The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Chapter 6

by Ali Ahmad Jalali

CHAPTER 6: BLOCKING ENEMY LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS

The war was a contest by both sides to control the other's logistics.The Soviets used aerial bombing, scatterable mines, crop burnings and assaults on rural villages to drive the rural population into exile or into the cities. Their objective was to deprive the guerrilla of his source of food, shelter and rest. The Soviet lines of communication (LOC) was a double-lane highway network which wound through the Hindu Kush Mountains—some of the most inhospitable terrain on earth. Mujahideen constantly cut the road and ambushed convoys carrying material from the Soviet Union. TheSoviet presence depended on its ability to keep the roads open. Much of the Soviet combat in Afghanistan was a fight for control of the road net-work. Soviet security of the Eastern LOC required 26 battalions manning 199 outposts, patrolling the LOCs or escorting convoys. The more-open Western LOC required three battalions. More than three-fourths of Page 148 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Soviet combat forces were routinely involved in security missions. DRA forces were also tied down in LOC and area security. The resistance destroyed over 11,000 Soviet trucks. DRA trucklosses were reportedly higher. The Mujahideen ability to interdict the LOC was a constant concern to the Soviets and prevented them from maintaining a larger occupation force in Afghanistan.

VIGNETTE 1: CARVING UP REGIMENTS ON THE APPROACH TO WAZI

by Haji Badshah Khan

In April 1980, I set out to capture the Wazi District Headquarterswhich sits astride the main road between Gardez and Khowst. I hadsome 400 Mujahideen who came from the Dari Khel Valley. TheSaroti pass is at the northern end of the Dari Khel Valley and offersaccess from Gardez to Khowst. The Satakandow pass on the mainGardez-Khowst highway was already controlled by the Mujahideen,so the Dari Khel approach was the only possible route for the DRA.In those days, we did not have base camps, but lived in our villagesand used whatever weapons were at hand. We had rifles plus somelocally manufactured machine guns from Pakistan. I made my planof attack. During the night, we moved to Wazi which is close to theDari Khel Valley (Map 6-1 - Wazi). I divided my men in groups andwe surrounded the district headquarters on all four sides. I orderedmy subordinate group commanders to wait for my signal to attack. Inthe morning, I intercepted radio communications between the Wazigarrison and their headquarters. The commander was asking forhelp and stated that he was surrounded by Mujahideen. Shortlyafter that, two helicopters came, circled the area and returned. Thecommander of the garrison was Mohammad Hashem. He was fromthe Jaji tribe and we knew each other. He sent a mediator to me whoannounced that the garrison was ready to surrender. I told him todisarm his men first and then we would negotiate. He did and thenhe surrendered the garrison. We captured a lot of weapons. Thespoils of this action encouraged other Mujahideen to besiege otherposts for their weapons. The DRA reacted to the fall of Wazi by sending two columns toreestablish government control. The government forces moved ontwo axes, one from Khowst and the other from Gardez. The columnfrom Khowst reached Said Khel and formed an assembly areathere. The column from Gardez approached the Saroti pass. I beganto mobilize people against the government forces. I sent harbakai(tribal police or regulators who kept law and order in their areas) Haji Badshah Khan is from the warrior subtribe of Dad Khel of the Zadran tribe. He liveson the Saroti pass approach to Khost. When the communist coup occurred, he took hisfamily to Pakistan and then returned to build resistance forces in the area. [Map sheets2883 and 2983]. Page 150 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 6, Vignette 1 Page 151 to rally the tribes and the tribes responded since they knew that theDRA would loot the villages if they let them into the area. I assignedtwo harbakai groups to reinforce the Mujahideen blocking DRA forcesat Said Khel. I took the rest of the Mujahideen to the Saroti pass. Iarrived at Saroti in the late afternoon and surveyed the area. I deter-mined how many Mujahideen I would need and where I would posi-tion the forces. I did not have enough Mujahideen, so I assembledsome of the local barbers (Pushtun barbers usually also play drums)to play their drums to gather a lashkar.1 I did this to raise the wholearea and to demoralize the enemy. The drummers did a great job.Warriors came from many tribes to Saroti and soon I had a largearmy. Originally, I had planned to defend the pass, but when Iviewed the size of my army, I decided to attack. I promised them theweapons we captured and we attacked the column and capturedweapons, trucks and tanks. When we had dealt with the Saroti force,I left a blocking force to deal with any further columns and then tookthe lashkar to Said Khel. We cut the road to Khowst behind the DRA regiment which wasstill assembled at Said Khel. Then we surrounded the regiment. Itremained trapped for 20 days. The DRA sent another column out ofKhowst to relieve this force, but they could not break through theMujahideen blockade. After some fighting, the entire force at SaidKhel surrendered. There were 1,300 personnel in the column and wecaptured 1,200. The enemy lost another 100 either KIA or WIA. Wecaptured all the weapons of this regiment including 50-60 trucks andarmored vehicles. After the surrender, the DRA air force bombedtheir own column and destroyed the rest of the vehicles in it, or wewould have had even more booty. A few vehicles managed to escapefrom us. The father of DRA Minister of the Interior Gulabzoi waswounded in the fighting and managed to escape in one of the APCs.His name was Gulab Shah and he was a member of the Zadran tribe,so perhaps some tribesmen helped his escape. COMMENTARY: Early in the war, the Mujahideen resistance was most-ly centered on the tribes. Only later, when the United States, Egypt,Saudi Arabia and other countries began supplying the Mujahideenthrough the various religious-based factions, did the Mujahi-deen's primary focus and loyalty shift to the factions. The method of 1 Lashkar in Pushto usage means a tribal army or armed force. A lashkar is usually gath-ered for a short time. Page 152 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War raising the force and fighting the DRA columns described here islittle different from what the British forces experienced fightingthese same tribes on the northwest-frontier. Once the lashkar assem-bled, the warriors would chant and sing along with the drums. Thisoccurred here as well.

VIGNETTE 2: BLOCKING THE PAGHMAN HIGHWAY

by Commander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak

I have been in many actions, but one stands out that I won't everforget, because it was a very trying situation. On 4 or 5 June 1983 wewere in Paghman, a district capital (garrisoned by DRA forces),2 whichis some 25 kilometers west of Kabul. We received information oneevening that a major Soviet/DRA column Would attempt to resupplyand reinforce Paghman's garrison and government enclave. There aretwo parallel highways from Kabul to Paghman. (Map 6-2 - Paghman)The late Commander Habibullah, the late Commander Wahed and oth-ers planned to block the convoy. They had some 250 to 300 Mujahideenarmed with two mortars, one recoilless rifle, 12 RPG-7s, and someKalashnikov and Enfield rifles. They assigned sectors of responsibili-ty to different groups. Each group would block the highway withambushes in its sector. Habibullah (HIK), Commander Aman (IUA)and I (NIFA) were given the sector from Khwajajam to KhwajaMusafer. Khwaja jam is about a kilometer from the Cheltan road fork.We occupied positions primarily on the south side of the road.Commanders Ajabgul, Wahed, Abduljan and Kochi had the sector fromKhwaja Musafer to Pajak. They occupied ambush positions mostly onthe southern side of the road. From Pajak to Paghman, Mujahideenoccupied ambush positions on both sides of the road. We occupied our ambush positions at night. The next morning, thecolumn left Kabul. As the leading armored vehicle reached KwajaMusafer, we opened fire. The ambush turned into a battle as wedestroyed 11 armored vehicles and two helicopters. Enemy aircraftand helicopters continually tried to drive us from our positions, but weheld and the fighting continued for three days.3 Even during the fight- Commander Haji Aaquelshah Sahak is from the Chardehi District of Kabul (which is asouthern suburb). He was affiliated with NIFA. [Map sheets 2786 and 2886]. 2 Reportedly two companies from the 200th Separate Reconnaissance Battalion. 3 Zakari, a Mujahideen in Commander Sahak's group, gave the following account of a por-tion of the battle. "I had an 11-shooter [bolt-action Enfield rifle]. It held 10 rounds in themagazine and one in the chamber. The Russians knew the sound of the 11 shooter andwould count off the 11 shots and then charge after the 11th shot while you were trying toreload. I was shooting at this Russian and had fired all 11 shots. He had counted my shotsoff and charged me. I yelled for help to my friend who had an RPG-7 antitank grenadelauncher. 'What, shoot him with this thing?' my friend replied. 'Yes, he'll kill me' Ianswered. 'Okay" he yelled and fired his RPG-7. It completely disintegrated the Russian." Page 154 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 6, Vignette 2 Page 155 ing, the women from the villages would bring bread and milk forwardto our positions. The whole area was actively supporting us. Theinhabitants of Paghman, Oryakhel and Khaldari were feeding us.Mujahideen came from outside the area to reinforce us. Modir Zaherof Khaldari took nine wounded Mujahideen into his home. His wifecared for them, nursed them and applied dressings on them. TheSoviets tried to bypass our ambush by moving on the northern route toPaghman through Qaragha. Mujahideen stopped this column atDodamast northwest of Qaragha. The enemy then tried to bypass theKwaja Musafer ambush by skirting around it, but the bypassing forcesoon fell into further Mujahideen ambushes. The center of fightingwas Kwaja Musafer and we stopped and held the enemy there. Afterthree days of fighting, the enemy broke contact and withdrew to Kabul.In my sector, we lost 13 KIA and many wounded. I personally know of20 wounded, but there were many more. The enemy lost 14 armoredvehicles and trucks in my sector. I know that over 40 DRA soldierswere captured or defected. We captured hundreds of small armsduring this battle. COM1VIENTARY: This is an example of good Mujahideen field coopera-tion—not always a feature of the war. The Mujahideen cooperated andtheir overall formation strengthened as the battle continued sinceMujahideen came from all around the area to join in the fight. TheBritish noted that a good fight had almost a magnetic effect on thewarrior-tribesmen of Afghanistan and the Soviets learned that thistrait had not disappeared over time. The Soviets and DRA broke con-tact after three days although their lines of communication were intactand the enemy was fixed in known positions. Firepower could notbreak the Mujahideen and the Soviets and DRA would not commit thenecessary infantry to close with the Mujahideen. The road to Paghman runs through a heavily-populated green zoneand the Mujahideen were able to select and fortify good ambush posi-tions along the route. In this summer fighting, the trees and crops pro-vided good concealment for the Mujahideen. Page 156 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

