CHAPTER II.
FROM THE OUTBREAK OF THE DISAFFECTION TO THE DISBANDING OF THE 19TH NATIVE INFANTRY.

The King of Oudh having been, as before stated, summarily deprived of his kingdom, determined to appeal to the Parliament and people of England for redress. Accordingly, in the month of April 1856, he came down to Calcutta, and took up his abode at Garden Peach, in the outskirts of Calcutta, attended by his prime minister, Ally Nucky Khan, and several followers. The Queen-mother, his brother, and one of his sons, proceeded to England, in the month of May following, in order effectually to prosecute the schemes on which he had resolved for the recovery of his kingdom. They set out, in fact, not with any hope on their part, or on the part of the King and his advisers, that their mission would be successful, but in order to convey to the people of England the impression that he had no hope but in their justice and mercy, in order to remove attention from the vast design he had formed—to upset at one blow the British rule in India.

In fact, this plan was decided upon before the King[1] left Lucknow. He had become aware, from the reports of his agents, that the Bengal Army was disaffected, and ripe to be worked upon. The Brahminical priesthood throughout the country were impatient at the proselyting efforts of the missionaries, whilst the Mahomedans, as I have shown before, were discontented at seeing the only kingdom connected with them by faith swallowed up by the paramount Power. The King found, in fact, that there never would be a time more propitious for an attempt to overthrow the British. Acting accordingly under able advice, he at once commenced a system of tampering with the native army. Of the Mahomedans he was sure; the Hindoos, already disaffected, might be acted upon by means of their religion. The new system of administration in Oudh would, he felt satisfied, cause considerable vexation to the families of the Sepoys, and, consequently, no little discontent amongst the Sepoys themselves. His agents were accordingly directed to lay stress on this new interference of the British with the privileges of the natives. It was pointed out to them that they were the original owners of the land, the lords of the soil, but that now, gradually and insidiously, the British were depriving them of their rights, and resolved to go on until they had subverted their religion. An alliance was at the same time entered into with the King of Delhi, who entered heart and soul into the plot, and it was finally determined that throughout the Bengal Presidency, from Calcutta to Peshawur, there should be a simultaneous rising on one day, in which the life of no Christian should be spared. The month of August, 1857, by which time it was hoped the Queen-mother would have left England, was fixed upon for the outbreak.

Had the measures of the Government of India been conducted at this time with even ordinary prudence, had the Military Secretary not blundered in a manner which would have been unpardonable in an ensign of twelve months' standing, it is probable that the attempts of the King of Oudh to tamper with the native army would have altogether failed. In the absence of tangible evidence on the subject, it had been difficult to convince the Hindoo Sepoys that their religion was actually in danger, and without satisfactory proof on that point they were unwilling to rise against the Government. In fact the plot was beginning to languish, when, at this juncture, the combined ignorance and folly of Colonel Birch gave the King of Oudh the very opportunity he had been seeking for in vain.

It is well known that the chief object of a Hindoo's veneration is the cow. She is in his eyes the sacred animal, the visible presence of the Creator on earth. Her life is not only precious, but to take it the greatest crime of which man could be guilty. The slaughter of a cow in a Hindoo village would always have been the signal for a rise. So convinced, indeed, were the Governments of former days of the necessity of respecting this prejudice, that in the large towns where Europeans were stationed a paddock or compound, surrounded by high walls, was set apart for the reception of bullocks intended for their food. The Hindoos always ignored the existence of such a spot; indeed all possible means were adopted to conceal it from them. To kill a cow openly was openly to violate their religion, and the practice was consequently forbidden throughout India.

