The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 2
The raid is a surprise attack designed to seize a point, exploit success and then withdraw. It is a temporary measure to capture equipment, destroy installations, bait traps to draw enemy reactions and attack morale. The Mujahideen conducted raids as a primary way to obtain weapons and ammunition — preferably from DRA security posts. They also conducted raids to demonstrate their ability to attack DRA and Soviet installations with relative impunity. Raids generally require fewer supplies than an attack on a strong point since there is no intention of holding the objective for any length of time following a raid.
VIGNETTE 1: RAID ON THE TOTUMDARA SECURITY POST
edit- by Commander Sarshar
(Commander Sarshar was a police officer in Parwan who worked clandestinely with the Mujahideen. When his cover was about to be blown, he became a Mujahideen commander in Ghorband. He commanded a mobile group in the Ghorband front near Charikar.)
The Soviets had a series of security posts protecting the Salang-Kabul highway. They had one at Totumdara which is eight kilometers north of Charikar[1] (Map 2-1 - Totumdara). This post had five armored vehicles. We mounted a raid on the security post in September 1981. My base was in Ghorband Canyon. I had 60 Mujahideen armed with four Goryunov heavy machine guns, two PK medium machine guns, four RPG-7s, and Kalashnikov rifles. The area around my base is very mountainous, but also heavily patrolled, so we had to move at night. We moved from our base over the mountain pass to our staging area at Ofian-e Sharif. Ofian-e Sharif is about three kilometers south of our target and it took us six hours to reach it from Ghorband. We had to carry all our equipment on our backs.
We stayed in Ofian-e Sharif during the day and rested and made our plan. That night we crossed over to the east into the green zone and moved into the villages near the target. I positioned 40 of my Mujahideen to secure our route back into the mountains and to help carry the gear. The other 20 were my raiding party. I divided these 20 men into a 10-man group for immediate security and a 10-man assault group. The assault group had two Goryunov heavy machineguns, two PK medium machine guns, two RPG-7s and some Kalashnikovs. We attacked the post that same night. We destroyed two tanks with our RPGs and terrified their infantry with our Goryunovs. However, the security post was heavily protected by mines so we could not cross the mine fields to get into the post. The Soviet security post at Pul-e Matak and the Project security post(named after the Chinese irrigation project) were on the Totumdara security post flanks. Both of these posts opened fire on us and we were forced to withdraw. We withdrew to our base in Ghorband by the same route we came. We had no casualties.
COMMENTARY
editThe Soviets employed millions of mines in Afghanistan for installation security, LOC security and area denial. Mine clearing was a major problem for any Mujahideen attack on a prepared site and often prevented Mujahideen success. The Mujahideen needed rugged, light-weight mine detection and clearing gear which would allow them to clear mines quickly under fire. Often the Mujahideen had to resort to heaving large rocks to create a path through a minefield.
Attacking parked vehicles is certainly easier than attacking vehicles which are crewed and moving. Apparently the Soviets had not bothered to create a sandbag wall around their tanks, although an RPG can penetrate the turret armor of older tanks.
The Mujahideen chose a target flanked by two other outposts that could bring fire onto their attacking flanks. The flank security elements were close-in elements that merely guarded the flanks and did nothing to pin the outposts in position. The bridge outpost should have been an easier target with a better chance of success. This attack also could have employed a larger force in two phases. The first phase would be an attack to the flanks to neutralize the flanking fire. The second phase would then be an attack on the Totumdara post. Such an attack would require better coordination and discipline than demonstrated.
VIGNETTE 2: CHAMTALA RAID
edit- by Tsaranwal (Attorney) Sher Habib
(Tsaranwal (Attorney) Sher Habib commanded the Ibrahimkhel Front north of the city of Paghman. His primary AOR extended from Paghman east and northeast to Kabul (some20 kilometers).)
In June 1982, Commander Sheragai led a group of ten of my Mujahideen on a successful raid on a DRA outpost on the Chamtala plain near Highway 2, just north of Kabul. Commander Sheragai was a Kochi[2] and a kinsman of a Kochi clan which had its summer quarters in Paghman and in the areas around Kabul. Some of the families of the clan pitched their tents in Chamtala plain. There they tended their flocks of sheep and goats in the grazing lands just north of Kabul. Their grazing lands were close to a DRA security outpost. The DRA outpost hindered Mujahideen movement through the area (Map 2-2 - Chamtala).
We decided to raid the DRA outpost. I selected Commander Sheragai to lead the raid since he could easily gain the full cooperation of his Kochi clansmen in the area. His group was armed with small arms. They left our base at Qala-e Hakim in Paghman and walked to the Chamtala plain. There, Kochi families took the raiding party into their tents and cared for them. The raiding party stayed with the nomads for several days while they studied and evaluated the outpost and prepared for the raid. Commander Sheragai wanted to find an unmined approach to the outpost, so he asked his kinsmen to move their flocks to various spots around the outpost so he could probe the approaches. This went on for three days while Commander Sheragai picked the most secure approach to the outpost where the terrain allowed to Mujahideen to sneak up on the outpost unobserved. They cleared this approach of mines.