VIGNETTE 3: ROAD BLOCK AT ESTALEF

by Commander Sofi Lal Gul

In October 1983, one of my men was injured during a fight withother Mujahideen from the local area. I took a group of 20 of myMujahideen from my base in Farza and went five kilometers northto Estalef. We were going to meet with local elders in Estalef to set-tle the dispute with other local commanders. Estalef is a popularsummer resort some 40 kilometers north of Kabul. Informers told the DRA and Soviets about our gathering and theenemy decided to attack us. The Soviet forces came from nearbyBagram and the DRA forces came from Kabul. At night, Mujahideenpatrols at the Estalef junction of the Kabul-Charikar highway report-ed that Soviet and DRA columns have moved from Kabul and Bagramand were heading toward Estalef. The Mujahideen alerted their menat dawn. My 20 men joined a force of nearly 100 commanded by alocal commander who was the son of a leading Estalefi chieftain(Wakil Mohammad Amin Khan). We took up positions in theorchards at Deh-e Khwajahasan and Qabr-e Malik (Map 6-3 -Estalef). We planned to block the Estalef road and deny the enemyaccess to the town which dominated the fertile valley. The Mujahideen commanders divided their men into small teamsof four-five men and deployed them in the orchards along the road inorder to ambush the enemy column over a wide stretch. We instruct-ed our men to let the head of the enemy column reach Qabr-e Malikand then everyone should open fire. As the leading vehicles reachedQabr-e Malik, the attack signal was given and relayed throughportable megaphones. We hit the lead armored vehicle and a jeep.The battle raged along the length of the column from Qabr-e Malik toDeh-e Khwajahasan. The Soviet infantry dismounted and attackedthe Mujahideen positions and heavy fighting ensued. We were scat-tered throughout the orchards and had plenty of room to maneuver,so it was hard for the Soviet infantry to pin us down. However, wewere short of supplies, particularly ammunition. Further, theSoviets/DRA had much more combat power than we did and they Commander Sofi Lal Gul is from Farza village of Mir Bacha Kot District about 25 kilome-ters north of Kabul: 'He was affiliated with Mojaddedi's Afghanistan National LiberationFront of Afghanistan (ANLF) during the war with the Soviets. Commander Sofi Lal Gul con-centrated his efforts on the Kabul-Charikar highway. [Map sheet 2886, vic grid 0754]. Page 158 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War were using helicopter gunships and other aircraft against us. Sincewe were scattered over a wide area in small groups, Mujahideencommand and control over the battle was difficult and sporadic.Coordination of the actions of the many resistance groups becamevery difficult. The battle in the orchards continued until 1400 hours. As theyran out of ammunition, the various Mujahideen groups withdrew indifferent directions and moved their wounded to safe areas. TheSoviets consolidated their advance through the green zone, securingthe high ground commanding the approaches to Estalef. I pulled mymen out to Shoraw, about three kilometers northeast of Estalef. TheSoviet/DRA column moved to Estalef and launched an intensive searchof homes. The soldiers looted homes, destroyed property and set fire to the houses of suspected Mujahideen. Many people lost their liveli-hoods due to their actions. The Soviets stayed three days in Estalefand then returned to their bases. Mujahideen casualties in my groupwere two KIA and 18 WIA. Most of the casualties were from Soviet airstrikes.

COMMENTARY:

The large Mujahideen concentration in Estalef, closeto Soviet/DRA forces, was an extremely imprudent move. If theMujahideen patrol had not provided early warning, the Mujahideenlosses at Estalef might have been much higher. The Mujahideendeserve high marks for their quick reaction and rapid deploymentalong the road to Estalef. They utilized their familiarity with theirhome area to quickly select effective fighting positions and they usedlocal terrain and vegetation to conceal themselves from Soviet groundand air power. However, the Mujahideen suffered from lack of effec-tive command and control which prevented the timely coordination ofcounterattacks and countermeasures. Better command and controlmight have enabled the Mujahideen to hold the high ground domi-nating the Estalef approach and to prevent the Soviet entry. But thewell-armed and supported Soviet force was able to push its waythrough. The Mujahideen were reluctant to become decisivelyengaged in a protracted battle with a much-stronger, better-suppliedopponent. They felt that they had to survive to face this opponentover and over again. The Mujahideen lack of a structured, viablesupply system hampered their tactical capabilities significantly. The Soviets and DRA deserve high marks for carrying enoughforces for dismounted combat and for using them aggressively. Thecombination of overwhelming firepower and ground maneuver Chapter 6, Vignette 3 Page 159 unhinged the Mujahideen defense and the decisive action taken bythe Soviet infantry forced the poorly-supplied Mujahideen to breakcontact—leaving the dominant terrain and subsequent access toEstalef open. However, the Soviet/DRA forces merely pushed at amore-nimble foe and failed to try to outflank or encircle theMujahideen force. This kept them from bringing the Mujahideen todecisive combat and allowed the Mujahideen to withdraw withoutheavy losses. Page 160 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

VIGNETTE 4: DEFENSE OF A RIVER LINE AND ROAD BLOCK AT SAYAD

by Commander Haji Abdul Qader

In late summer and early fall of 1983, the Mujahideen in Nejraoand Tagao Districts of Kapisa Province increased their attacks ongovernment facilities. These districts are located on the east side of the Panjshir River and link Sarobi on the Kabul-Jalalabad highwaywith key locations in the provinces of Parwan, Kapisa and Laghman.These districts also provided access to several Mujahideen mountainbase camps. The only permanent bridge across the Panjshir River (atAbdullah-e Burj) is located in this area and provides direct access toBagram. We expected Soviet/DRA forces at Bagram to launch astrike through the area. Their purpose would be to protect Sarobiand the main road connecting Sarobi with the Kapisa ProvinceCapital of Mahmoud-e Raqi and Gulbahar located further north atthe mouth of the Panjsher Valley.

We decided to block this expected advance with my forces and theforces of Commander Shahin (based around Mahmoud-e Raqi). Weprepared defensive positions on the north bank of the Panjshir Riveraround the bridge at Abdullah-e Burj (Map 6-4 - Sayad) We builtblocking positions in a deep ditch which passes through upper Sayadvillage and covers the road as it approaches the bridge. We preparedpositions on the high ground south of the river which dominates theapproach and both banks of the river. We put in land mines and builtshelters with overhead cover to protect our Mujahideen from air andartillery fire. We moved supplies forward to a forward supply base inDeh Babi village immediately northwest of Sayad village. We builtcovered trenches from the base to the forward positions. The trench-es were big enough to allow us to resupply by pack horses, mules andfoot porters.

Commander Shahin had approximately 600 men and I hadapproximately 250. There was not enough space to deploy them all,so one-third of the force occupied fighting positions while the restwere in reserve or given support tasks. Some Mujahideen held flankpositions to contain the enemy. Since all of the Mujahideen werelocally based, we were able to deploy the blocking force in total Haji Abdul Qader was a Commander for the HIK faction. His forces were based aroundthe vital Bagram area. [Map sheet 2886, 2887, vic grid 2872] Page 162 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

secrecy. This helped surprise the enemy and hit him at a time andplace where he was not fully ready to react effectively. Early on the morning of 31 October 1983, Soviet and DRA forcesmoved out of their Bagram base along two parallel routes andapproached the Abdullah-e Burj bridge. I estimate the strength atseveral regiments backed by strong artillery support and ample logis-tics. Tanks and APCs led the column. As the head of the columnreached the lower Sayad village on the southern bank, the tail of thecolumn had not cleared their Bagram base some ten kilometers to thesouthwest. As the enemy tanks and APCs passed through lowerSayad village toward the river, we opened fire and took the enemy bysurprise. It took the enemy some time to react and find our positions.We intensified our fire as more vehicles of the enemy column cameinto anti-tank weapons range. We hit several of their vehicles andthey started to burn. Instead of trying to secure the bridge byinfantry, the enemy continued to push his tanks and APC's towardthe bridge. One tank and two APCs made it to the bridge, but weknocked them out at the bridge site.

