The Six Books of Proclus, the Platonic Successor, on the Theology of Plato/Book V

by Proclus

BOOK V.

CHAPTER I.

In the next place, let us survey another order of Gods, which is called intellectual, being indeed conjoined to the orders prior to it, but terminating the total progressions of the Gods, converting them to their principle, and producing one circle of the primarily-efficient and all-perfect orders. Let us also extend the intellect that is in us to the imparticipable and divine intellect, and distinguish the orders and diminutions of essence that are in it, according to the narration of Plato.

This intellectual hypostasis therefore of the Gods, is suspended indeed from more ancient causes, and is filled from them with total goodness and self-sufficiency. But after these causes, it establishes an illustrious empire over all secondary natures, binding to its dominion all the partial progressions of the Gods. And it is denominated indeed intellectual, because it generates an impartible and divine intellect. But it is filled from intelligibles, not as from those intelligibles which are co-arranged with intellect, nor as with those which are alone divided from intellect by the conception of the mind, but as establishing in itself unically all multitudes, and occultly containing the evolutions of the Gods into light, and the hyparxes of intelligibles. It is likewise allotted the total intellect of intellectuals, the variety of beings, and the multiform orders of divine natures; and it convolves the end of the whole progression [of the Gods] to the one intelligible principle. For intellectuals are converted to intelligibles. And some intellectuals indeed are united and firmly established prior to the divided Gods; but others are multiplied and through conversion are conjoined to primarily-efficient causes. The intellectual Gods however proceed from all the Gods prior to them, receiving indeed unions from the one that is prior to intelligibles; but essences from intelligibles; and being allotted lives all-perfect, connective and generative of divine natures, from the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods; but the intellectual peculiarity from themselves. They likewise convert to themselves all the divided orders, but establish themselves in intelligibles, existing wholly through the whole, pure and unknown knowledges, and fervid lives. Besides these things also, they are all-perfect essences, producing all secondary natures through subsisting from themselves, and being neither diminished by their progression, nor receiving an addition by their progeny; but through their own never-failing and infinite powers, being the fathers, causes, and leaders of all things. Nor are they co-divided with their progeny, nor do they depart from themselves in their progressions; but at once, and according to union they govern total multitudes, and all orders, and convolve them to the intelligible, and to occult good.

Whether therefore I may speak of life, it is not proper to think that it is such a life as we surveyed a little before. For that was imparticipable, but this is participated. And that indeed, was generative, but this is vivific. But it is not immanifest that these differ from each other. For the vivific cause indeed, is also evidently generative; but the generative cause is not entirely vivific. For it imparts figure to things unfigured, bound to things indefinite, and perfection to things imperfect Or whether I may denominate the cause in intellectuals intelligible, it must not immediately be conceived to be such an intelligible, as that of which we have before spoken. For that was imparticipable, and prior to intellectuals, itself pre-existing by itself, and exempt from wholes; not being denominated intelligible, as the plenitude of intellect, but as the prior-cause of it, and the object of desire and love to it, subsisting uniformly uncoordinated with it The intelligible however which is now the subject of consideration, is participated, and co-arranged with intellect, is multiform, and contains in itself the divided causes of all things. Or whether we may call the Gods in this order fathers and fabricators, it must be admitted that this paternal and fabricative characteristic, is different from the hyparxis of the intelligible^[1] fathers. For they indeed were generative of whole essences; but these pre-exist as the causes of divisible emanations, and of definite productions of form. And they indeed contained in themselves powers fabricative of the divine progressions; but these separate from themselves prolific causes, and are not conjoined to them according to union, but according to a communion subordinate to union. For the marriages which are celebrated by fables, and the concordant conjunction of divine natures, are in the intellectual Gods. But the demiurgic being mingled with the vivific effluxions, every genus of the Gods is unfolded into light, both the supermundane, and the mundane. This, however, will be hereafter discussed.

CHAPTER II.

Since however, we have, in short, surveyed the peculiarity of the intellectual Gods, it remains that we should deliver an appropriate theory concerning the division of them. For the intellectual order is not one and indivisible, but is allotted progressions more various than those of the more elevated genera. There will therefore be here also three fathers, who divide the whole intellectual essence; one indeed, being arranged according to the intelligible, but another according to life, and another according to intellect. They also imitate the intelligible fathers, who divide the intelligible breadth in a threefold manner, and who are allotted a difference of this kind with respect to each other. For one of these intellectual fathers proceeds analogous to the first [intelligible] father, and is intelligible. But another proceeds analogous to the second [intelligible] father, and binds to himself the whole of intellectual life. And another proceeds analogous to the third father, and closes the whole intellectual, in the same manner as he closes the intelligible order.

But these fathers being three, and the first indeed, abiding in himself, but the second proceeding and vivifying all things, and the third glittering with fabricative productions, it is evidently necessary, that other triple Gods should be conjoined with them; of which, one indeed will be the source to the first intellectual God, of stable purity; but another, of undefiled progression, to the second God; and another of exempt, fabrication, to the third. For in the Gods prior to these, the undefined deities were according to cause, through union without separation, and a sameness collective of powers which are not in want of the communion of these. But in the intellectual Gods, where there is an all-perfect separation, as in total orders, and a greater habitude to secondary natures, unpolluted deity or power is necessary, which has the ratio of sameness, and undeviating subsistence, to the paternal cause, and which is co-divided with the fathers, so that each of the undefiled Gods is conjoined with a peculiar father.

These two triads therefore have presented themselves to our view, one indeed, of the intellectual fathers, but the other of the undefiled Gods. There is however, besides these two, a third other triadic monad, which is the cause of separation to intellectuals, and which subsists together with the above mentioned triads. For the fathers indeed are the suppliers of all essence; but the inflexible Gods, of sameness. But it is evidently fit that there should be also the came of separation, and that this should be one and at the same time triple, separating the intellectual Gods from the above mentioned orders, from themselves, and from inferior natures. For why are they the leaders of another order, if they are not divided from the first orders? Why are they multiplied, and why do they differ from each other in their kingdoms, unless they are separated? Why also do they transcend the partial [Gods] unless they are also separated from these? The cause of separation therefore, will be for us one and a triple monad. But the paternal and undefiled causes will be each of them a uniform triad. And what is most paradoxical of all, the separative cause is more monadic; but the paternal and also the undefiled cause, are each of them more triadic. For the separative monad indeed, is the cause of separation to the other monads; but the others are the sources of communion and union to it. Hence each of these, being separated, becomes triadic; but the separative monad is monadic, in consequence of being united by these. For all intellectuals pervade through each other, and are in each other, according to a certain admirable communion, imitating the union of intelligibles, through being present and mingled with each other. The sphere also which is there, is the intellectual order, energizing in and about itself, and proceeding into itself hebdomatically, being a monad and a hebdomad, the image, if it be lawful so to speak, of the all-perfect intelligible monad, and unfolding its occult union, through progression and separation. This first progression therefore of the intellectual Gods, which is separated by us into a heptad, we have perfectly celebrated.

Other secondary seven hebdomads, however, are to be considered under this, which produce as far as to the last of things, the monads of this heptad. For each monad is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad conjoined with it, and extends this hebdomad from on high, from the summit of Olympus, as far as to the last, and terrestrial orders. I say, for instance, the first paternal monad, indeed, constitutes seven such monads. But the second again constitutes seven vivific monads. And the third, seven demiurgic monads. Each likewise of the undefiled monads constitutes a number equal to that produced by the fathers. And the monad of separation constitutes seven [separative monads]. For all these causes proceed in conjunction with each other. And as the first triad of the fathers subsists together with the undefiled triad, and the divisive monad, after the same manner also, the second triads are allotted seven coordinate undefiled triads, and separative monads. Whence, therefore, does so great a number of intellectual Gods present itself to our view? It is evident, indeed, from what has been said. For the first hebdomad, indeed, the cause of the second hebdomads, and which has the relation of a monad to them, and which a little before we denominated an intellectual sphere, subsists according to the intelligible breadth, imitating the paternal nature of it through the paternal triad but the eternity of its power, through undefiled sameness; and the multitude shining forth in its extremities, through the monad which is divisive of wholes. The remaining hebdomads, however, which are derived from this, proceed according to the intelligible and intellectual genera. For each monad, conformably to the summits of those genera, constitutes a monad co-arranged with the multitude proceeding from it; since every summit is uniform [i. e. has the form of the one,] as we have before demonstrated. But according to the middle and third progressions of those genera, each monad generates two triads. For the separation of them was apparent in the middle and ultimate progressions, as we have before observed. As, therefore, the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual genera, produced the intelligible breadth, which is of a unical nature, into a triadic multitude, after the same manner also the intellectual monads call forth the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual triads, into intellectual hebdomads. and they constitute indeed the monads which are coarranged with the hebdomads, according to the summits of the triads; but the two triads, according to the second and third decrements of those triads. Hence every hebdomad has the first monad indeed intelligible; but the second after this, and which is triadic, intelligible and intellectual; and the third triad, which is the next in order, intellectual. All these likewise subsist as in intellectuals. For they are characterized according to the peculiarity of the constitutive monad.

In short, the intellectual powers proceed according to the intelligible orders; but they constitute these seven hebdomads according to the first intellectual orders. For it is indeed necessary that exempt causes should be assimilated to the intelligible Gods; but that co-arranged causes, and which proceed every where, should be assimilated to the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods; since these also are the first that divide the worlds triadically, and pervade as far as to the last of things, connectedly containing and perfecting all things. But the intelligible Gods contain the causes of wholes uniformly, and occultly. You may also say, that the intelligible Gods produce all things uniformly; for numbers subsist in them monadically. But the intelligible and intellectual Gods produce all things triadically. For the monads in these are divided according to number. And what the monad was in the former, that number is in the latter. And the intellectual Gods produce all things hebdomadically. For they evolve the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual triads, into intellectual hebdomads, and expand their contracted powers into intellectual variety; since they define multitude itself and variety by numbers which are nearest to the monad, for the numbers of the partial are different from the numbers of the total orders in the Gods. And the whole of. this intellectual number is indeed more expanded than the natures prior to it, and is divided into more various progressions, yet it does not desert its alliance with the monad. For hebdomadic multitude has an abundant affinity with the nature of the monad j since it is measured according to it, and primarily subsists from it. And the Pythagoreans, when they denominate the heptad light according to intellect, evidently admit its hyparxis to be intellectual, and on this account suspended from the monad. For the unical, which light manifests, is inherent from this in all the divine numbers. And thus much concerning the division of these intellectual Gods.

CHAPTER III.

It follows in the next place, that we should adapt the theory of Plato to this order, and show that he does not dissent from any of the theological dogmas concerning it. Since, therefore, we have demonstrated, that the celestial order, which we find in the Cratylus perfectly celebrated, possesses the middle bond of the intellectual, and at the same time, intelligible Gods, but that under this another order of Gods is immediately arranged, as Socrates shows in the Phædrus, called the subcelestial arch, and which we have considered as not divided from the heaven,—this being the case, what order is it which divides itself from the kingdom of the heaven, but is the leader of the intellectual order of the Gods, and is primarily the supplier of intellect, according to the doctrine of Plato, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, except that which the mighty Saturn comprehends? For he calls this God the first and most pure intellect. This God, therefore, is the summit of a divine intellect, and, as he says, the purest part of it; separating himself indeed from the celestial order, but reigning over all the intellectual Gods; because be is full of intellect, but of a pure intellect, and is a God extended to the summit of the intellectual hypostasis. Hence also, he is the father of the mighty Jupiter, and is simply father. For he who is the father of the father of all things, is evidently allotted in a much greater degree the paternal dignity. Saturn, therefore, is the first intellect; but the mighty Jupiter is also an intellect, containing, as Socrates says in the Philebus, a royal soul and a royal intellect.

And these Gods are two intellects, and intellectual fathers; the one, indeed, being intellectual; but the other intelligible, in intellectuals. For the Saturnian bonds which Socrates mentions in the Cratylus, are unific of the intelligence of Jupiter about the intelligible of his father, and fill the Jovian intellect with the all-perfect intelligence of the Saturnian intellect. And this I think is likewise evident from the analogy of souls to Pluto. For as he binds souls about himself, filling them with wisdom and intelligence, thus also Saturn being the object of desire and love to Jupiter, contains him in himself by indissoluble bonds. And these things Socrates indicates in the Cratylus, jesting, and at the same time being serious in what he says. The object of desire therefore, and the intelligible to Jupiter, is Saturn. But the mighty Jupiter himself is a divine and demiurgic intellect. Hence, it is necessary that there should be a third other intellectual cause, generative of life. For Jupiter indeed is the cause of life, as Socrates says, but intellectually and secondarily. But we say that life is every where arranged prior to intellect. Hence, we must say that the queen Rhea, being the mother of Jupiter, but subordinate to the father Saturn, gives completion to this middle, existing as a vivific world, and establishing in herself the causes of the whole of life. These three paternal orders, therefore, have appeared to us in intellectuals: one of them indeed subsisting according to the intelligible power of intellectuals; but another according to divine and intellectual life; and another according to intellectual intellect. For we celebrate the middle deity, herself by herself, as the mother of the demiurgus, and of wholes. When, however, we survey her together with the extremes, we denominate her a paternal cause, as being comprehended in the fathers; and as generating some things together with Saturn, but others in conjunction with Jupiter.

