The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 4
CHAPTER 4: ATTACKING A STRONG POINT edit
Attacking a strong point is often similar to conducting a raid andmany of the same tactical considerations and techniques apply.Attackers quickly abandon their objective after a successful raid,while there is usually an intent to hold a captured strong pointfor some period of time. Therefore, an attack on a strong pointgenerally involves more supplies and heavier armaments. Mostoften, the strong points were political centers which the Mujahideenwanted to hold for propaganda value. 1 KM 0 ■ • IN ■ ■■ •• •• •■ r. • •me TOKHIKHWAR • \ ••• ■ ■ ■• •• •• • • • ■ ) • ALINGAR cc wlALINGAR 2 Map 4-1 AMIR •SHAHID ■HILL NOT TO SCALE Page 118 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 1 TAKING ALINGAR DISTRICT CAPITALby Nawaz Khan, Doctor Abdul Qudus Alkozai and Haji M. Siddiqullah In July of 1980, the subdistrict capital of Nengrach was collocatedwith the Alingar District Capital in the town of Alingar. This isbecause the Mujahideen had driven the government out of the moun-tain redoubt of Nengrach. The district government of Nuristan wasalso there. This was a common practice. The DRA maintained many"governments in exile" for areas they did not control and held "nation-wide" congresses using emigrants to represent those uncontrolledareas. The DRA never controlled more than 15% of the countryside.We decided to eliminate all these governments by seizing Alingar town.It proved to be a major victory. The DRA 81st Regiment had a battalion in Alingar and there weresome DRA militia forces as well.' (Map 4-1 - Alingar 2) We had twocontacts in the DRA garrison. One was Captain Yar Mohammad whohad a brother in our Mujahideen group. Captain Mohammad was fromnearby Koh-e Safi and routinely provided us information about gov-ernment plans. We talked to the Captain about capturing Alingar andhe agreed to help us. We introduced the Captain to our other contact,Piroz. Piroz was a cook in the DRA garrison. We gave drugs to Piroz.The Captain and Piroz agreed that Piroz would drug the food beforeour attack and that the captain would signal us when that was doneand we could launch our attack. We asked the cook how manyMujahideen we should bring. "Not too many to cause trouble, but nottoo few to fail" he replied. "Okay, about 70,000" we joked. "No, onlyabout 10,000" he joked back. In any case, the Mujahideen sympathiz-ers in the DRA camp would kill the communist officers. The signal toattack was the firing of a magazine full of tracer ammunition. Nawaz Khan was a cadet in the Afghanistan Military Academy when he joined the resis-tance. He was a Mujahideen commander in Mehtar Lam, the Provincial Capital ofLaghman Province. Haji Sidiqullah was the Provincial Military Commander of the HIH fac-tion in Laghman. He joined HIH in the fight against Dauod before the communist revolu-tion. Dr. Qudus was a commander under Sidiqullah who doubled as the force medic. [Mapsheet 3086, vic grid 2455]. 1 According to Soviet sources, the DRA 71st Infantry Regiment was garrisoned in MehtarLam with some forces in the Alingar area. The 81st Mechanized Infantry Regiment wasstationed further to the south in Nangrahar Province. General Alexandr Mayorov, Pravdaob Afganskoy voyne [Truth about the war in Afghanistan], Moscow: Prava Chiloveka, 1996,Map set. Page 120 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War There were about 300 total Mujahideen formed in four groups andabout 30 subgroups. We called the group commanders together andtold them to concentrate their men at night in Tokhi Khwar about onekilometer from the district headquarters. We told them that we hadinside contacts but provided no details. We also assigned a group ofMullas with megaphones to begin broadcasting after the attack. Theywere to persuade the beseiged DRA to surrender. H-hour was midnight. There were 150 Mujahideen in Nawaz Khan's group. They werearmed with three DShK heavy machine guns, two 82mm recoillessrifles, some mortars and Kalashnikov rifles. Dr. Qudus group hadone Soviet PPSH submachine gun, some bolt-action rifles and someother weapons. Several Mujahideen were unarmed. The other Muja-hideen groups were similarly equipped. The signal to attack