The enemy stopped and began pounding suspected Mujahideenpositions with artillery fire and air attacks. He also began indis-criminately bombing the area, including the surrounding villages.However, our blocking force was well entrenched and protectedagainst the enemy fire. Most of our Mujahideen moved into thecovered shelters for the duration of the enemy fire preparation. Assoon as the enemy began to shift his fire so that he could launch anattack, our Mujahideen would reoccupy their fighting positions andengage enemy infantry and tanks with mortars, machine guns,82mm recoilless rifles and RPG-7s. The news of our defense againstthe Soviet/DRA forces soon spread throughout the area and reachedas far as Kabul, Charikar and Panjsher. Mujahideen from theseareas began to move to the fight. This had a demoralizing impact onthe enemy as these Mujahideen began probing attacks against hisflanks and rear.

In early afternoon, the enemy reinforced his efforts with someDRA troops and launched another attack to clear the roadblock. Wedrove back the attack and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. Inthe late afternoon, the enemy again conducted heavy artillery and airstrikes on our positions. Artillery, jets and helicopter gunships tooktheir turns against us and then a Soviet unit attacked us. We defeat-ed this attack as well. During the night, the enemy tried to attackacross the bridge three times. Each time he was unsuccessful.

Chapter 6, Vignette 4 Page 163

The river could not be forded by vehicles and he did not try using infantryin assault boats to cross at another point to outflank us. Probably thenumber of Mujahideen who had come to the fight on both sides of the river discouraged the enemy from risking • an infantry assaultcrossing at night.

On the morning of 1 November, the enemy resumed heavyartillery fire and air attacks. At the same time, we detected enemyactivity toward the south. Around 1000 hours, the enemy facing thebridge began to break contact. Most of their troops headed southacross the plain on the southern bank of the Panjsher river. We laterfound out that the enemy built an engineer bridge across the rivernear Shokhi, some 20 kilometers down stream and crossed there tomove against Nejrao and Tagao Districts. Seeing the enemy with-draw, we left our positions and collected what the enemy had leftbehind. The next day, we pushed their disabled tanks and APCs offthe bridge into the river.

COMMENTARY:

The Soviet/DRA force did not lead with reconnaissance,nor did it use forward detachments to seize potential chokepointsbefore it moved. The Soviet/DRA force was evidently surprised by thestrong resistance they met. Had they detected the Mujahideen roadblock in advance, they could have dealt with it more effectively thantrying to force a crossing through repeated frontal attacks.

The Soviet/DRA force had several options besides frontal attacks.First, they could have moved DRA forces from Jabul-e Seraj andGulbahar in the north to attack the Mujahideen positions from theflank and rear since these forces were already garrisoned across theriver. Second, they could have conducted an infantry assault crossingat an unopposed site and then attacked the Mujahideen position fromthe flank. Third, if speed was essential, the planners could have select-ed the option it was later forced to choose after sustaining losses andlosing much time at the Abdullah-e Burj bridge.

Once delayed by a strong Mujahideen resistance, the Soviet/DRAcolumns acted very slowly to try to seize the initiative. Tanks wereineffective in forcing the bridge. The Soviet/DRA force needed to usewell-trained infantry to seize the dominant Kuh-e Top Mountain quick-ly. This mountain was on their side of the river and would facilitateforcing the bridge. By allowing the column to stall in a Mujahideenarea, the Soviet/DRA force became vulnerable to flank and rear attacksby local Mujahideen. Quick, decisive action is key to the survival of astalled, surrounded force.

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Mujahideen secrecy while planning and implementing the roadblock was commendable. The local commanders coordinated theiractions and the force fought staunchly. Their well-prepared defensivepositions allowed them to survive artillery fire and air bombardment.The Mujahideen had the advantage of fighting on home turf with localsupport. Had the Mujahideen developed a more effective system of opera-tional cooperation and coordination, the enemy column might not havesucceeded in reaching Nejrao and Tagao. Lack of a viable operationalcommand and control system prevented the Mujahideen at Abdullah-eBurj, Shokhi, Nejrao and Tagao from acting together. A more elaborateoperational coordination could have mobilized the Mujahideen forcesat Shokhi to prevent the Soviet/DRA troops from crossing the river toKapisa Province.

VIGNETTE 5: THE DEFENSE AGAINST THE SOVIET OPERATION "MAGISTRAL"

by General Gulzarak Zadran, Lieutenant Omar,Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani, and Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman

'We were a very desperate people without much equip-ment or armaments, but we had the power of our faith,love for our homeland, love of freedom and reliance onthe Almighty. We were fighting against very heavyodds." General Gulzarak Zadran

Sources in the DRA warned us that a combined Soviet/DRAforce would launch an offensive to open the road between Gardezand Khowst. We Mujahideen closed the road in March 1979 andthe government had supplied their garrison at Khowst by air eversince. The DRA had tried to open the road on many occasions andhad two entire regiments annihilated in the process. The road hadbecome a thing of myth—the Mujahideen-held road that no powercould open. We watched the enemy mass his forces and supplies inGardez in November 1987. This was clearly going to be a major 40thArmy operation involving forces from several Soviet motorized rifledivisions, the Soviet airborne division, DRA units, Spetsnaz, massedartillery, surface-to-surface missiles, and Soviet air power. At thetime, General Zadran analyzed the impending operation to deter-mine its operational significance. He determined two possible goalsfor the operation: this unprecedented massing of such a major forceeither meant that the Soviets wanted to escalate the war by threat-ening Pakistan directly from Paktia; or the Soviets wanted to shatter

General Guzarak Zadran was an officer in the Afghan Army and attended the Afghan ArmyHigher OfficersTraining Institute where the author, All Jalali, was his instructor. He joinedthe resistance and fought in Paktia Province. He fought in Zhawar 1 and 2 and at theSatakandow pass. He belonged to IUA. After the fall of the DRA, he became the DeputyMinister of Defense in the interim government. Currently he lives near Peshawar. [Mapsheets 2883, 2884, 2983].

Lieutenant Omar (Zabit Omar) graduated from the Kabul Military Academy in the 1970s.After the communist coup and the Soviet invasion, Lieutenant Omar joined the Mujahideenof the fundamentalist Islamic Party (HIK) founded by Mawlawi Mohammed Yunis Khalis.He was a close aide to Jalaluddin Hagan' and fought with him throughout the war. Haqaniran the Mujahideen effort in the crucial Paktia Province. Lieutenant Omar also served as Page 166 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Chapter 6, Vignette 5 Page 167

the myth that the Mujahideen along the Gardez-Khowst highway areinvincible by opening the unopenable road. If the Soviet goal was toescalate and to threaten Pakistan, then the Soviets needed to bringmore forces to Paktia Province after they opened the road to Khowst.General Zadran thought that this was too dangerous a gamble forthe Soviets to take, considering the probable international andregional implications. Instead, General Zadran concluded that theSoviets meant to show their military might to the world by doingthe impossible, so that they could then end the Soviet occupationof Afghanistan and withdraw with a solid victory to their credit. Inorder to accomplish the impossible, the Soviets needed to forcethe main road from Gardez with at least a division and, havingachieved the breakthrough, move toward Khowst to link-up withthe DRA 25th Infantry Division which would try to open a corridorto the west. General Zadran's final analysis was that the Sovietsneeded to flex their muscles by opening the road that had been closedfor all those years.

We started to prepare for the Soviet offensive against theSatakandow pass. The shoulders of the pass loom some 400 metersover the road and, once in the pass, the road follows a slow, twistedroute packed with hairpin curves. It is an excellent place to defend.We reinforced the minefields along the road. We laid three minebelts on a three kilometer front at the opening of the pass with 300-400 meters between mine belts. We reinforced our positions on thehigh ground overlooking the road and pass. We had a total of tenBM-12s in the area. We crowned the pass with ZGU-1 air defensemachine guns. These are both good positional weapons but arevery difficult to displace rapidly when the situation requires. Wealso had DShK machine guns, 75mm and 82mm recoilless riflesand plenty of RPG-7s. Haji Nawab Khan commanded the Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was a group commander and a deputy to Jalaluddin Haqani.He was a member of the fundamentalist Islamic Party (HIK) led by Mawlawi MohammedYunus Khalis. He joined the Mujahideen following the communist coup in 1978 and foughtin the Paktia area. Prior to the Soviet invasion, his group had liberated the area sur-rounding Khowst and only the city of Khowst remained under government control.

Mawlawi Abdul-Rahman of Zadran is the son of Noor Mahmuod from Kandow village.When Soviet forces attacked Satakandow pass, his group of 100-120 local Mujahideenoccupied positions at Ghelgoy. They were armed with 82mm recoilless rifles, ZGU-1machine guns, DShK machine guns, 82mm mortars, MBRL and one Stinger. His groupfought a rearguard action through the pass to Sewak before they went into the mountains. He lost ten KIA in the fighting.

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Satakandow pass approach. Two kilometers to the west of theSatakandow pass is the Khadai pass—a secondary pass with a dirttrail going through it. We reinforced the defenses here as well.Ismail commanded the Khadai pass approach (Map 6-5 - Magistral).