Moreover, Plato following Orpheus, calls the inflexible and undefiled triad of the intellectual Gods Curetic, as is evident from what the Athenian guest says in the Laws, celebrating the armed sports of the Curetes, and their rhythmical dance. For Orpheus represents the Curetes who are three, as the guards of Jupiter. And the sacred laws of the Cretans, and all the Grecian theology, refer a pure and undefiled life and energy to this order. For το κορον to koron, indicates nothing else than the pure and incorruptible. Hence, we have before said, that the mighty Saturn, as being essentially united to the cause of undefiled purity, is a pure intellect. The paternal Gods therefore are three, and the undefiled Gods also are three. Hence it remains that we should survey the seventh monad.

If, therefore, we consider the fabulous exections, both the Saturnian and the Celestial, of which Plato makes mention, and thinks that such like narrations should always be concealed in silence, that the arcane truth of them should be surveyed, and that they are indicative of mystic conceptions, because these things are not fit for young men to hear,—[if we consider these] we may obtain from them what the separative deity is, who accomplishes the divisions, and segregates the Saturnian genera indeed from the Celestial, and the Jovian from the Saturnian, and who separates the whole intellectual order from the natures prior and posterior to it, disjoins the different causes in it from each other, and always imparts to secondary natures, secondary measures of dominion. And let not any one be disturbed, or oppose me on hearing these things. How therefore does Plato reject exections, bonds, and the tragical apparatus of fables? For he thinks that all such particulars will be condemned by the multitude and the stupid, through ignorance of the arcana they contain; but that they will exhibit to the wise certain admirable opinions. Hence, he indeed does not admit such a mode of fiction, but thinks it proper to be persuaded by the ancients who were the offspring of the Gods, and to investigate their arcane conceptions. As therefore he rejects the Saturnian fables, when they are narrated to Euthyprhon, and the auditors of the Republic, yet at the same time admits them in the Cratylus, placing about the mighty Saturn and Pluto, other secondary bonds,—thus also, I think he forbids exections to be introduced to those who know only the apparent meaning of what is said, and does not admit that there is illegal conduct in the Gods, and nefarious aggressions of children against their parents, but he opposes, and confutes as much as possible such like opinions. He assents however to their being narrated to those who are able to penetrate into the mystic truth, and investigate the concealed meaning of fables, and admits the separation of wholes, whether [mythologists] are willing to denominate them exections for the purpose of concealment, or in whatever other way they may think fit to call them. For bonds and exections are symbols of communion and separation, and each is the progeny of the same divine mythology. Nor is there any occasion to wonder, if from these things we endeavour to confirm the opinion of Plato; but it is requisite to know how the philosophy of Plato admits all such particulars, and how it rejects them, and in what manner he apprehends they may be the causes of the greatest evils, and of an impious life to those that hear them. The seven intellectual Gods therefore, will through these conceptions appear to have been thought worthy of being mentioned by Plato.

CHAPTER IV.

It is, however, I think, necessary syllogistically to collect the progression of them according to hebdomads, from images. The demiurgus therefore, [in the Timæus] fabricates the soul of the universe an image or all the divine orders, in the same manner as he fabricates this sensible world an image of intelligibles. And in the first place indeed, he constitutes the whole essence of the soul, and afterwards divides it into numbers, binds it by harmonies, and adorns it with figures, I mean the rectilinear and the circular. After this also, he divides it into one circle and seven circles. Whence therefore, are this monad and hebdomad derived, except from the intellectual Gods? For figure, number, and true being, are prior to them. And as in the fabrication of the soul, after the subsistence of the psychical figure, the division of the circles according to the monad and hebdomad follows, thus also in the Gods, after intellectual and intelligible figure, the intellectual breadth, and that sphere of the Gods succeed. The multitude therefore of the seven hebdomads subsist from the divine intellectual hebdomad entering into itself. And on this account, the demiurgus thus divides the circles in the soul, because he, and every intellectual order, produce an intellectual hebdomad from each monad. I do not however assert, and now contend, that the seven circles are allotted an hyparxis similar to the seven Gods that proceed from the demiurgus, but that the demiurgus dividing the soul according to circles, introduces number to the sections from the intellectual Gods, I mean the monadic and the hebdomadic number. For the monad indeed subsists according to the circle of sameness, but the division, according to the circle of difference. Shorly after however, it will appear that same and different belong to the demiurgic order.

Farther still, after the division of the circles, the demiurgus assumes some things which are symbols of the assimilative, and others which are symbols of the liberated Gods, and through these, he refers the soul to these orders of the Gods. If therefore figure is prior to the intellectual Gods, but the similar and dissimilar are posterior to them, it is evidently necessary that the monadic and at the same time hebdomadic, should be referred to this order, and that the progression from the monad to the hebdomad should pertain to this order. Each therefore of the seven intellectual Gods, is the leader of an intellectual hebdomad, as we may learn from images. There however indeed, the hebdomad is one, and allied to itself. But in souls, the circles differ from each other, according to the divine peculiarities. For they receive number in such a manner as to preserve the proper nature which they are allotted, connectedly containing mundane natures, and convolving the apparent by their own circles. And thus much concerning these particulars, which afford arguments that are not obscure of the arrangement of them by Plato.

CHAPTER V.

Again however, making another beginning, let us speak about each [of the intellectual Gods,] as much as is sufficient to the present theology. Let Saturn therefore, the first king of the intellectual Gods, be now celebrated by us, who according to Socrates in the Cratylus illuminates the pure and incorruptible nature of intellect, and establishing his own all-perfect power in his own summit of intellectuals, abides in, and at the same time proceeds from his father [Heaven]. He likewise divides the intellectual government from the connective, and establishes the transcendency of the other intellectual Gods in connexion with his own; but comprehends in himself the intelligible of the demiurgic intellect, and the plenitude of beings. Hence the Saturnian bonds, mystically, and obscurely signify the comprehension of this intelligible, and a union with it. For the intelligible is comprehended in intellect.

As therefore, the intelligible is indeed exempt from intellect, but intellect is said to comprehend it, thus also Jupiter is said to bind bis father. And in placing bonds about his father, he at the same time binds himself [to him]. For a bond is the comprehension of the things that are bound. But the truth is as follows: Saturn is indeed an all-perfect intellect; and the mighty Jupiter is likewise an intellect. Each therefore being an intellect, each is also evidently an intelligible. For every intellect is converted to itself; but being converted to it energizes towards itself; Energizing however towards itself, and not towards externals, it is intelligible and at the same time intellectual; being indeed intellectual, so far as it intellectually perceives, but intelligible, so far as it is intellectually perceived. Hence also the Jovian intellect is to itself intellect, and to itself intelligible. And in a similar manner the Saturnian intellect is to itself intelligible, and to itself intellect. But Jupiter indeed is more intellect, and Saturn is more intelligible. For the latter is established according to the intellectual summit, but the former according to the intellectual end. And the one indeed is the object of desire, but the other desires. And the one fills, but the other is filled.

Saturn therefore being intellect and intelligible, Jupiter also is in the second place intellect and intelligible. The intellectual however of Saturn is intelligible; but the intelligible of Jupiter is intellectual. Jupiter therefore, being at the same time intellectual and intelligible, intellectually perceives and comprehends himself, and binds the intelligible in himself. But binding this in himself, he is said to bind the intelligible prior to himself, and to comprehend it on all sides. For entering into himself, he proceeds into the intelligible prior to himself, and by the intelligible which is in himself, intellectually perceives that which is prior to himself. And thus the intelligible is not external to intellect. For every intellect possesses that which is in itself without any difference with respect to itself. But again, it intellectually perceives in itself that which is prior to itself. For every thing which is external to intellect, is foreign and adventitious, and pertains to an inferior nature. But that which is pre-established in the order of cause, and which pre-exists as the object of desire, is in the desiring natures themselves. For being converted to, and verging to themselves, they discover the causes of themselves, and all more ancient natures. And by how much more perfect and uniform the conversion of the desiring natures is about the objects of desire, by so much the more are they present with their own desirables. Hence every intellect, by intellectually perceiving itself, intellectually perceives likewise, all the natures prior to itself. And by how much the more it is united to itself, in a so much greater degree it is established in the intelligibles prior to itself. For the cause of any being, and which is the source of essence or of perfection to it, is not external to that being; but that which is subordinate to any being, is external to it, and is not the intelligible. On this account also, each of the divine natures is unconverted to that which is inferior to itself, but is converted to itself, and through itself reverts to that which is more excellent. And the intelligible indeed is not inferior to any intellect; but every intellect energizing towards itself, and comprehending the intelligibles prior to itself, intellectually perceives them.

Some intelligibles likewise are such as are conjoined with intellect. But others are such as are proximately participated by it. And others are such as it sees more remotely, and which are more exempt from its nature. On this account, the demiurgic intellect is indeed at the same time intelligible and intellect, but has the intelligible of his father, which he binds as the fable says. He sees however animal itself, which is, according to Timæus, the most beautiful of all intelligibles, And if the illustrious Amelius, forming such conceptions as these, said that intellect is threefold, one being that which is, another that which has, and another that which sees, he rightly apprehends the conception of Plato, according to my opinion. For it is necessary that the second intellect should not only have the intelligible, but that it should be and have the intelligible; that it should be indeed the intelligible coordinate with itself, but have the intelligible prior to itself, so far as it participates of it. And it is necessary that the third intellect should see the intelligible, and should also be and have it; that it should see indeed the first intelligible; but have that which is proximately beyond itself; and that it should be the intelligible which is in itself, and which is conjoined with its own intelligence, and should be inseparable from it.

If therefore, as we said from the beginning, Jupiter intellectually perceives his father Saturn, Saturn is indeed intelligible, but Jupiter is intellect; being one intelligible himself, but participating of another. Hence also Plato does not simply call Saturn intellect, but a pure and incorruptible intellect. For he in the intellectual is intelligible. Since however, he is not simply intelligible, but as in intellectuals, he is intellect, and is himself paternally so, being both father and intellect, and having the paternal intellectually. In intelligibles therefore, intellect is also father; but in intellectuals father is intellect. Hence Saturn is a pure, immaterial and perfect intellect, established above fabrication in the order of the desirable. But possessing such a peculiarity as this, he is full of all intelligibles intellectually, is as it were exuberant with intellections, and establishes twofold genera of Gods, some indeed in himself, but others posterior to himself. And he leads forth, indeed, the prolific powers of his father Heaven as far as to the last of things; but fills the demiurgic order with generative goods.

CHAPTER VI.

Saturn however is the only one of the Gods who is said both to receive and give the royal dignity with a certain necessity, and as it were violence, cutting off the genitals of his father, and being himself castrated by the mighty Jupiter. For he bounds the kingdom of his father, and is bounded by the God posterior to himself He is also filled from the natures placed above him, but fills the whole fabrication [of the universe] with prolific perfection. But separating himself from his father, he is exempt from his progeny. Being however one all-perfect intellect, he contains in himself the multitude of total intelligibles. And as he deifies the intellectual summit, he illuminates all things with intelligible light.

CHAPTER VII.

Very properly therefore, has this universe twofold lives, periods, and convolutions; the one being Saturnian, but the other Jovian, as the fable in the Politicus says. And according to one of the periods indeed, it produces all goods spontaneously, and possesses an innoxious and unwearied life. But according to the other it participates of material error, and a very mutable nature. For the life in the world being twofold, the one unapparent, and more intellectual, but the other more physical and apparent, and the one being defined according to providence, but the other proceeding in a disorderly manner according to fate;—this being the case, the second life indeed, which is multiform, and perfected through nature, is suspended from the Jovian order; but the more simple, intellectual, and unapparent life, is suspended from the Saturnian order. And these things the Elean guest clearly teaches, calling one of the circulations Jovian, but the other, Saturnian; though Jupiter also is the cause of the unapparent life of the universe, is the supplier of intellect, and the leader of intellectual perfection; but he elevates all things to the kingdom of Saturn, and being a leader in conjunction with his father, constitutes the whole mundane intellect. And if it be requisite to speak the truth clearly, each of the periods indeed, I mean the apparent, and the unapparent, participates of both these Gods; but the one indeed is more Saturnian, and the other is perfected under the kingdom of Jupiter.