wasgiven 10 minutes early. The tracers ripped into the air. Although thedrugged food did not have its desired effect, Piroz and 10 otherMujahideen sympathizers had killed their communist officers. TheDRA battalion surrendered to us as we stormed inside the battalioncompound. The first one in was Doctor Nasar who just this year fin-ished his education in Egypt. It was the 1st of July 1980. The Mujahideen had deployed forces to the north, south and west of the district center. One group attackedthe DRA security posts on Baghal mountain to the northwest. Onegroup attacked along the main road which ran east of the river. Onegroup attacked to seize and cross the bridge. One group attacked theDRA posts on the Amir Shahid hill to the southeast. The DRA militarydid not want to fight us, however, the local militia units were reluctantto surrender and fought on. The militia were still protecting the gov-ernment enclaves of Alingar, Nuristan and Nengrach. The militarythen cooperated with us and turned their guns on the militia. A fiercebattle ensued with the Mujahideen and military fighting the militia.During the fighting, the district governor of Alingar and eight or nineaides managed to escape to Mehtar Lam. Still, we captured Alingarand eliminated the DRA governments of Nengrach and Alingar.Thirteen officials from Nuristan made a break, but were cut down inour cross fire. The governor of Nuristan was killed by a Mujahideenwhose brother had been killed by this same governor. At one point,Sidiqullah saw Saidagul, the Alingar Communist Party Secretary,being dragged off by a group he did not recognize. Since he had lenthis rifle to a friend, Sidiqullah was unarmed and so he struck twostones together to imitate a bolt action rifle action and challengedthem. Mawlawi Rahim identified himself and stated that they had Chapter 4, Vignette 1 Page 121 captured a DRA soldier. Sidiqullah identified Saidagul and told themthat they had a much more important catch. The fighting continuedthrough the night, the Mujahideen moving to cut off the fleeing DRAofficials and pursuing them in the dark. The fighting ended in time formorning prayers. One of the groups involved in the fighting was a group of teenagersfrom 13 to 18 years old who we called the Khandakiano (bull terriers)group. During the fighting, one 14-year-old was fighting a desperatehand-to-hand combat with a DRA sports captain named Sharif.Fortunately, another Mujahideen killed Sharif during the fight. We killed 285 DRA officials, police, soldiers, militia and civilians.2We captured 80 heavy weapons, two armored vehicles and 1,200 smallarms. The heavy weapons included one 76mm mountain gun, one76mm field gun, some ZGU-1 heavy machine guns, a 107mm mortar,several DShK heavy machine guns, and some 82mm mortars. Manygovernment people also surrendered to us. It was a bonanza. InNawaz Khan's group, they lost three KIA and seven WIA. InSidiqullah's group they lost two KIA. We kept the district capital forsome time until a joint Soviet/DRA force pushed us out and reestab-lished DRA government in Alingar. COMMENTARY: Alingar is about 30 kilometers from the province capitalof Mehtar Lam. At this point of the war, the Mujahideen were deter-mined to control political centers so that they could claim to be a legit-imate government in Afghanistan. The DRA was equally determinedto prevent this. 2 Sidiqullah states 120 DRA casualties. Page 122 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War VIGNETTE 2 THE BATTLE FOR PANJWAYEEbased on an interview with Mulla Malang In September 1982, the DRA, backed by Soviet forces, had firmcontrol of Panjwayee, the district capital of Panjwayee District (Map4-2 - Panjwayee). Panjwayee is located some 25 kilometers southwestof Kandahar. The district was militarily significant to both sides sincethe town and its surrounding hills provided a favorable base for mili-tary action in the green zones which stretch all the way to the city ofKandahar. This area was also the hot bed of resistance in the region.Seizing control of Panjwayee was in the interest of all the localMujahideen groups based in the area. Therefore, about 1,000 Mujahi-deen assembled near. Panjwayee to take the town. The operation wasdirected by HIK commander Mulla Malang and