Most of the Mujahideen in this area were local men who weredefending their own villages. Unlike other parts of Afghanistan, thepeople still lived here and had not been driven out to the refugeecamps in Pakistan. The majority of the people in the area belongedto the Zadran tribe, but other tribes and different factions were alsoinvolved. The decision to prepare and the decision to fight was notmade by the factions, but by the tribal council. This was to be fightfor homes and neighborhoods. Our local major commanders wereMawlawi Neza-muddin Haqani, Mula Ibrahim, Mula Abdurrahman,Captain Khan. Zamak, Izat Khan, Ghaday, Dool Khan, Ghanamkay,Sadat, Hakem, Jung, Dr. Khiali, Badshah and Alef.

We focused our efforts on the main road where it runs throughthe Satakandow pass. There is another road some seven kilometersto the east which goes through the Saroti pass and joins the mainhighway at Lakatega4—some 25 kilometers to the south of theSatakandow pass. This is a poor road which passes through the DariKhel tribe.5 We did not expect that the Soviets would want to movevehicles along this road, so we did not mine it. However, we did rein-force the local Mujahideen in this area. Each tribe sent harbakai tohelp and we sent about 300 harbakai as reinforcements to the Sarotipass in the Dari Khel area. Commander Badshah commanded theSaroti approach.

The Soviets established forward bases at Dara and Zawa. Theydeployed their artillery in Division Artillery Groups (DAGs) nearDara and deployed their Army Artillery Group further back south ofGardez. They moved a maneuver force to Zawa. Suddenly, theylaunched an attack from Zawa toward Saroti. We were completelytaken by surprise. In four to five days of fighting, the Soviets pushedus back on the Saroti approach. Commander Badshah was killed inthis fighting. Qader Shah took over command and fought a stubbornwithdrawal back through the Saroti pass (Map 6-6 - Phase 1).

Once the Soviets captured the Saroti pass, they launched airassault landings on the high ground located between the main roadand the road through the Saroti pass. They now held key terrain

4 Lakatega means erected stone.

5 The Dari Khel tribe is a subdivision of the Zadran tribe. The Dari Khel have a welldeserved reputation as a very military and warlike people.

Page 170 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

controlling both axes with air assault troops and small caliberartillery.6 From these peaks, they could hit our positions andsupport their advance through the Satakandow pass on the mainroad. At the same time, they could support their continued advancealong the Saroti approach. Their sudden seizure of the high groundbetween their two axes gave them a tremendous advantage. TheSoviets began bombing the Mujahideen headquarters at SaraniCommand and control suffered greatly from the shelling.

The Soviets on the high ground began directing artillery and rocket fire on the villages in both valleys leading from Satakandow andSaroti. The Zadrans in the villages had not emigrated and theSoviets wanted to displace them. They were successful. ManyMujahideen, concerned about the danger to their families, left thefighting to evacuate their families to Pakistan. This exodus openedthe way for the further advance of the Soviet troops. They were nowready for the main attack on the Satakandow axis.

The Soviets opened their operation against the Satakandow pass7with heavy air strikes and artillery fire while they moved theirmaneuver forces to Dara. Then, once their positions were set, theyflew an airplane over the pass at high altitude, dropping paratroop-ers. Reconnaissance aircraft, flying at much higher altitudes, trailedthe aircraft that was dropping the paratroopers. We engaged theparatroopers with all our air defense machine guns and whateverother air defense weapons we had. As the paratroopers drifted clos-er, we realized that we had been duped. The "paratroopers" were dummies and the reconnaissance aircraft had photographed our response and pinpointed our positions.

The Soviets now began firing on our positions in earnest. Heavyartillery strikes followed air strikes, which were followed by moreartillery strikes. We were pinned down in our positions by the strikeswhich continued for hours. Our positions were generally artillery-proof but not bomb-proof and, thanks to their reconnaissance, theywere hitting our positions exactly. They then launched their groundattack, but we readily defeated it. The next day, 1 December 1987,they resumed their heavy shelling and bombing.

6 Possibly the AM 2B9 Vasilyek (Cornflower) 82mm automatic mortar. This weapon canfire direct and indirect fire. Other candidates are the older D-44 85mm gun (which wasfound in airborne units) or the M-69 76mm mountain gun. 7 Vignette 17 in The Bear Went Over the Mountain describes the battle for the Satakandowpass from a Soviet perspective. Chapter 6, Vignette 5 Page 171

The overwhelming force of their artillery and airpower took the initiative from us. There were no Soviet forces garrisoned in Paktiaand we were used to fighting the DRA. The DRA had no artillerylarger than 130mm Now we were getting pounded by heavy artilleryincluding BM21 and BM-27 MRL. In Dara, the Soviets had three,powerful, long-range heavy artillery pieces with four tires each. Wesaw one of these firing. The firing recoil gases alone flipped a jeepover.8 Aircraft were dropping cluster bombs on us. We could notsurvive in these positions, so we left our positions and moved tohigher mountains in the west called Ghumbor Khwaley and Fakhry.The Soviets advanced on our positions behind us and, after five days,they seized the Satakandow pass.

We had cut and destroyed sections of the road in the Satakandowpass. As the Soviets tried to repair the road, we started firing onthem with our heavy weapons from the high ground. But the Sovietfirepower was strong and the Soviets pushed us higher into themountains. As their converging forces cut our rear, we fell back. Theycaptured Gulzarak Zadran's base at Shwak. The Mujahideen tookwhat equipment they could, but some had to be abandoned to theenemy. The Mujahideen withdrew to the southwest mountains andthe Soviets/DRA advanced and established a base camp where theystayed for two days. Then they resumed their advance to Sarani.They destroyed the Mujahideen base camp at Sarani—our first indi-cation that the Soviets/DRA planned to abandon the route instead oftrying to maintain a long-term presence there.

The Mujahideen plight was serious and we were suddenly facedwith a new problem—the absence of drinking water. The intensityof Soviet shelling was so great, that the chemical residue fromthe explosions had contaminated the streams. Some of us thoughtthat the Soviets had poisoned the water since one glass of waterwould choke you up and make you very ill. We had to use snow fordrinking water, but the snow was also affected by the chemicals. Oursupplies were cut off and food was scarce, but our major problemwas thirst. People were suffering from dehydration, but they couldnot use the local water. We had not made arrangements to haulwater into the area since local water had always been adequatefor our needs. The roads were blocked so trucks could not enter thearea. We had some mules that we could use in some of the area, but we carried in most of our supplies by Mujahideen porters.

8 This was probably the 2A36 152mm gun, the "Hyacinth". It has a maximum range of28.5 kilometers and fires 5-6 rounds per minute. The round weighs 46 kilograms and hasa muzzle velocity of 942 meters/sec. The piece weighs 9,800 kg and has a 8.197 meterlong barrel. Krasnaya zvezda [Red star], 16 July 1993, page 2. Page 172 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

The Soviets continued their move south. They preceded theirmovement by air assault landings to seize high ground on bothsides of the road. Their columns would then advance under theprotection of these picketing forces. As the Soviets moved forward,they left security OPs behind to secure their lines of communication.The Soviets reached Lakatega and the columns from Satakandowand Saroti linked up. After that, it was smoother for them. TheSoviets/DRA left a security detachment at Lakatega and advancedon Khowst. At the same time, a DRA detachment from the 25thInfantry division moved west out of Khowst to link up with theapproaching column After the force secured the road to Khowst, theybegan moving supply columns along the road to resupply thebeleaguered city.

The tide was beginning to turn. The local Mujahideen, who hadtaken their families to Pakistan, returned. Mawlawi JalaluddinHaqani and other commanders (Matiullah, Mula Abdul Ghafur,Gulzarak Zadran, Amanullah, Mula Seddiq, Tawakal, Abdur-rah-man, Wakil Wazir Mohammad, Pari, Padshah Khan and Sadat)arrived and moved into the mountains west of the highway. ColonelImam of the Pakistani ISI arrived and tried to coordinate. theMujahideen action. Haji Amanullah Khan and other commandersarrived. Mujahideen from other areas in Afghanistan arrived.Mujahideen and Taliban arrived from Pakistan. They were all eagerfor a fight. The Mujahi-deen selected 12 commanders and assignedenemy outposts between Wazi and Satakandow for them to attack.The Soviets had moved into the side valleys, but the 12 commandersforced the Soviets out of the side valleys and confined them to thevicinity of the road. Then they began attacking the road. Jalaluddin Haqani, was at Fakhry. Once again, Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded during battle—this time with shrapnel in his thigh. Although Haqani was wounded, he stayed on for a week. Then he was evacuated on mule back over mountain paths to Miram Shah.

The Soviets/DRA could only keep the road open for 12 days. Thenthey withdrew. When the Soviet air assault abandoned the heights,they took their weapons, but left all the ammunition behind. TheMujahideen recaptured the road and neither the DRA nor the Sovietscould reopen it. Despite the intensity of battle, Mujahideen casualties were light.There were perhaps some 100 Mujahideen KIA. The villagerssuffered greatly and the villages were heavily damaged or destroyed. Chapter 6, Vignette 5 Page 173

Some 80% of the villages in the area were damaged. Soviet/DRAlosses are unknown. The Mujahideen shot down one helicopter andthree jets. As the Soviets withdrew, we captured two intact Soviettanks and four trucks. Some 600 DRA soldiers defected or werecaptured. Most of them defected with their weapons.

