The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War/Preface
PREFACE edit
Afghanistan, a multi-ethnic state in southwest Asia, is home todiverse social communities that share common experience throughinteraction with dominant states, empires, invading armies, tradeand cultural movements that traversed the land during their thou-sands of years of history. The different ethnic groups in modernAfghanistan (Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmans, Persian-speakingHazaras, Balochis, etc.) straddle the boundries of the state. However,their national identity is mostly defined by their differences withtheir ethnic kinsmen across the borders rather than their nationalcommonalities. About 99% of Afghanistan's over 17 million popula-tion are Muslim, of which 85% are followers of the Sunni sect whilethe rest are Shia. About 85% of Afghans live in rural communities ina land dominated by mountains and deserts. Modern travel isprimarily restricted to a highway ring connecting the various cities.There is no railroad network. Afghanistan has mostly been a loose collection of tribes and nation-alities over which central governments had varying degrees of influ-ence and control at different times. The country has been historicallyknown for its remarkable Islamic and ethnic tolerence. However trib-al rivalries and blood feuds, ambitions of local chieftains, and tribaldefiance of pervasive interference by the central government have keptthe different parts of the land at war at different times. In such casesthe kinship-based identity has been the major means of the communi-ty's political and military mobilization. Such identity places fargreater importance on kinship and extended family than ideology.
Afghanistan stands at a geographic crossroads that has seen thepassage of many warring peoples. Each of these has left their imprinton the ancient land and involved the people of Afghanistan in conflictOften this conflict got in the way of economic development. What hasdeveloped is a country composed of somewhat autonomous "villagestates" spread across the entire country.1 Afghans identify themselvesby Qawm—the basic subnational identity based on kinship, residenceand sometimes occupation. Western people may refer to this as "tribe",but this instinctive social cohesiveness includes tribal clans, ethnic 1 Ali A. Jalali, "Clashes of Ideas and Interests in Afghanistan", paper given at the Instituteof World Politics, Washington, D.C., July 1995, page 4. XIII subgroups, religious sects, locality-based groups and groups united byinterests.2 The Qawm, not Afghanistan, is the basic unit of socialcommunity and, outside the family, the most important focus on indi-vidual loyalty. Afghanistan has, at times, been characterized as adisunited land riven by blood feuds. The feuds center on family andQawm. Yet, the leaders of the various Qawm have resolved feuds andheld the land together. Village elders can put feuds on hold for adecade or longer and then let them resume once the agreed-on time hasexpired and the matter is still unresolved. Afghanistan's ancient rootsand strong ties of kinship provide an anchor against progress, but alsothe means to cope when central authority has collapsed. Historically,the collapse of the central government of Afghanistan or the destruc-tion of its standing armies has never resulted in the defeat of thenation by an invader. The people, relying on their decentralized polit-ical, economic and military potential, have always taken over theresistance against the invaders.3 This was the case during two wars with Great Britain in the 19th Century (1839-1842, 1878-1880). This happened again in the Soviet-Afghan War.
The tactics of the Mujahideen reflected this lack of central cohesion. Their tactics were not standard, but differed from valley tovalley and tribe to tribe. No more than 15 percent of the guerrillacommanders were military professionals. However, Afghanistan hada conscript army and virtually every 22-year-old male served his twoyear obligation. This provided a basic military education which easedcooperation between the various Mujahideen groups. The Mujahi-deen were true volunteers—unpaid warriors who fought to protecttheir faith and community first and their nation next. As true vol-unteers, fighting for their Qawm and religion, the Mujahideen lookeddown on the professional soldier (asker) as a simple mercenary whowas either the victim of a press gang or too stupid to ply any othertrade.4 This disdain did not attach to the professional officer, whoenjoyed a great deal of prestige.