On the morning of the raid, the Mujahideen raiders moved to the target within a herd of sheep. Some Mujahideen posed as shepherds, while others crawled along in the middle of the grazing sheep. The herd moved right up to the DRA outpost, but the Mujahideen presence was never detected or suspected by the DRA guards. The raiding group spent the whole day in the middle of the sheep herd and found hiding places. At sunset, the shepherds drove the flock back toward the encampment, while the Mujahideen remained behind in hiding places. One of the things that the Mujahideen had discovered was when the seven-man security outpost had dinner, one guard was left on duty while the rest ate their dinner. As dinner was being served, three Mujahideen crept to the outpost, jumped the guard and disarmed him. One Mujahideen kept his hand on the mouth of the guard to prevent him from screaming. Then the rest of the raiding party swarmed into the outpost. They surprised the rest of the DRA soldiers and captured them all without firing a shot. A DRA lieutenant was among the prisoners. The Mujahideen took whatever they could carry and then left for their base with all their prisoners.
COMMENTARY
editKabul and the surrounding area were heavily guarded. The Soviet 103rd Airborne Division, the 180th and 181st Motorized Rifle Regiments of the Soviet 108th Motorized Rifle Division, the DRA 8th Infantry Division, the DRA 37th Commando Brigade and the DRA 15th Tank Brigade were all garrisoned in Kabul. Careful reconnaissance, strict camouflage discipline and a clever deception plan enabled the Mujahideen to carry off this raid. Local assistance from the Kochi was essential to the plan. The selection of a Kochi commander and his efforts to gain the cooperation of his kinsmen paid off. The Mujahideen relied on the local populace for cover, food and water, intelligence, shelter and early warning. The time and effort spent were essential to the Mujahideen success.
On the other hand, the DRA commander allowed his outpost activities to become routine. The Mujahideen planned the attack when security was relaxed and captured the outpost without firing a shot or alerting neighboring garrisons.
VIGNETTE 3: RAID ON BAGRAMI DISTRICT HEADQUARTERS
edit- by Commander Shahabuddin
(Commander Shahabuddin is from Shewaki Village south of Kabul.)
In July 1983, local units of all seven major factions united to raid the Bagrami District Headquarters to the southeast of Kabul. We assembled about 250 Mujahideen armed with six 82mm mortars, nine recoilless rifles, and eight RPG-7s. We assembled at my base at Yakhdara, made our plans and then spread our forces out in the villages. We assigned 100 Mujahideen to route security and posted them prior to moving our main raiding forces to Bagrami and Qal-eAhmadkhan. These towns are in the suburbs just outside of Kabul and are part of the inner security belt of Kabul. The Bagrami 40-man assault group had eight RPG-7s, three recoilless rifles and two mortars. They were to attack the district headquarters from three directions. I led the assault group at Qal-e Ahmadkhan. I had 50 men - 10 of which I used for flank protection and 40 for the raid. I also attacked from three directions. As we approach Qal-e Ahmadkhan, we were stopped by a small outpost. We overran it. Then we attacked one of the many security outposts in the village. We overran this outpost killing 25 and capturing eight DRA soldiers. We also captured 14 Kalashnikovs and a telephone set. The Bagrami assault group could not get close enough to their target to attack it directly, so they shelled it instead.
COMMENTARY
editThe DRA and Soviets surrounded Kabul with a series of three security belts composed of outposts, minefields and obstacles. Their purpose was to deny Mujahideen entry into the city and prevent Mujahideen shelling attacks. The Mujahideen often attacked these outposts, but could not hold them. The main benefits of the security belt system to the Mujahideen were these attacks kept a large numbers of troops tied up in passive security roles, the outposts provided a source of weapons and ammunition and these attacks affected the morale of their opponents. There is no map with this.
VIGNETTE 4: ATTACK ON THE TSAWKEY SECURITY POSTS
edit- by LTC Haji Mohammad Rahim
(LTC Haji Mohammad Rahim was an officer in the Afghan Army who became a Mujahideen and led a group in Kunar Province. )
Tsawkey is a district of Kunar Province. The DRA established asecurity post in the Tsawkey High School. This high school security post provided protection for a section of the Jalalabad to Asadabad highway. (Map 2-3 - Tsawkey) It was a usual practice of the DRA to convert public buildings to such uses. I decided to capture this post in October 1983. I had approximately 70 Mujahideen armed with two 82mm mortars, one DShK and some Enfield rifles. We planned our battle in our base in the nearby Babur Gorge. Other Mujahideen joined us from Dawagal. We would attack from three directions — from the north (high ground), along the road from the northeast and from the west. We moved from our base at night, deployed and attacked the target. Our attack lasted 30 minutes. We overran the post but could not hold it. We killed 11 DRA and captured one. We also captured a ZGU-1, a DShK and some Kalashnikovs. We had three Mujahideen KIA and one WIA. We could not hold the security post, so we left it.
There were two DRA security outposts near the Tsawkey District headquarters. One was in the high school and the other was near the bridge. We had a contact inside the second post who was a DRA officer — Musa Khan. In June 1985, he helped us capture his security post. I assembled 50 Mujahideen armed with an RPG-7, Kalashnikovs and Enfields. We came during the night from our base in Babur Valley and followed the road bank to the southwest. We approached the post at dawn from the high ground to the north. Our contact led us inside. Most of the soldiers were asleep and we wanted to capture them. However, some of our Mujahideen were not very quiet and the detail woke up and started fighting us. We killed seven of the security detail and captured one. We also captured one PK medium machine gun, 12 Kalashnikovs and ammunition. The firing alerted the other enemy unit in the Tsawkey high school. They sent a detachment to the outpost, but I had posted a security element on the road. This security element blocked the movement of the detachment and covered our withdrawal. We all withdrew up to our base in the mountains. I had one Mujahideen wounded.