COMMENTARY:

Gulzarak Zadran's evaluation of the Soviets is notflattering. "I should mention here that the Russian Army is a worth-less military institution and that no professional soldier willgive them a high mark in discipline or the will to fight. They areuseless. I should also note that the Russians relied throughout theaction on maximum use of artillery and one Mujahideen would drawthe fire of a battery or more for several minutes. The high peakswhich they occupied by heliborne troops helped them a lot. Eventhere, they surrounded themselves with all sorts of mines And these`bears' would be sitting around lighted campfires to keep themselveswarm in the winter, so the peaks were on fire all night. The SovietAir Force was not very effective because they flew very high, proba-bly out of fear of our Stingers."

Despite General Zadran's comments, the Soviet planning andexecution of this operation was well done. It matches the initialSoviet invasion in tactical surprise, the use of multiple axis, opera-tional tempo and innovation. The fire support and logistics portion of the plan were first rate and the use of dummy paratroopers was amasterstroke. The use of air-assault forces was well-planned andexecuted. The Soviets needed a "save-face" operation before with-drawal and Magistral was that. A c') rri NAGLU DAMARROW 1 Map 6-7a MEHTAR LAM10 KMDAROULA DAM 4t. 411-KABUL ALALABAD-► 7 _47HISARAK -L-- 0

VIGNETTE 6: OPERATION GHASHEY (ARROW IN PUSHTO)

by General Abdul Rahim Wardak

From 23 October to 7 November 1988, a force of some 2,000Mujahideen from the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA)shut down the Kabul-Jalalabad highway along a 70-kilometer stretchbetween Sarobi and Laghman. I commanded them. This action was part of a four-party (NIFA, HIK, HIH and JIA)combined operation aimed at closing the eastern supply route to the Afghan capital for a period of two months (October-November).Each party was responsible for deploying its units to keep the high-way blocked for 15 days. The operation was planned in the wake ofSoviet forces withdrawal from the Nangrahar Province. TheMujahideen intent was to prevent the government from reinforcingthe Jalalabad garrison while the Mujahideen prepared to advance onJalalabad from Torkham.

Elements of the DRA 8th and 18th border guard brigades, the DRA60th Infantry Division, tank subunits from the 15th Tank Brigade, aSarandoy battalion and local militia manned the enemy's six bases andnearly 20 outposts along this stretch of road. The DRA hoped to pro-tect the highway against Mujahideen attacks and keep the supplyroute to Jalalabad open (Map 6-7a - Arrow 1). Each base was mannedby at least a platoon reinforced by one or two tanks or APCs, 122mmD30 howitzers plus heavy machine guns and 82mm mortars. Theoutposts consisted of five to ten men reinforced with machine guns,AGS-17 and mortars.9 I assembled my force from Mujahideen groups based across

General Wardak was an officer in the Afghan Army. He trained at US military schoolsbefore the war and testified before the United States Congress on several occasions dur-ing the war. He was one of the most noted Mujahideen commanders. At the close of thewar, he was seriously wounded by a SCUD missile and was treated in the United Statesfor his wounds. He became the first Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of theIslamic Government of Afghanistan in 1992 following the Mujahideen victory and the down-fall of the communist regime in Kabul. NIFA records and other interviews conducted by AliJalali are used in this vignette. Correspondent Askold Krushelnycky accompanied NIFAforces and filed a report on Operation Gashay in The Sunday times of 6 November 1988.[Map sheets 2985, 2986,3085 and 3086].

9 A layout and discussion of the security outposts along this stretch of highway are foundin LTC Tubeev's article on pages 129-133 of The Bear Went Over the Mountain: SovietCombat Tactics in Afghanistan, edited by Lester W. Grau, Washington: NDU Press, 1996.

Page 176 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

several districts in Nangrahar and Kabul Provinces. Some of thesegroups were based more than 200 kilometers apart. Other groupsand a contingent of 70 former Afghan Army officers, who were usedto work with combat task forces, came from the NIFA central reservebased in Pakistan.

I organized my force into five strike groups (task forces Bravo,Charlie, Falcon, Gulf and Hurricane), two containment (holding)groups (task forces Alpha and Delta), one reserve (task force Echo) andone rocket launcher group (Saqar Rocket launcher). The force compo-sition follows:

A. NIFA's Kabul Province Eastern Sector Forces under the overall commandof Dr. Shahrukh Gran

1.Task Force Alpha AO: Marora and Salamkhel Tangay Number of Mujahideen: 350. Unit commanders: Sadiq Patang, Haji Sangeen, Mir Wali, Khawani,Mirajan, Wrekhmin, Haji Habib, and Mo'alem Karim.

2.Task Force Bravo AO: Debili Number of Mujahideen: 393 Unit commanders: Janat Gul, Haji Mir, Gulbat, Sakhi Usmankhel, GhulamRasoul

3.Task Force Charlie AO- Kamkay Dargo Number of Mujahideen: 276 Unit commanders: Mohammad Alam, Zaher Khan, Sahak, Sakhi Janikhel,Majnoon

4.Task Force Delta AO: Ghata Dargo Number of Mujahideen: 411 Unit commanders: Noor Hasan, Sayed Rahman, Captain Zalmay, Afridi,Gulab, Noor Rahman, Ruhullah.

5.Task Force Echo AO: Dargo Number of Mujahideen: 343 Unit commanders: Hasan Khan Kairokhel, Sartor, Asel Khan, CaptainHashmat, Khalil, Ehsan

6.Task Force SSM (Saqar) AO: Chakari targeting Kabul Airport Number of Mujahideen: 100 Unit commanders: Captain Sediqullah, Zaher Kahn, Shinwari, Hanan,Ghulam Haider, Umar, Hasan Khan, Momin Khan

Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 177

B. NIFA Forces From Nangrahar Province, Southwestern Sector:

1.Task Force Falcon AO: Tor Ghar opposite the Kaftarkhana base Number of Mujahideen: 250 Unit commanders: Lt. Wali, Sharrati, Mohammad Anwar

2.Task Force Gulf AO: Tor Ghar opposite the Spina Thana base Number of Mujahideen: 350 Unit commanders: Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, Zabit Zaher

3. Task Force Hurricane AO: Tor Ghar opposite Khairokhel baseNumber of Mujahideen: 130 Unit commanders: Asef Khan, Qazi Samiullah

While all these groups were assembling to the south of the KabulRiver, I ordered a group of about 50 Mujahideen under command ofLieutenant Ali Ahmad and Ghuncha Gul to move from their bases inthe north (Ozbin area) and take positions at the northern ridge alongthe Kabul-Jalalabad highway overlooking the Debili bridge. Theywere to observe enemy activity and support the operation by fire. Thisgroup occupied the designated position but was unable to participateeffectively and withdrew after a few days.

While the number of Mujahideen in each group ranged between 100 and 350, I could use only one third of them for combat since therest were required for logistics and security tasks and occasionallyrelieving combatants at the front lines.

My force was armed with individual automatic rifles (AK-47), lightmachine guns (RPK), heavy machine guns (PK), light anti-tankgrenade launchers (RPG-7), Milan anti-tank missile launchers, 82mmrecoilless rifles, 75mm recoilless rifles, 82mm mortars, 107mmMultiple Barrel (twelve barrel) rocket launchers (BM12), Saqar RocketLaunchers, and Stinger shoulder-fired air defense missiles.

I instructed my five strike groups to attack and seize enemybases/outposts, establish road blocks and lay ambushes against theenemy columns.

The western containment (holding) group—Task Force Alpha—was positioned in Marora and Salamkhel Tangay area. I ordered themto block enemy columns attempting to enter its AO or attempting tooutflank my forces along the old Sarobi-Jalalabad road. This roadpasses through Jegdalay, one of my main Mujahideen supply bases. Igave Task Force Alpha an "on order" mission to disrupt any enemy con-centration in Sarobi by fire. I gave the eastern containment (holding)

Page 178 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

group—Task Force Delta—a similar mission on the eastern flank of the operation area, i.e. eastern mouth of the Abreshmin Gorge. I gaveTask Force Delta an "on order" mission to be prepared to serve as astrike group. I had the Reserve group (Task Force Echo) concentratein the Dargo area. They were prepared to act against enemy heliborneinsertions; to relieve task forces Alpha, Bravo, Charlie, Delta; and tolaunch a counter-attack if needed. I had the rocket launcher detachment operate independently.Their mission was to occupy firing positions in the Chakari area (about80 kilometers away)and hit the Kabul airport to divert attention fromthe rest of the operation.