others. The town was defended by up to 300 militia who lived there withtheir families The militiamen had turned their houses and all otherbuildings into fortified positions. They placed bunkers on the roof topsand occupied and fortified the high ground overlooking the town andthe approaches to it. The Mujahideen began by surrounding the townand shelling it for two days. The shelling had little effect on thedefenders, but the Mujahideen soon found themselves the object ofenemy artillery fire and aerial bombardment. Most of the Mujahideenwithdrew into the neighboring villages of Sperwan and Zangabad. On the third day, Commander Mulla Malang decided to penetratethe town with a small group and to seize control of a number of thedominant positions that covered the approaches to the town. At noon,Mulla Malang led a group of 25 Mujahideen to the southern edge of thetown. They carried picks and shovels. They quietly dug a hole throughthe adobe wall and broke into a house. Once inside, they began toadvance from house to house by knocking holes into the walls. Theiradvance was totally unobserved by the militia who were occupying therooftop positions overlooking the streets of the town. The Mujahideenfinally knocked a hole through a wall that opened onto a courtyard.They burst into the courtyard with weapons at the ready. Themilitiamen were caught by surprise. They assumed that the town Mulla Malang was one of the most famous commanders of the Kandahar area. He was anadherent of Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis-Islamic Party (Hezb-e-lslami Khalis). [Mapsheet 2180, vic grid 4794]. Page 124 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War was already captured by the Mujahideen, and fled from the town.Mulla Malang's group established a secure area and signaled theMujahideen outside the town. Soon, hundreds of other Mujahideenpoured into the town and cleared it from the southeast to the north-west, ending on the bank of the Arghandab River. They cleared thetown building by building, again avoiding the streets by advancing byknocking holes in the walls Other Mujahideen immediately climbedto the roof tops and manned the abandoned positions. Only the districtheadquarters remained under militia control. That night, theMujahideen consolidated their gains and captured the district head-quarters the next day. The militia had suffered heavy casualties and retreated to the over-watching high ground of a neighboring hill. The Mujahideen sur-rounded the militia positions. The government forces then openednegotiations with the Mujahideen—apparently to gain time As theywere talking, an armored Soviet/DRA column arrived from Kandahar.The Mujahideen withdrew inside Panjwayee. The following night, the Soviet and DRA forces attackedPanjwayee and a heavy house-to-house battle ensued. The Mujahi-deen fired from the roof tops at the government forces advancingalong the streets. Eventually, the Soviet/DRA combat power made theMujahideen position untenable. The Mujahideen withdrew in smallgroups under the cover of darkness. The regime restored the districtgovernment in Panjwayee. CommErrrARY: The Mujahideen gradually learned that overrunningand seizing control of government administrative centers is easy, butretaining them usually resulted in rapid Soviet or DRA retaliation.The Soviets/DRA felt that they had to retain control of local govern-ment agencies and would go to great lengths and take high risks todefend local administrative centers, even when they were tightlybesieged by the resistance. Control of a district center symbolizedcontrol of the district, though this was seldom the case. In someremote districts, government control was restricted to a few buildingsin the center of the district town. The government spared no effort tomaintain their presence in these remote district centers despite theirinsignificant military usefulness and the high costs,in men and mate-rial, of holding them. This policy was promoted by the political impor-tance of maintaining control, albeit nominal, over all provinces,districts and subdistricts in a country which was in revolt against theforeign-installed government. Chapter 4, Vignette 2 Page 125 The battle of Panjwayee is an example of how easily the