Afghanistan was not a guerrilla war ala Mao Tse Tung or VoNguyen Giap. The Mujahideen were not trying to force a new ideolo-gy and government on a land. Rather, they fought to defend theirQawm and their religion against a hostile ideology, an atheistic value 2 ibid,3. 3 ibid,4. 4 Oliver Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994,page 158-159. xiv system, an oppressive central government and a foreign invader. Itwas a spontaneous defense of community values and a traditional wayof life by individual groups initially unconnected to national or inter-national political organizations.5 The Great Game 6 Russian expansionism and empire building in Central Asia beganin 1734 and Moscow's interest in Afghanistan was apparent by the late1830s. The Great Game described the British and Russian struggle forinfluence along the unsettled northern frontier of British India and inthe entire region between Russia and India. Afghanistan lay directlyin this contested area between two empires. Russia described hermotives in the Great Game as simply to abolish the slave trade and toestablish order and control along her southern border. The British,however, viewing Russian absorption of the lands of the Caucasus,Georgia, Khirgiz, Turkmens, Khiva and Bukhara, claimed to feelthreatened by the presence of a large, expanding empire near Indiaand ascribed different Russian motives. The British stated thatRussian motives were to weaken British power and to gain access to awarm-water port. Britain claimed that her own actions were to protectthe frontiers of British India.
The Great Game spilled into Afghanistan when British forcesinvaded during the First Anglo-Afghan War (1839-1842). Britainclaimed that the invasion was supposed to counter Russian influence.After hard fighting, the British withdrew. By 1869, the Russianempire reached the banks of the Amu Darya (Oxus) river—the north- .ern border of Afghanistan. This caused additional British concern. In1878, the arrival of a special Russian diplomatic mission to Kabul ledto another British invasion and the Second Anglo-Afghan War. TheBritish Army again withdrew. In the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1907,the Russians agreed that Afghanistan lay outside its sphere of inter-est and agreed to confer with Britain on all matters relating toRussian-Afghan relations. In return, Britain agreed not to occupy orannex any part of Afghanistan nor interfere in the internal affairs ofthat country. Although the Amir of Afghanistan refused to recognizethe treaty, Russia and Britain agreed to its terms and honored them 5 Jalali,1 6 Section derived from Richard F. Nyrop and Donald M. Seekins (editors), Afghanistan: ACountry Study, Fifth edition, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1986, 22-73 andPeter Hopkirk, The Great Game, New York: Kodansha International, 1994. XV until 1919 when Afghan troops crossed into British India, seized avillage and attempted to raise a popular revolt in the area. TheBritish responded with yet another invasion and the Third Anglo-Afghan War. The political settlement resulted in Afghanistan's fullindependence from Great Britain. Afghanistan's foreign policy from 1919 until 1978 balanced thedemands of her immediate neighbors, and external powers such as theUnited States, Germany and Great Britain. Normal relations with hernorthern neighbor, the Soviet Union, led to increased Soviet invest-ment and presence in Afghanistan.
In April 1978, a small leftist group of Soviet-trained Afghan officersseized control of the government and founded the Democratic Republicof Afghanistan, a client state of the Soviet Union. Civil war broke outin Afghanistan. The putsch installed President Nur M. Taraki, aMarxist who announced sweeping programs of land distribution,changed status for women and the destruction of the old Afghanistansocial structure. Disregarding the national social structure and mores,the new government enjoyed little popular support. The wobbly Tarakigovernment was almost immediately met by increased armed resis-tance as the Mujahideen ranks grew. In 1978, religious leaders, inresponse to popular uprisings across Afghanistan, issued statements ofjihad (holy war) against the communist regime. This was an appeal to the supranational identity of all Afghans--a fight to defend the faith ofIslam. The combat readiness of the Army of the Democratic Republicof Afghanistan plunged as government purges swept the officer corps.Soldiers, units and entire regiments deserted to the resistance and bythe end of 1979, the actual strength of the Afghan Army was less thanhalf of its authorized 90,000. In March 1979, the city of Herat revolt-ed and most of the Afghan 17th Infantry Division mutinied and joinedthe rebellion. Forces loyal to Taraki reoccupied the city after theAfghan Air Force bombed the city and the 17th Division. Thousands ofpeople reportedly died in the fighting, including some Soviet citizens.
