a policy of justice to Ireland, to throw stones at Mr. Rhodes.

Mr. Rhodes in 1885 wrote a letter of such phenomenal length that it filled a whole sheet of the Times, but as it related chiefly to the controversy as to the best way of administering Bechuanaland, and was the product of the combined wits of Mr. Maguire and himself, it is not necessary to quote it here.


A Portrait of Mr. Rhodes taken in the Matoppos, 1899.

Footnotes

  1. The date of this letter is sufficient to prove the absurdity of the popular superstition that Mr. Rhodes bought the support of the Irish Party for the Charter by a gift of £10,000. At that time there had been no application for the Charter, and Mr. Rhodes had not then obtained the mineral concession from Lobengula upon which the application for the Charter was based. Neither Mr. Rhodes nor Mr. Parnell alluded to the subject, either in conversation or in writing. The contract between the African and the Irishman was strictly limited to the conversion of Home Rule from a disruptive to a federative measure. It had no relation directly or indirectly to any of Mr. Rhodes’s Irish-African schemes. The whole story is told at length by “Vindex” in an appendix to “The Political Life and Speeches of Mr. Cecil Rhodes,” from which I quote these letters.