resistancecould seize control of an isolated district center and how vulnerable theresistance became once it was forced to defend the town in the face ofoverwhelming Soviet/DRA forces. For this reason, it was only towardthe end of the Soviet occupation that the Mujahideen again moved toseize control of major district and provincial centers. The source of theresistance power was not the cities and towns but the rural areas andthe hundreds of the cross-border supply and infiltration routes whichthey controlled throughout the war. Tactically, a 25-man detachment accomplished what a 1,000 manforce could not. They did this through surprise and the indirectapproach. However, the lack of an overall operational command leftthe Mujahideen vulnerable. After seizing Panjwayee, the Mujahi-deen became overconfident and failed to prepare for the enemycounter attack. They confidently parleyed with the militia while theSoviet/DRA force formed and moved. The Mujahideen failed toconsolidate their victory and to establish defensive positions on thehills to the east and west of Panjwayee and on the Arghandab Riverto the north. They failed to post reconnaissance and ambush forceson the likely enemy avenues of approach. Instead of having to fighttheir way through a series of ambushes and then bumping intooutlying Mujahideen fortified positions, the Soviet/DRA relief forcemoved unopposed to the battlefield and surprised the victoriousMujahideen at Panjwayee. Tactically, the Mujahideen realized that movement along streets issuicidal in urban combat. However, the spontaneous nature of theunpaid, volunteer Mujahideen made control very difficult. Mujahideenforces joined the battle and left as they wished. Often, they did notbother to let the coordinating commander know. Page 126 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War DARA-ENURVALLEY x 1618 DARAH-EA6k,NUR 1483 BODYALAYGHAR SHEWA • •• ImoKuNA,„arm.-91f KMBODYALAY Map 4-3 VIGNETTE 3 ATTACK ON THE BODYALAY GARRISONby Doctor Mohammad Sadeq A DRA border guard battalion' at Bodyalay near Shewa Districthad security posts on the high ground commanding the Dara-i-NurValley which stretches northward from Bodyalay. We decided to attackthe security posts in March 1983 (Map 4-3 Bodyalay). We had 65Mujahideen armed with one DShK heavy machine gun, one 82mmmortar, four RPG-7s, 22 Kalashnikovs and other small arms. At thattime, we did not have a permanent base but moved from village to vil-lage in the Dara-i Nur Valley. We came down from the mountains inthe north through the side valley that opens onto Ziraybaba abouteight kilometers to the east. From that valley, we moved on mountainpaths to reach the eastern flank of the main valley at BodyalayMountain We positioned the DShK and mortar near the peak ofBodyalay Mountain. I divided our force into four groups. One groupdeployed against the south side of the battalion garrison to pin them inposition and cut off any aid from the south. The second group deployedagainst the government base at the village of Darah-e Nur to pin themdown. The third group deployed against the two battalion outposts onBodyalay Mountain. The fourth group was the support group whichmanned the DShK and mortar on the top of Bodyalay Mountain. We started our attack after midnight. One mortar shell scored adirect hit on a government OP and killed one and wounded five of theenemy defenders. We were fighting for 2 hours and 30 minutes butwere unable to overrun either of the outposts. As the day dawned, wehad to withdraw since we were surrounded by enemy forces and wereabout to lose the advantage of night. We withdrew over the samemountain paths. I had two wounded Mujahideen from the attack. COMMENTARY: The Mujahideen force harassed the DRA battalion, butlacked sufficient combat power to overrun any of its outposts sincemuch of its force was deployed to prevent the DRA forces from movingto reinforce the besieged outposts. Even if the attack succeeded, theattackers would have only had time to grab weapons and other spoilsand leave. The Mujahideen force escaped over the same route that Doctor Mohammad Sadeq was a commander with the HIH in Kunar Province. [Map sheet3186, vic grid 4830]. 