The Right to Life of the Unborn Child/The Right to Life of the Unborn Child

THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE UNBORN CHILD. II. REPLY TO PROF. H. TREUB, M.D.

BY THE REV. R. VAN OPPENRAAY, D.D V S.J.

I beg leave to propose an amendment to the new statute drafted by Prof. H. Treub, prefixed to his paper here preceding. He proposes that: Whoever forbids or in any way hinders another to call in, or to accept, medical aid for his ailments, shall, in case death result to the other from the illness, be punished with imprison- ment, etc.

I would suggest to insert " such medical aid that will neither conflict with the laws of morality nor with the precepts of a recog- nized creed."

Even in this form such law would surely provoke considerable parliamentary debate, but then the most dangerous point would be obviated by my amendment. For this way the Catholics would not be put to the test as to which they respect more, their religious con- victions or the views of the legislators of their country, and as to whom they would acknowledge as the supreme judge of morals, the State or the Church.

No one suspects Prof. Treub, the implacable foe of criminal abor- tion, of unscrupulousness in medical treatment, or of encouraging or even tolerating of immoral abuses, consequently he will cheerfully ac- cept the first part of my amendment. Nor will any one ascribe to the

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REPLY TO PROF. H. TREUB, M.D.

humane and tolerant professor any " Kulturkampf " tendencies ; still he proclaims himself an opponent to the second part. " That makes the whole law useless," he will probably say, " as it aims precisely at such a religious precept." And should we hint at liberty of con- science, he will indignantly interrupt us : " Liberty indeed, in all that which is reasonable, moral or even doubtful; but, no liberty for Moloch-worship and human sacrifices." There are things which are wrong beyond doubt, which neither can nor should be made doubtful by Church decisions. The tragic occurrence which led Prof. Treub to propose this law evidently belongs, in his opinion, to that latter class. The fact is (to him) so clear as to relieve him of the necessity to submit proofs for his charges, and as to move him to use ex- pressions of which he himself qualified the mildest as strong.

Is the matter, then, really so evident? Let us consider. The most renowned professional men teaching moral theology is a profession, forsooth have ever found this matter an extremely dif- ficult one. The Church, having attentively followed the disputes of these most learned professional men, after centuries of prudent hesi- tation at length coming to the decision that a certain medical treat- ment is illicit, it must be evident that submission to this particular treatment can not be imposed on anybody as a strict duty. Or may our theologians be supposed to be so stupid and barbarous as to prescribe- downright abominations ? And had the wise Pope Leo XIII. the reputation of being narrow or thoughtless, so as to approve of narrow-minded decisions, at different periods of his reign ?

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THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE UNBORN CHILD.

The difficult question, as to whether the intra-uterine fetus may be killed to save the mother's life, when otherwise both mother and child are in danger of perishing, hinges upon the following funda- mental principles of Catholic, and, I hope also, of Christian, morals :

I. Thou shalt not kill.

II. Uterine life must be respected as much as the extra-uterine.

III. The end never justifies the means: Non sunt facicnda mala ut eveniant bona, i. e., one can not do evil that good may come.

To shake these principles is exceedingly dangerous, not only for the social well-being, but also for morality in a strict sense. And is it not clear that they are shaken by any arbitrary action which clashes with these principles?

To explain, defend, and apply these principles in the case, it would require more space than I may ask. Moreover, it behooves one to leave that task to a certain professional man, who will soon treat this subject at length in another paper.* I simply desire to show by analogy as a preliminary to, and in anticipation of, his thorough analysis that the case is by no means so self-evident as it appears, and that Prof. Treub has allowed his good heart to lead him astray.

Let us suppose the following case, which we shall call Case A in distinction from Case X:

Case A: Right after the birth of a child a jealous and barbarous

• Dr. Th. M. Vlaming's paper. See page 22.

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husband would say to the mother : " Kill this fruit of your unfaith- fulness, or I shall kill you both." Should this woman now argue : " Better one dead than two," and should she strike her own child, what judge would have the courage, I will not say to excuse her, but to acquit and even praise her ? . And, reversing the case, who would not applaud the mother who would answer her brute husband : " I shall rather die with my child than live at the expense of my child's life"?

Well, now, what difference in principle is there between Case A and Case X? That the threat in Case A comes from a debased man, and in Case X from nature, rather favors my position ; for the means which I may not use to free myself from the consequences of an unjust attack, may certainly not be used to prevent the natural con- sequences of a natural condition.

Nor does any difference arise from the fact that in Case A the mother would herself kill her offspring, for, though in Case X the mother's hands are not actually imbrued in blood, the deed is hers all the same, as the physician is but her tool.

There remains, then, no difference between both cases, except that in Case A the child is outside, and in Case X inside, the mother's womb. And what does this difference amount to? Is the killing of the child, which in both cases must die at any rate, a lawful deed to save the mother one day before its birth, and a horrible crime the next day after? And whether one day before its birth, or four or five txionths before, what difference would it make ?

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THE RIGHT TO LIFE OF THE UNBORN CHILD.

But let us not content ourselves with these questions, however clearly they are self-evident.

If the child may be killed in Case X and not in Case A, this, methinks, can be only for three reasons :

1. That the life in the womb, i. e., an infant's life, comes less under the law than out of it.

2. That in this case there is question of an immature fetus.

3. That this fetus must in any event die before birth.

No one will care to countenance the first reasons. For, apart from the fact that one can not logically detect a difference in rights between the living child in the womb and the same child just born, such ideas would open a wide door to immoral conclusions. For instance, the means that may be employed to save the mother's life, may be resorted also to for other reasons equally grave, e. g., to save one's honor, etc.

Nor can the third reason stand. If the unborn offspring may be sacrificed, because it can not arrive at birth, why might one not also sacrifice the child just born, which is but one step further in its de- velopment and has no chance of surviving (Case A)? Both must die at all events, die without any consciousness of life, without any conscious enjoyment of life, without having performed any con- scious act.

Some one has contended that 2d and 3d must be taken together ; and that an immature fetus, which can not reach maturity, may be

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destroyed for grave and sufficient reasons. The argument has been advanced that a fetus under such circumstances is but an organized tumor. I answer : If of two reasons, independent of each other, the first proves nothing, and the second proves nothing, then they prove nothing taken together. And as regards this argument, I say: Either the fetus is always a mere organized tumor, or it is always more than that (also in Case X). Extrinsic circumstances, such as, in this case, the sickness of the mother, can not alter the intrinsic essence of a thing. Or was the immature fetus a child before the mother's illness, and turned suddenly into an " organized tumor " when the disease reached a certain degree of severity, and will it again become a child when the danger disappears ?

The conclusion from all this is obvious : Either the horrible child- murder is equally lawful in Case A, or the killing is equally unjusti- fiable in Case X, and becomes a medical Moloch-worship.

I do not at all flatter myself that my readers will by these few remarks be convinced of the necessity of the Catholic view ; but, I trust, many will agree that this view is neither foolish nor criminal. And if the severe and inflexible decision of the Holy Office does compel the tardy respect for uterine life, then the children spared will far exceed in number the few heroic mothers who, for the sake of a great moral principle, die because they refuse a treatment, with- out which sometimes both mother and child are preserved, and by the application of which the mother is by no means always saved at the cost of -her child's life.