COMMENTARY
editLess than 15% of the Mujahideen commanders had previous military experience, yet the impact of the military who joined the Mujahideen was significant. They provided a continuity, an understanding of military planning and issues, a modicum of uniform training and an ability to deal with outside agencies providing aid to the Mujahideen. On the other hand, these were fairly soft targets. The security outposts were situated in existing buildings backed by wooded high ground. The Mujahideen had concealed approaches and exits as well as inside help.
VIGNETTE 5: RAID ON PUL-E CHARKHI RADIO TRANSMITTER STATION
edit- by Major Sher Aqa Kochay and others
(Principally based on an interview with Major Sher Aqa Kochay in Peshawar on September14, 1996. Other sources include NIFA documents about the battle, Ali Jalali's discussions with Hasan Khan Karokhel in 1986 in Peshawar, his interviews with the late Wali Khan Karokhel (NIFA's provincial military commander of Kabul) in Peshawar and Islamabad in 1984 and 1986 and interviews with General Abdul Rahim Wardak. [Map sheet 2886, vicgrid 3221].)
In June 1984, Provincial NIFA leader Wali Khan issued orders to Major Sher Aqa Kochay, the commander of a NIFA base in Sewak (about 20 kilometers southeast of Kabul). Major Aqa would join two other regional commanders — Haji Hussein Jan of Narey Oba and Sayed Hasan Khan of Khak-e Jabar—in a raid on a radio transmitter station. The transmitter was located near Pul-e Charkhi (20 kilometers east of Kabul city) and the raid would take place on the night of 26 June. The Soviet-backed Afghan government was expanding the transmitter facility which would reach wider audiences inside and outside the country. The station used local broadcasts as well as programs produced in the Soviet Union.[3]
The transmitter station was located in Pul-e Charkhi near a military complex which included the DRA 15th Tank Brigade, DRA 10thfield Engineer Regiment and some other units. (see Map 16a - Qafus 1,Chapter 1 and Map 2-4 - Pul-e Charkhi.) Further to the east, between Butkhak and Sarobi, a government-paid militia force patrolled the area and protected the power lines and pylons that supplied electricity from Naghlo Dam through Sarobi to Kabul. The militia was recruited from the local tribe of the Karokhel clan of Ahmadzai Pushtuns. Their chief was Hasan Khan Karokhel.[4] On the surface, Hasan Khan was a government supporter. But he was actually a major Mujahideen collaborator. He provided the Mujahideen with logistic support, sheltered their resistance fighters and even provided medical care to Mujahideen wounded at regime medical institutions.[5]
According to the plan, Mujahideen from the three bases wouldassemble at Mulla Omar for final instructions prior to the raid. By theafternoon of 26 June, all three groups were in Mulla Omar. Major Sher Aqa and Haji Hussein Jan had each brought 30 men from their basesin Sewak and Narey Oba. Sayed Hasan Khan came with a 50-manunit from Khak-e Jabar.
Wali Khan Karokhel issued the final instructions. Major Sher Aqa was appointed the overall commander of the raiding group. He divided his force into four teams. A 20-man assault team, commanded by Haji Hussein Jan, carried automatic rifles, light machine guns and RPG-7 antitank grenade launchers. Their mission was to attack the transmitter from the southwest, destroy the facility and then withdraw under the cover of the support group.
Major Sher Aqa's 20-man support team would cover the assault team from positions in a ditch immediately to the east of the target. The group had one 82mm mortar, a single barrel 107mm rocketlauncher (BM-1), a PK medium machine gun, a few RPG-7s and AK-47 assault rifles. Major Sher Aqa decided to stay with this team since it would be the last to pull-out.
Sayed Hasan Khan commanded a 25 to 30-man containment team. They were armed with small arms and RPG-7s. They would block the Pul-e Charkhi-Butkhak road on the east bank of Kabul River and prevent the enemy forces from reaching the target. The rest of the Mujahideen were assigned as supply and evacuation elements to help the other groups.
Major Aqa decided to launch the assault at midnight. Since it is about 15 kilometers from Mulla Omar to the site and since the raiding party had to bypass a Soviet unit deployed in Gazak, the departure time was set at dusk (about 2000 hours). The party would move from Mulla Omar through Gazak to reassemble briefly at Lewano Kandow. The Mujahideen force moved out in small groups following each otheron the same route all the way to Lewano Kandow. A pair of reconnaissance patrols moved on the flanks and one moved to the front of the column—keeping within voice contact distance.
When the force reached a water spring at the Lewano Kandow, Major Sher Aqa issued the last coordinating instructions and ordered the groups to open fire when he did. This would signal the start of the raid. From their Lewano Kandow assembly area, the different elements of the raiding party moved separately toward their designated areas.
Just before midnight, all groups were in place. Everything was quiet around the transmitter site. At Major Sher Aqa's signal, the assault team opened fire on the site and began the attack. The support team covered their advance. RPG rounds set the wooden buildings on fire and soon fire swept the site. The defenders at the site panicked and failed to put up an organized resistance. The assault team over-ran the site, killed several soldiers, captured five Kalashnikov assault rifles and demolished the transmitter station.
The DRA quickly responded by moving a tank column from the Pul-e Charkhi garrison to the site. The column crossed the bridge over the Kabul River but then left the main road and bypassed the Mujahideen blocking positions established by the containment (holding) team of Sayed Hasan Khan. The tanks, driving with their headlights off, cut across the plain to the east of the Mujahideen, cutting off their escape route. A young Mujahideen named Babrak hit one tank with an RPG-7 rocket and set it on fire. But the rest of the column moved swiftly to the south-west.