3 Probably the 902nd Border Guards Battalion. Page 128 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War they arrived on. If the DRA informer net was effective, the Mujahideenwere risking ambush on their return. The Mujahideen had no radiosor other rapid communications and so control of the battle was prob-lematic at best. VIGNETTE 4 ATTACK ON SORUBAYby Toryalai Hemat There were a lot of DRA sympathizers in the Nazian Valley. Wecalled this area "Little Moscow", as did the many Arabs in the areawho had joined us in jihad.4 The district headquarters of the NazianValley is Sorubay. All the residents of Sorubay were communistsympathizers. We decided to seize the district center in July 1985(Map 4-4 - Sorubay). It was a combined action by the forces ofHikmatyar, Sayyaf, Mohammadi and Khalis (HIH, IUA, IRMA andHIK). There were about 1,000 Mujahideen in various bases in theMaro Mountain stronghold area. Sorubay District center is 12 kilometers north of the Melava baseand Maro Mountains—about a six-hour hike through the mountains.I had 80 men in my command and we were well armed. I had threeBM12s, some medium mortars and many heavy machine guns in mygroup. This was a major attempt by us to seize the Nazian Districtgovernment and in many respects was closer to conventional warthan guerrilla war. For two weeks, Mujahideen supply trains resup-plied Melava base, replenished our ammunition and our MRL rock-ets. We prepared for the attack for an additional week and thenmoved from Maro Mountain down into the Nazian Valley. Early inthe morning, we deployed our first groups against the DRA OPswhich sat on the small mountains overlooking Sorubay. There wereabout 12 security OPs on the mountains surrounding Sorubay, so theattack on the center started with the attack on the security posts.After conducting heavy fire on these posts, we attacked and seizedthem. We captured Sar Ghar and Tor Ghar security posts by 1000hours. Then we started shelling the district center and descended onSorubay. Government officials, DRA soldiers and their families start-ed fleeing. They left in such a hurry that when we entered Sorubay,we discovered that the occupants had left their dinners still cookingand bread dough was waiting to be baked. We captured many impor- Toryalai Hemat was a regiment commander of a mobile force allied with the IUA—IslamicUnity of Afghanistan of Sayyaf. He fought in many provinces in Afghanistan. [Map sheet3185, vic grid 8299]. 4 Moscow soghra is the Arabic. Many Arabs came to Afghanistan for the jihad. The over-all Afghan impression of the Arab Mujahideen, gathered from our interviews, is that theywere prima donnas who were more interested in taking videos than fighting. Page 130 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War ■ 4%•. SHINWAR• 1:I ♦ ♦ I I ♦ SAR GHAR SORIBAY•I • TOR GHAR 02345 KMSORUBAY Map 4-4 Chapter 4, Vignette 4 Page 131 tant government documents which we sent to Peshawar. We sent ourDRA captives to Landay. I lost seven KIA during the attack. Westayed in Sorubay overnight. The enemy responded by sending forces from Jalalabad. Heavyenemy artillery fire began to fall on the OPs located on the highground. Aircraft hit us as enemy armored vehicles neared the districtcenter. We could not hold the district center against the air andartillery and so we vacated the place. During this fighting, we lostmany people. I lost another seven KIA in my group. We left one ofour dead, Ahmad Said, behind. He used to wear camouflage fatigues.The next day the DRA radio stated that they had identified Chinesemercenaries among our dead. Perhaps this was Ahmad. Two dayslater, we attacked Sorubay again and I lost yet another seven MA. Ihad lost 21 of 80 men in this action. I don't know what the enemycasualties were, but I personally saw 15 bodies when we capturedSorubay. We returned to our bases. COMMENTAAY: There was a political advantage to holding districtcapitals, as it conferred a degree of legitimacy on the Mujahideen.However, these capitals were usually located on accessible groundand were not sited for defense against modern artillery and airpower. In this instance, the Mujahideen moved from guerrilla war-fare to a set-piece battle to capture Sorubay and were victorious.However, their attempt to hold the prize resulted in heavy losses andno political advantage.