Yet, in the face of these prejudices, of the order to respect them, and of the danger of the consequences which must result from their violation, no sooner had the Government of India resolved to introduce, the Enfield rifle partially into the Indian army, than the Secretary to Government deliberately issued an order, which, by violating the caste of the Hindoo, was alone sufficient to bring about a revolt. The Enfield rifle required a particular species of cartridge, and this cartridge in England was greased with lard made from the fat either of the hog or the ox. Without reflecting, or if reflecting, ignoring the consequences of his act, Colonel Birch ordered that the cartridges for use in India should be made up similarly to the cartridges in use in England, and should be used by the native troops—that is to say, that Hindoo Sepoys should handle cartridges besmeared with the fat of their sacred animal, the cow! The knowledge of this fact was conveyed to the Hindoos in the most casual manner. These cartridges had been made up by Lascars—men of an inferior caste. It happened that one day a Lascar requested a Brahmin Sepoy to give him a drink of water from his lotah, or brass pot. The Sepoy refused on the plea of his superior caste, and that the lotah would be defiled by the touch of the Lascar. The Lascar in reply taunted him for talking of defilement, when he every day touched cartridges besmeared with cows' fat. The Hindoo, horror-stricken, rushed to his comrades and told them the story: they inquired, and found it true to the letter. Indignant, believing themselves deceived by the Government, they wrote an account to their comrades throughout India. From that moment the work of the agents of the King of Oudh was easy.

For a man occupying the position of Military Secretary to the Government of India to make so gross a blunder was unpardonable. Equally so that, when the mistake was discovered, no disavowal was made by Government for four months, and then only in consequence of the outbreak at Meerut! Well aware that the idea had taken possession of the Sepoys' minds, Colonel Birch made no attempt to counteract it, gave no intimation that the manufacture of greased cartridges had been stopped. He calmly surveyed the mischief his acts had caused, and—did nothing. Yet this man, whose blundering incapacity caused the revolt, is still Secretary to the Government of India in the military department!

The consequences of this gross mismanagement were quickly apparent. The agents of the native conspirators were not the men to allow such an opportunity to slip through their fingers. On the 24th of January, less than a week after the discovery of the greased cartridges, the telegraph office at Barrackpore was burned down. An idea seemed to pervade the minds of the Hindoos that the Government was resolved to Christianise them all; that as the plan of open conversion, pursued now for several years, had failed entirely, it had been resolved to resort to insidious and secret measures to bring about the same end; that Lord Canning had undertaken the government of India with that sole object in view, and that he had engaged to accomplish it in three years. Hence the greasing of the cartridges: hence the changes that were talked about in their dress and equipments. They knew our skill; they witnessed the constant scientific improvements evinced in railways, electric telegraphs, &c., and they dreaded lest some morning they should awake and find themselves, owing to some unaccountable ingenuity on our part, deprived of their religion and caste. Discontent took possession of their minds; they were in perpetual dread of something undefined, supernatural: a restless desire of showing their discontent evinced itself, and resulted, after nearly a week's hesitation, in the perpetration of the act recorded above, viz. the burning of the electric telegraph office at Barrackpore.

This station, distant about sixteen miles from Calcutta, was garrisoned entirely by native troops; at this time four regiments were quartered there, the 2nd Grenadiers, the 34th Native Infantry, the 43rd Light Infantry, and the 70th Native Infantry. Between Calcutta and Dinapore, an extent of 400 miles in length and enormous breadth, there was but one European regiment, the 53d Foot. Half of this regiment garrisoned Fort William, the other half was stationed at Dumdum, about seven miles from Calcutta. In case of any disturbance, not a single man could have been spared from the wing located in the fort, whilst the other was insufficient in strength to put down a simultaneous rising of the town and of the native army.

Such an idea, at this time, never suggested itself to a single European in the country. Although after the burning of the telegraph office on the 24th, scarcely a night passed over without the perpetration of some act of incendiarism, these acts were never traced to their source. The Government were confident and callous. Although about this time[2] the excited state of the minds of the Sepoys, consequent upon the discovery of the nature of the grease, was reported to them, not a single explanation was offered, not an attempt made to soothe them. It is true that an order was issued, after the interval of almost a month, to serve out no more greased cartridges, but, in the absence of any accompanying explanation, the Sepoys viewed that merely as an evidence that the Government was baffled for the time, and waited only a more convenient season for the renewal of their insidious attacks on their caste.

But, although the eyes of our Government were blinded, those of the King of Oudh and his agents were wide open to the importance of the occasion. The minds of the Sepoys at Barrackpore were hourly worked upon, and with such effect, that letters were despatched in shoals to every regiment in the service, giving full details, often amplified and exaggerated, of the cartridge business. Agents were also despatched, well supplied with money, to every station in India; these men were directed to prepare the native army for an immediate rise, and to adopt every possible means to bring about the revolt without the cognizance of the authorities.

