The Proletarian Revolution in Russia/Part 7/Chapter 1
I
THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION
Thanks to the peace secured—in spite of all its oppressiveness and insecurity—the Russian Soviet Republic is now able, for a certain time, to concentrate its efforts on the most important and most difficult phase of the Socialist revolution, on the problem of organization.
This problem is presented clearly and precisely to all toiling and oppressed masses in the fourth section of the resolution adopted on March 16, 1918, at the Moscow All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in the section which speaks of the self-discipline of the toilers and of the merciless struggle against chaos and disorganization.
The uncertainty of the peace secured by the Russian Soviet Republic is not determined, of course, by the fact that the Republic is now considering the renewal of military activity. With the exception of the bourgeois counter-revolutionists and their aids (the Mensheviki, etc.), no sensible statesman thinks of that. The insecurity of the peace is determined by the fact that in the imperialistic nations on the West and on the East of Russia, and possessing enormous military power, the upper hand may at any moment be gained by the military party, which is tempted by the temporary weakness of Russia and incited by the Socialism-hating capitalists.
Under such conditions our real, and not paper, guarantees or peace lie exclusively in the antagonisms between the imperialistic powers, which have reached the highest point,—manifested, on the one hand, in the renewal of the imperialistic slaughter of the peoples on the West; and, on the other, in the extremely keen imperialistic rivalry between Japan and America for supremacy on the Pacific and its coasts.
It is obvious that, in view of the weakness of such guarantees, our Socialist Soviet Republic is in an extremely precarious, undoubtedly critical international position. We must strain all our strength in order to utilize the respite granted us by this situation to cure the most severe wounds inflicted on the social organism of Russia by the war, and economically rehabilitate the country, without which there can be no serious improvement in our ability to offer resistance.
It is also obvious that we can give serious aid to the Socialist revolution in the West, which has been delayed on account of a number of causes, only in so far as we are successful in solving the problems of organization that confront us.
A fundamental condition for the successful solution of our most urgent problems of organization is the complete comprehension by the political leaders of the people, that is, by the members of the Russian Communist Party (the Bolsheviki), and then by all conscious representatives of the toiling masses, of the basic difference between the earlier bourgeois revolutions and our Socialist revolution, with respect to the problem under consideration.
In the bourgeois revolutions the main task of the toiling masses consisted in performing the negative, destructive work—the destruction of feudalism and monarchy. The positive, constructive work of organizing a new society was performed by the propertied bourgeois minority of the population. And they accomplished this task, in spite of the resistance of the workers and the poorest peasants, with comparative ease, not only because the resistance of the exploited masses was then, on account of their unorganized state and their ignorance, extremely weak, but also because the fundamental organizing force of the anarchic structure of capitalist society is provided by the natural, extensive and intensive development of the national and international market.
In every Socialist revolution, however, the main task of the proletariat, and of the poorest peasantry accepting its leadership,—and hence also in the Socialist revolution in Russia inaugurated by us on November 7, 1917—consists in the positive and constructive work of establishing an extremely complex and delicate net work of newly organized relationships covering the systematic production and distribution of products which are necessary for the existence of tens of millions of people. The successful realization of such a revolution depends on the original, historical and creative work of the majority of the population, and first of all, of the majority of the toilers. The victory of the Socialist revolution will not be assured, unless the proletariat and the poorest peasantry will manifest sufficient consciousness, idealism, self-sacrifice, and persistence. With the creation of a new—the Soviet—type of state, offering to the oppressed toiling masses the opportunity to participate actively in the free construction of a new society, we have solved only a small part of the difficult task. The main difficulty is in the economic domain—to raise the productivity of labor, to establish strict and universal accounting and control of production and distribution, and actually to socialise production.
The evolution of the Bolshevik party, which is today the government party of Russia, shows with great clearness the nature of the historical crisis characterizing the present political situation and demands a new orientation by the Soviet authority, that is, new methods applied to new problems.
The first problem of any rising party consists in convincing the majority of the population that its program and policies are correct. This was the most important problem during Czarism and during the period of compromise of the Chernovs and Tseretellis with Kerensky and Kishkin. At present this problem, which is, of course, far from solution or immediate solution, is, in the main, solved, since the majority of the workers and peasants of Russia, as was shown beyond doubt by the last Congress of the Soviets in Moscow, are definitely with the Bolsheviki.