The outposts overlooking Sorubay appear to have been sited rather haphazardly with little planning for mutual support. The DRA evidently fragmented their force to little advantage.
VIGNETTE 5 STORMING GULA'lby Haji Malangyar The Nangrahar agricultural/irrigation project was located inShinwar District, Nangrahar Province southeast of Jalalabad. Themassive irrigation project was built with Soviet help and guardedby several DRA military garrisons. (No Map) A battalion and somemilitia units protected the irrigation system. The battalion was gar-risoned at the main water pump some 1.5 kilometers north of Gula'i.Gula'i is three kilometers northwest of Ghanikhel. A canal runs par-allel to the main road north of Ghanikhel and a militia unit guard-ed a bridge on this road. Another battalion protected a bridge furtherto the northwest. Our base at Marochina, was seven kilometers west of Gula'i.There were no people left in Gula'i since everyone had migrated. Ihad 59 Mujahideen armed with an 82mm mortar and 12 RPG-7s.The 8th of July 1985 was the last day of fasting in Ramadan. Thenext day would be the Feast of Ramadan (Eid-al-Fitr). We felt thatmany DRA soldiers would celebrate the festival at home makingthis a good time to attack. As was our custom, we prayed to Godand put the Koran inside the cloth tsadar. We held the tsadar highand had every Mujahideen pass under it to ask God's blessing onus. We walked to Gula'i and spent the night of July 8th in an aban-doned house. I selected four groups of eight-to-ten men each todivert and contain the outposts at the Narai Pul bridge, the AozhdaGhundai hill, Smats hill, and the Spin Khwar syphon. I had radiocommunication with all groups. I commanded the 19 men in themain attack. Each containment group had two RPGs and the mainattack group had four RPGs. I positioned our mortar near theCongregation Mosque (Eidgah). I started the attack at 1600 hoursand three hours later we overran the government post in Gula'i. Thecontainment groups prevented any assistance to the post. Afterdark, we all gathered at the designated assembly area. We had twoWIA. The enemy lost three KIA and two POWs. We also captured11 Kalashnikovs, 100 boxes of badly needed ammunition and somehand grenades. Haji Malangyar fought in the heavily contested Shinwar District. There is no map with thisvignette. [Map sheet 3185, vic grid 7910].
COMMENTARY: Radios greatly helped coordinate Mujahideen actions.Evidently, attacking during the Feast of Ramadan also helped.Because the DRA had to protect military, political and economic instal-lations this spread the DRA force thin and inhibited offensive actions.The agricultural project was vital to the economic well-being of thearea and, although the Mujahideen attacked the military posts, theydid not attack the canals.
VIGNETTE 6 DESTRUCTION OF THE BAGH-E MUMTAZ BRIGADEby Doctor Mohammad Wakil In 1988, the DRA deployed a security ,brigade north of Kabul tosecure the route for the withdrawal of the Soviet 40th Army. It wasstationed on the Kabul-Charikar highway near the road junction withthe road leading to Shakardara—the district headquarters ofShakardara District. The brigade was stationed in the Mumtazorchard, so it was called the Bagh-e Mumtaz Brigades (Map 4-5 -Shakardara). My brother, the late Commander Wasil, was the overallcommander of the many factions involved in this battle. He workedout the plan during several commanders councils at thevarious factionbases. At 0800 hours on 21 June 1988, we would begin our attack onthe brigade. The first phase would be the isolation and artillery prepa-ration phase. Mujahideen would block the road from the north andsouth to isolate the garrison and begin a seven-day artillery prepara-tion with a BM-12, Saqar MRL, 122mm howitzer, 82mm mortars and82mm recoilless rifles. The artillery preparation would be fired fromfour directions. The second phase would be the ground offensive. Onehundred Mujahideen would attack on each of four axes. The attackfrom the south would be led by my brother, Commander Wasil, on thesouthern axis Sehab-e Quli Village—Morad Beg town. Commander TajMohammad would lead the attack on the southwest axis from Karez-eMir Village. Commander Naser would lead the attack on the westernaxis while Commander Anwar would lead the attack on the easternaxis. Mujahideen armaments included one Saqar, one BM12, one122mm howitzer, six 82mm mortars, eight 82mm recoilless rifles andapproximately 40 RPG-7s. We also had some ZSU-23-2 antiaircraftguns and some Stinger antiaircraft missiles.
