3919092The Prince (Byerley) — Chapter 4James Scott ByerleyNiccolo Machiavelli

CHAP. IV.

Why the Kingdom of Darius conquered by Alexander remained with his Successors after his Death.

In considering the difficulties which have been Experienced in preserving a state newly conquered, it might seem surprising that Alexander the Great, having in a few years made himself master of Asia, and dying before he had time to take possession of it, the whole country had not revolted. In fact, his successors maintained themselves in it, and in its preservation experienced no other difficulty than that which their own particular ambition excited among them.

To which I answer, that all the principalities of which any traces remain to us in history have been governed iii two different ways; either by an absolute prince to whom all the rest are slaves, to whom, as ministers and from favour, he delegates the privilege of assisting him to govern his kingdom; or else by a prince and nobles: these last do not govern through the princess favour, but solely by a right inherent in the seniority of their ancestors. They have also particular states and subjects who acknowledge them as their lords, and who entertain a particular affection for them. In a country governed by a prince and slaves, the prince has infinitely the greatest authority. In fact, in all his states there are none who acknowledge any other sovereign than himself, and if they pay obedience to others, it is as his ministers or officers, for whom they have no particular affection. Turkey and France furnish at present examples of these two kinds of ġovernment. The whole Turkish monarchy is governed by a master to whom all the others are slaves. He divides his kingdom into different provinces, and into them he sends divers administrators; he changes and recalls them at his will; but the King of France is placed amidst a crowd of ancient nobility, who having subjects that acknowledge and are attached to them, they are entitled to certain prerogatives, of which the king cannot without danger deprive them.

If we examine both these sovereignties, we shall find that there are great difficulties in the way of conquering a kingdom governed like that of Turkey, but that once effected, nothing is so easy as to preserve it. It is difficult to seize on such a statę, because he who would attempt it cannot be called in by the nobles of the kingdom, nor reckon on the assistance and rebellion of those who surround the prince. The motive of this is easily conceived by what we have said of its organization. In fact, áll being his slaves and dependants, it becomes more difficult to corrupt them; and when they are even gained over, but little assistance is to be had from them, they not being able to draw the people along with them, for the reasons before adduced. Thus whoever attacks the Turks ought to expect to find them united, and to depend more on his own strength than on their division. But once vanquished, and their armies put to the rout, so as they shall not be able to reassemble them, there is nothing to be dreaded but the family of the prince. This once extinct, there remains no one to be afraid of, all the rest being without credit among the people; and as the conqueror before the battle has nothing to hope from them, after the victory he has nothing to fear.

It is quite otherwise in kingdoms governed like France; here one may easily gain an entrance by gaining over certain nobles of the kingdom, among whom there is always to be found men who are discontented and who are fond of change. Those can open the gates, and facilitate the conquest of it: but if you wish afterwards to maintain yourself in It, you will meet with an infinity of difficulties Both on the part of those you have conquered, and on that of those who have assisted you in the enterprise. Here it is not sufficient to destroy the family of the prince: there still remain the nobles. öf the kingdom, who put themselves at the head of new parties; and as you can neither content ner destroy them, you will lose this conquest on the first and frequently.on the slightest occasion.

But if you examine what was the nature of Darius's government, you will find it similar to that of Turkey. Thus Alexandor was obliged to attack him in the most rapid manner, and in every part, to prevent him from keeping the field. after victory and Darius's death, this kingdom remained with Alexander, without any fear of losing it again from the reasons we have before given: and if his successors had been united, they would have enjoyed it as peaceably; in fact, this empire gave rise to no other troubles than those whhich they themselves excited in it.

But kingdoms governed like France we cannot hope to possess so peaceably. The frequent insurrections of Spain, of the Gauls and of Greece, against the Romans were entirelyowing to the number of petty princes with which these states abounded. So long as the first race subsisted, the possession of this country by the Romans was wavering and uncertain; but these lords once destroyed, and their power effaced even from the memory, the strength of the Romans and the continuity of their domination rendered them secure possessors of it: these princes might'afterwards be divided and fight with each other, as each of them formed pretensions to such part of these provinces according to the authority which he knew he had in it; but those provinces when once the house of their prince was extinct, no longer acknowledged any other master than the Romans.

In paying attention to all these differences, we shall not be surprised at the facility with which Alexander preserved the kingdoms which he conquered in Asia, and the difficulties which certain other conquerors, such as Pyrrhus, &c. had to preserve their conquests ; which we must not attribute to the good or bad conduct of the conqueror, but to the difference of the government of the conquered countries.