That the mighty Saturn therefore is allotted a kingdom different from that of the Gods prior to him, the Elean guest clearly manifests in what he asserts prior to the fable. For he says, “We have heard from many respecting the kingdom of which Saturn was the founder.” According to this wise man therefore, Saturn is one of the royal Gods. Hence also he presides over a kingdom different from that of his father. And while his father connectedly contains the middle centres of the intelligible and intellectual Gods, he is the leader of the intellectual orders and supplies all intellectual life, first indeed, to the Gods, but secondarily to the natures more excellent than ours, and in the last place to partial souls, when they are able to be extended to the Saturnian place of survey. For this universe, and all the mundane Gods, always possess this twofold life, and imitate the Saturnian intelligence indeed through unapparent and intellectual energy, but the demiurgic intellect of Jupiter, through a providential attention to secondary natures, and in short, through the visible fabrication. But partial souls at one time energize intellectually, and consecrate themselves to Saturn, but at another time after a Jovian manner, and pay a providential attention to secondary natures, without restraint. When however they revolve analogous to those deities [Saturn and Jupiter] they intellectually perceive intelligibles, and dispose sensibles in an orderly manner, and live both these lives, in the same manner as the Gods and the more excellent genera. For their periods are twofold; one being intellectual, but the other providential. Their paradigms also are twofold; the Saturnian intellect being the paradigm of the one, but the Jovian intellect of the other. For the mighty Jupiter himself has a twofold energy, containing indeed intelligibles in intellect, but adorning sensibles by demiurgic production.

Since however the circulations are twofold, not only in wholes, but also in partial souls, the Elean guest says that in the Saturnian period, the generation of these souls is not from each other, as in men which are the objects of sensible inspection, nor as the first man with us is alone earth-begotten, so in partial souls one first soul is the offspring of man, but all of them are earth-begotten. For they are elevated from ultimate end terrestrial bodies, and embrace an unapparent, relinquishing a sensible life. He also says that neither do they verge to old age, and change from being younger to becoming older; but on the contrary, they are rendered more vigorous, proceed intellectually in a way contrary to generation, and as it were, divest themselves of the variety of life with which in descending they became invested. Hence likewise all the symbols which are adapted to youth are present with these souls, when they pass into this condition, such as a privation of hair, and a smoothness of the cheek instead of hoariness and beards. For they lay aside every thing which adheres to them from generation. But being situated there with Saturn, and living the life which is there, he says that there are abundance of fruits from trees, and many other [vegetable] substances, which the earth spontaneously produces. Being likewise naked, and without coverlets, they are for the most part fed in the open air; for they have a temperament of the seasons which is always the same. But they make use of soft beds, grass in abundance being produced for them from the earth. Souls therefore derive these and such like goods from this mighty God, in the Saturnian period. For they are thence filled indeed with vivific goods, and gather intellectual fruits from wholes; but do not procure for themselves perfection and blessedness, from partial energies. For doxastic nutriment indeed has divisible and material, conceptions; but intellectual nutriment has pure, impartible, and native conceptions, which the spontaneous obscurely signifies.

The production from the earth also signifies the prolific intellect of the Gods, which imparts to souls by illumination perfection and self-sufficiency. For on account of the exuberant abundance of good, they are able to impart an influx of it, according to the measure of felicity adapted to them. Hence, they are neither covered with garments, as when they proceeded into generation, nor have they superabundant additions of life, but they are purified themselves by themselves from all composition and variety, and extending their intellect to total good, they participate of it from the intellectual father, being guarded by the intellectual Gods, and receiving from them the measures of a happy life. They likewise pass through the whole of their existence with facility, lead a sleepless and pure life, being established in the generative powers of intelligibles; and being filled with intellectual goods, and nourished with immaterial and divine forms, they are said to live a life under Saturn.

CHAPTER VIII.

Because, therefore, this God is the leader of all intellectual life, and every intellect as well that which is imparticipable, as that which is participable proceeds from this cause, hence it belongs to this mighty God to feed in a distributed manner, and to nourish souls. For because indeed he is intelligible in intellectuals, he nourishes souls, and souls are called the nurselings of Saturn. But because he does not fill them with first, and unical intelligibles, but with those that are multiplied by his own cause of separation, he is said to feed them distributedly, and as it were in a divided manner. And do you not see how through these things, this God appears to be coordinate to the first triad of the intelligible and intellectual Gods? For as Socrates,in the Phædrus, says, that souls are nourished in the supercelestial place, and in the intelligible meadow, so the Elean guest asserts that the souls that are fed under Saturn, are filled with intelligible goods. And it is not at all wonderful if souls are perfected by both these; intellectually indeed, under the kingdom of Saturn; but intelligibly under the order of the first intellectual Gods. For this God himself is nourished by that order. And on this account he is allotted a leading and primary transcendency in intellectuals, because they are filled from that order [through him] with occult and unapparent powers. And he is that among the intellectual fathers, which the order of the first intellectual Gods is in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual orders. Hence the intelligible every where becomes nutriment to ascending souls, but the connexion with it is effected through the second and third Gods.

As therefore, the demiurgic order elevates souls to the Saturnian place of survey, thus also the Saturnian order elevates them to the subcelestial arch. For having made many and blessed discursive energies in the kingdom of Saturn, they are again extended from hence to the perfective, and from thence to the celestial triad, from which contemplating the supercelestial place, they are now ineffably conjoined with the supreme goods of intelligibles. And after this manner the second orders always connect souls with the orders prior to them. Hence also, the theurgic art imitating the unapparent periods of souls, arranges initiations in the mysteries of the second Gods, prior to the more sublime mysteries. And through these, it causes us to pass to the intelligible place of survey. These things, therefore, Plato indicates concerning the Saturnian life, and the polity of souls under Saturn, not in the Politicus only, but also in the discourses of the Athenian guest. For in the fourth book of the Laws he celebrates the life under Saturn, obscurely signifying the undefiled nature, the facility, plenitude, and self-sufficiency of that energy, through fabulous fictions.

CHAPTER IX.

If, however, it be requisite from these things, and from all the mystic discipline concerning this God, to consider and discuss the orders which he constitutes in wholes, in the first place, we must direct our attention to the three kings mentioned in the Gorgias, who distributing the kingdom of Saturn were produced by him, as being allotted in a divided manner a uniform and impartible dominion, and over whom he places the divine law, which is the cause of distribution according to intellect, both to the Gods themselves, and to all the natures posterior to the Gods. In the second place we must consider the rulers and kings mentioned in the Laws, who are said to preside over the different allotments of souls, and who are not men, but dæmons of a more divine and excellent genus, who distribute to souls the measures of good, cut off their generation-producing lives, restrain their disorderly lation, retain them in the intelligible, and comprehend them in the kingdom of Saturn. In the third place, therefore, we must direct our attention to the dæmon Gods, who preside over the parts of the world, and the herds [of souls] that are in it, as the Elean guest says in the Politicus, and who at one time come into contact with the objects of their government, and distribute to them intellectual, and all unapparent goods, but at another time withdraw themselves from the physical life of the world, recur to their own place of survey, and imitate the exempt transcendency of the demiurgus and father of the universe.

But after these things, we must survey the twofold circulations of the mundane Gods, viz. the Saturnian and the Jovian; for these Gods always have each of these, as the fable says in the Politicus. For it is evident that the mutation of the stars and the sun takes place in each of the revolutions. This period, therefore, being twofold, it is obvious to every one that the periods are full of Saturnian goods, and participate of the Saturnian series. And not only the mundane Gods, but likewise all the, more excellent genera that follow the Gods, energize according to both these energies, and revolve according to the twofold circulations, through which souls also sometimes participate of an intellectual life, and proceed in this path, exchanging for sense intellect as the leader of their motion and circulation. Saturn, therefore, extends his kingdom supernally from the first Gods, as far as to partial souls, perfects all things, and fills them with intellectual goods, distributing to different natures different measures of good. For on account of this, law also subsists with him, as Socrates says in the Gorgias: “This law therefore was in the time of Saturn, and always was, and now is, among the Gods.” For law is the distribution of intellect; but this God is the first, most pure, and incorruptible intellect.

If, however, this God is the primary leader of all division, and is the origin of intellectual separation, it is necessary on this account, that law should be with him, which distinguishes the orders of beings, divides the intellectual genera, and separates all forms according to a well-ordered progression; but imparts to all things by illumination the measure of hyparxis, connecting the order which is in them, preserving the boundaries of divine distribution immutable, and possessing the same dignity in the kingdom of Saturn, and in intellectuals, as Adrastia in the supercelestial place, and in the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual orders. For from each of them an immutable guard, and the progression of order to all things are generated. But they differ from, each other, because law indeed divides the one into multitude, defines the measures of intellectual subsistence, and distributes to every thing an appropriate good, producing the different measures of beings from the one [Saturnian] intellect. But Adrastia abiding in the intelligible, guards all things uniformly, and preserves total order in a firm undeviating manner, exempt from all division. Law, therefore, is a certain God which divides divine forms, and definitely imparts to every thing that which is adapted to it according to the plenitude proceeding from one uniform cause; and it is also co-existent with the Saturnian order, in which the separations of beings, and the all-perfect progression of forms first subsist. Hence the demiurgus likewise looking to this conducts all things according to law, and constitutes mundane providence an image of the union of the father; but fate and the fatal laws, an image of the division according to law. Souls, therefore, live according to law; in the Jovian period indeed being governed conformably to the laws of Fate; but in the Saturnian period living according to divine law they are subservient to the multitude [of divine forms] and are extended to the one cause of all; and ascending to the intelligible place of survey, they are subjected to the sacred law of Adrastia. For this law extends from on high as far as to the last of things, and defines to souls the measures of whole periods, as Socrates says in the Phædrus. Who therefore this greatest God is, and what the goods are of which he is the cause to souls, and prior to these, to Gods and dæmons, the leaders of souls, let it, from these things be manifest.

CHAPTER X.

Since however, theologists assert that an exemption from old age pertains to this order, as the Barbarians say, and Orpheus the theologist of the Greeks, (for he mystically says that the hairs of the face of Saturn are always black, and never become hoary) I admire the divinely-inspired intellect of Plato which unfolds the same things concerning this God those who proceed in his steps. For he says that souls in the Saturnian period abandon old age, but return to youth, and remove from themselves hoariness, but have black hair. For he says that the white hairs of the more elderly become black; but the cheeks of those that have beards being rendered smooth, they are restored to the past season [of youth.] These things indeed are asserted by the Elean guest; similar to which are the assertions of Orpheus concerning this God.

─────────── under Saturnian Jove
Men liv’d immortal; moist and fragrant hair
From the pure chin then sprouted, nor was mix’d
With the white flower that marks infirm old age;
But in its stead, a florid down appeared.

In these verses he delivers the similitude of Saturnian souls to this God. For he says that they remove from the view the old age which they had acquired from generation and abandon material imbecility; and that they exert the juvenile and vigorous life of intellect; For it is no otherwise lawful for them to be assimilated to the God who is exempt from old age, than through intellectual puberty, and undefiled power; But the cause of this is, that king Saturn himself is the source of the unallured Gods, and the inflexible triad. Hence he is, as Socrates says, a pure intellect. For he is at the same time the intellect of the undefiled order, ranking as a summit, and riding as in a vehicle in the flourishing and vigorous Gods that govern wholes. The souls also which are sent to him, wonderfully advance, in conjunction with intellectual energy, in vigour, and in a power undeviating, and free from any tendency to matter. Partial souls therefore, when they change their periods, at one time proceed to a more juvenile, and at another, to a more aged condition. But whole souls always live according to both these periods, and are conversant with Saturn according to the unapparent period, but govern the universe in conjunction with Jupiter, according to visible providence, at once receiving an increase according to both these periods, and becoming at one and the same time both older and younger. And this is what Parmenides indicates when he says, that the one proceeding according to time becomes at once younger and older. These things however, will hereafter be more manifest.

CHAPTER XI.

Having therefore brought to an end the information concerning the king of the intellectual Gods, it evidently follows that we should in the next place celebrate the queen Rhea. For both Plato and Orpheus assert that she is the mother of the demiurgus of wholes, but a divinity posterior to Saturn. Thus therefore, we must speak concerning her. The stable and united cause of all intellectuals, and the principal and original monad, abiding in herself, unfolding into light all intellectual multitude, and again convolving it into herself, and embosoming her progeny, and the causes of wholes that emerge from her, analysing as it were after division the natures that are divided, and being paternally allotted the highest kingdom in intellectuals,—this being the case, the vivific Rhea proceeds as the second from her proper principle, being allotted a maternal order in the whole paternal orders, and producing the demiurgus, of wholes, prior to other Gods, and the immutable guard of the Gods, For this Goddess is the middle centre of the paternal intellectual triad, and the receiving bosom of the generative power which is in Saturn, calling forth indeed, to the generation of wholes, the causes which abide in him, but unfolding definitely all the genera of the Gods. And being filled indeed from the father prior to her with intelligible and prolific power, but filling the demiurgus and father subsisting from her, with vivific abundance. Whence also the demiurgus is the cause of life to all things, as containing in himself the plenitude of intellectual life, and extending to all things the prolific cause of his mother. For as the middle Goddess multiplies the uniform powers of Saturn, and produces and causes them to preside over secondary natures, so the third father, at, one and the same time unfolds, divides, and produces as far as to the last of things, the all-perfect abundance of the Saturnian monad, and the dyadic generation of the mother Rhea, so as not to leave the most material and disorderly part of the universe destitute of the power of Saturn.