The attack started on time, but the garrison did not last for the sevendays. The brigade's morale broke and we overran it by 1400 hours on thefirst day. The brigade's tanks broke out. The brigade commander andsome of his deputies were on board the tanks. We tried to stop them withRPG fire, but they escaped to Kabul. I do not know the total Mujahideencasualties, but I do know of four KIA, including my brother. I also know Doctor Mohammad Wakil is from Shakardara District north of Kabul. He graduated fromhigh school before the war. He joined the resistance and received medical training inPakistan. [Map sheet 2886., vic grid 0737]. 5 Bagh-e means orchard. This was probably the 520th Brigade. Page 136 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War 10 of the Mujahideen WIA. We killed around 100 in the brigade and cap-tured some 400-450 DRA soldiers. We also captured some 40 armoredvehicles, although not all of them were functioning We captured 10trucks and some 600 small arms. The Kabul government was slow inreacting to our attack, since they did not expect that the brigade's resis-tance would collapse so quickly. After 1400 hours, the artillery of theDRA 8th Infantry Division" began firing on the captured garrison frompositions in Qargha and the Kabul airport. However, they did notemploy any aircraft against us due to the presence of the ZSU-23-2s andStingers. We did not intend to hold the garrison area and had no desireto remain under artillery fire, so we grabbed what we could and left. Thegovernment never reestablished a unit at that garrison site.
COMMENTARY: Planning a seven-day siege within 15 kilometers of theheavily garrisoned capital of Kabul is a high-risk option, but the garri-son evidently capitulated as soon as its commander abandoned it andfled in a tank. The Mujahideen southern roadblock was evidently nottoo effective since the brigade's tanks managed to blast right throughit. At this point in the war, the DRA's morale (which was never high)was at a record low. The Soviets had begun their withdrawal on May15th over this same road and were conducting few offensive actions.The DRA felt like the hapless brigade watching their commander flee.The Soviets were clearly preparing to abandon the DRA.
The Mujahideen, on the other hand, were practically giddy withanticipation of the complete Soviet withdrawal. The Mujahideen hadnot expected to win the war and now could sense victory Their actionsbecame more daring. However, after the Soviet withdrawal, theMujahideen began quarreling among themselves even more than usualand the DRA resolve strengthened. The war went on. Coordinating an attack by different factions with uncertaincommunications from four directions is also a high-risk option whichchances fratricide. However, audacity prevailed and the Mujahideenquickly destroyed a larger force.
The introduction of the U.S.-manufactured, shoulder-fired Stingerair defense missile caused a change in Soviet aerial tactics. TheSoviets would not employ close air support forward of their own forcesif Stingers were present. Further, a Mujahideen rocket attack on theKabul airfield about this same time reportedly destroyed five SU-25close air support aircraft and damaged three others. Mujahideen airdefenses and aircraft availability probably limited the Soviet/DRAresponse to artillery fire.
CHAPTER COMMENTARY edit
When the guerrilla force decides to seize and hold a strong point,implied missions are the conduct of regular logistic resupply, thecontinual manning of the strong point and the ability to withstandartillery and air strikes. None of these are easy for a guerrilla forcedependent on part-time guerrillas. Further, it requires the commit-ment of crew-served weapons and sufficient ammunition—commo-dities that are hard to remove during a forced withdrawal. Theguerrilla is trading his mobility and anonymity for a fixed-piececonventional battle. Quite frequently, the pierrilla is unable tomake the transition. Asadabadalalabad