Fearing encirclement, the containment (holding) team and the assault team immediately broke contact and, without notifying Major Sher Aqa, pulled out toward the Lewano Kandow, leaving the support team behind. As Commander Sher Aqa was desperately trying to establish contact with the other teams, he heard tanks moving to the rear of his position. By this time, all electric lights in the area were extinguished, but the transmitter station continued to burn brightly. The Mujahideen and the DRA tank column both used the fire for orientation. Facing a threatening situation, Major Sher Aqa instructed his men not to panic but to exfiltrate individually through the intervals between the tanks. Using masking terrain, his Mujahideen managed to exfiltrate and move to the designated assembly area at Lewano Kandow. As they straggled in, they found that the assault and containment teams along with supply and evacuation personnel were already waiting there. Major Sher Aqa discovered that all the groups, except his support group, had withdrawn when the enemy tank column arrived. All Mujahideen reached Lewano Kandow by 0200.
Mujahideen casualties were six wounded — one from the supporting team who died on the way back, two from the assault team and three from the containment team. It was not safe for the Mujahideen to move further, since daybreak would be in two hours and the Mujaideen would once again have to bypass the Soviet force at Grazak. The raidon Pul-e Charkhi would clearly have alerted the Soviets to the presence of a Mujahideen force in their area.
Two groups, Haji Hussein Jan's detachment and Sayed Hasan Khan's party, decided to stay during the day in the Lewano Kandow mountain since they could not reach their bases during the remaining hours of the night. Major Sher Aqa's group, along with the wounded, moved forward to Mulla Omar. This was only possible since Hasan Khan Karokhel had sent trucks to Lewano Kandow to carry the wounded and other Mujahideen to safety before daybreak. The trucks, posing as militia patrols trying to hunt down the raiding force, took these Mujahideen to Mulla Omar where they were taken care of and medical personnel were summoned from Kabul who tended to the wounded. The next night, the Mujahideen groups returned to their bases and sent the body of the one dead warrior to his family for burial.
COMMENTARY
editThe assistance extended by the Karokhel militia contributed markedly to the Mujahideen success. Such assistance was essential for actions conducted around a strongly defended city like Kabul. From 1980 to 1984, the militia helped many Mujahideen infiltrate into Kabul before defecting en masse to the resistance. Their assistance was particularly important in suporting the withdrawal of Mujahideen strike groups at the end of an action. Such inside help made it possible for a force of more than 100 to launch a raid right in the heart of the enemy stronghold. Ideally, a much smaller group, like a 15-man team, would have been more appropriate to the task. But the Mujahideen preferred to move in large groups. Large groups could carry heavy loads, provide needed labor in the field and carry and escort the wounded and dead. Many Mujahideen felt more comfortable having their relatives or close friends with them.
Lack of reliable internal communications among the Mujahideen combat teams led to a situation that could have turned disastrous. The containment team did not contain the DRA tanks and pulled out immediately after it saw the tanks bypass its position. The group helped the assault team during the assault, but this was not their assigned mission. Had the group laid anti-tank mines in areas that the enemy tanks had to pass over — particularly in the vicinity of the bridge over the Kabul River and the river fords — it could have delayed the tank column and allowed them to engage it more effectively. This would have prevented the enveloping movement that almost encircled the whole Mujahideen contingent.
Apparently, the DRA had not developed and rehearsed contingency plans to deal with such a raid. This, and luck, helped the Mujahideen escape heavy casualties. A more active reaction by the DRA could easily have jeopardized the concentration of a sizeable Mujahideen force in an area totally controlled by Soviet/DRA forces. Relying on tanks, the enemy failed to deploy infantry with the tanks. Infantry are more effective in the dark against guerrillas and provide protection to the tanks against anti-tank gunners. At the same time, the Mujahideen failed to take advantage of the tank column's vulnerability and use their RPG-7s at close distance against the unprotected tanks. The Mujahideen had the opportunity to kill more than the one tank they actually destroyed. Fear of being cut off inhibited much of the Mujahideen action after they successfully destroyed the transmitter. However, through good leadership, Major Sher Aqa turned a threatening tactical situation into a more manageable one and succeeded in pulling his men out through the tank cordon.
