The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 4/Introduction
INTRODUCTION
The events of August marked the lowest depth of the Revolution. Reaction had scored heavily, and, behind the screen of the dictatorship of the "Socialist" Kerensky, the Cadets, and other still more sinister forces of the imperialistic bourgeoisie, were preparing for the coup d'etat that would annihilate the Soviets—and the Revolution. The moderate Executive Committee of the All-Russian Soviets had approved of Premier Kerensky; but this was insufficient, as it was necessary for Kerensky's purposes to secure a mandate from "all the classes;" and, accordingly, the Government convoked a National Conference which convened at Moscow on August 26. The Conference was not only to "broaden the base" of the Provisional Government, it was equally an expression of Kerensky's Bonapartist policy.[1] The composition of the Conference was overwhelmingly conservative, reactionary and counter-revolutionary.
The delegates to the National Conference were carefully chosen, the Bolsheviki, naturally, being excluded. The four Dumas—and their character is clear, being expressions of the timid opposition legally allowed under the Czar—were represented by 188 members; the other delegates included 100 representatives of the Peasants, 229 representatives of the Soviets of Worker's and Soldiers' Delegates, 147 delegates from the Municipalities, 113 representativese from the banks and industrial organizations of capital, 313 representatives of co-operative organizations, and 176 representatives of trades unions.[2] The delegates of the Soviets consisted of moderates from the Menshevist and Social-Revolutionary parties.
At the Conference a concerted attack was made upon the Soviets and the Revolutionary Democracy, although it was not driven to a conclusion. It was a preliminary offensive. The representatives of the Soviets were on the defensive. Kerensky, in opening the Conference; declared:
"The Provisional Government has not called you together here to discuss questions of program, or, still less, to allow any attempts, from whatever sources they may come, to take advantage of the present Conference or the exceptionally difficult position of the Russian State, or to encourage any attempts to undermine at undermining the power of the Provisional Government."
But the plea of Kerensky—for in spite of its assuming the form of an ultimatum, it was nothing but a plea—was unavailing. His speech was a mass of generalities, attacks upon the Right and Left alternating with concessions to the Right and Left; and his statement, "We are determined that Russia shall be ranked among the World Powers" evoked boisterous applause.
Minister of Finance Nekrasov made an attack upon the Revolution's evil influence upon the finances, declaring that the money being expended by the Food Supply Committees and for wage increases was ruining the state and country, and should be stopped. General Kornilov, Commander in Chief of the armies, emphasized the disintegration of the army, and urged drastic measures to restore discipline, among these measures being the practical abolition of the soldiers' committees. He attacked the measures of the Provisional Government introducing democracy into the army, and concluded with a covert threat of allowing an invasion of the country in order to compel the introduction of the necessary measures:
"If decisive measures for the improvement of discipline at the front followed as a result of the devastation of Tarnopol and the loss of Galicia and Bukovina, we must not allow that order in the rear should be a result of the loss of Riga, and that order on the railroads be restored at the price of surrendering Moldavia and Bessarabia to the enemy."
General Kaledine, of the Cossacks, was even bolder than Kornilov, making direct attacks upon the Socialist ministers, and suggested the following measures:
"1.—The army must be kept out of politics. All meetings and assemblies with their party antagonisms must be absolutely forbidden at the front.
"2.—All councils and committees in the army must be abolished at the front as well as behind the lines, except those of the regiments, companies, divisions and other military units, and their rights and duties must be strictly limited to the management of the soldiers' economic affairs.
"3.—The Declaration of Soldiers' Rights must be revised and amplified by a declaration of his duties.
"4.—Discipline in the army must be restored and strengthened by the most decisive measures.
"5.—To insure the fighting capacity of the army, the front and the rear must be recognized as one whole, and all measures required for strengthening discipline at the front must also be applied to the rear.
"6.—The disciplinary rights of superior officers must be restored to them. (Applause from the Right.)
"7.—The army leaders must have their full authority restored.
"8.—At this terrible hour of great reverses at the front and complete disintegration springing from political and economic disruption, the country can be saved from final ruin only by placing full power in the hands of firm, experienced and skilled people not bound by narrow party or group programs, (Loud applause on the Right) not hampered by the necessity of turning back after every step in order to find out whether the various committees and councils approve or disapprove of their acts, (Restlessness on the Left. Applause on the Right.) and who fully recognize that the people as a whole and not separate parties or groups are the sources of sovereign power in the State.