This Goddess therefore, being the middle of the two fathers, one of which collects, but the other divides intellectual multitude, and the one through transcendency desiring to abide and to be established in himself, but the other hastening to produce, generate and fabricate all things, she educes indeed into herself, the demiurgic causes of wholes, but imparts her own proper power to secondary natures, in unenvying abundance. Hence also Plato assimilates her prolific exuberance to streams, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, evinces that this Goddess is a certain flux, and in what he asserts of her obscurely shows nothing else than her fontal nature, and a power unically comprehensive of the divisible rivers of life. For the first-effective flux is fontal; which also Socrates indicating in this Goddess, shortly after clearly says that the name of Tethys is the name of a fountain. Why therefore, is it any longer necessary to doubt about these things, and to say where does Plato make mention of fontal Gods? For he himself denominates the causes of the subsistence of all the Gods fontal fluxions. And besides this, if he admits that the mundane soul is the fountain and principle of life, because it proceeds both from an impartible and partible vivification, how is it possible that he should not in a much greater degree and more truly call the Goddess who comprehends in herself all life, fontal?

Concerning names however, it is not, I think, at all proper to contend, but we should survey the orders themselves of the first effective Gods, and see how Plato following theologists copiously unfolds them to us, celebrating after the Saturnian monad the kingdom of Rhea, constituting from these the demiurgus of wholes, and all the multitude of Gods which is woven together with him. For this Goddess binding together the breadth of intellectuals, and embosoming total life, emits all the intellectual powers in herself of the rivers of life; and by the summit of herself indeed, is conjoined to the first father, and together with him generates wholes, and the genera of Gods that abide in him; but by her extremity is connascent with fabrication, and according to a kindred conjunction with fabrication, constitutes all the orders of Gods that are prior to the world, and that are in the world. Hence there also the causes of the demiurgi of wholes primarily subsist, and the more partial genera of life: and the union and total deity of all these, is at once exempt from the plenitudes of herself, and is at once co-arranged with them.

Thus therefore, she is both uniform and multiform, one and simple, though being self-perfect, she is a vivific world, proceeding from on high as far as to the last of things, and as far as to the extremities of the universe, giving subsistence to the vivific powers of the breadth of life. Hence also Plato refers the vivific Cause of wholes to this Goddess, and through the last gifts of this divinity, indicates her total energy; which primarily indeed fills the whole demiurgus with intellectual and prolific power, but secondarily perfects all the genera of, the Gods with the intellectual fruits of herself. According to a third order also, her total energy nourishes the souls that are the attendants of the Gods, with the rivers of divine perfection. And in the last orders, it imparts to mortal animals the gift of nature. This therefore so, I think, more known than every thing to those who admit that things divine are beyond the works of nature.

That however, which it is more fit the lovers of the contemplation of truth should consider, I say, is this, that Plato divides Ceres from the whole vivific deity, and coarranges her, at one time with Proserpine, at another with Juno, and at another with the progeny of Jupiter, as we may learn in the Cratylus. In which dialogue indeed, he co-arranges Rhea with Saturn, but connects a certain common investigation and theory about Ceres, Jupiter, and Juno. In the Laws likewise celebrating the legislative Goddesses, he refers the whole of a legitimate life to the union of Ceres and Proserpine; since according to Orpheus this middle Goddess being conjoined with Saturn by her summit, is called Rhea; but producing Jupiter, and together with Jupiter unfolding the whole and partial orders of the Gods, she is called Ceres. And all the order of middle life is comprehensive of the other Titanidæ, and likewise of Ceres. For it preestablished this monad as a middle collective of all the orders in it, both those that are occult, and those that are divided about the generative powers of the Goddess. Each of these powers, however, are triple. And this monad indeed conjoins the superior triad to Saturn, but weaves the inferior, together with the demiurgic order. It also evinces that the Cerealian monad being the middle, is coarranged with, and is at the same time exempt from the demiurgus of wholes. For in conjunction with the whole order it constitutes, and together with Jupiter generates Proserpine. And thus we have celebrated the primogenial Goddess who is the middle of the fathers.

CHAPTER XII.

Now however, after this Goddess, the demiurgus of wholes is in the third place to be celebrated, according to the order which he is allotted in the intellectual Gods, peculiarly unfolding for this purpose all the truth concerning him. And in the first place, we must remember that it is necessary the peculiarity of this third father should be demiurgic; and thus in the next place, following Plato, we must direct our attention to other particulars [respecting this God]. The first of the intellectual Gods therefore, who is parturient with multitude, who is the leader and source of all separation, and who separates himself from the uniform and first Gods, but generates the divided principles of wholes,—this God again converts his progeny to himself, and weaves together these parts with his own sameness, and exhibits himself as one intelligible world in intellectuals, bringing forth in himself, and retaining with himself his own offspring. But the second of the intellectual deities, is the vivific Goddess, who brings forth indeed in conjunction with the first intellectual God, occult multitude, (for she is conjoined to him according to supreme transcendency) but cannot endure to remain in this mode of generating, and in Collecting the separation of wholes into unseparated union. Hence she separates the third intellect from the [first] father; but produces the multitude of the Gods, and of intellectual reasons, and fills the demiurgus with generative power. If, therefore, the first intellectual God is parturient with the generation of wholes; but the prolific vivification of the intellectual orders causes this generation to shine forth;—it is evident that the intellect of the intellectual fathers according to his own order, produces and adorns all things, and calls forth indeed, the occult nature of his father, into separation and progression, but prepares total vivification to send forth the rivers of itself, as far as to the last of things. For it is every where the peculiarity of intellect to divide and unfold multitude, the plenitudes of life, and the unions of intelligibles. Intelligible intellect however contains multitude uniformly, or according to the form of one; for multitude preexists in the intelligible according to cause. But the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual intellect, has indeed secondary measures of union, but is exempt from all perfect separation, abiding in the first principles of wholes. And intellectual, intellect is the source of all division, and of the subsistence of partial natures; since it preestablishes in itself all the multitude of forms, and this not tetradically only, as intelligible intellect, but it possess we all-perfect intellectual cause of all forms. It is necessary therefore that the whole demiurgic principles should pertain to this intellect, that all the demiurgic Gods should proceed from this one third father, and that this should be the demiurgus of wholes. For as the first of paradigms co-subsists in intelligible intellect, and in the third triad and the first father, so likewise we must place the first demiurgic monad in intellectual intellect, and the third father of the intellectual Gods. For on this account also the demiurgic is conjoined with the paradigmatic cause, according to the analogy which each is allotted among the fathers; one indeed in intelligibles, but the other in intellectuals. For one is the boundary of the intelligible, but the other of the intellectual order. But this is evident from what has been before said.

Farther still, fabrication being fourfold, and one indeed adorning wholes totally, another adorning wholes but partially, another adorning parts, but totally, and another weaving parts together with wholes, partially,—this being the case, it is evident that the cause of wholes which is the cause of them uniformly and indivisibly, is the most ancient of all the causes. It is necessary however, that this cause should either be prior to, or in, or posterior to the intellectual Gods. Where therefore shall we place it? For all the parts which are constituted by intellectuals are more partial than the one and total fabrication. For the division of wholes into three, and the leaders of divisible production, present themselves to the view in these orders. The natures therefore, that are prior to intellectuals, are defined according to other peculiarities of the Gods, as was before shown, and in short, they subsist according to union and are expanded above the separation of intellectual forms.

CHAPTER XIII.

It remains therefore that the one demiurgus of wholes must be arranged in intellectuals. But if indeed, he is the first father, he will be intelligible, will contain his progeny in himself, and will be the collector of separation. How therefore, does he divide the worlds? How does he generate the multitudes of mundane natures? How does he speak to all the junior demiurgi at once? For the first father is uncoordinated with the whole number of mundane natures, and also converts his first progeny to himself, flying as it were from multitude to union, and. hastily withdrawing himself from all-various separation into intelligible transcendency. But if the one demiurgus of wholes is the vivific order, all things indeed, will be full of life, on account of the whole demiurgus. And the cause of souls, according to a probable reason will here become apparent subsisting prior to multitude. But how will he convert all things to himself? How is he called demiurgus and father? For the vivific deity, herself by herself, has a maternal dignity among the Gods, and is the supplier of progression to all things. But to produce forms, and to convert, are the. illustrious and peculiar good of intellect. Neither therefore, is the demiurgus of wholes in the supermundane order. For all the natures there are partial, and either partially preside over wholes, or comprehend the productions of parts totally. Nor is he in intelligibles. For all the Gods there are fathers; and no one there is called demiurgus and father. But the divine orders antecedently comprehend all things in a manner perfectly occult and unical. Nor is he in the intelligible and at the same time intellectual order. For to collect, connect, and perfect multitudes, is not the province of the demiurgic peculiarity. For this is the source of separation, and the production of forms, glittering with intellectual sections. But the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, extend intellectual multitudes to the union of intelligibles. Nor again, is it possible to admit that the demiurgic cause is in the first or second order of intellectuals. For the summit of intellectuals is imparticipable by mundane natures, and is rather proposed to them in the order of the desirable; but is not productive of them. Hence, all the Gods in the world are elevated to the Saturnian place of survey; but proceed from another secondary principle, and through it are converted and conjoined to the exempt kingdom. And the middle centre being vivific, is not defined according to the paternal characteristic. For the generative very much differs from the paternal, and the vivific from the demiurgic genus; so far, I think, as the principles of the whole orders, I mean bound and infinity, differ from each other. For the demiurgic and paternal order is referred to bound; but all vivific and generative power, to infinity.

CHAPTER XIV.

I wonder therefore, at those interpreters of Plato, who do not make one fabrication but many, who assert that there are three demiurgi of wholes, and pass at one time to the second, and at another to the third demiurgus; and who divide what is said in the Timæus, and think fit to refer some of the assertions to one, but others to another cause. For that there is a demiurgic triad, and another multitude of Gods characterized according to the producing cause, I also admit, and think it will be granted by Plato. It is necessary however in each order prior to the triad, and prior to every multitude, that there should be a preexistent monad. For all the orders of the Gods originate from a monad; because each of the whole orders is assimilated to the whole progression of the Gods. As therefore the subsistence of the Gods has the cause of its generation from the imparticipable one, thus also it is necessary that the perfect orders in the Gods, should have a preexistent monad, and a first-effective principle. According to the same reasoning, all the vivific progressions are suspended from one vivification, and the demiurgic orders are extended to one fabrication. And it is not proper that there should be multitude without the monad. For, there will neither be coarrangement, nor a division of multitude according to intellect, unless the one and whole preexist. For on this account prior to all the divine progressions, the order of wholeness subsists, in order that it may comprehend parts, and may define them in, and about itself.

How therefore neglecting whole in fabrication, can we survey demiurgi divided according to parts? Though Plato himself thinks with respect to the paradigm of the universe, that the world should not be assimilated to any thing which naturally subsists in the form of a part, but to all perfect animal; and on this account he demonstrates that the world is only-begotten, because its paradigm is one. For if it were not one, but many paradigms, again it would be necessary that there should be another animal about it, of which it would be a part, and it would be more right to assert that the world is no longer similar to the many paradigms, but to that which comprehends them. For it is necessary that the one paradigm should precede the many, in the same manner as the one good subsists prior to participated goods, and that the whole world should be the image of one paradigm prior to many. For whether it is alone the image of many paradigms, whence will the world be one and a whole? And how is it possible it should not be more dishonourable than its parts? For these indeed, are assimilated to intelligibles, but the whole world is similar to no one of real beings. Or whether all the world subsists from a certain intelligible paradigm, if indeed there are many paradigms of one world, these also will be similar to each other, if they are the causes of the same image. It is necessary therefore, that sameness should be communicated to these from one form; or again, the world will be more venerable than its paradigms according to union. But if the paradigm is one, after the same manner also the demiurgic cause is one. For as there is one image from one paradigm, thus also the progeny being one, derives its subsistence from one demiurgus and father. For it is necessary that the paradigmatic cause should either be the same with the demiurgus, and should be established in him, or that it should be prior to the demiurgus, as we say it is, or that it should be posterior to the demiurgus, as some think proper to assert.

If however, the paradigm and the demiurgus are the same, the demiurgus will be one according to Plato. For the paradigm is only-begotten, as he demonstrates. But if the demiurgus exists prior to the paradigm, which it is not lawful to assert, but the paradigm is one, much more will the demiurgus be one. For the causes which are more elevated are allotted a more uniform hypostasis; since also the first cause of wholes is one. And if the paradigmatic cause has indeed the first order in beings, but the demiurgic cause the second order, and this universe the last order, being the resemblance of the former, and the progeny of the latter, how is it possible since the extremes are monadic, the middle multitude should be without the monad? For it is necessary that the paradigm being intelligible, should impart by illumination a greater degree of union to the universe than the demiurgic cause* And as the paradigm being only-begotten, comprehends in itself the first paradigms, after the same manner it is necessary that the demiurgic monad should be comprehensive of many demiurgi. For if the world derives its only-begotten subsistence from the paradigm, but through the demiurgus, the demiurgus also is indeed entirely one.