The King of Oudh was well served. The whole army succumbed to his influence; a very considerable portion of the large police force came into his plans, and even where his agents were unsuccessful, in not one instance were they betrayed.

By the middle of the month of February, the discontented amongst the native regiments at Barrackpore had assumed such an appearance, and had risen to such a height, that General Hearsey commanding the Presidency division found it necessary to assemble the troops, in order to point out to them the absurdity of the fears they entertained for their religion. General Hearsey was a very gallant cavalry officer, well acquainted with the native character: he spoke the language also with rare facility. It was not in his power to do more than harangue the troops and report their state of mind to the Government: the first he did well, and at the outset with some effect; but as the second measure produced no explanation or sign from the head of the military department, the Sepoys, still secretly instigated, soon returned to their former state of murmuring against their masters.

To give one instance of the apathy of the Government at this momentous period it will suffice to state, that although disaffection had been manifested, in the most marked manner, by the Sepoys at Barrackpore and Dumdum on account of the greased cartridges, towards the end of January, it was not before the middle of the following month that Colonel Birch telegraphed to the schools of musketry at Seealkote and Umballah to prohibit the use by the Sepoys at those stations of the greased cartridge. Long before the message reached Seealkote (in the heart of the Punjab) those cartridges had been distributed to, and used by, the native troops there located.

The condition of the troops at Barrackpore, towards the latter end of February, was that of men who felt themselves aggrieved, who were resolute to revenge themselves on the supposed authors of their grievances, but who were restrained, partly by fear, partly by policy, from setting about it at once. Suddenly a spark lighted on the powder: it did not, fortunately for us, at the moment ignite, but a low rumbling noise, sufficient to enable us to make some preparation, warned us of our danger. The spark was first visible at Berhampore; it fizzed subsequently at Barrackpore; but the grand explosion took place two months later at Meerut!

On the 24th February, a small guard of the 34th Regiment N.I. arrived in the station of Berhampore, distant from Calcutta about one hundred and twenty miles. As was customary in such cases, the men of the 19th Regiment N.I., then stationed at Berhampore, feasted the men of the 34th guard, and of course inquired after the doings of their comrades at Barrackpore. The 34th men made a clean breast of it; they poured all their grievances into the sympathising ears of their entertainers: not an item in the catalogue was left out—the cartridges, the beef fat. Lord Canning's supposed mission, all were enumerated; the determination of the Barrackpore brigade to mutiny on the first convenient occasion was dwelt upon;—nothing, in short, was omitted which could possibly work upon the feelings of their listeners.

It is a remarkable fact, illustrative of the native character, that in a regiment numbering a thousand men, composed of Mahomedans and Hindoos, of high caste and low caste, not a single man after hearing the astounding stories of the 34th guard thought it worth while to go to his commanding officer or to the adjutant of the regiment and inquire into their truth. They had been associated for years with their European officers, had marched with them from station to station, had received from them the kindest treatment, and, moreover, were conscious of the pride with which they were regarded, and of the implicit confidence placed in them by all. Yet on hearing for the first time, perhaps, tales which were brought them by men of another regiment, of a vast conspiracy brewing against the state, not one of them reported the circumstance or even inquired if it were true!

The acute sensitiveness peculiar to the natives on matters affecting their caste doubtless induced them to accept all they heard as literal truth. For a whole day they brooded over it; in making the morning report to their officers on the 25th of February, their demeanour was quite respectful, there was not an outward sign of the excitement which reigned within. But their feelings had been too much worked upon to allow this passive submission a longer sway. A slight circumstance supplied the igniting spark. On the 25th February, Colonel Mitchell, commanding the 19th, ordered a parade for exercise with blank ammunition for the following morning. In the evening, the blank cartridges were served out to the men. They were of the very same description as those which for a century past had been used by the Bengal Army. These particular cartridges had, in fact, been made up before even an Enfield rifle had reached India, and had been made over to the 19th magazine by the 7th Regiment N.I., on the latter leaving the station. In ordinary circumstances no objection whatever would have been made by any Sepoy to use similar cartridges. But the passions of the men had been roused; their feelings had been so excited that they could no longer control them; they were beyond the power of reason; they felt satisfied that their caste was to be taken away by means of cartridges, and their excitement persuaded them that these were the fatal messengers. They at first refused to receive them, and it was only when their commanding officer threatened all recusants with court-martial that they took them in gloomy silence. That night they held a consultation. The "multitude of counsellors "gave new energy to their fears, and in a moment of fanatical frenzy the regiment rose as one man, and took possession of their arms, shouting defiance.

