The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Foreword

by Ali Ahmad Jalali

FOREWORD

When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, few expertsbelieved that the fledgling Mujahideen resistance movement had achance of withstanding the modern, mechanized, technologically-advanced Soviet Army. Most stated that resistance was futile and thatthe Soviet Union had deliberately expanded their empire to the south.The Soviet Union had come to stay. Although some historians lookedat the British experience fighting the Afghan mountain tribesmen,most experts discounted any parallels since the Soviet Union pos-sessed an unprecedented advantage in fire power, technology andmilitary might. Although Arab leaders and the West supplied armsand material to the Mujahideen, they did so with the hope of creat-ing a permanent, bleeding ulcer on the Soviet flank, not defeatingthe Soviet Union. They did not predict that the Soviet Union wouldvoluntarily withdraw from Afghanistan in 1989.

What caused the Soviet withdrawal? The Soviets realized thatthey were trapped in an unwinnable war where they were suffering"death from a thousand cuts" by an intractable enemy who had no hopeof winning, but fought on because it was the right thing to do. Afterfailing to achieve military victory, the Soviet Union cut its losses andwithdrew. The Soviet Union lost 13,833 killed. Over 1.3 millionAfghans died and over a third of the population became refugees. Mosthave not yet returned to war-torn Afghanistan.

There have been few studies of guerrilla warfare from the guer-rilla's perspective. To capture this perspective and the tactical experi-ence of the Mujahideen, the United States Marine Corps commissioned this study and sent two retired combat veterans to interview Mujahideen. The authors were well received and generously assisted by various Mujahideen who willingly talked about their long, bitter war. The authors have produced a unique book which tells the guerrillas' story as interpreted by military professionals. This is a book about small-unit guerrilla combat. This is a book about death and survival, adaptation and perseverance.

This is a book for the combat-arms company and field grade officer and NCO. It provides an understanding of guerrilla field craft, tactics, techniques and procedures. It has application in Basic and AdvancedOfficer and NCO courses as well as special warfare courses. Seniorleaders will also find valuable insights for training and supportingguerrilla forces as well as defending against guerrilla forces. This book is a companion piece to The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan which National Defense University press published in 1996.