Farther still, I think that those who are the patrons of this opinion should direct their attention to that assertion of Socrates, that it is every where fit the many should be comprehended in the one. For on account of this we admit the hypothesis of forms [or ideas], and prior to other things we preestablish intellectual monads. How therefore are intellectual forms extended to one principle, and how do each of them proceed from one demiurgic cause, but the whole demiurgic form is multiplied, and divided prior to the indivisible monad? For it is necessary that as all equals, whether they are intellectual, or psychical, or sensible, should be suspended from one first equality, all beautiful things, from beauty itself, and the many every where, from primary beings, thus also it is necessary that the multitude of demiurgi should be suspended from one fabrication, and should subsist about one demiurgic monad. For how can it be lawful to leave the one in forms rather than in the Gods? For forms indeed, have their hypostasis mingled with multitude; but the Gods are defined according to union itself. If therefore all the multitudes of forms are the progeny of monads, much more are the orders of the Gods allotted peculiarities which originate from monads, and which through monads are inherent in multitudes. But if this be the case, it is necessary that the whole demiurgus should subsist prior to the multitude of demiurgi, and that the three demiurgi should distribute the one cause of the generation of the universe.

Again therefore we assert from the beginning that it is necessary the demiurgic principle should either be one, or many, or one, and many. But if indeed, it is one alone, and the multitude in the world, and the different order which it contains subsist similarly from one demiurgic principle, how are mortal and immortal natures the progeny of the same cause without a medium? For all the natures that proceed from the one fabrication are immortal. But if the demiurgic principle is many only, whence is the common form of hyparxis communicated to the multitude, if it does not originate from one? For as the final cause is one, viz. the good, as the paradigmatic cause is one, viz. animal itself, and as the world is a generated one, thus also after the same manner, the demiurgic cause is one. But if there are one and many demiurgic principles, whether does the one principle belong to partial or to total genera? If however, it belongs indeed to partial genera, bow is it extended to the first and intelligible paradigm? For the supermundane genera subsist about the intellectual Gods, and according to intellectual paradigms. For being partial, they entirely assimilate the natures posterior to themselves to intellectuals, co-ordinately to themselves. Or how will it any longer preserve the union of total fabrication which produces wholes totally? For a thing of this kind pertains to no partial nature; but it belongs to a partial principle, to produce parts either totally or partially, as we before observed. But if the demiurgic principle belongs to the total orders, it is necessary that it should either be intelligible or intellectual, or intelligible and intellectual. If however, it is of an intelligible nature, how is it divisive of wholes? How is it co-arranged with mundane natures? How is it said to fashion the universe? How from the genera of being does it produce soul, and the natures posterior to soul? For [on this hypothesis] we must admit that all these are in intelligibles, viz. figure, the genera of being, and these divided, the similar and the dissimilar, and other things through which the demiurgic principle constitutes the whole world. But if the demiurgic principle is of an intelligible and at the same time intellectual nature, how does he produce participated intellect? How does he separate the multiform orders of souls? How does he divide the parts, or the circles that are in them? For that which is generative of participated intellect, is imparticipable intellect. And that which has the power of dividing multitude will not [on this hypothesis] differ from that which connects the total genera of the Gods. And in short, the demiurgus of wholes, is called by Timæus intellect, and is frequently said to see, to discover, and to reason, but he is no where denominated by him intelligible and at the same time intellectual. For the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, divide all things triadically. But the demiurgus, at onetime indeed, divides the world into five parts, and at another divides the circles of the soul into hebdomads, that he may generate either the celestial spheres, or the seven parts of the soul. We must say therefore, that he is entirely secondary to the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, and he is the cause of secondary goods to the world. But we must refer to those Gods the cause of united forms and reasons. That the demiurgic intellect however, is an intellectual God, is I think through these things sufficiently apparent at present.

CHAPTER XV.

But Plato appears to me to have indicated the peculiarity of this God in a remarkable manner, by calling him intellect, and asserting that be sees intelligibles, but admitting that they are visible to him according to nature. For that which is truly intellect, and which establishes itself according to this hyparxis, is intellectual intellect. For intelligible intellect also, is indeed simply intelligible, and is of that allotment; but is said to be intellect, as being the cause of every intellectual nature. And the intellect of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods, has not its own nature unmingled with the intelligible. But intellectual intellect alone, is peculiarly intellect, being allotted the intellectual itself in intellectuals; just as the most principal of intelligibles, is primarily, the first, and the highest intelligible, which we denominate the one being, and that which is occultly being. This therefore is that which is simply intelligible. But that which is simply intellect is intellectual intellect. For the intelligible indeed possesses the summit, but intellect the end of wholes. And the intermediate natures partly pertain to the intelligible, and partly to intellect, and the intellectual nature. And the intelligibles indeed, that are primarily so, possess intellect according to cause; but the first of intellectuals have the intelligible according to participation; and the natures that are collective of these, conjoin the intelligible and intellectual peculiarity together. Since, therefore, Timæus also calls the demiurgus intellect indefinitely, and neither denominates him life, nor intelligible, in consequence of his peculiarity being alone intellectual, it is certainly necessary that he should be established at the end of the intellectual Gods.

For there intellect is intellect itself, and is not such an intellect as the Saturnian is. For Saturn also is intellect, but he is a pure and incorruptible intellect, which manifests his supreme empire in intellectuals, transcending the whole intellectual Gods. But the demiurgus is simply intellect. As therefore, the simply intelligible is the first of intelligibles, so that which is simply intellect, is the last of intellectuals. For all things are in each of the orders. For in intelligibles life and intellect preexist; and in the breadth of life, there are similarly life and intellect. And in intellectuals there is each of the rest. But in intelligibles indeed, being is according to essence, but life and intellect are according to cause. In intellectuals, intellect indeed is according to essence, but being and life are according to participation. And in the intermediate natures, intellect is according to cause, but being is according to participation, and life according to essence. As therefore, that which is most vital in life is the middle, and as that which is especially intelligible is the summit in being, so in intellectuals, the extremity is that which is most intellectual. Hence if there is a certain intellect which is simply intellect, and a perceiving intellect, this is intellectual intellect, which Plato denominating the demiurgus unfolds to us the most manifest order, which it is allotted in intellectuals. On this account also, prior to all other things, the demiurgus constitutes participated intellect, as Timæus says. For placing intellect in soul, and soul in body, he fashioned the universe. Energizing therefore, according to his own essence, and producing by his very being, he constituted the intellect of the universe prior to all other things. For every participated proceeds from imparticipable intellect. Hence, as if Plato had said, that the generative cause which gives subsistence to participated intelligible, is that which is primarily being, so since the demiurgus first produces intellect from himself, he will be imparticipable and intellectual intellect. From these things therefore, it is evident what the hyparxis of the demiurgus and father is, and what order it is allotted in intellectuals according to Timæus.

CHAPTER XVI.

Let us however after another manner syllogistically collect the peculiarity of the demiurgus, receiving from the Timæus the principles of the arguments on this subject. This therefore is known to every one, that Timæus calls the whole demiurgus fabricator and father, in the beginning of what he says concerning him. For he says, “It is difficult to discover the fabricator and father of this universe, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.” Hence, he does not think fit to call him either father alone, or fabricator alone, nor again connecting the two, father and fabricator, but on the contrary, he places the fabricative prior to the paternal. Now therefore, we must show in the first place, in what respect fabricator and father differ from each other; and in the next place, in addition to this, who the fabricator alone is, and who father and fabricator is, and how the fabricative and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is considered by Plato as adapted to the demiurgus.

If therefore, we divide all things into the Gods, and the progeny of the Gods, and this is the same thing as to divide them into superessential monads, and the progressions of beings, father indeed will be generative of the Gods and superessential unities; but fabricator will give subsistence to essences and beings. For again, according to this reason Timæus says, that the natures which are generated by the demiurgus are equal to the Gods; for the demiurgus is not only fabricator, but also father; but that those which are produced by the junior Gods, are allotted a mortal nature. For these Gods are alone producers and fabricators of things which participate of existence alone, and not of the superessential peculiarity. Hence through that by which they suffer a diminution with respect to the demiurgic monad, through this they are not allotted a power generative of things equal to the Gods. And through that by which the intellectual demiurgus is expanded above the junior Gods, through this he binds to himself the generations of all mundane natures.

But if again, we divide beings into the total and partial, father indeed, will appear to us to be the hypostatic cause of wholes, but fabricator of partial natures. For the former is the cause exemptly of things that are generated; but the latter proximately. And the former, produces indeed by his very being, energy giving perfection to his hyparxis; but the latter produces by energizing, his hypostasis being fixed according to energy. If also we again separately divide the generations of perpetual and* mortal natures, we must refer the generation of perpetual natures to the paternal cause, but the generation of mortal natures to the fabricative cause. For the fabricator indeed produces that which is generated from non-being to being. For the Elean guest defines the effective art to be this. But the father constitutes things posterior to himself consubsistent with himself. For he is father by his very being, and has the power of generating united with himself. Each therefore, I mean the paternal and the effective or fabricative, is assimilated to the principle of bound. And the former indeed is the cause of union, but the latter of the production of forms. And the former is the cause of wholes, but the latter of an extension as far as to parts. And the one indeed, is the primary leader of simple, but the other of composite natures; Again however, in these the generative cause, and the cause which is productive of life, are opposed to each other; because the paternal cause indeed is connascent with generative powers, but the effective with vivific powers. And as the paternal and the effective causes pertain to the coordination of bound, so every thing prolific and vivific, pertains to vivification, and the first infinity.

These things, however, being thus divided by us, it is evident that the paternal indeed, is itself by itself primarily in the intelligible Gods. For they are the fathers of wholes, being fixed according to supreme intelligible union. And on this account, Plato also calls the first God father, from the natures which are proximately established after him, transferring to him the appellation of father. For every where indeed, it is usual with Plato to introduce names to the ineffable from secondary causes, and the causes which are posterior to it. But at one tune indeed, he introduces the names from all beings, and at another from the first beings. For it neither was nor is lawful to refer names to him who is exempt from all beings, from subordinate natures, and which are placed in an order very remote from him. If therefore, all beings participate of the paternal peculiarity, we must say that Plato gives this name to the one from all beings; for there is. not among all beings such a cause as this. Hence it is evident that Plato introduces to the one an appellation of this kind, from that which is the first and highest in the Gods. The intelligible Gods, however, are more ancient than all (he divine orders, and subsist immediately after the one. The paternal cause therefore of beings is in the intelligible Gods, and the intelligible Gods are the fathers of all the divine genera; being established in the highest essences, and occultly producing wholes. And the first God indeed, is beyond the appellation of father, as he is likewise beyond all other names; and he is neither properly called the good, or the one, through his ineffable and unknown transcendency. But the intelligible Gods are primarily superessential unities and goodnesses, and are the exempt fathers of beings.

The paternal peculiarity, therefore, originates supernally from the first intelligible triad; but the fabricative first presents itself to the view in the third triad. For that which generates all forms, and adorns all things with forms is the third triad of intelligibles. For there, as we have said, all-perfect animal subsists, which is comprehensive of the first and intelligible paradigms. Here therefore, the effective also or fabricative at the same time subsists. For animal itself constitutes the Gods, and produces the forms of all beings. Hence it is allotted the paternal peculiarity, according to the divine cause, but according to the formal cause, it unfolds into light the effective principle of wholes. But again, on the contrary, the effective and at the same time paternal peculiarity, is allotted its hypostasis in the demiurgic monad. Hence also the demiurgus of wholes is the hypostatic cause of Gods. In a particular manner however, he fabricates the world, energizing with forms and demiurgic reasons. For he constitutes intellect, souls and bodies, adorning all things with forms, some indeed with first, others with middle, and others with last forms.

Do you not see, therefore, how the end of intelligibles indeed, was paternal and at the same time effective; but the end of intellectuals is effective and at the same time paternaL There however, the paternal peculiarity is more predominant; but here the effective. For in both indeed, both causes preexist; nevertheless in the paradigm [i. e. in animal itself] the paternal is more prevalent, but in the demiurgus the effective. For the former produces by his very being; but the latter by energizing. And in the former indeed, fabrication [or effective energy] is essential; but in the latter essence is effective. Forms also are with both; but in the former intelligibly, and in the latter intellectually. From these things therefore, it is evident, that the demiurgic cause subsists analogous to the paradigmatic cause; and that it has the same order with respect to intellectuals, as that has with respect to intelligibles. And on this account Timæus also says that the demiurgus of wholes was extended to that paradigm. For he says, “Whatever ideas intellect perceived by the dianoëtic energy in animal itself, such and so many he conceived it necessary for the universe to contain.” And together with this analogy, there is a diminution of the intellectual with reference to the intelligible. For the latter is more united; but the former is more separated. And the one indeed is preestablished in the order of the desirable; but the other is moved about the desirable. And the one fills with paternal power; but the other absorbs as it were and embosoms the whole prolific abundance of the desirable. And after this manner, the demiurgus of the universe is all-perfect, receiving whole intelligible powers, from all-perfect animal. For the universe is threefold; one indeed being intelligibly [all]; another intellectually; and another sensibly. For the world is perfect, from perfect natures, as Timæus says. And animal itself is perfect according to all things, as the same Timæus asserts. The demiurgus likewise, being the best of causes, is all-perfect.