Intelligence of these facts was promptly conveyed to the commanding officer, Colonel Mitchell. Two courses were open to him. The only troops at the station besides the 19th were a detachment of native cavalry and a battery of native artillery. The night was pitch dark, and no movement could be made with any certainty. He might either, therefore, have despatched the cavalry and artillery to guard the public buildings, the treasury, &c., and await the early dawn for ulterior operations, or he might at once march down on the lines and endeavour to coerce the mutineers. The first course seemed the most prudent, and was urged upon him; however, he adopted the other, and moved as quickly as possible on his mutinous regiment. The night was so dark that he was compelled to use torches to enable him to find the way; in this manner, and with difficulty, he moved on.

In the meanwhile the 19th having seized their arms, remained drawn up in front of their lines, waiting apparently for their European officers to take the initiative. The ground near their lines was interspersed here and there with tanks, and on these, by the light of the torches, they beheld the artillery and cavalry advancing. Had they been thoroughly evil-disposed, it would have been easy for them, in darkness as they were, to have picked off their officers and the artillery-men, whilst the nature of the ground and the darkness of the night would have prevented all idea of danger from the cavalry. They were, however, more excited than ill-disposed, and with arms in their hands they waited the first movement of their officers.

On his part Colonel Mitchell could not have been insensible to the insecurity of his own position; he was marching at the head of natives against natives. Could he depend upon them? It was at all events doubtful. Were he to give the order to charge or to fire, was he certain that he would be obeyed? And if he were not obeyed, not only would there be three regiments in revolt instead of one, but the lives of the residents of that and surrounding stations would be jeopardised. Besides which he found, as had been pointed out to him, that the nature of the ground and the darkness of the night would prevent the possibility of his acting efficiently against the mutineers.

Something, however, must be done: he felt that. After deliberately weighing every circumstance of his position, he deemed it most prudent to try in the first instance the effect of conciliatory measures. He accordingly addressed the men of the 19th; he pointed out to them the absurdity of their fears and the enormity of their offence, and conjured them to give up their arms and return peaceably to their lines.

The 19th on their part were not over-anxious to push matters to extremities; their excitement was beginning to wear off, and many of them felt a little ashamed of themselves. Still they were sensible of the advantage of their position, and seemed resolved not to act under coercion. In reply, therefore, to their Colonel, they expressed their readiness to return to their lines, and to restore their arms to the proper place, provided only the artillery and cavalry were first moved away.

To this unmilitary concession Colonel Mitchell felt averse to accede. However, for the reasons above stated, he was powerless: he did not wish to provoke the 19th into a more open demonstration; he consented then to the proposal, and moved off the artillery and cavalry. The 19th gave up their arms, returned to their lines, and the émeute was at an end.

Reflections on Col. Mitchell's conduct.—Colonel Mitchell's conduct on this trying occasion was much criticised at the time, and he was generally condemned for not at all risks enforcing his order to the mutineers to lay down their arms. Subsequent events have proved that had he done so—had he ordered the artillery to fire, or the cavalry to charge—he would not in all probability have been obeyed. Or, even had they endeavoured to obey him, the darkness of the night would have prevented any efficient working of the guns, whilst the Sepoys could have picked off the gunners with but little risk to themselves. Had he been worsted in the encounter, the rebellion would have been precipitated two months; the regiments at Barrackpore would have risen en masse, and the consequences to the metropolis would have been fearful.

The writer is of opinion that if Colonel Mitchell erred, he erred in not adopting the advice said to have been tendered to him of placing guards over the treasury and public buildings till the morning, and then acting with decision. But even then, as shown above, the result would have been doubtful; and every Englishman ought to be thankful that the matter ended as it did.