The second problem of our party was the conquest of political power and the suppression of the resistance of the exploiters. This problem as well is not yet completely solved, and we cannot ignore that fact, for the Monarchists and Cadets, on the one hand, and the Mensheviki and right Social Revolutionists—who echo and follow them—on the other, continue their attempts to unite for the overthrow of the Soviet power. But, in the main, the problem of the resistance of the exploiters was already solved in the period between November 7, 1917, and (approximately) February, 1918—the time of the surrender of the Cossack Bogajevsky.
We are now confronted by the third problem, which is the most urgent and which characterizes the present period: to organize the management of Russia. Of course, we had to deal with this problem and have been at it ever since November 7, 1917. But heretofore, as long as the resistance of the exploiters manifested itself in open civil warfare, the problem of management could not became the pincipal, the central problem.
At present it has become the central problem. We, the Bolshevik party, have convinced Russia. We have won Russia from the rich for the poor, from the exploiters for the toilers. And now it is up to us to manage Russia. The special difficulty of the present period consists in comprehending the peculiarities of the transition from the principal problem of convincing the people and suppressing the exploiters by force to the now principal problem of management.
For the first time in the history of the world the Socialist party has succeeded in completing, essentially, the task of securing power and suppressing the exploiters, and in coming close to the problem of management. We must prove worthy of this, the most difficult (and most promising) problem of the Socialist revolution. We must not fail to see that, besides the ability to convince and to win in civil war, successful management depends on the ability for practical organization. This is the most difficult problem,—it means the organization, on a new basis, of the deepest foundations—the economic—of the life of tens and tens of millions. And it is the most promising problem, for only after its essential solution shall we be able to say that Russia has become not only a Soviet, but a Socialist republic.
This objective situation, which was created by the extremely oppressive and insecure peace, by the terrible disorganization, unemployment and starvation, which we have inherited from the war, and from the rule of the bourgeoisie (represented by Kerensky and his supporters, the Mensheviki and right Social-Revolutionists),—all this has inevitably produced an extreme weariness and even an exhaustion of the toiling masses. It is but natural that they insistently demand some rest. The restoration of the productive forces destroyed by the war and by the mismanagement of the bourgeoisie; the curing of wounds inflicted by the war, defeats in the war, speculation, and the attempts of the bourgeoisie to establish the overthrown power of the exploiters; the economic rehabilitation of the country; the maintenance of elementary order;—these are the urgent problems to which we must turn. It may seem paradoxical, but the fact is that in view of objective conditions, there can be no doubt that at the present moment the Soviet power cannot make secure the transformation of Russia toward Socialism, unless it can solve in a practical way these most elementary problems of social life—in spite of the resistance of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviki and the right Social-Revolutionists. In view of the concrete peculiarities of the present situation and in view of the existence of the Soviet power with its laws on socialization of the land, on workers' control of industry, etc., the practical solution of these elementary problems would mean that we will have overcome the organization difficulties of the first steps toward Socialism.
Keep accurate and conscientious accounts, conduct business economically, do not loaf, do not steal, maintain strict discipline at work,—these slogans, which were justly ridiculed by revolutionary proletarians when they were used by the bourgeoisie to assure their domination as a class of exploiters, have now, after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie, become urgent and fundamental slogans. And the practical realization of these slogans by the toiling masses, is, on the one hand, the sole condition for the salvation of the country, which has been shattered by the imperialistic war and by the imperialists (headed by Kerensky); and, on the other, the practical realization of these slogans by the Soviet power, with its own methods, and on the basis of its own laws, is necessary and sufficient for the final victory of Socialism. This, however, is not comprehended by those who contemptuously refuse to urge such "common" and "trivial" ideas. In our agricultural country, which only a year ago overthrew Czarism and less than half a year ago freed itself from the Kerenskys, there remained, naturally, a good deal of unconscious anarchism, which is increased by the bestiality and barbarity accompanying every prolonged and reactionary war, and a good deal of despair and aimless anger has accumulated. If we should add to this the treasonable policy of the servants of the bourgeoisie, the Mensheviki, right Social-Revolutionists, etc., it will become clear what energetic and persistent efforts must be exerted by the best and most conscious workers and peasants to effect a complete change in the mood of the masses and to turn them to regular, uninterrupted and dsciplined labor. Only such a change, accomplished by the masses of proletarians and semi-proletarians can complete the victory over the bourgeoisie, and, especially, over the more persistent and numerous peasant bourgeoisie.