Conduct of the Operation

During the late part of September and first three weeks of October1988, I directed the preparation, resupply and movement of partici-pating Mujahideen forces as they moved to the area of operation anddeployed for action. I moved a total of 400 tons of various suppliesfrom Pakistan to the area of operation by mules and other pack ani-mals. Supplies included mines, small arms ammunition, rockets, mor-tar rounds and anti-tank ammunition. One major challenge facing me was to covertly move the variousMujahideen groups from widely dispersed locations to the deploymentarea, avoiding enemy observation and air attack. Further, movingammunition, supplies and men from Pakistan through the threeprovinces of Paktia, Logar and Kabul required detailed planning andcareful execution. Mujahideen were all unpaid volunteers who joined the jihad tofight. One leadership challenge was to convince guerrillas to performthe vital, if unglamourous, missions of rear area security and LOCsecurity instead of participating in actual combat. This was alwayshard since these volunteers wanted to fight. Another leadership challenge was commanding and controllinga volunteer multi-regional force and integrating them into a singlecommand In fact, as later transpired, the right flank strike groups(task forces Falcon and Hurricane) left their positions and withdrewunannounced to their permanent bases when their permanent basescame under enemy threat. Further, as our operation continued over aweek many Mujahideen became restless and gradually left the battlearea unannounced. Mujahideen had developed the habit of what AliJalali terms "short hit and long run tactics." Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 179 There were several reasons for this. First, the Mujahideen felt thatthey were fighting a war of "a thousand battles" and no single battlewas a decisive one. Therefore, the Mujahideen felt that combat shouldbe limited in terms of time and space in order to increase theMujahideen's survivability. Another reason was the absence of an efficient logistic system toprovide meals, medical support and other required services. The fight-ers were issued all available supplies prior to the battle. There wasseldom resupply available afterwards. This forced the Mujahideen tocarry heavy loads and forage for food. Local food resources were scarcesince the Soviets had destroyed the local economy and driven out thepopulation in the rural areas. Consequently, Mujahideen field rationshad to be carried from Pakistan and were poor and monotonous (usual-ly bread with tea or boiled rice and dhal (a split chick pea dish). Mujahideen fought best on their home territory. This area of oper-ation was not the "home turf' for most of my forces. They were notfighting on their home territory but away from their villages wherethey were better provided for and had a better chance for rest. Giventhe traditional attachment of the Afghan resistance to its home terri-tory, many Mujahideen did not feel the same enthusiasm they showedin fighting their own villages. Finally, the long treks in the mountains sometimes lasted forweeks and contributed to fatigue before the battle began.Mujahideen commanders were hard pressed to keep their extremelyhungry and tired fighters together for an extended period of time. Although my operations plan encompassed a wide front fromSarobi to Surkhakan Bridge (70 kilometers), the main action tookplace on a four-kilometer stretch between Debili and Dargo bases(Map 6-7b - Arrow 2). Combat at other points was either in supportof this action (task forces Alpha, Delta and Echo), or were separateactions (such as attacks on Khairokhel Post, Spina Thana Base andKaftarkhana Base). The operation began with rocket attacks on the Kabul militaryairport on October 19. The rocket launcher detachment targeted theairfield and kept it under intermittent fire until a few days afterthe beginning of the road block when the rocket detachmentmoved to Jagdalay to fire on an enemy concentration in the Nghlu-Sarobi area. My operations plan had four phases: 1. Attack to destroy and seize enemy bases and outposts:

Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 181 2.Block the road by destroying bridges, laying mines and shellingenemy columns attempting to reopen the highway. 3.When the enemy manages to reopen the highway, conduct a large-scale ambush to inflict heavy losses. 4. Break contact and withdraw.

PHASE ONE

The strike groups initiated their attack along the extendedfront at 1000 hours, October 23. Rocket launchers, mortars, recoil-less rifles and heavy machine guns provided supporting fire from thesouthern high ground overlooking the highway. Since the area washeavily mined by the enemy, my Mujahideen could not descend onthe road from all points. Instead, they moved down a limited numberof mountain arroyos. These arroyos were safe since minefields couldnot be maintained in them due to the periodic flash floods whichswept through them. These arroyos were mostly in the Debili andDargo area.

Once my Mujahideen passed through the mined area, they fannedout and attacked the enemy using the paved road as the mainapproach. Their movement was covered by fire from the high grounddominating the gorge. The assault groups stormed the targetedenemy outposts and bases. After fierce fighting, several posts wereoverrun and others isolated from their bases and neighboring postsby 1600 hours.

During subsequent attacks through October 25, my force seized14 outposts and four bases. The occupants were killed, fled orcaptured. We seized about 100 prisoners, 11 tanks or APCs and 21other vehicles. We damaged the hydroelectric installations at Sarobiand Nghlu which supply electricity to Kabul and Jalalabad. Our loss-es were 10 killed and 21 wounded.

PHASE TWO

As my strike groups secured the highway, they destroyedthree highway bridges—Khairokhel bridge, Istehkam (Dargo) bridgeand Debili bridge; mined the road; set up road blocks and estab7lished firing positions on the southern high ground overlookingthe highway, the roadblocks and the destroyed bridges. Four otheroutposts and the remaining bases, except the Mash Ala base, fell tous by October 31.

The DRA's reaction was slow and incremental. The DRA nowlacked sufficient observation and security posts on the high ground Page 182 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War flanking the highway. The DRA failed to recapture any of his out-posts except the Owa-Tsalay post. The Owa-Tsalay post was locatedon the highest peak overlooking Sarobi and provided observation ofMujahideen groupings and artillery positions. The Owa-Tsalay out-post changed hands several times, but we finally held it. The DRAheld the Mash'ala Base throughout the operation.

Our attack gained control of this stretch of the highway. DRAreaction was very slow and ineffective. DRA forces in Sarobi firedlots of artillery against my attacking force while their aircraftbombed suspected Mujahideen positions on the rocky ridges southand southwest of the gorge. DRA and Soviet helicopter gunshipswere not very effective since they did not dare fly low through thegorge or fly close to our positions. The DRA made no attempt tooutflank NIFA positions from Sarobi or from the eastern mouth of thegorge at Mash'ala base. They also made no attempt to use helibornetroops to cut our supply and withdrawal routes.

From October 25 through the end of the operation, the enemyconcentrated its efforts on building up forces at the two entrancesof the gorge and continuously tried to demolish our roadblocksand regain control of the gorge section of highway. The DRAlaunched frontal attacks using infantry supported by tanks movingfrom the Mash'ala base in the east and from Sarobi in the west.The DRA reinforced the beleaguered Mash'ala base with elements of the 11th DRA Division which had been operating in Alingar Districtof Laghman Province.

The DRA build-up from Laghman and Jalalabad was possiblebecause Mujahideen groups from Nangrahar Province (task forcesHurricane, Gulf and Falcon) withdrew a week after overrunning theirassigned objectives. The DRA had moved reinforcements andlaunched attacks in Nanagahar Province and the Mujahideen fromthat area left to defend their homes. Consequently the DRA wasable to push more troops into the gorge from the east in anattempt to break through the main obstacles (between Dargo andDebili). From 25 through 31 October, the DRA launched severalunsuccessful attempts to open the road and suffered losses in menand vehicles.

Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 183

As the task forces Falcon, Gulf and Hurricane withdrew fromtheir sectors, two mechanized columns of DRA moved into the areafrom two directions. Elements of 8th DRA Division, reinforced withSoviet elements, moved east from Kabul to Sarobi and tried to openthe highway. Another column moved west from Jalalabad trying to overrun Mujahideen blocking positions between Dargo and Debili.The pressure of the two-pronged attack on the widely scatteredMujahideen groups and the lack of supplies forced me to narrow myfront and concentrate in the four-kilometer stretch between Dargoand Debili between the two highway bridges which his Mujahideenhad destroyed earlier.

From 1 to 6 November, the enemy moved bridge-building vehiclessupported by tanks and motorized infantry to lay bridges acrossthe Kabul river at Debili and Dargo. We Mujahideen repeatedly disrupted and defeated these attempts by firing from the high groundsouth of the narrow gorge. We also took DRA columns under cross-fire from well-prepared positions. During these attempts, the DRAlost several tanks, APCs and bridging equipment sets.

PHASE THREE

The third phase of the operation was the conduct a large-scaleambush before withdrawal. I ordered all Mujahideen task forces toobserve complete radio silence and cease firing effective 2000 hourson 6 November. I further directed some Mujahideen to physicallywithdraw as part of the deception. The next morning, the entire frontwas quiet. The DRA moved freely along the highway and replacedthe necessary bridges. At 1530 hours, the DRA started moving largemechanized columns across the Debili bridge toward Dargo, enteringour "kill zone." A large number of vehicles entered the kill zone astraffic surged into the gorge from both directions. The two-way laneswere full of vehicles and a traffic bottleneck ensued. The head of thecolumn coming from the east reached the repaired bridge at Debiliand the head of the column coming from the west reached the newly- Enemy Outposts Overrun:

1. Owa-Tselay Post 7. Dargo post 2. Sherkhan Upper Post 8. Kalima Post 3. Gharray Post 9.Girdabi Post 4. Two outposts set between the 10. Toot Post Pul-e Estehkam bridge and 11. Soorey Tiga Post Debili bases. 12 Lakai Post 5. Two outposts around the Pul-e 13.Tekas Post Estehkam Base 14.Surkhakan Bridge Post 6. One outpost set between the 15.Khairokhel Post Dargo and Pul-e Estehkam 16.Lower Khairokhel Post Bridge

Page 184 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

Enemy Bases Overrun during the Operation 1. Debili Base 4. `Pori Zhawari Base 2. Dargo Base 5. Kaftarkhana Base 3. Pul-e Estehkam Base 6. Spina Thana Base (Engineer Bridge Base)

restored bridge at Dargo. The four-kilometer stretch between the tworestored bridges was jammed with traffic when I gave the signal toopen fire. My Mujahideen opened fire along the entire front, takingthe DRA by surprise. Mujahideen firing began at 1600 hours andcontinued until 1900 hours in the evening. We inflicted heavy losseson the trapped columns. The DRA columns retreated into Sarobi.