VIGNETTE 6: RAID FROM CHELTAN ON OUTPOSTS IN THE KABUL SUBURBS
edit- by Commander Asil Khan
Kabul was surrounded by three security belts made up of security outposts manned by Soviet and DRA forces. A battalion from the DRA 8th Infantry Division garrisoned the old highway construction headquarters, commonly known as "the company," in the western suburbs of Kabul. The battalion also guarded a number of government supply depots located across the highway to the west. The battalion built security outposts on the Khwaja Pushta hills in the south. The battalion protected all its installations with mine fields except for the outposts on the hills. This made all the other installations too difficult to attack in the dark. I commanded a joint 200 Mujahideen detachment made up from local resistance units affiliated with NIFA, HIK and Etehad-e Islami(IUA). According to our agreed plan, we were to move from our bases around Cheltan and converge on the target area in the dark. We would continually shell the main battalion camp and the depots, while the assault groups would attack the Khwaja Pushta hill outposts (Map 2-5 - Cheltan). In the late afternoon of 1 June 1985, I led my NIFA Mujahideenfrom our base at Morghgiran. We arrived near the target after 2000hours. We deployed for battle according to plan. I established blocking positions at Asia-e Beni and Pul-e Khushk and deployed about 20Mujahideen at each position. I positioned one 82mm mortar with its five-man crew and two 82mm recoilless rifles (each with a five-man crew) at Asia-e Beni to shell the enemy battalion. The raid began around 2100 hours and lasted until 2300 hours. Our heavy weapons kept the enemy battalion and the depot forces pinned in place. The enemy responded with artillery fire but made no attempt to counter with infantry or tanks. No enemy helicopters responded throughout the raid. This lack of response left the tactical initiative in my hands. We easily overran the enemy outposts on the Khwaja Pushta hills and captured weapons and a radio set. Most of the DRA soldiers ran away. At one outpost, we killed two enemy soldiers and wounded another. We had no casualties. We pulled out before midnight and the force split up and returned to their bases. Asil Khan was a NIFA commander and a famed guerrilla commander in the Kabul area.[Map sheets 2885 and 2886]. Page 88 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War COMMENIARY: Throughout the war, Soviet and DRA forces were reluctant to respond aggressively to Mujahideen night attacks. Unless the Soviet and DRA forces had planned and rehearsed a counter-attack drill, they rarely left the relative safety of their prepared positions to deal with Mujahideen night attacks. This encouraged the Mujahideento harass the enemy continuously at night and to attack the weakest points of their defenses. Often, the Mujahideen boldly attacked areas adjacent to large forces. These security posts were out of supporting range of other posts, so the DRA refusal to react to the attack practically handed the outpost to the Mujahideen. However, the Mujahideen could not fully exploit their enemy's reluctance to fight at night to achieve decisive tactical results. The Mujahideen could not readily penetrate the heavily-mined zones surrounding Soviet and DRA positions. As long as the Soviet/DRA forces felt no serious threat from isolated Mujahideen night attacks, they preferred to respond by artillery fire instead of risking stumbling into an ambush. The Soviet and DRA response came in the form of well-planned major cordon and search operations in those areas where the Mujahideen had gained an upper hand.
VIGNETTE 7 RAID ON MAHIPAR OUTPOSTSby Commander Wazir Gul In July 1984 three groups of Mujahideen combined to raidSoviet/DRA security outposts on the main Kabul-Jalalabad highway.(Map 2-6 - Mahipar) Highway 1 at Mahipar passes through a deep gorge, with the river flowing immediately to the north of the road and with a steep ridge rising on the south. Other than the highway, the main access to Mahipar is through Mulla Omar Dara, a mountain valley connecting Mulla Omar Village with Highway 1. At that time, the DRA had a militia unit headquartered at Mulla Omar. The DRA militia commander was Hasan Khan Karokhel, the local Ghilzai Pashtun chieftain. Hasan Khan was also a secret collaborator with the Mujahideen. He helped facilitate our movements and combat against Soviet/DRA forces in the area. My group reached Mulla Omar in the evening after a day march from our base at Tangi Tezin. There, we were joined by two NIFA commanders, Captain Afghan of Deh Sabz, and Sayed Hasan Khan of Khak-e Jabar. All together, we had 80 Mujahideen armed with AK-47sand .303 Enfield rifles, five BM-ls, four 82mm recoilless rifles, four82mm mortars, two DShKs and 13 RPG-7s. We planned our combined action at Mulla Omar and moved out the next morning toward Mahipar over Lataband mountain. We had packed our heavy weapons on mules. There were three chief components in our combined force—two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group had BM-1s and 82mm mortars. Their mission was to attack and pin down the DRA base on the left flank and the Soviet base on the right flank. The assault group consisted of three teams. Each assault team had a designated outpost to attack. Each assault team had RPGs and recoilless rifles to support their attack. In order to minimize the daylight available to the enemy's aircraft, we began our attack at 1600. We knew it would take several hours for them to respond. Our heavy weapons pounded the flanking bases to isolate the attack area. The assault teams began to fire on the security posts and slowly move forward. The attack on the security posts was hindered by enemy mines and it took several hours for the Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of BurhanuddinRabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Latabandand Mahipar areas. [Map sheet 2986, vic grid 4723]. Page 90 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 2,
VIGNette 7 Page 91 Mujahideen to overrun the outposts after heavy clashes. By 2100, theDRA soldiers manning the outposts were either killed or had escaped.We took one tank crew prisoner. The Soviet base and outposts further down the road could notsupport the embattled DRA outposts. But as we pulled out, theSoviet base began heavy fire on the withdrawing Mujahideengroups. Their fire had little effect in the dark. We destroyed twotanks, killed nine enemy soldiers and captured three DShKs, six AK-47 rifles and a large amount of ammunition. Two Mujahideen werewounded in the battle. We spent the night at Mulla Omar andreturned to our bases the next day. COMMENTARY: The terrain here is very restrictive and rugged. TheSoviet/DRA bases and outposts were all in the canyon. TheSoviets/DRA surrendered the initiative in this area and trusted that the difficulty in crossing the rugged terrain, coupled with their bunkers and field fortifications, would protect these sites from the Mujahideen. There were a series of three security outposts along the road: two on the high ground on both sides of the gorge and the other on the road. The purpose of security outposts was to protect bridges, hydroelectric installations, dams and block the side valleys. The out-posts on the high ground were not high enough to interfere with Mujahideen freedom of action. There were a few observation posts on the high peaks but they were not effective, particularly at night. Thesecurity outposts on the high ground were mostly manned by DRA or militia which lacked training and were in fact prisoners in their mine-protected enclaves. The Mujahideen could easily bypass them—particularly at night. The Soviets/DRA had mined the main approaches to the gorge, but given the steep nature of the approaches, the mines usually washed away when it rained. The Mujahideen often used such steep areas to descend to the highway. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, saw this set up as an excellent opportunity to punish their opponent, pick up some weapons and resupply ammunition. The Mujahideen developed a standard pattern for attacking outposts along this road. They would attack late in the afternoon to minimize the effectiveness of air strikes and artillery. They would fire rockets and mortars at the main base camps on both flanks of the target area to seal the area and hold the attention of the base camps so that they would not interfere with the main attack. Then they would launch the attack against the outposts which were mostly manned by ill-trained, poorly-motivated conscript DRA. The Page 92 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War DRA had little stomach for the fight and, once the Mujahideen got through the minefields surrounding the outposts, the Mujahideen would strip the outposts of everything they could carry and disappear into the night. The Mujahideen would usually offer DRA prisoners the opportunity to serve as labor service with the Mujahideen or simply turn them loose. The Mujahideen felt that the conscript DRA soldier had little choice in the fight. DRA officers were kept prisoner untilthey could be tried by field tribunal. The Mujahideen felt fairly secure from sallies from the base camps at night. Soviet and DRA reaction was mainly limited to area shelling and bombing.