Again therefore, resuming what we have said, we repeat, that the paternal cause commences from the supreme union of intelligibles; but the paternal and at the same time effective cause is consubsistent in the intelligible paradigm; and the effective and at the same time paternal cause is defined according to the whole demiurgus. But the cause which is alone effective and fabricative, pertains to the junior Gods who give subsistence to partial and mortal things. The peculiarity therefore of the demiurgic cause is effective and paternal. And this Timæus asserts, not only in the beginning of the discourse about it, in which he says, “[To discover] therefore, the artificer and father of this universe, &c.;” but also in the speech to the junior Gods, he does the same thing; for the demiurgus in a similar manner says to them: “Gods of Gods of whom I am the demiurgus and father, [Whatever is generated by me is indissoluble, I being willing that it should be so.]” For he does not call himself father and demiurgus, but demiurgus and father, just as there [Timæus calls him] fabricator and father. And not in the Timæus only is this mode of the arrangement of the names defined, but in the Politicus also, the Elean guest speaking about the world says that it imitates the instruction of its demiurgus and father; and in the beginning indeed, he uses these names more accurately, but in the end more negligently. Since Plato therefore, every where preserves this order of names unchanged, it is evident to those who are not entirely unskilled in things of this kind, that he defines the demiurgic monad according to this peculiarity, and that he considers it to be effective and at the same time paternal. For because indeed, it is the end of the intellectual triad, it is allotted a paternal transcendency with respect to all the second genera of Gods; but because it produces from itself all the partial genera and species of beings, it possesses an effective cause of the natures to which it gives subsistence. And because indeed, it is father, power is in it, and at the same time intellect. For the demiurgus himself says, “Imitating the power which I employed in your generation.” And again, Timæus says concerning the demiurgus; “Whatever ideas intellect perceived in animal itself, such and so many he conceived by the dianoetic energy it necessary for this universe to contain.” Hence he is father, and the power of the father is in him, and intellect. All these however, are in him intellectually, and not intelligibly. Hence, I think he is called father indeed, not simply, but together with effector and demiurgus; and power, not by itself, but the power of the demiurgus and father. For he who calls himself demiurgus and father, says that it is the power of himself. But he is immediately called intellect, without the addition of power, and the other appellations. Whatever ideas therefore intellect perceived,” &c. For all things are in him intellectually, and both power and father, by which he imitates the intelligible paradigm. For in him all things were intelligibly, viz. bound, infinity, and that which is mixed from both these. These, however, are father, power, and intellect. But the intellectual of the paradigm indeed was intelligible in the intelligible Gods, subsisting prior to an intellectual cause. The intellectual however of the demiurgus, is of itself intellectual, being intellectual in intellectuals, as was before observed. Because indeed, as we have said, he is father, power is in him, and also intellect. But because these are defined according to the effective and demiurgic, he is coarranged with the vivific order, and together with it constitutes the genera of life, and vivifies the whole world. What this order is however, and where it is arranged, we shall shortly survey. But thus much is evident from what has been said, that so far as he is the demiurgus, he requires contact with the vivific order, together with it generates total lives, and conjoins it to himself. Disseminating, however, all the measures of life in it, and together with it adorning and producing them, he again converts them to himself. For it belongs to him to generate all things, and to recall all things to himself, no less than to generate them, because he is established at the end of the intellectual order, and is the demiurgic intellect. As he is therefore demiurgic, he gives subsistence to all things; but as intellect, he convolves multitude to union, and converts it to himself. He also accomplishes both these, by the words which he delivers to the junior Gods. For he fills them with demiurgic and prolific power, collects them to himself, constitutes himself the object of desire as it “were to the multitude of Gods, and extends about himself all the demiurgi in the world.

CHAPTER XVII.

In the third place therefore, let us purify our conceptions about the demiurgic cause according to other projecting energies of intellect, following for this purpose Timæus. In the first place then, Timæus in the beginning of the theory concerning the demiurgus, sufficiently exhibits his goodness, and his unenvying and abundant communication of demiurgic reasons, being impelled to this from the seat of goodness which is inherent in him, and from his exuberant deity. For his goodness and his unenvying abundance, are not as it were a certain habit of good, and a power, or a form itself by itself existing prior to many goods, but it is one ineffable participation of good, and the one of the demiurgic order; according to which the demiurgus also is a God, and fills all things with their proper good. For because there is deity in him which desires to adorn and arrange all things, and an hyparxis which is extended to the providence of the whole of things, on this account he establishes the principle of fabrication. His goodness therefore is nothing else than demiurgic deity. But his will is the progeny of the energy of his goodness, bounding the end of his power. For since in the demiurgus of wholes there are, as we have said, father, power, and intellect, and these subsist in him intellectually, according to each of these he is filled with the participation of the one. And through goodness indeed, that which is paternal in him, and which is as it were the intelligible of intellect, is illuminated. But through will, his power is governed, and is extended to one intelligible good. And through providence, his intellect is perfect, and gives subsistence to all things. All these likewise are the progeny of the one deity in the demiurgus.

In the first place, therefore, as I have said, Timæus unfolds through these things the divine peculiarity of the demiurgus. But in the second place, he presents to our view the intelligible cause which is in him, and also the united paradigmatic cause of wholes which he contains. For to make all things similar to himself, evinces that he is the intelligible paradigm of every thing beautiful and good in the world. For because he gives subsistence to all things by his very being, that to which he gives subsistence is the image of himself. And according to this reasoning the demiurgus is not only a God, but he contains in himself the intelligible, and true being, and antecedently comprehends not only the final cause of mundane natures, but also the paradigmatic cause. But again, in the third place, Timæus celebrates the demiurgic power, and the principle which abolishes every thing disorderly and indefinite, and prepares the beautiful alone and the good to have dominion in wholes. For the assertion that the demiurgus to the utmost of his power suffered nothing evil and vile to exist, indicates his unconquerable power, which adorns things material in an unpolluted manner, and imparts by illumination bound to indefinite, and order to disorderly natures.

In which part of the Timæus, likewise, this dogma of Plato will appear to you to be admirable, that matter is generated from some one of the Gods situated above the demiurgus. For the demiurgus receiving matter occupied by the vestiges of forms, thus himself introduces into it all the perfection of ornament and arrangement. Matter, therefore, and the whole of that which is the subject of bodies, proceed supernally from the first principles, which on account of their exuberance of power, are able to generate even the last of beings. But the demiurgus of the universe, imparts by illumination, order, bound, and ornament, and the whole world is fabricated an image of intelligibles, through the communication of forms.

In the fourth place, therefore, let us survey how Timæus unfolds to us the demiurgic intellect. “By a reasoning process,” says he, the demiurgus discovered from the things which are visible according to nature, that no work which is destitute of intelligence can ever become more beautiful than that which possesses intellect.” What therefore is this reasoning? What is the discovery, and whence does it originate? Reasoning, therefore, is indeed distributed intellection, looking to itself, and in itself investigating good. For every one who reasons, passes from one thing to another, and being converted to himself, searches after good. The demiurgic intellect, therefore, in adorning and arranging the universe subsists analogously to him who reasons; for he emits the divided causes of mundane natures, which preexist unitedly in intelligibles. For those things which intelligible intellect constitutes uniformly and exemptly, these intellectual intellect separating, distributing into parts, and as it were fabricating by itself, generates. Reasoning therefore is the being filled with the intelligible, and an all-perfect union with it. By which also it is evident that it is not fit to think this reasoning [of the demiurgus] is either investigation or doubt, or a wandering of divine intellect, but that it is stable intelligence intellectually perceiving the multiform causes of beings. For intellect is always united to the intelligible, and is filled with its own intelligibles. And in a similar manner it is intellect in energy, and intelligible. For at one and the same time, it intellectually perceives and is perceived, discovers itself, entering into itself, and the reasoning also finds what this intelligence is, but not according to transition. For the intelligence of the Gods is eternal. And invention with them is not the discovery of that which i3 absent; for all things are always present to the intellect of the Gods. The intelligible likewise there is not separated from intellect. The conversion, therefore, of intellect to itself may be called reasoning; but the being filled from intelligibles invention. And intelligibles themselves may be denominated things visible according to nature. For because Timæus had denominated the unadorned subject of bodies when it was vanquished by the obscure vestiges of forms, visible, hence, I think, he calls intelligibles visible according to nature. For it is according to nature, to intellect to look to these, and not to things subordinate to these. As, therefore, he says, that intellect itself sees intelligibles, after the same manner also he calls intelligibles things naturally visible, and converts intellect to the intelligible, as that which sees to that which is seen. If, therefore, intellect sees animal itself, and assimilates to it the whole world, it may be said that animal itself is visible to the demiurgus of the universe. For there the most splendid of intelligibles subsists; and this is that which we before demonstrated, when we said that there the fountain of beauty shines forth, which Socrates, in the Phædrus, denominates splendid and fulgid.

CHAPTER XVIII.

Such therefore are the conceptions which are to be assumed of the demiurgic cause, and from these things they are to be derived. We shall however obtain one perfection of the summit of the dogmas concerning it, if we are able to survey the words which this cause extends to the junior demiurgi, and to unfold the concealed meaning of them. This, therefore, we shall also do, establishing the following principle of the explanation of them: The energies and powers of the Gods are twofold. And some indeed abide in, and energize about them, and have for their end one hypostasis, and which is united to essence. But others proceed from them, exhibit an efficacious power about secondary natures, and coexist with the multitude of their recipients, and with the peculiarity of essence. These, however, being twofold, the secondary are suspended from those that are prior to them, are defined about them, and receive their proper hyparxis according to them. For it is every where necessary that externally proceeding should be the images of internal energies, evolving the at-once-collected nature of their indivisibility; multiplying that in them which is united, and dividing their impartibility.

According to this reasoning, therefore, the energy of nature is also twofold, one being that which abides in it, according to which it connects itself, and the reasons it contains, but the other proceeding from it, through which also bodies are filled with these physical powers, which being moved by nature, act on each other, and physically suffer by each other. Again, the motion of the soul likewise is twofold. And the one indeed is self-motive, is converted to itself, is of itself, concurs with the life of the soul, and is without any difference with respect to it. But the other is incumbent on alter-motive natures, moves these, and about these extends the power of itself. The energy of intellect, therefore, is likewise twofold. And one indeed is intellectual, is united to true beings, and is impartible, being coexistent with the intelligible itself of intellect, or rather being the intelligible itself, and intellect. For intellect is not of itself in capacity, and afterwards receiving energy, intellectually perceives the intelligible; but it is one simple energy. For the multitude of it is unical, and its energy is directed to itself. But the other,energy of intellect is directed to externals, and to things which are able to participate of intellect. For these intellect causes to be intellectual through itself, splendidly as it were emitting the light of its own intelligence, and imparting it to others. It is necessary, therefore, that the divine and demiurgic intellect itself, should always indeed be united to the intelligible, and that it should have the plenitude and self-sufficiency of demiurgic intelligence eternally established according to a union exempt from wholes; to which, as it appears to me, Timæus also looking says, that the father of the universe abides in his accustomed manner, and withdraws himself to his own place of survey, delivering the fabrication of mortal natures to the mundane Gods. For so far as he is exempt from the beings posterior to himself and is uncoordinated with the more partial multitude of Gods, so far he is converted to himself, and surveys and intellectually perceives the natures prior to himself, according to one uniform union. But in consequence of the more ruling and leading Gods being extended towards him, he emits from himself secondary energies, to all the partial orders.

Timæus, therefore, fashions through words, these powers and efficacious energies which proceed from the whole and one fabrication to the demiurgic multitude of Gods. For words are the images of intellections; because indeed they evolve that which is contracted in intelligibles, but lead forth that which is impartible into a partible hypostasis. They likewise transfer that which abides in itself into habitude to another thing. And it is evident that the reasons which are impelled from nature, are certain natural [powers], and render that which receives them physical. But the reasons which are generated from soul, are indeed vivific, but render the inanimate nature which participates of them [animated] and moved from itself, through the power of soul, as Socrates says in the Phædrus, and communicate to it the resemblance of self-motion. And the reasons which are generated from intellect, illuminating the natures posterior to it, distribute all intellectual goods to their recipients, being the suppliers of true knowledge, of purity and a more simple life. After the same manner also the demiurgic words produce in the junior Gods, whole, impartible, and united measures of exempt fabrication, and fill their essences with demiurgic providence. They likewise render them second demiurgi, and emulous of their father. For he indeed gives subsistence to the whole plenitudes of the world. But they, imitating him, fabricate all partial natures in conjunction with wholes. And he produces the essence of perpetual natures. But they fashioning mortal natures according to one generation-producing circle, likewise transmute these. And as the one demiurgus governs the whole periods of the universe, thus also the many demiurgi convolve the divisible circles of the natures that are borne along in generation. If, therefore, we assert these things rightly concerning the words proceeding from the demiurgus to the multitude of mundane Gods, and they are efficacious, fabricative, and convertive of their recipients to a union with him, and are also perfective of the beneficent reasons which they contain, we shall no longer seem to speak paradoxically, if we say that these words extend to the Gods in the world the participation of all the powers that are firmly established in the father, and of the causes prior to, and subsisting after him. And as he convolving the end of the intellectual Gods, is the plenitude of all things, so likewise the demiurgic words proceeding from him, produce in the junior Gods the peculiarities, as I may say, of all the divine genera that are above the world, through which they are suspended from all the orders prior to them; just I think as the whole of this world [is suspended from the mundane Gods who] fabricate all mortal natures, and impart to different things a different power, and an efflux of divine powers.

