The New Europe/Volume 7/Number 88/Dr. Friedjung on Bohemia

by Heinrich Friedjung

Dr. Friedjung on Bohemia

[On 1 June the German-Austrian historian, Dr. Friedjung, published in the Vossische Zeitung the following article on recent Czech policy, which is, above all, remarkable for what is written between the lines. In quoting the same writer’s denunciation of Professor Lammasch’s attempts to draw the Emperor Charles away from Prussian influence, as a prelude to peace and federal reconstruction, we had occasion to remark that Dr. Friedjung would never have adopted such an attitude of veiled arrogance towards the Emperor if he was not in possession of compromising information. It is abundantly clear from the present article that Dr. Friedjung. despite loyal phrases, does not trust either Charles or his advisers, and from this it is safe to infer the attitude of a growing number of Austrian Germans.]

“What at first depressed the Germans of Austria and filled them with deep anxiety for the future is now proving their salvation. The negotiations conducted in Paris by Prince Sixtus of Parma were to form a bridge to the Western Powers, but thanks to that gentleman’s (sic!) dangerous Bourbon policy and of Clemenceau’s insults to the pacific Emperor Charles, have become a motive for strengthening the Central European Alliance. The same is true of internal affairs. The continued treachery of Czech units, the mutiny in Cattaro, the handing over of a small warship, finally the invitation of an Italian attack at Carzano, an important point of the Tirolese front, have finally silenced the advocates of the Slavs in the entourage of the Emperor. The monarch was deeply pained that the general amnesty granted by him in 1917 should have been rewarded by rank ingratitude; and though it must be recognised that the majority of the Czech troops did their duty, still the treachery of Carzano was a most melancholy proof of the, I will not say predominant, but at least widespread, spirit among the Czech reserve officers. Even the Emperor’s aide-decamp, Prince Lobkowitz, who, himself loyal in sentiment, always contrived to find words of excuse for the Czechs with whom he reckons himself, saw himself refuted by actual facts. It is to this that the recent change in internal politics is due. The Emperor felt himself more and more attracted to the loyalest of the loyal, the Germans of Austria, and as there was some fear lest their confidence might have been shaken by his former acts of government, he gave them two pledges of his feeling. This is the explanation of the Government decrees regarding the District Constitution (Kreisverfassung) of Bohemia and of the Emperor’s address to the Alpine Germans. The Seidler Cabinet fulfilled the Imperial orders in regulating matters in Bohemia, just as it had covered with its name the premature amnesty. It is certain that Dr. von Seidler took the latter step more willingly than the former, but his Cabinet offers no guarantee that the path recently entered upon will be adhered to. So long at least as Count Silva-Tarouca (who opposed the division of Bohemia into districts in the Council of Ministers, and had to be voted down) belongs to the Government, the door remains half-open for the entry of Bohemian ‘State Rights.’ It is characteristic that the decrees were only signed by the Minister of the Interior and not by the whole Cabinet—probably out of consideration for Silva-Tarouca. Against such obstacles the Emperor enforced his will. It is true that the Reichspost goes too far when, in its joy at the Imperial pronouncements, it compares them to ‘an offensive and defensive alliance between the Crown and the Germans’; but, in any case, they are a sign that the Czech Declaration Party, owing to its rude rejection of the sovereign’s overtures (des landesväterlichen Entgegenkommens), is no longer reckoned with. The Czech Club in Parliament refused offhand the invitation to negotiate, and this equally stubborn and foolish policy produced what the loyalty of the Germans alone could not have produced: the first step towards national autonomy in Bohemia and the pledging of the Imperial word for the maintenance of the Adriatic provinces within the unitary Austrian State connection.” [At this point it is perhaps well to draw attention to the phrase, “national autonomy” for the German scheme, in view of the highly ambiguous use of that word in President Wilson’s speech of last January.]

Dr. Friedjung naturally approves of the separation of German Bohemia, but regrets that the change is not to come into force sooner than 1 January, 1919. Turning to the policy of Dr. Kramař, he declares that “it is clear as daylight that this must end in collapse unless the triumph of the Engish and French on the battlefield finally places the enemies of Germanism on the throne in Prague also. Kramař and his people have set their fortune on this one lottery ticket, and it is already obvious that they have drawn a blank. . . . Those who prophesied a revolt in Prague owing to the decree regarding District Autonomy have been happily proved wrong by events. Those know little of Czech popular psychology who credit them with the heroic or rather desperate resolve to risk an armed struggle which would be foredoomed to failure. Often as everything in Bohemia has seemed stretched to breaking-point during the past fifty years, the break has never come. . . . The Czechs are sober people who, from the safe haven of London, Paris and New York, preach revolution, but will avoid the madness of an armed rising in Bohemia. . . . What helps the Czechs is the fear of an insurrection which prevails in many quarters in Vienna, especially in the higher, and their leaders have skilfully played on this instrument. . . . Therefore: no persecution, except for clear treason, but also no weak concession, and, above all, not the zigzag policy to which the Clam-Martinitz, Lobkowitz and Silva-Taroucas are always offering their noble names and scanty intelligence.”