The Quickstep

Court Documents

United States Supreme Court

76 U.S. 665

The Quickstep

APPEAL from the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New York in a matter of collision; the case, as assumed by this court upon the evidence, was this:

One Byrne, the captain and owner on the canal-boat Citizen, laden with wheat, contracted with the captain of the tug Quickstep to tow the canal-boat from New York to New Brunswick. Byrne did not know how many boats the captain

of the tug would take. The tow, however, when completed, consisted of six boats,-two abreast, on each side of the tug, and one directly in the rear of each of the two boats, as shown in the upper part of the drawing. The Citizen was on the port side, and nearest the tug, and the Wide World was in the same position on the starboard side. The stern of the boats, abreast of the tug, were about even with the stern of the tug, but their bows extended further than the bow of the tug, and the bows of the Citizen and Wide World were coupled by what is called a 'bridle line;' the line having been furnished by the towing tug.

This fleet proceeded on their voyage with safety until they approached a point in the harbor of New York, known as Robbins' Reef lighthouse, when the boat in the rear of the boats on the port side of the tug became detached. The weather, which was fair when the boat set off from New York, was now somewhat rough, with a certain amount of wind. The tug stopped as soon as the boat broke loose, and then proceeded to back. In backing the bridle-line parted, and the tug got into the trough of the sea, and collided with the Citizen, knocking two holes in her starboard side near the stern, and producing so considerable an injury that she ultimately sunk; her crew, however, not perhaps having exerted themselves as perseveringly as they might have done, to save her. The matter is exhibited in the lower part of the diagram.

In the course of the difficulty two other of the boats got loose. One of them cast anchor and was saved at the spot. The other, loaded with iron, drifted about all night and was picked up uninjured on the next morning.

The owner of the Citizen libelled the Quickstep in the District Court of New York.

The libel alleged 'a contract' with the steam-tug to tow the canal-boat to New Brunswick for a stipulated price, deviation to another dock before setting off, unreasonable delay in the performance of the contract. It alleged further, that the canal-boat was staunch, &c., and under the complete control of the steam-tug; that when near the light-house on Robbins' Reef, the boat which had been hitched to 'the boat of the libellant by some means became detached, that there-upon the steam-tug attempted to pick her up, and to that end commenced to back in so negligent and careless a manner as to endanger the safety of the boat of your libellant; that the libellant protested and warned the master or those in charge of said steam-tug that by so doing they would sink his boat, but the said parties paid no heed to his protest or warning, but continued to back said steam-tug, and handled and managed the same in such a careless and unseamanlike manner that the same said steam-tug struck against the canalboat with great force and violence, breaking in her starboard side, and causing her to fill with water and sink; that the libellant did all in his power to prevent the said loss; that the same was without fault on his part, and occurred entirely through the carelessness and mismanagement of the master and mariners on board of the steam-tug.' In conclusion, the libel prayed damages.

The answer substantially denied these allegations and set up the plea of inevitable accident. The evidence upon the trial was quite conflicting, but the case, as above given, was the case which this court considered as established by it.

The District Court, giving no opinion and finding no facts whatever, held that the libellant and claimant were both in fault, and divided the damages. On appeal, the Circuit Court gave an opinion of a few words, in which, however, no facts were found-and affirmed the decree. The owners of the steam-tug appealed.

Mr. Donohue, for the appellant:

The circumstance that the decrees in both courts below were against us, will perhaps be relied on as a reason why the decree here should be against us also. But the object of an admiralty appeal is to bring up the facts in the cause, and to have a rehearing on them; and while the court may, from time to time, speak of not reviewing the facts, it is submitted that both on principle they are bound to do it, and in precedents have done it. [1] Only where the evidence is balanced will they refused to reverse.

But here the case comes to this court free from all question of a prior disposition of any fact. It is open for judgment upon the evidence; for we know not on what grounds either court below adjudged the case, whether on fact or on law.

The libel is too general in its terms. Alleging negligence and misconduct generally, it wholly omits to state what particular acts of the tug produced the catastrophe. We cannot reply to such allegations. Moreover, it sets up a contract made to tow direct, and a deviation; that we took too many boats; that in backing to pick up another boat we injured this boat and sunk her. But the case shows that proof as to the contract to go direct failed. No such contract is in the least established.

The accident is readily accounted for by a vis major. It occurred in a storm. The line parted, without our fault, and the only mode left for us was to back. On our side, although not called on to do anything but to wait until the opposite side have made out a case, we yet fully proved an entire want of negligence. Having started with fair weather, and with reason to suppose we could tow through, we met with a severe storm, which broke this line, and the vessel being deeply loaded, and not protected, sunk.

But whatever view is to be taken of the case, the decree must be reversed. A decree which finds no fact or facts, but a simple legal conclusion, cannot be examined.

Mr. Carter, contra.

Mr. Justice DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court.


^1  Schooner Catharine, ad. Dickinson, 17 Howard, 170; Sturgis v. The R. L. Mabey, 21 Id. 451.

This work is in the public domain in the United States because it is a work of the United States federal government (see 17 U.S.C. 105).