What, therefore, in short, is it which Plato indicates the Gods derive through these words from the first demiurgus, and the all-perfect fabrication? In the first place, indeed, they derive this, that they are Gods of Gods. For the vocal address proceeding to them from the father, is the supplier of divine power, and is allotted an efficacious presence in its participant, as we before observed. But in the next place, these words impart to them an indissoluble power. The demiurgus of wholes, however, comprehends in himself the cause of dissolution, in order that they may indeed be essentially indissoluble, but according to the cause of binding, not indissoluble. In the third place, therefore, the demiurgus produces in them from on high, through these words, a renovated immortality. For the assertion that they are neither immortal, nor shall be subject to the fatality of death, establishes them in this form of immortality, which the fable in the Politicus denominates renovated. In addition to this also, the words testify that they derive from the father a power perfective of wholes. For if the world is imperfect without the subsistence of mortal animals, it is doubtless necessary that those who preside over the generation of them should be the causes of perfection to the universe. And in the last place, these words impart to the junior Gods a paternal and generative empire derived from the exempt and intellectual cause of wholes; and insert in them the proximate powers of regeneration. For through these words, the junior Gods again receive in themselves the natures that are corrupted, fabricate parts from wholes, and again effect the dissolution of parts into their wholes. And universally the words of the demiurgus subject the perpetually-generated course of nature, to the fabrication of the junior Gods. In short, therefore, the demiurgus fills the junior Gods with divine union, fills them with a firm establishment, and fills them with a perpetuity adapted to their nature. But he pours into them the all-various causes of perfective powers, of vivific rivers, and demiurgic measures. Hence also, the many demiurgi refer the fabrication of particulars to the one and whole providence of the father, and the principles of demiurgic works which they received from him, to his efficacious production. And all of them indeed are filled with all powers, because all of them participate of the demiurgic words which proceed into them from the father. But some of them are more characterized by one peculiarity than another.

And some of them indeed are the suppliers of union to their progeny; others, of indissoluble permanency; others, of perfection; and others, of life. But others preside over regeneration, and being allotted in a distributed manner in the universe, the powers which subsist unitedly in the one demiurgus, they are subservient to the providence of the father. And every thing which is generated by the many demiurgi, is in a much greater degree produced by the one fabrication; which governs mortal natures indeed, eternally, things that are moved, immoveably, and partible natures impartibly. It is not however necessary that the progeny of that one demiurgus should be suspended from the motion of the junior Gods. For every where the one fabrication is more comprehensive than that which is multiplied. And the more causal of divine natures energize prior to their own offspring, and together with them constitute the progeny that proceed from them. The first [demiurgic] God, therefore, produces from and through himself the divine genera1 of the universe, according to his beneficent will. But he governs mortal natures through the junior Gods, generating indeed these also from himself, but other Gods producing them as it were with their own hands. For he says, “these being generated through me will become equal to the Gods.” The cause, therefore, through which, is to be attributed to the junior Gods; but the cause from which, even in the production of mortal natures is to be referred to the whole demiurgus. For always the first of those things that are constituted, produce in conjunction with their monad the generation of secondary natures. And all things indeed proceed from that monad, but some things immediately; and through it, but some things through other media receive the providence that emanates from it. For these middle genera of causes are allotted the providential inspection of secondary natures from the first effective monad.

CHAPTER XIX.

Concerning the words, therefore, in the Timæus, which the demiurgus delivers to the Gods in the world, thus much may suffice at present. But after these, it is fit to survey the second measures of total demiurgic providence, which the demiurgus extends from himself to the many and divisible souls. For having constituted these, divided them equal in number to divine animals, and disseminated them about the world, he inserts in them fabricative boundaries, defines the whole periods of them, inscribes in them the laws of Fate, proposes the apparent measures of their generation-producing life, legally institutes, and adorns in a becoming manner all the rewards of virtue, and the works of vice, intellectually comprehends in one the end of every period, and coarranges with a view to this the whole polity of partial souls. All souls, therefore, of an immortal condition, being allotted a progression from the demiurgus, are filled from him with an united and intellectual providence. Because, however, progeny which are suspended from their causes participate of the perfective efficacy which proceeds from them, divine souls, indeed, primarily subsisting from thence, become auditors of the words of their father immediately; but partial souls participate of the uniform providence of the demiurgus secondarily, and with greater partibility. Hence also the demiurgus, as a legislator, defining to these all the measures of their life, he thus extends demiurgic words, unitedly comprehending the divided nature of the whole of their life, convolving in sameness without time their temporal mutability, and collecting uniformly, according to one simplicity, the multiform and diversified nature of the energy which exists about them. But to divine souls he immediately unfolds the providence of himself, and exhorts them to join with him in a providential inspection of the whole world, to fabricate, adorn and dispose in conjunction with him, mortal natures, to govern generated beings according to the measures of justice, and to lead and convolve all things, following demiurgic providence. Very far therefore, are those interpreters of Plato from according with the fabrication of the universe, who admit that partial are the same with whole souls, and who attribute the same essence to all souls; because all of them are allotted their generation from one demiurgus.

For in the first place, the father in the course of his fabrication adorning, and disposing in an orderly manner partial souls, poured mingling, the remainder of the former mixture, says Timæus, and produced the second and third genera. But in a progression of this kind, the words effective of conversion which he extends to divine souls, are intellectual, and demiurgic, and impart to them generative powers, and perfective goods; but those which he extends to partial souls, are the definite sources of generation, of the laws of Fate, of justice, and all-various periods. If, therefore, every thing which proceeds from the demiurgus is essentially imparted to souls, it is indeed necessary that different measures of words should be the causes of different powers; and that to some among the number of divisible souls, the demiurgus should distribute a polity exempt from mundane affairs, but to others a polity arranged under these souls, and supernally governed by them. These things, however, may elsewhere be more copiously demonstrated.

CHAPTER XX.

After the demiurgic words therefore, again returning to the demiurgic intellect, let us survey following Plato, who the demiurgus is, who convolves the end itself of the intellectual triad to the beginning, and after what manner it is fit to denominate him according to the Grecian theology. Or rather, prior to this let us summarily show what we may assume concerning him according to the narration of Timæus. For we shall more easily learn those particulars, if we assent to these. For directly, in the beginning of the theology concerning him, he is celebrated as the fabricator and father of the world. And he is neither called fabricator alone, nor father and fabricator, but at one and the same time manifestly possessing both peculiarities, he is rather characterized by the fabricative, than by the paternal cause. But he is denominated the demiurgus of wholes, according to his goodness, unenvying and exuberant will, and his power which is able to adorn and arrange all things, and even such as are of a disorderly nature. He is however particularly unfolded to us as the supplier of beauty, symmetry and order, and as the best of causes; and this because he is allotted the uniform, and first effective power of the whole demiurgic series. But he gives subsistence to intellect and soul, and at the same time to all the life in the world; since he fabricated the whole world an animal animated, and endued with intellect. Being likewise full of every intelligible, and extending himself to intelligible and all-perfect animal and conjoining this to himself through similitude, he fabricates the sensible universe only-begotten, in the same manner as the separate paradigm [animal itself] transcending wholes, unitedly constitutes the intelligible universe.

Moreover, he is likewise the fabricator of bodies, and the perfector of works, binding all things by the most excellent analogies, and co-adapting their powers, bulks, and numbers by the most beautiful bonds. Farther still, he constituted the universe a whole from wholes, and perfect from perfect parts, that it might be free from old age and disease, and might contain in itself all the genera of the elements. He likewise adorned it with the first figure, and with the most simple and most comprehensive of all figures. Besides these things, he is also the cause of self-sufficiency to the universe, and of a circulation into itself, in order that suffering all things from, and effecting all things in itself, it might not be in want of any thing externally situated. And he is indeed the supplier of intellectual motion, and of a life which is evolved according to time, and which effects a mutation always according to the same, and similarly, and about the same things. Farther still, he is the father of soul, and of all the genera in soul, of the division in it, and all the harmonic reasons it contains, constituting it in the world, as a self-moved and immortal lyre; and he is also the divider of the one, and the seven circles in it, and in short, is the maker and fabricator of figure and morphe.^[2]

In addition to these things likewise, he generates from himself the whole of time, according to the imitation of eternity, together with all the measures of time, and the Gods that unfold these measures into light. But he especially constitutes the whole sun, enkindling its light from his own intellectual essence, in order that possessing a transcendency exempt from the other Gods it might be the king of the universe. Moreover, he fabricates all the multitudes of mundane Gods and dæmons, and all celestial and sublunary natures, in order that he may evince this only-begotten and self-sufficient God [the world] to be the image of the intelligible and all-perfect God; fixing the earth indeed, as a firm seat or Vesta, in it, but distributing by lot the other elements to divine souls and dæmons. Besides all this likewise, he converts to himself the genera of Gods that have proceeded from him, and fills all things with undefiled generation, with perpetual life, demiurgic perfection, and generative abundance. He also constitutes divisible souls together with their vehicles, divides them about their leading Gods, arranges different souls under different Gods, unfolds to them the laws of Fate, measures their descents into generation, establishes rewards to their contests in their periodic revolutions, and institutes, as I may say, the whole of their polity in the world.

But after all these things, he introduces a boundary to the providence of wholes, and returning to his own place of survey, delivering to the junior Gods the superintendence of mortal natures, and abiding in his own accustomed manner, is the paradigm to the demiurgi in the world of providential attention to beings of a second order. And as in the fabrication of wholes the paradigm is intelligible animal, so in the arrangement of partial natures, the paradigm is intellectual animal, in which all forms shine forth in a divided manner, according to their own nature. For Timæus says, “the children understanding the order of their father, were obedient to it,” and he abiding, and paternally, and eternally producing all things, they adorn and arrange the mortal genera demiurgically, and according to time. Hence the providence of the demiurgus presents itself to the view, extending from on high as far as to the production of these, and what is here said by Plato, is as it were a hymn to the demiurgus and father of this universe, celebrating his productions, and the benefits which he confers on the world.

And it is requisite that being persuaded by what is here clearly written, we should investigate all the other enquiries about the demiurgus. My meaning is, that we should investigate what we mentioned a little before, who the demiurgus is, and how we ought to denominate him according to the sentiments of the Greeks; and on what account, Timæus neither delivers the name of him, nor unfolds to us who he is, but says, “that it is difficult to discover him, and that when discovered, it is impossible to speak of him to all men.” Now therefore, I think, from what has been already said, it is evident even to those who are but in a small degree intelligent, that according to the decision of Plato, it is the great Jupiter, who is now celebrated by us as the demiurgus. For if, as we have observed, the kingdom of Saturn is the summit of the whole intellectual triad, and the intelligible transcendency of intellectuals, but the maternal and vivific fountain of Rhea, is the middle centre, and the receiving bosom. of the generative power in Saturn, it is manifest to every one, that the mighty Jupiter is allotted the end of this triad. For from the before-mentioned causes, one of which indeed is paternal, but the other generative, he is the God having a paternal subsistence, who is said to reign, receiving the intellectual dominion of his father. If, therefore, it is necessary that the demiurgus should convolve the end of this intellectual triad, as was before demonstrated, and to effect this, is the province of the royal power of Jupiter, we must evidently acknowledge that the Jovian empire is the same as that of the demiurgus, and that Jupiter is the demiurgus celebrated in the Timæus.

CHAPTER XXI.

If, however, it be necessary to consider this as worthy of further discussion, and to demonstrate that the theology in the Timæus about the demiurgus, accords with what is elsewhere written by Plato concerning this God, let us in the first place assume what is delivered in the Critias, because this dialogue proximately follows the Timæus, and is composed according to an analogy to it, delivering the hypostasis of the same things in image, the primary paradigms of which Timæus celebrates through the fabrication Gf the world. Here, therefore, Plato, (that I may derive what I say from the beginning) relating the warlike preparations of the Athenians, in former times, and the insolence and usurpation of the Atlantics, who were the progeny of Neptune, but destroyed the divine seed, through the mixture of human and mortal pursuits, and conducted themselves insolently to all men, collects indeed the Gods to a consultation concerning them, in the same manner as poets inspired by Phoebus, and forms a common assembly of the Gods. But Jupiter is the author of the whole polity of them, and converts the multitude of them to himself. And as in the Timæus the demiurgus convolves all the mundane Gods to himself, so Jupiter in the Critias providentially attending to the whole of things, collects the Gods to himself.