Soviet Intervention edit
The Soviet-Afghan War began over the issue of control. TheDemocratic Republic of Afghanistan was nominally a socialist stategoverned by a communist party. However, the state only controlledsome of the cities, while tribal elders and clan chiefs controlled thecountryside. Furthermore, the communist party of Afghanistan wassplit into two hostile factions. The factions spent more time fighting each other than trying to establish socialism in Afghanistan. InSeptember 1979, Taraki's Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin, seizedpower and murdered Taraki. Amin's rule proved no better and theSoviet Union watched this new communist state spin out of control.Meanwhile, units of the army mutinied, civil war broke out, cities andvillages rose in revolt and Afghanistan began to slip away fromMoscow's control and influence. Leonid Brezhnev, the aged SovietGeneral Secretary, saw that direct military intervention was the onlyway to prevent his client state from disintegrating into complete chaos.He decided to intervene.
The obvious models for intervention were Hungary in 1956 andCzechoslovakia in 1968. The Soviet General Staff planned theAfghanistan invasion based on these models. However, there was asignificant difference that the Soviet planners missed. Afghanistanwas embroiled in a civil war and a coup de main would only gaincontrol of the central government, not the countryside. Althoughparticipating military units were briefed at the last minute, the SovietChristmas Eve invasion of 1979 was masterfully planned and well-executed. The Soviets seized the government, killed the president andput their own man in his place. According to some Russian sources,they planned to stabilize the situation, strengthen the army and thenwithdraw the majority of Soviet forces within three years. The SovietGeneral Staff planned to leave all fighting in the hands of the army of the Democratic Republic. But Afghanistan was in full revolt, thedispirited Afghan army was unable to cope, and the specter of defeatfollowing a Soviet withdrawal haunted the. Politburo. Invasion andoverthrow of the government proved much easier than fighting thehundreds of ubiquitous guerrilla groups. The Soviet Army wastrained for large-scale, rapid-tempo operations. They were nottrained for the platoon leaders' war of finding and closing with small,indigenous forces which would only stand and fight when the terrainand circumstances were to their advantage.
Back in the Soviet Union, there was no one in charge and all deci-sions were committee decisions made by the collective leadership.General Secretary Brezhnev became incapacitated in 1980 but did notdie until November 1982. He was succeeded by the ailing YuriAndropov. General Secretary Andropov lasted less than two years andwas succeeded by the faltering Konstantin Chernenko in February1984. General Secretary Chernenko died in March 1985. Althoughthe military leadership kept recommending withdrawal, during this "twilight of the general secretaries" no one was making any major deci-sions as to the conduct and outcome of the war in Afghanistan. Thewar bumped on at its own pace. Finally, Mikhail Gorbachev came topower. His first instinct was to order military victory in Afghanistanwithin a year. Following this bloodiest year of the war, Gorbachev real-ized that the Soviets could not win in Afghanistan without unaccept-able international and internal repercussions and began to castabout for a way to withdraw with dignity. United Nations negotiatorsprovided that avenue and by 15 October 1988, the first half of theSoviet withdrawal was complete. On 15 February 1989, the last Sovietforces withdrew from Afghanistan. Soviet force commitment, initiallyassessed as requiring several months, lasted over nine years andrequired increasing numbers of forces. The Soviet Union reportedlykilled 1.3 million people and forced 5.5 million Afghans (a third of theprewar population) to leave the country as refugees. Another 2 millionAfghans were forced to migrate within the country. The country hasyet to recover.
Initially the Mujahideen were all local residents who took arms and banded together into large, rather unwieldy, forces to seize the localdistrict capitols and loot their arms rooms. The DRA countered theseefforts where it could and Mujahideen began to coalesce into muchsmaller groups centered around the rural village. These small groupswere armed with a variety of weapons from swords and flintlock mus-kets to British bolt-action rifles and older Soviet and Soviet-blocweapons provided to Afghanistan over the years. The guerrillacommanders were usually influential villagers who already had aleadership role in the local area. Few had any professional militaryexperience. Rebellion was wide-spread, but uncoordinated since theresistance was formed along tribal and ethnic lines.