PHASE FOUR

My Mujahideen withdrew without DRA interference. They broke.contact during the night following the ambush and returned to theirbases.

DRA/Soviet Losses Total losses during the entire operation include: •Forty-two tanks and APCs, six BMPs, nine artillery pieces, oneBM-13 MRL, one bulldozer, two cranes, 65 soft-skin vehicles, twojet aircraft and one helicopter gunship destroyed or damaged. Mostvehicle losses were inflicted during the Phase 3 ambush. •Over 500 soldiers killed or wounded and 212 soldiers and 11 offi-cers captured. •Four pistols, 261 assault rifles, two flare guns, three light machineguns, four medium (PK) machine guns, three heavy 7.62 machineguns, three 12.7 DShK machine guns, seven ZGU-1 14 5mm heavymachine guns, two AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers, thirteenRPG-7 antitank grenade launchers, seven medium 82mm mortars,,and nineteen tactical radio sets captured. Mujahideen Losses18 killed and 53 wounded. Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 185

COMMENTARY:

OPERATION ARROW was one of the few thoroughly-planned and fairly well-coordinated large4cale operations conducted by the Mujahideen. The command and staff and the Mujahideen combatants showed a high level of combat capability and resoluteness during the action. It was a complex, daring undertaking which achieved an ambitious goal. Considering the number of combatants,the time spent for preparation (two-three months according to General Wardak), the complexity of the planning, the amount of supplies needed to be moved to the battle area—mostly all the way from Pakistan across three provinces (Paktia, Logar, Nangrahar)—and the results achieved, it appears that OPERATION ARROW was an expensive and not very cost-effective venture.

OPERATION ARROW was driven more by political than military considerations. The Soviet Union was withdrawing from Afghanistan and, by this time, over half of the Soviet forces had already left.People expected the DRA to rapidly crumble once the Soviets were gone. The various political factions of the Mujahideen were jockeying for position in the post-communist government of Afghanistan. Inorder to maintain the interest and financial support of their Arab and Western backers, the Mujahideen had to demonstrate their ability towork together militarily—a cooperation that had been lacking(except, to some extent, in the fighting around Kandahar) throughout the war. This need for a show of military/political cooperation wasone of the key factors in planning and conducting such a large-scale operation in this guerrilla war. OPERATION ARROW was a success and boosted Mujahideen prestige and particularly promoted the lagging image of the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan (NIFA), which enjoyed the greatest military success during the operation.

Militarily, the resources could have been better used by substitut-ing a series of smaller actions (conducted successively by groups of about 50-70 Mujahideen at a time) at different points along the highway. These actions would each last for a few days over an extended period of time. Such an option, although not very spectacular, would effectively block the highway for a longer period of timethan during OPERATION ARROW. The DRA losses would not have been spectacular each time but should have ended with higher over-all losses. While NIFA could afford to launch an "Arrow"-sized operation once a year, it could conduct several similar actions of smaller size with the same or less cost in men, material, time and other resources.

Page 186 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

The political requirement to employ the forces of four Mujahideen factions to close the Kabul-Jalalabad highway for two weeks each was an expensive option. It required four separate deployments of forces, four separate plans of operation, three relief operations asone faction took over the task from another and four withdrawals.This inevitably entailed tactical and logistic duplications, unneces-sary transportation costs, and the tactical complications involved with relieving one group by another over a wide front. Dividing thearea into four sectors, each the responsibility of one faction for aperiod of eight weeks, would have achieved the same goal withfewer complications, lower costs, better logistic support, and more focused action. However, the lack of a unified political and mili-tary leadership and factional differences among the Mujahideen prevented this option.

The combined command and staff of the Mujahideen force showed a high level of professionalism and operational vision in both planning and execution. The movement of a large force from widely dispersed bases to the area of operation and providing for its logistic support using very limited local resources is an extremely challenging task. The leadership of the force accomplished this with admirable effectiveness. The impact of the operation went far beyond the tactical and operational level, contributing to strategic and political destabilization of the Soviet-backed government in Kabul. The operation panicked the DRA government which committed unnecessarily-large forces into the area and accepted heavy casualties.

But the Mujahideen also paid a political price for the operation.The highway closure caused losses to civilian merchants who, atthis time of the year, export pomegranates from Tagao and grapesfrom Kabul to Pakistan. The fresh fruit and vegetable trade is oneof the major sources of income in Afghanistan. During the first weekof November, representatives of fruit dealers appealed to the Mujahi-deen to open the highway, but to no avail. In a guerrilla war, supportof the local population is too valuable to be risked by actions that hurtlocal economy.

Tactically, the DRA committed several errors. Inadequate DRAreconnaissance allowed the Mujahideen to deploy a several-thousandman force within a short distance of DRA positions without detectionor interruption. Most of the Mujahideen movement took place atnight and employed natural cover and concealment in the mountain-ous terrain. However, a more active DRA reconnaissance would havedisclose the Mujahideen secret deployment and allowed counter-measures to interrupt the Mujahideen preparations for the operation.DRA failure to establish and man observation posts on the higher mountains also let the Mujahideen move' into the area and prepare attack positions undetected.

Chapter 6, Vignette 6 Page 187

The enemy forces in Sarobi were in a favorable tactical position tolaunch 'a flanking attack against the main base of the Mujahideentoward Hisarak. Such a move, supported by air and artillery support,should have foiled the Mujahideen operation and cut off theirwithdrawal. Such a move, supplemented by heliborne landingsbehind the Mujahideen lines, could have created chaos and forcedthe Mujahideen to abort the operation. The DRA reaction, howeverwas reactive and unimaginative. The road-bound DRA forces paidheavily for this leadership failure.

Falling into the final Mujahideen ambush was the worst and the most costly DRA mistake. After the Mujahideen guns fell silent,the DRA did not bother to ensure that the silence really meant that the Mujahideen had withdrawn and was not a "calm before the storm." The DRA then allowed too much traffic to move down the unsecured highway. The DRA traffic jam occurred right in the Mujahideen kill zone.

The two following vignettes describe battles within OPERATION ARROW on the eastern approaches to the gorge.

SURKHAKAN .... SOBIKHEL 111 RUINS CIL:3 •C3L-1 SURKHAKAN BRIDGE KABUL RIVER • KHAIROKHEL POST a • •• • IOC METERY \ \ 012 KM TASK FORCE GULFARROW 3 Map 6-8 -ek GARDAY KAC - W SPINA TANA oA-Qc -0 CDCOCD CD C- O CD 0 CD cnCD co 0CD CD 0 ,q.S:u a:(E,cr,C)11.) 5-• CD C/) 0 cu CO

