CHAPTER XXI
HOW A PRINCE MUST ACT IN ORDER TO GAIN
REPUTATION
Nothing causes a prince to be so much esteemed as great enterprises and setting a rare example. We have in our own day Ferdinand, King of Aragon, at present King of Spain. He may almost be termed a new prince, because from a weak king he has become for fame and glory the first king in Christendom, and if you regard his actions you will find them all very great and some of them extraordinary. At the beginning of his reign he assailed Granada, and that enterprise was the foundation of his state. At first he did it leisurely and without fear of being interfered with; he kept the minds of the barons of Castile occupied in this enterprise, so that thinking only of that war they did not think of making innovations, and he thus acquired reputation and power over them without their being aware of it. He was able with the money of the Church and the people to maintain his armies, and by that long war lay the foundations of his military power, which afterwards has made him famous. Besides this, to be able to undertake greater enterprises, and always under the pretext of religion, he had recourse to a pious cruelty, driving out the Moors from his kingdom and despoiling them. No more admirable or rare example can be found. He also attacked under the same pretext Africa, undertook his Italian enterprise, and has lately attacked France; so that he has continually contrived great things, which have kept his subjects' minds uncertain and astonished, and occupied in watching their result.
And these actions have arisen one out of the other, so that they have left no time for men to settle down and act against him. It is also very profitable for a prince to give some rare examples of himself in the internal administration, like those related of Messer Bernabò of Milan, when it happens that some one does something extraordinary, either good or evil, in civil life, and to take a means of rewarding or punishing him which will be much talked about. And above all a prince must endeavour in every action to obtain fame for being great and excellent. A prince is further esteemed when he is a true friend or a true enemy, when, that is, he declares himself without reserve in favour of some one against another.
This policy is always more useful than remaining neutral. For if two neighbouring powers come to blows, they are either such that if one wins, you will have to fear the victor, or else not. In either of these two cases it will be better for you to declare yourself openly and make war, because in the first case if you do not declare yourself, you will fall a prey to the victor, to the pleasure and satisfaction of the one who has been defeated, and you will have no reason nor anything to defend you and nobody to receive you. For, whoever wins will not desire friends whom he suspects and who do not help him when in trouble, and whoever loses will not receive you as you did not take up arms to assist his cause. Antiochus went to Greece, being sent by the Ætoli to expel the Romans. He sent orators to the Achaei who were friends of the Romans to encourage them to remain neutral, on the other hand the Romans persuaded them to take up arms on their side. The matter was brought before the council of the Achæi for deliberation, where the ambassador of Antiochus sought to persuade them to remain neutral, to which the Roman ambassador replied: "As to what is said that it is best and most useful for your state not to meddle in our war, nothing is further from the truth; for if you do not meddle in it you will become, without any favour or any reputation, the prize of the victor." And it will always happen that the one who is not your friend will want you to remain neutral, and the one who is your friend will require you to declare yourself by taking arms. Irresolute princes, to avoid present dangers, usually follow the way of neutrality and are mostly ruined by it. But when the prince declares himself frankly in favour of one side, if the one to whom you adhere conquers, even if he is powerful and you remain at his discretion, he is under an obligation to you and friendship has been established, and men are never so dishonest as to oppress you with such ingratitude. Moreover, victories are never so prosperous that the victor does not need to have some scruples, especially as to justice. But if he to whom you adhere loses, you are sheltered by him, and so long as he can, he will assist you; you become the companion of a fortune which may rise again. In the second case, when those who fight are such that you have nothing to fear from the victor, it is still more prudent on your part to adhere to one; for you go to the ruin of one with the help of him who ought to save him if he were wise, and if he conquers he rests at your discretion, and it is impossible that he should not conquer with your help. And here it should be noted that a prince ought never to make common cause with one more powerful than himself to injure another, unless necessity forces him to it, as before said; for if he wins you rest at his discretion, and princes must avoid as much as possible being at the discretion of others. The Venetians united with France against the Duke of Milan, although they could have avoided that union, and from it resulted their own ruin. But when one cannot avoid it, as happened to the Florentines when the pope and Spain went with their armies to attack Lombardy, then the prince ought to join for the above reasons. Let no state believe that it can follow a secure policy, rather let it think that all are doubtful. This is found in the nature of things, that one never tries to avoid one difficulty without running into another, but prudence consists in being able to know the nature of the difficulties, and talking the least harmful as good. A prince must also show himself a lover of merit, and honour those who excel in every art. Moreover he must encourage his citizens to follow their callings quietly, whether in commerce, or agriculture, or any other trade that men follow, so that this one shall not refrain from improving his possessions through fear that they may be taken from him, and that one from starting a trade for fear of taxes; but he should offer rewards to whoever does these things, and to whoever seeks in any way to improve his city or state. Besides this, he ought, at convenient seasons of the year, to keep the people occupied with festivals and spectacles; and as every city is divided either into trades or into classes, he ought to pay attention to all these things, mingle with them from time to time, and give them an example of his humanity and magnificence, always holding firm, however, the majesty of his dignity, which must never be allowed to fail in anything whatever.