The Soviet invasion changed the nature of the Mujahideen resis-tance. Afghanistan's neighbors, Pakistan and Iran, nervously regard-ed the advance to the Soviet Army to their borders and began provid-ing training and material support to the Mujahideen. The UnitedStates, Peoples Republic of China, Britain, France, Italy, Saudi Arabia,Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates began funneling military,humanitarian and financial aid to the Mujahideen through Pakistan.Pakistan's assessment was that the Soviet Union had come toAfghanistan to stay and it was in Pakistan's best interests to supportthose Mujahideen who would never accept the Soviet presence. ThePakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) began to funnel aid through various Afghan political factions headquartered in Pakistan.Eventually there were seven major Afghan factions receiving aid. Thepolitics of these factions were determined by their leaders' religiousconvictions—three of which were Islamic moderates and four of whichwere Islamic fundamentalists. Pakistan required that the variousethnic and tribal Mujahideen groups join one of the factions in order toreceive aid. Over time, this provided the leaders of these factions withpolitical power which they used to dominate the politics of post-communist Afghanistan. The Pakistani authorities favored the most-fundamentalist groups and rewarded them accordingly. This aiddistribution gave the Afghan religious leaders unprecedented power inthe conduct of the war. It also undermined the traditional authority of the tribal and village leaders.
The Mujahideen were unpaid volunteers with family responsibili-ties. This meant that they were part-time warriors and that spoils ofwar played a major role in military actions. Mujahideen sold mostlycaptured weapons and equipment in the bazaars to support theirfamilies As the war progressed, mobile Mujahideen groups emerged.The mobile Mujahideen groups were larger and consisted of young (under 25), unmarried, better-trained warriors. Sometimes the mobile Mujahideen were paid. The mobile Mujahideen ranged over a muchlarger area of operations than the local Mujahideen and were moreresponsive to the plans and desires of the factions.
The strategic struggle for Afghanistan was a fight to strangle theother's logistics. The Mujahideen targeted the Soviet lines of commu-nication—the crucial road net work over which the Soviet supplieshad to travel. The Soviet attack on the Mujahideen logistics was twophased. From 1980 until 1985, the Soviets sought to eliminateMujahideen support in the rural countryside. They bombed granariesand rural villages, destroyed crops and irrigation systems, mined pastures and fields, destroyed herds and launched sweeps throughrural areas—conscripting young men and destroying the infrastruc-ture. The Soviet leadership, believing Mao Tse Tung's dictum that theguerrilla lives in the population like a fish in water, decided to kill thefish by draining off the water.[1] As a result, Afghanistan became anation of refugees as more than seven million rural residents fled to the relative safety of neighboring Pakistan and Iran or to the cities ofAfghanistan. This Soviet effort denied rural support to theMujahideen, since the villagers had left and most of the food now had to be carried along with weapons and ammunition and materials ofwar. The Mujahideen responded by establishing logistics bases insideAfghanistan. The Soviet fight from 1985 to withdrawal was to findand destroy these bases.
Terrain, as any infantryman knows, is the ultimate shaper of thebattlefield. Afghanistan's terrain is varied and challenging. It isdominated by towering mountains and forbidding desert. Yet it alsohas lush forests of larch, aspen and juniper. It has tangled "greenzones"—irrigated areas thick with trees, vines, crops, irrigation ditch-es and tangled vegetation. It has flat plains full of wheat and swampyterraces which grow delicious long-grained rice. It is not ideal terrain for a mechanized force dependent on fire power, secure lines of commu-nication and high-technology. It is terrain where the mountainwarrior, using ambush sites inherited from his ancestors, can inflict "death from a thousand cuts". The terrain dictates different tactics,force structure and equipment from those of conventional war.
This book is not a complete history of the Soviet-Afghan War.Rather, it is a series of combat vignettes as recalled by the Mujahideenparticipants. It is not a book about right or wrong. Rather, it is a bookabout survival against the overwhelming firepower and technologicalmight of a superpower. This is the story of combat from the guerrilla'sperspective. It is the story of brave people who fought without hope ofwinning because it was the right thing to do.
- ↑ Claude Malhauret, Afghan Alternative Seminar, Monterey, California, November 1993.