VIGNETTE 6A: THE BATTLE FOR THE KHAIROKHEL POST

by Asef Khan

I brought my 130 Mujahideen from our permanent base inSurkhrud District, southwest of Jalalabad to join OPERATION ARROW.My group was designated Task Force Hurricane. My group deployedat night into its attack position located in the folds of the Tor GharMountain. My attack position was about 3 kilometers directly south ofmy objective—the Khairokhel post (Map 6-8 - Arrow 3). Khairokhel post was located immediately west of the Khairokhelvillage. It was manned by a platoon-sized unit supported by two tanksand one APC. They also had mortars and machine guns includingDShKs. There was another post connected with the Khairokhel defens-es between the village and the Surkhakan Bridge Post to the east. Theenemy would detach small teams during the day to patrol the mainhighway between Khairokhel and the Surkhakan bridge. The patrolswould return to their base at night. Task Force Gulf, commanded by Haji Zaman Ghamsharik, wasdeployed on the left flank of my group. Its mission was to attack theadjacent enemy base at Spina Thana. Further to the west, Task ForceFalcon, commanded by Shari' ati and Lt. Wali, was to attack theKaftarkhana Base. The right flank of my task force Hurricane wasexposed and covered only by mountainous terrain. I formed my task force into three groups: an assault group, a sup-port group and a service detachment. There were 50 Mujahideenarmed with assault rifles and 15 RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launchersin the assault group. The support group manned the heavy weaponsincluding one BM-1, one 75mm gun, and three 82mm recoilless rifles. At 2200 hours on the night of 22 October 1988, I took a few mendown to the Khairokhel village on reconnaissance. I had dinner withthe local elders and asked them to talk to the government postcommander and convince him to abandon his positions rather thanface attack. Following the meal, I completed my reconnaissance andreturned to the attack position in the hills overlooking the village. Itwas so close to the enemy that an American female journalist whowas accompanying my group said If I were the government militia,you would not be able to survive a single night sitting so close to the Asef Khan was the commander of Task Force Hurricane. Page 190 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War governMent post within range of heavy weapons." The operational commander, General Rahim Wardak, radioed myadjacent commander, Haji Zaman, and told him that the attack timeon the posts would be at 0800 hours, 23 October. When I returned frommy reconnaissance, Haji Zaman relayed this information to me. Imoved my raiding party into some ruins located one kilometer south of the Kabul-Jalalabad highway in preparation for the next morningsattack. I also set up an ambush near the highway to kill the patrolthat left the Khairokhel post and moved toward the Surkhakan bridgeevery morning. My aim was to keep the area clear for my raid on theKhairokhel Post. At 0700, a group of about 15 soldiers left the government post andstarted moving in the direction of Surkhakan bridge to set up securi-ty checkpoints. My Mujahideen let them clear the village and, assoon as they reached an open stretch of the road, opened fire fromwell-concealed positions near the road. My ambush killed six enemysoldiers and wounded a few others. This action drew a heavy barrage from the enemy bases on eitherside of Khairokhel. Artillery and tanks were firing from the SpinaThana in the west and from Surkhakan Bridge Post on the east. Atthis point I radioed a coded message to Haji Zaman saying "get thedogs off my back." He immediately responded with heavy fire againstthe enemy base at Spina Thana. Haji Zaman's group was ready sinceit was 0800 hours, the time to start the attack. Mujahideen fire on Spina Thana took the pressure off myKhairokhel sector. For several hours, Task Force Gulf exchanged firewith the Spina Thana base. Then, some direct hits on fuel drums setthe fort ablaze. Task Force Gulf then attacked the enemy base. As Task Force Gulf launched its attack against Spina Thana, Ilaunched the main part of Task Force Hurricane against the enemypositions around the Khairokhel Post. I kept a security detachmenteast of the village to block enemy forces trying to enter the engagementarea. The coordinated attacks of Task Forces Gulf and Hurricane over-ran the adjacent Spina Thana base and Khairokhel Post at about 1430hours. My Mujahideen destroyed the tanks and APCs at the KhairokhelPost and, while part of my group established a perimeter defensearound the captured post, the other part moved captured weapons andequipment to my mountain hideout. This continued all day. During the attack, the enemy was moving communist officials of the Alingar District government to Jalalabad in a military convoy (atthis time, due to the ongoing Soviet withdrawal, the communist Chapter 6, Vignette 6a Page 191 regime was withdrawing its military and administrative units fromthose remote areas which could not be easily maintained or defend-ed). This convoy deployed in the Mehtar-e Lam Baba hills north of the Kabul river and began to employ long-range artillery and rocketfire across a wide front stretching from Khairokhel to Kaftarkhana.Their artillery and. BM-21 multiple rocket launchers were firing at arange of over 10 kilometers, so their fire was not very accurate oreffective. However, later in the day, part of the column moved alongthe main road toward the battle area and tried to cross theSurkhakan bridge. The enemy base at Kaftarkhana was still alive.However it was under attack by Shari'ati's group and could not spareits fire against the Mujahideen in adjacent areas. In order to contain the movement of the enemy column, I movedmy assault group with all available RPG-7s to positions facing theSurkhakan bridge. I also destroyed the highway bridge at Khairo-khel village with demolition charges that we had brought for thispurpose all the way from our home base. The enemy tanks and APCsin his column came under flanking fire from my RPGs. The enemycould not hit my RPG gunners since they were protected by a steepturn in the road. The enemy could not flank my position since theoff-road areas were heavily mined and the blown bridge prevented afrontal assault. This significantly boosted my Mujahideen's moraleand gave them a sense of improved security. For some reason, enemyair activity was weak despite the fact that the area was open and thefight was going on in broad daylight. At dusk the enemy column pushed its infantry out front to clearthe way for the vehicles, but it did not make any headway. Later, aswe moved our spoils and POWs to their mountain positions in thesouth, I withdrew my security elements from the highway since theenemy was moving yet another motorized column into the area fromJalalabad. By the next day, Task Forces Falcon, Gulf and Hurricanehad withdrawn their forces from along the highway. The enemycolumns coming from Jalalabad and Laghman moved slowly downthe road all the way to Mash'ala Base and reinforced it TheMujahideen never overran this base and it played a pivotal role inmaintaining enemy's presence. Following this, I limited our action to firing our heavy weapons atenemy targets on the highway. Shortly thereafter, I withdrew myMujahideen from the operation since DRA forces had moved into mydistrict and were threatening our homes. COIVIMENTARY: The confident commander's meal with the village elderscertainly helped his reconnaissance, but clearly tipped off the defend-ing DRA commander that the Mujahideen attack might come soon. Onthe other hand, the Mujahideen had been in the area for some time.Further, the guerrilla commander apparently assumed that all thelocal inhabitants were favorably disposed to the Mujahideen. Hisbrash behavior succeeded this time, but could have compromised oper-ational security. Apparently, the DRA commander took no action toincrease his defenses and may not have even informed his superior. Apparently, the Mujahideen lacked enough working radios so thateach Task Force Commander could have one. General Wardak couldnot rapidly influence the course of the battle since communicationswere scarce. Further, General Wardak lacked radio communicationswith his eastern flank. This seems a serious problem in case the DRAdecided to roll up his operation from that flank. Once the Mujahideen withdrew to the hills, their long-range fireshad little apparent effect. Their early departure, however, did createadditional problems for General Wardak.

VIGNETTE 6B: THE BATTLE FOR SPINA THANA BASE

based on interviews with Haji Zaman Ghamsharik

I commanded the 200-man Task Force Gulf (See Map 6-8 - Arrow3). As part of OPERATION ARROW, I launched my attack on the govern-ment base at Spina Thana in coordination with attacks on theKhairokhel Post to the east and Kaftarkhana Base to the west. SpinaThana was one of the main military bases providing security forcolumns moving along the Kabul-Jalalabad highway. It alsopatrolled against guerrilla incursions across the Kabul River intoLaghman Province. A reinforced company supported by tanks,BMPs, APCs, heavy machine gun and guns garrisoned the base.They protected the base with mines and other obstacles. The entirearea surrounding the base, except the paved highway runningthrough the base was heavily mined. Spina Thana woulthke a tough nut to crack. I could assign up to150 Mujahideen to the assault group, but using such a large force forthe attack carried some risks. I could incur heavy casualties since thegroup could not effectively deploy due to the mines. I considered anight attack, but this was equally difficult because of the mines, par-ticularly since the enemy habitually mined the exits and entrances to the base at night. I decided on a day-light attack. I intended to movepart of my force as close to the base as possible under heavy coveringfire. I decided to put my attacking force on the highway outside themined area and move on the highway in the attack. This was the onlyroute guaranteed free of mines. I constituted a Task Force support group which manned our BM-12and BM-1 MRL, 82mm recoilless rifles, ZGU-1 and DShK heavymachine guns and mortars. I positioned it in the terrain folds of TorGhar dominating the enemy base on the low ground between the mainhighway and Kabul river. I had to begin my planned fires earlier than intended when TaskForce Hurricane came under heavy fire from the Spina Thana Base.The enemy responded resolutely to my fires. The fire exchange went Haji Zaman Ghamsharik was the commander of Task Force Gulf. At the start of the war,Ghamsharik controlled Khogiani District. He faked a defection to the DRA and requestedthat the DRA provide him trained personnel to run the district. The DRA responded bysending him 71 communists—who were promptly executed. Page 194 The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War on unabated until my Mujahideen gunners set part of the base on firewith some direct hits. This was the turning point in the battle. Aspanic spread throughout the defenders, I led a 60-man assault groupthrough a ravine to the west of the base. We got on the highwayand attacked east. I instructed my men to stay on the pavement.Two of my Mujahideen who strayed had their legs blown off bymines. We moved quickly to the base entrance. The defenders hadlittle time to mount an organized defense, particularly since some of the defenders had fled from their positions in panic and were rushingto the river to escape the fire. We met little resistance in stormingthe base. We captured scores of defenders including the basecommander, Rahmatullah Spelanay. We destroyed the tanks andAPCs and whatever else could not be moved. We continued theattack to the east to help Task Force Hurricane which was locked inbattle with the defenders of the Khairokhel Post. As we Mujahideenadvanced from two directions, most of the Khairokhel defendersfled toward the river. We captured the rest. The actions for the restof the day unfolded as detailed in the preceding vignette. COMMENTARY: One estimate claims that the Soviets left over 13million landmines behind in Afghanistan. The Soviets and DRAsurrounded their outposts and bases with minefields. A majorMujahideen problem in capturing a position was getting through theminefield. Mujahideen minefield clearing methods included:

• probing the ground cautiously in a slow advance;
• driving a flock of sheep through the minefield;
• heaving boulders ahead of an advance to provide steppingstones for the advance;
• firing recoiless rifles into the minefield and creating a path viathe recoiless rifle craters;
• limited use of some mineclearing systems provided by westernand Arab backers.

CHAPTER COMMENTARY

Control of the highway net was essential to the Soviet/DRA effort,but in some regions, the Mujahideen were able to block the highway forweeks, months and even years. The best blocks were maintained bylocal Mujahideen who were able to look after their personal interestsand yet maintain an effective blockade. The least effective road blockswere those done by mobile guerrillas who lacked the supplies andcommitment required to keep the road closed.