VIGNETTE 8 RAID ON LATABAND SECURITY OUTPOSTSby Commander Wazir Gul There are two highways between Kabul and Sarobi. The northern highway is the newer one and is part of Highway 1—the main highway of Afghanistan. The older Kabul-Sarobi highway runs roughly parallel to Highway 1, some four-ten kilometers to the south. A series of Soviet and DRA security bases and outposts protected both highways. In September 1985, several Mujahideen groups combined to conduct a raid on the Soviet/DRA security outposts in the Lataband pass east of Kabul (Map 2-7 - Lataband). Lataband is located on the old Kabul-Sarobi highway. The Lataband pass was protected by a Soviet base atMulla Omar in the west, and a DRA Sarandoy base at Lataband in the east. The area between the two bases was protected by several security outposts manned by DRA military detachments. My group's base was in Zandeh Kalay which is some 25 kilometers south of the pass. I planned the attack at the base. We left the base at1500 and moved to the Tezin Valley where we spent the night. We car-ried our supplies and ammunition on mules. Once we got to the TezinValley, I met with the commanders of other groups and we coordinated our attack. The total strength of the combined Mujahideen force was about 150 fighters. We left what we did not need for immediate com-bat at Tezin and moved out toward our targets. We brought the mules with us. There were three chief components in our combined force—two fire support groups and an assault group. Each fire support group had heavy weapons (three BM-1, four DShK, three 82mm mortars).Their mission was to attack and pin down the Soviet base at MullaOmar and the Sarandoy base at Lataband. The assault group had twelve RPG-7s and four 82mm recoilless rifles. The assault group was composed of three 20-man teams Each 20-man team had a designated enemy outpost to attack. We moved into position. In order to minimize the daylight avail-able to the enemy's aircraft, we decided to start our attack in the late afternoon. We began the attack at 1600 with heavy fire on the bases at Mulla Omar and Lataband. Meanwhile, the assault teams occupy- Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of BurhanuddinRabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Latabandand Mahipar areas. [Map sheets 2985 and 2986vic grid 5618]. Page 94 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 2,
VIGNette 8 Page 95 ing the high ground south of the Lataband pass began to fire on the enemy outposts below. The shelling confused the enemy as the three teams of the assault group approached their outposts and launched the attack. The battle continued into the evening and the assault teams overran the enemy outposts. As the Mujahideen approached the out-posts, most of the DRA soldiers ran away and left behind an enormous amount of ammunition and other equipment. We loaded what we could on our mules and hauled it away. The enemy responded by saturating the area in and around the outposts with artillery fire and air attacks. We lost two mules to artillery fire and so withdrew at 2100. We suffered personnel losses. The losses, in my own group were one KIA and six WIA. We captured two DRA soldiers and lots of ammunition and supplies. COMMENTARY: The isolated highway security posts were extremely vulnerable to attacks by Mujahideen who controlled the surrounding high ground. The Soviets/DRA had insufficient intelligence or surveil-lance in the immediate region. Furthermore, their contingency plans to reinforce outposts or to react swiftly against Mujahideen attacks were lacking or poorly executed. The forces in the bases seemed to have a severe case of "bunker mentality" and passively sat out the Mujahideen shelling and attack on the outposts. The Soviets and DRA seemed particularly reluctant to move and fight at night. The Mujahideen exploited this reluctance. Air support apparently was slow in coming and was not very accurate at night. In this example, the Soviet/DRA base forces waited until the out-posts were overrun and the Mujahideen were withdrawing before they reacted. They reacted with artillery and air strikes—not maneuver forces. The DRA in the outposts were left to their own devices. The DRA forces were generally ill-trained and had poor morale. Most of the DRA soldiers had been press-ganged into the army and had no desire to fight their countrymen. Therefore, the DRA soldiers were more interested in escaping than in stubborn defense and were quite willing to abandon the ammunition and supplies of the outpost to the attacking Mujahideen. The Mujahideen preferred to attack DRA outposts for this reason. Mujahideen dependence on these types of raids for weapons and ammunition cost them casualties. The Soviets and DRA reacted with artillery and air strikes when they could, but they did not continue them all night long. This gave the Mujahideen the option of immediately entering the camp to seize what material they could and then Page 96 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War leaving to get far away before dawn or waiting for the artillery to sub-side and then leaving with less time until daylight. Both courses entailed risk.