The news of this outbreak reached Calcutta about the 4th of March, and first opened the eyes of the Government to a sense of their insecurity. They had but one European regiment between Calcutta and Dinapore. It would be unsafe to punish the 19th Native Infantry without having European troops at hand to overawe them, and Government had literally none. Perhaps, after securing the fort and public buildings, about two hundred men might have been available—a mere handful amongst five native regiments deeply imbued with a spirit of fanaticism. In such a crisis there was but one course for Government to pursue; and it is but justice to say that they pursued it. No intimation was conveyed to the 19th of the sense entertained of their conduct. They were allowed to do their duty as usual; but on the morning of the 6th of March the Oriental Company's steamer "Bentinck" steamed for Rangoon, with orders to bring up H.M.'s 84th Foot to Calcutta with the utmost possible dispatch.

On the account of the disturbance at Berhampore reaching Barrackpore, great excitement was manifested by the Sepoys of the regiments at that station, more especially by those of the 2d and 34th Regiments. They did their duty, it is true, but with a sullen doggedness which it was impossible to conceal: it was known that nightly meetings took place in their lines, at which the conduct of the 19th in seizing their arms was applauded, and great sympathy expressed for them. A report of these meetings was made to Government; but not having the power to interfere with effect, they wisely abstained from noticing the matter.

Reports about this time reached Calcutta of ill-feeling and disaffection evinced at the important stations of Meerut and Lucknow. The occurrence of constant incendiarisms in the neighbourhood of the Sepoy lines cast suspicion upon them, and served to show, not only that they were dissatisfied, but were seeking opportunities to evince their feelings.

At length, on the 20th of March, to the great satisfaction of every one in Calcutta, the "Bentinck" returned from Rangoon. H.M.'s 84th were immediately conveyed to Chinsurah, a station eight miles distant from Barrackpore; and orders were immediately transmitted to the officer commanding the 19th Regiment to march his corps to Barrackpore.

Greater excitement than ever prevailed at that station in consequence of the arrival of the 84th. The native troops, feeling themselves guilty of conspiring against the state, imagined that this move was directed against them. In the 34th especially the mutineers' whispers became louder and louder; they openly expressed their sympathy with the 19th, and scarcely concealed their intention to stand by the men of that regiment in the event of their offering any resistance.

Happily for us, these feelings found a vent before the 19th reached Barrackpore.

On the 29th March it was reported to Lieut. Baugh, Adjutant of the 34th, that several of the men of his regiment were in a very excited state; and that one of them especially, Mungul Pandy by name, was traversing the lines, armed with a loaded musket, calling upon his comrades to rise, and declaring himself that he would shoot the first European he came across. On receipt of this intelligence Lieut. Baugh put on his uniform, mounted his horse, and, with a pair of loaded pistols in his holsters, rode down to the parade-ground. It must here be mentioned, that immediately in front of the Quarter-guard of the 34th Regiment the station gun was posted, from which the morning and mid-day salutes were fired. Mungul Pandy, on hearing of Lieut. Baugh's approach, concealed himself behind this gun; and as that officer drew near, he took a deliberate aim and fired. The ball wounded the horse in the flank, and brought him with his rider to the ground. Lieut. Baugh, however, quickly disengaged himself; and snatching up one of his pistols, advanced on Mungul Pandy, who, finding himself unable to load his musket a second time, had taken up a sword which he had with him. Lieut. Baugh fired and missed. Before he could draw his sword the Sepoy was on him, with one blow brought him to the ground, and but for timely assistance would have then and there killed him.

All this took place, it must be recollected, in front of the Quarter-guard of the 34th, and not thirty yards distant from the guard of a jemadar and twenty Sepoys there located. These men not only made no effort to assist their officer, but showed evident sympathy with Mungul Pandy. The Sergeant-major of the regiment, who was a short distance behind Lieut. Baugh at the time, called out to them to assist him; but their jemadar forbad them to stir. At this juncture, just as Lieut. Baugh had been struck down wounded, the Sergeant-major came up breathless, and attempted to seize Mungul Pandy; but he, too, was wounded and struck down. Upon this the jemadar advanced with the men of his guard; but these, instead of assisting their European officers, commenced striking their heads with the butt-ends of their muskets. To this treacherous conduct there was one exception. The Mahomedan orderly who had followed Lieut. Baugh from his house, arrived on the scene of action in sufficient time to seize Mungul Pandy just as he had succeeded in reloading his musket. He was quickly followed by General Hearsey and other officers, who had been roused by the firing; and by their joint aid the officers were rescued from their perilous situation. Mungul Pandy, on being seized, made an abortive effort to shoot himself. He was then taken off the ground and lodged in the Quarter-guard of the 70th Regiment. Affairs wore a very serious aspect when General Hearsey reached the ground.[3] That gallant officer, a friend and pupil of Sir Charles Napier, comprehended all in an instant. He felt that to give way now would be to incite a mutiny. Drawing a pistol from his belt, he rode up to the men of the guard, and ordered them back to their posts, declaring he would with his own hand shoot the first man who showed any symptoms of disaffection. This conduct had the desired effect; the men were for the moment overawed; and the dark cloud which appeared to be on the very point of bursting passed quietly way.