"9.—The Central, as well as local, (government must be undivided. A stop must be put immediately and abruptly to the usurpation of power by the central and local committees and Councils." (Vigorous protest on the Left. Shouts: "Down with him!" "Counter-Revolutionist!" Enthusiastic applause from the Right.)
Cheidse, president of the Central Committee of the All-Russian Soviets, answered Kaledine and defended the Soviets, declaring that the revolutionary democracy "has always placed the interests of the country and the Revolution above the interests of separate classes and groups. … Only due to the revolutionary organizations has the creative spirit of the Revolution been preserved; that is saving the country from disolution and anarchy." But Cheidse's answer was not an answer to the problem, since the status quo was itself responsible for the prevailing situation: the status quo had to be destroyed either by the bourgeoisie or by the revolutionary proletariat. The measures proposed by General Kaledine were unavoidable if the army was to be restored, but the introduction of these measures, under the prevailing conditions, would have necessarily meant the abolition of the Soviets as the active force of the Revolution, the conversion of the army into a counter-revolutionary instrument, and a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The attacks upon the Provisional Government emphasized that the end of the Soviets equally meant the end of the "liberal" government of the imperialistic bourgeoisie: the Provisional Government itself assailed by the Right. The lament of the former Minister of War Guchkov that the Provisional Government without power revealed the situation clearly: the Soviets had the power and the Provisional Government could have power only with the destruction of the Soviets.
It was this abolition of the Soviets that was being engineered. The Cadets challenged the Soviets to assume full responsibility for the government, or else cease their "advisory" function. But the Mensheviki and Social-Revolutionists cravenly evaded the challenge: neither a dictatorship of the proletariat nor a dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Milyukov and Nabokov refused to participate in the Minitsry, feeling that the annihilation of the Soviets was first necessary.
The Moscow Conference was called as a pledge of national unity and to promote naftional unity: it simply revealed the acute disunity and intensified the antagonisms. Nothing of a practical character was accomptisheed by the Conference, and Kerensky's final address indicated the depth of the failure: "The Government does not regret having called this Conference, for although it has not secured practical results, it has given an opportunity to all Russian citizens to say openly what they have on their minds. And that is essential for the state."
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Sources: All the chapters of Part Four are from Trotzky's pamphlet, What Next? published in Petrograd in September, 1917. The following is Trotzky's preface to the pamphlet, which he calls "Instead of a Preface:"
"Since the July 1st offensive on the external front there begins a retreat of the Revolution on the internal front. This retreat, led by the official democracy, assumed, after the events of July 16–17, the character of a panic. At this moment it presents a somewhat more orderly appearance, without, however, ceasing its flight. The war is devouring the Revolution before our eyes. And as the generals control the war, they attempt to take all actual power into their own hands.
"At what point is this to stop? The making of a prognosis requires that we ask ourselves what is the nature of the forces that are engaged in a struggle on the political stage, or are—surrendering without a struggle. That is the object of this study.
"The first two chapters were written before the Moscow Conference. We have not altered them in any way. In our attempt to prognosticate the function and consequences of the Moscow solemnity, we proceeded, not from the statements of leaders and the declarations of newspapers (never, it seems, have leaders and newspapers lied as they lie now,) but from class interests and political activities: the latter method, which has the recommendation of Marx, is infinitely more reliable.
"Even after the Provisional Government had disarmed revolutionary Petrograd, and set up the Cossack 'Landes' over the red banners, it did not dare enrage the workers by the sight of a Conference which was stigmatized as of Government, not to say 'anti-popular.' The 'live wires' were invited to pious and peaceful Moscow. But the Moscow proletariat received the uninvited guests with a strike of protest and contempt. And, thus vindicated, the proletariat of Petrograd breathed freely on that day.
"With the permission of the Moscow Worker-Comrades, I am dedicating this brochure to them."
- ↑ In an article in "Pravda," at the time, Zinoviev pointed out that the Cadets were at first suspicious of the Moscow Conference, considering it a part of Kerensky's Bonapartist policy, the policy of a dictatorship merging both forces in himself. And this was precisely the purpose of the Conference, although the Cadets finally participated.
- ↑ These are the figures given in A. J. Sack's "The Birth of Russian Democracy," from which source also are quoted extracts from the speeches delivered at the Conference (with the exception of the final quotation from Kerensky.)