VIGNETTE 9 RAID ON OUTPOSTS AT WRESHMIN GORGEby Commander Wazir GuI During October 1985, Mujahideen factions took turns blockingthe Kabul-Jalalabad highway at Wreshmin Tangay (gorge) between Dabili and Dargo bridges (Map 2-8 - Wreshmin). My mission was to block the highway for eight days. At that time, I commanded 70 Mujahideen. We were armed with five BM-ls, two BM-12s, four 82mm recoilless rifles, two ZGU-1s, three 82mm mortars and many RPG-7s. In order to block the highway, I had to remove enemy security posts along that stretch of road. I moved my force from Manayin Hisarak to the Tsapar (Capar) mountain where I refined my battle plan. Since there are limited access routes into the area and since the area near the highway was heavily mined, I decided to launch the initial attack against the flanks of the area we were going to block, i.e. against the Dabili bridge in the west and the Dargo bridge in the east. These two places are relatively accessible from the mountains in the south. After destroying the road bridges at these two points, I planned to isolate the area and continue the attack down the highway against 'the security outposts. The high-way approach was best since the highway itself was not mined. I divided my detachment into two groups and moved them to Dabili and Dargo. I kept a reserve centrally located to the rear between the two attacking groups. The two groups approached the target at night. The next day, they captured the Dabili and Dargo bridges by swift attacks. They immediately destroyed the bridges with explosives. This isolated the area. Then, the two groups attacked down the road(to avoid the DRA minefields) from the opposite directions. They eventually overran 16-17 small Soviet/DRA security outposts located on the road. Then they turned around to consolidate their success and rein-forced the defenses at the east and west flanks of the blockade. During the next eight days, the Soviets and DRA tried to reopen the highway, but failed. Their air strikes and artillery were generally ineffective due to the narrowness of the canyon. The enemy sent a column from Jalalabad to force the road, but we stopped them in the narrow confines around Dargo bridge and they had to withdraw. We spent the Commander Wazir Gul was affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami Afghanistan (JIA) of BurhanuddinRabbani. His base was in Tezin southwest of Sarobi. He fought in the Sarobi, Latabandand Mahipar areas. [Map sheets 2985, 2986, vic grid 7617 to 8317]. Page 98 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 2,
VIGNette 9 Page 99 eight days stripping all the ammunition, weapons and supplies out of the bases and outposts. We hauled the spoils of war into the mountains. We captured about 100 weapons and an enormous amount of ammunition. At the end of our eight days, I withdrew my detachment and we returned to our base. I lost six KIA and 18 WIA or about 30% of my force. Enemy losses were heavier and included some 50 killed or wounded and 24 soldiers captured. COMMENTARY: The terrain played a major role in shaping the battle. The Soviets/DRA controlled the ribbon of highway running through a narrow gorge, while the Mujahideen controlled the surrounding mountains whenever they wanted to. The Mujahideen had the freedom to choose the time and place to raid dozens of security outposts sprinkled along the treacherous highway snaking through the very narrow canyon in Mahipar and the Wreshmin Tangay. In the WreshminTangay, virtually all Mujahideen groups habitually first attacked the two main bridges i.e. Dabili and Dargo. Then, after destroying the bridges, they would attack the rest of the security posts from both ends. This method proved to be the most effective one given the terrain, minefields, enemy dispositions and Mujahideen capabilities. BRIDGE POST -0 're% I YAWAR GALA`14' 44.t Irri-• I SA61EAELIUL 0.5 KM ITO ALINGAR TOWNI GHULAMALI QALA /Tres ‘'s 1)-14+ • Page 100 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan WarALINGAR Map 2-9
VIGNETTE 10 RAID ON THE BRIDGE POST IN ALINGARby Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Commander Haji Sidiqullah In February 1986, Commander Abdul Qudus Alkozai led a group of 15 Mujahideen on a raid of a government post near the center of the Alingar District in Laghman Province. The post overlooked a bridge on the Alingar River near Barwai Village, some four kilometers north of Alingar. The bridge outpost was located within a walled enclosure and included covered firing positions and parapets. The post included a one-room guard house for the six soldiers who manned the post. The outpost was part of a security belt protecting the district center against Mujahideen attacks. There were several other outposts in the area established in individual houses and fort-like structures. Among them were Ghulamali Qala to the north and Yawar Qala and Sahebgul Qalato the south of the bridge post. They were about 150-200 meters apart(Map 2-9 Alingar). My guerrilla raiding party left its base in a nearby village at 2200hours on a dark, cold, rainy winter night. Moving north to the objective, I dropped a two-man observation/security party opposite the Sahebgul Qala outpost. I posted another two-man observation/ security party outside the Yawar Qala outpost and a final two-man observation/security party alongside the road to the bridge. They were to pin down any forces which attempted to come to the aid of the bridge out-post. My eight remaining Mujahideen and I were armed with eight automatic rifles and one RPG-7. We moved to the bridge and deployed in the cover of a roadside ditch. We completely blocked the western approach to the bridge. My plan was to remain in the ditch until the soldiers at the out-post opened the door of the guard house to relieve the sentry. Then, using the light coming from the opened door to guide on, we would jump over the low (one-meter) outpost enclosure wall, storm the post and kill the occupants. We waited for two miserable hours in the cold rain, but nothing happened inside the outpost. Finally, I decided to take the initiative. Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH party in Laghman. Hejoined Hekmatyar in the fight against Daoud--before the communist revolution. He had noformal military education. Dr. Abdul Qudus was a guerrilla commander under Sidiqullah.He doubled as the force medic, since he received medic's training in Pakistan. [Map sheet3086, vic grid 2455]. Page 102 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War I directed three men to, move quietly to the post, jump over the walland attack the sentry. Then, as soon as the other soldiers started tocome out of the guard house, we would rush the guard house anddemand their surrender. I positioned the RPG-7 where it could hit the guard house and told the gunner not to fire if he heard his comrades telling the soldiers to surrender (surrender was the code word). I instructed him to open fire if the enemy initiated contact and opened fire on us. At about 0100, my three-men party approached the outpost. One man covered the team while the other two jumped over the wall. One of these Mujahideen landed squarely on the back of the sleeping enemy sentry. The sentry was wrapped in a blanket and sound asleep, but when my Mujahideen landed on him, he woke up and began to shout. My panicked Mujahideen opened fire and killed the sentry. Anticipating the reaction of the guards, one Mujahideen tossed a hand grenade into the door of the guard room. As it exploded, they rushed into the structure. My RPG gunner heard the commotion, but did not hear his comrades demanding the enemy surrender. Since the codeword was not used, my RPG gunner assumed that the enemy had over-whelmed his comrades and therefore opened fire on the guard house.