In order more effectually to convince the Sepoys that loyalty would always meet with a fitting reward from the British Government, General Hearsey then and there promoted Sheikh Pultoo, the Mahomedan orderly who had rescued Lieutenant Baugh and the Sergeant-major, to the rank of havildar. This had a most salutary effect: and yet it will scarcely be believed, that for this act a severe wigging was administered to the gallant officer by the Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department, Colonel Birch, whose quibbling mind and red-tape instincts could see no necessity for so grave a departure from rule!

But although the station had resumed its outward appearance of calm, within the lines all was disaffection. The jemadar and the Sepoys of the Quarter-guard, who, strange to say, had not then been, and were not for two or three days afterwards, placed in arrest, reproached their comrades for not taking advantage of so fine an opportunity of rising against and massacring the "Feringhees." The recriminations, however, were short, and the 34th, in conjunction with the 2nd Grenadiers, proceeded to mature a fresh plan, the nature of which will shortly be detailed.

On the 30th March the 19th Native Infantry arrived at Barraset, about eight miles distant from Barrackpore. It had by this time transpired that they were to march into the latter station for the purpose of being disbanded: still the behaviour of the men was respectful; and in order to avert their fancied doom, they had sent in a petition to the Governor-General, offering, in case they were pardoned, to proceed at once to China, or to serve anywhere on land or sea. In short, they showed a repentant spirit, and were never less inclined to join in a conspiracy against the state. On arriving on the morning of the 30th at Barraset, they found a deputation from the 34th awaiting their arrival. It has since transpired that these men made them a proposal—the result of their deliberations of the previous night—which it was well for us that they did not accept. On that very morning, Her Majesty's 84th, from Chinsura, a wing of the 53d Foot from Dumdum, a couple of European batteries from the same place, and the Governor-General's body-guard (native) from Calcutta, had arrived at Barrackpore, and had been ordered to appear on parade with the native regiments at five o'clock on the following morning. The proposal made by the 34th to the 19th was to the following effect: that they should, on that same evening, kill all their officers, march at night into Barrackpore, where the 2nd and 34th were prepared to join them, fire the bungalows, surprise and overwhelm the European force, secure the guns, and then march on to and sack Calcutta.

Had the 19th been as excitable then as they had shown themselves on the 25th of February, these views might possibly have been entertained; but they were repentant, and ashamed of their former excess. That they were not thoroughly loyal is proved by the fact that the tempters were not reported: they were suffered to return unbetrayed, but their scheme was at once and definitively rejected.

On the following morning the 19th Regiment marched into Barrackpore. An order by the Governor-General in Council, in which their crime was recapitulated, their fears for their religion pronounced absurd, and their disbandment directed, was read out to them in the presence of the assembled troops before enumerated. On being ordered to lay down their arms, they obeyed without a murmur; many of them, indeed, showed signs of deep contrition. They were then paid up before their comrades, and were marched across the river without arms. They had ceased to belong to the Company's army.

  1. It should be borne in mind that the expression, "King of Oudh," refers here to those who carried on intrigues in his name. It is probable that the king himself, an imbecile, was not trusted with the full extent of the conspiracy; but his prime minister, Ally Nucky Khan, without doubt a man of transcendant ability, was the soul of the plot. Since his confinement in Fort William he has, in private conversation, attempted to justify himself, by declaring it was a counter-stroke for the treachery by which the seizure of Oudh was consummated.
  2. January and February, 1857
  3. The men of the regiment had turned out in undress in front of their lines, and had shown, by their gestures and other signs, that their sympathies were all with Mungul Pandy. They had even jeered at Lieutenant Baugh as he passed them wounded, and reproached them for not assisting him.