The RPG-7 rocket ripped through the wall of the guard house, killing two soldiers and seriously injuring one of my Mujahideen standing nearby. This changed the situation drastically. My wounded Mujahideen was calling for help and his comrades stopped to evacuate him. As soon as my other Mujahideen saw their comrades stop to attend to their fallen comrade, they also stopped their attack. I called off the raid and ordered a withdrawal. As we withdrew, my security teams rejoined us and we returned to our base.
C0MMENFARY: The Mujahideen timing for the raid was ideal. Inclement weather and night movement covered their approach. The enemy guard was even asleep. This lack of enemy alertness was not unusual. The DRA and Soviets usually failed to deploy foot patrols at night between their outposts. There was also little tactical and fire coordination between outposts. This passivity at night resulted in a bunker mentality among the Soviet/DRA soldiers manning isolated security outposts and allowed the Mujahideen freedom of movement and the chance to own the night and conduct their hit and run raids.
Lack of control of the raiding party at the objective foiled an other-wise skillfully-planned action. What went wrong was a combination of Murphy's law, a lack of precombat rehearsals and a lack of a regular chain of command. Landing on a sleeping soldier was bad luck, but dry rehearsals would have exercised the option of an approach being dis- .covered and provided for the continuation of the attack while wounded are being evacuated. Since the force commander did not have communication with his RPG gunner, he needed the firm, positive control that a subordinate leader, located with the RPG gunner, could have provided. Lack of communication, subordinate leadership and fire coordination at the objective cost the Mujahideen a tactical victory.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY
editThe Mujahideen raid depended on surprise and quick execution. Raids produced needed weapons, ammunition and equipment. They also proved a good way to destroy DRA or Soviet security posts and sites. A well-organized raid had an assault force, a fire support group and a security element. Portable radios were needed to coordinate the raiding elements, but all too often the Mujahideen lacked these radios. The Mujahideen primary obstacle in a raid was to get past the minefields which the Soviets and DRA emplaced around their security posts and sites. The Mujahideen launched most of their raids at night. They did so to prevent being hit by effective air or artillery strikes and to avoid further contact with DRA or Soviet forces which were reluctant to leave their garrisons at night.
- ↑ This was part of the Soviet 108th Motorized Rifle Division area of responsibility. At thistime, the division's 285th Tank Regiment was stationed in Charikar while the 177thMotorized Rifle Regiment was stationed 13 kilometers north at Jabulassarai. The outpostbelonged to one of these two regiments.
- ↑ Kochi are nomadic peoples.
- ↑ The Soviet Union and their clients in Kabul were also engaged in jamming international broadcasts beamed to Afghanistan. Afghans considered such broadcasts the only source of objective and uncensored news to the country. The jamming was done at other sites.
- ↑ Hasan Khan later cooperated with the Mujahideen in a major action in 1984. He sheltered, guided and supported a NIFA force which blew up all the electric pylons between Butkhak and Sarobi. This cut off electrical power to Kabul for a long time. "Operation Black-out" marked the end of Hasan Khan's service as the head of the government militia and he, along with his family and 400 followers, migrated to Pakistan and continued his struggle against the Soviet-backed regime from there. Hazhir Teimourian reported on this in The Times of London on 31 August 1984. Wall Khan, Hasan Khan's brother, remained NIFA's provincial leader in Kabul until1986. Afterwards, he acted independently mostly in the anti Communist political movement outside the country. After the Soviet withdrawal, he joined the Council of Solidarity and Understanding--a movement of Afghan intellectuals campaigning for creation of a moderate government in Afghanistan. The movement, and particularly Wali Khan Karokhel, supported the restoration of the former King of Afghanistan as a person who would serve as a symbol of unity among the fractionalized Afghan Resistance. Wali Khan was assassinated in 1994 on the road between Peshawar and Islamabad by yet unidentified gunmen. Some speculation points to his political enemies among the extremist Islamic groups as the perpetrators of the murder.
- ↑ In fact NIFA's provincial commander, Wali Khan Karokhel, was the brother of Hasan Khan Karokhel. Hasan Khan Karokhel had his headquarters in Mulla Omar, the ancestral home of the Karokhel chiefs.