In the next place, therefore, let us consider what Plato says concerning this God, and how it accords with what was before said by Timæus. “But Jupiter the God of Gods who reigns legitimately, and who is able to perceive every thing of this kind, when he saw that an equitable race was in a miserable condition, and was desirous of punishing them, in order that by being chastized they might possess more elegant manners, collected all the Gods into their most honourable habitation, whence being seated as in the middle of the whole world, he beholds all such things as participate of generation.” Here, directly in the beginning, king Jupiter being celebrated as the God of Gods, does it not accord with what is written in the Timæus, where he is said to be the father and cause of all the mundane Gods? For what other God is it who reigns over all the Gods, except the cause of their subsistence and essence? Who is it also that calls the mundane deities, Gods of Gods? Is it not him who binds to himself the principle of all fabrication? If, therefore, he imparts to his progeny to be Gods of Gods, in a much greater degree it pertains to him to be celebrated as the God of all [the mundane] Gods. To which, therefore, of the Gods prior to the world, does it particularly belong to punish offenders except to him who defines to souls all their measures, unfolds to them the laws of the universe, and legally institutes such things as are fit concerning justice and injustice, in order that afterwards he may not be accused of the vices of each of them? Moreover, to congregate all the Gods into their most honourable habitation, from which the whole of generation may be seen, and which possesses the middle of the universe, is to attribute to him a providence exempt from multitude, but extending equally to the whole world; which things indeed are the illustrious goods of the demiurgic monad. For to convert all the Gods to himself, and to survey the whole world pertains exemptly to the demiurgus of the universe. For what else is multitude able to participate proximately, except the monad from which it derives its subsistence? And who can convert all the Gods in the world to himself, but the fabricator of their essence, and of their allotment in the universe?

CHAPTER XXII.

We must establish this, therefore, as one and the first argument in proof of the thing investigated. But if you are willing, we will derive a second argument from what is said by Socrates in the Cratylus, in which he discusses the meaning of the names, from which he may represent to us the essence of Jupiter. For he is not led to the nature of this God from one name, as he is in the names of other Gods, such as Saturn, Rhea, Neptune, and Pluto, but from two names which tend to one thing, and which divisibly indicate the one and united essence of Jupiter, he unfolds the power of this God, and the peculiarity of his hyparxis. For the common rumour concerning him, denominates him in a two-fold respect. And at one time calling him dia, we worship him in our prayers and hymns; but at another time we celebrate him as zena, a word derived from life. Being therefore at the same time called zeus and delighting in the appellation of dia, he is similarly denominated from both names by the Greeks. And these names manifest the essence and order which he is allotted among divine natures. And neither of these names indeed, is by itself sufficiently able to make known the peculiarity of the God; but when conjoined with each other and forming a sentence, they have the power of unfolding the truth concerning him. How, therefore, from both the names the power of this king is signified, and the precedaneous order of his hypostasis in the Gods, we may hear Socrates himself saying, “That the name of his father^[3] who is called Jupiter is beautifully posited; but that it is not easy to apprehend the meaning of it, because in reality the name of Jupiter is as it were a sentence. Dividing it however into two parts, some of us use one part, and some another. For some indeed call him zena, but others dia. And these parts collected into one evince the nature of the God, which we say a name ought to effect. For there is not any other who is more the author of life to us, and to all other things than he who is the ruler and king of all things. It happens, therefore, that this God is rightly denominated, on account of whom life is present to all living beings. But it is divided into two parts, as if I should say that there is one name from dia and zena.” The mode, therefore, of collecting the names into one, and of rendering the hyparxis of this God apparent through both, is manifest to every one.

If, however, he is the supplier of life to all things, as he is said to be, and is the ruler and king of all such things as are said to live, to whom can we assert this peculiarity pertains, if we omit the demiurgus? And is it not necessary, that according with what is said in the Timæus, we should refer to him the principle of vivification. For the demiurgus renders the whole world animated, endued with intellect, and an animal, and constitutes the triple life which is in it, one indeed being impartible and intellectual, another partible and corporeal, and another between these, impartible and at the same time partible. It is he likewise who conjoins each of the celestial spheres to the circulations of the soul, inserts in each of the stars a psychical and intellectual life, and produces in the sublunary elements leading Gods and souls, and in addition to all these things, constitutes the divisible genera of life, and imparts to the junior Gods the principle of mortal animals. All things therefore in the world are full of life, through the power of the demiurgus and father. And this world is one animal, deriving its completion from containing all animals, through the never-failing cause of the power by which it was generated. And there is no other who is the supplier of life to all things, and through whom all things live, some indeed more clearly, but others more obscurely, than the demiurgus of wholes. For he also is intellectual animal, in the same manner as the all-perfect paradigm is intelligible animal. Hence likewise, these are conjoined to each other. And the one indeed is paternally the cause of wholes; but the other demiurgically. And as animal itself constitutes intelligibly, all intelligible and sensible animals, according to one cause, thus also the demiurgus fabricates intellectually according to a second order, the animals in the world.

As animal itself likewise proximately subsists from intelligible life, so the demiurgus is generated from intellectual life, and is the first that is filled with the rivers of vivification. Hence he illuminates all things with life, unfolding the depths of the animal-producing deity, and calling forth the prolific power of the intellectual Gods. If therefore, all things live through the demiurgic cause, they also participate of soul and intellect, and, as I may say, of all vivification, through the providence of this God. But he who pours the rivers of life on all things in the world from himself, and is the ruler and king of wholes, is the mighty Jupiter, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, and evidently appears to be the same with the demiurgus. And the divinely-inspired intellectual conception of Timæus concerning the demiurgus, accords with the theology of Socrates about Jupiter. If likewise each of them denominates the knowledge of this God difficult to be apprehended, and one of them says that it is difficult to discover, him, and when discovered, that it is impossible to speak of him to all men, but the other asserts that it is not easy to understand the name of Jupiter, do they not in this respect accord with each other in what they say concerning this God? Besides this also, the composition of the names, and the coalition of the two names into one hyparxis, appear in a remarkable degree to be adapted to the demiurgus. For a biformed essence, and generative power, are attributed to him according to other theologists. For the duad sits with him, according to which he generates all things; concerning which Timæus also introduces him speaking to the demiurgi in the world, and saying, “Imitating my power.” And through this he produces and vivifies all things. Hence it is necessary through names also to consecrate the duad to him according to ancient rumour. For he glitters with intellectual sections, divides and collects wholes, and constitutes one indissoluble order from many things. And this the power of the names indicates, extending us from divided intellection, to one self-perfect and uniform theory.

All these particulars therefore, clearly demonstrate to us that Plato considers the demiurgus of wholes to be the same with Jupiter. For he who alone is the cause of life to all things, and who is the king of all things, is the demiurgus of the universe. And he who in a remarkable manner rejoices in a duad of names, is he who arranges and adorns the whole world. And it appears to me, as I have frequently said, that in consequence of being allotted the end of the intellectual triad, converting this to the beginning, and being full of the middle fountains of life, but uniting himself to the watch-tower of his father, and producing into himself the simplicity of an intelligible subsistence, according to the peculiarity of first-effective causes, he is also allotted a duad of names. And as he received his essence from both [i. e. from Saturn and Rhea] and possesses indeed bound from his father, but infinite power from the generative deity of his mother, thus also he possesses one of the names from his father, and from the uniform perfection which is in him; but the other from total vivification. And through both, as he is allotted an essence, so likewise an appellation. For it is obvious to every one, that the term dia on account of which, is a sign of a total essence. “Let us declare, says Timæus, on account of what cause [the composing artificer constituted generation and the universe]. He was good.” But the name of life pertains of itself to the middle order of beings. The demiurgus therefore obtains one of these names, viz. dia, from the intellectual summit, and the paternal union. For according to the participation of it, he is one, bound, and intelligible. But he obtains the other name from the middle order of intellectuals. For there life, and the vivific bosoms are allotted their hypostasis. The demiurgic intellect however, shining forth from both, participates also of the names through composition. For we call him dia and zena, because life proceeds to all things on account of him, and to live is inherent in all [vital natures] on account of him. And thus after a manner the position of the names indicates the progression of the demiurgus from both the precedaneous causes.

CHAPTER XXIII.

Again therefore, let us direct our attention to what is written in the Philebus, and survey how, in what is there said, Socrates refers the fabrication of the universe to Jupiter. For admitting that intellect adorns and arranges all things, in the same manner as the wise men prior to him, and that it governs the sun and moon, and all the circulation [of the heavens] he demonstrates that the whole world participates of soul, and intellectual inspection, and that we also derive the participation of these from wholes; but that the universe is not and was not from chance, and likewise the most divine of visible natures, as many physiologists assert, while the natures which the universe contains participate of soul and intellect. Having therefore, as we have said, demonstrated these things, and shown that what the whole world contains is greater and more perfect than what we contain, and that wholes have a greater authority, and a more ruling essence than partial natures, and having placed intellect over wholes, as that which adorns and arranges the universe, and likewise assigned this province to soul, through the inspection of intellect, (for intellect is not present to the world without soul) he afterwards recurs to imparticipable intellect, to the author of participated intellect and soul, and the fabricator of the whole world, and he denominates and celebrates this fabricator, who contains the causes of the plenitudes in the world, as no other than Jupiter the great king and ruler of wholes, conformably to the rumour of the Greeks. He likewise extends about him all the providence of the world, and places in him the whole cause of the arrangement and ornament of the universe.

It is better however, in the next place, to hear the words themselves of Plato. He gives therefore to the world an intellectual superintendance, and adds this to the before mentioned demonstrations, that there is, as we have frequently observed, an abundance of infinity in the world, and a sufficiency of bound, and that there is a certain cause in them by no means vile and contemptible, which adorns and co-arranges the years, the seasons, and the months, and which may most justly be called wisdom and intellect. But again, because it is necessary that participated intellect should govern the world through soul as a medium, (for it is impossible that intellect should be present to any thing without soul, as Timæus also asserts) hence it is requisite that soul also should preside over the universe, and that proximately having dominion over the natures it contains, it should govern the world according to intellect. This therefore Socrates having in the next place added, he subjoins as follows: “Moreover, wisdom and intellect could never be without soul.” For how could the impartible and eternal essence of intellect be immediately conjoined with a corporeal nature? It is necessary therefore that intellect should preside over wholes, that it may connect the order in the world, well-being, and all things. For order and well-being are the progeny of an intellectual essence. But it is necessary that soul primarily participating of intellect, should illuminate body with the light proceeding from thence, and fill all things with intellectual arrangement. It must be admitted therefore, that the world is animated and endued with intellect. Hence from this Socrates ascends to the cause itself of the whole world, which produced intellect and soul, and generated the total order [of the universe.]

“Hence, (Socrates adds) you may say that in the nature of Jupiter there are a royal soul and a royal intellect through the power of cause; and that in the other Gods there are other beautiful things, whatever they are, by which their deities love to be distinguished, and from which they delight in taking their respective denominations.” One of these two things therefore is necessary, either that what is here said is said concerning the world, or concerning the demiurgus of wholes. For if the world is Jupiter, the participated intellect in the world is royal, and the soul also is royal which governs the universe, and arranges and adorns it according to intellect. And these things are evidently present to the world through the power of the cause by which it was constituted, and which rendered it a partaker of intellect and animated. And thus Jupiter will be that which is adorned and fabricated, and not the adorner and fabricator of all things. If, however, it is necessary that the power of cause should be comprehensive in an exempt manner of a royal intellect and a royal soul, we must admit that the nature of Jupiter is in the demiurgic order and power; and intellect and soul will be in him according to cause, since he imparts both these to his progeny. Of these two opinions therefore, every one may adopt that which he pleases, but to me, when I consider what is here said, and every other assertion of Plato concerning this God, it by no means appears to be necessary to refer the nature of Jupiter to the whole world. For neither does the only-begotten subsistence of the world accord with the kingdom of Jupiter, since the Saturnian triad, and which distributes the dominion of the father, is manifestly celebrated by Plato himself; nor can that which is cause to all things, as it is said in the Cratylus, refer to the world. For the world is among the number of things which participate of life from another. As I have said therefore, we must leave this opinion, as by no means adapted to Plato, though it is adopted by some of his interpreters. But considering cause to be the same as Jupiter, we must say that soul and intellect are established in him exemptly; and that Jupiter participates of both these, from the Gods that are prior to him; of intellect indeed, from his father, but of soul from the queen [Rhea] who is the deity of vivification. For there the fountain of soul subsists, just as in Saturn, there is intellect according to essence. For every where the intelligible unically comprehends the intellect which is coordinate with it. And thus much concerning these particulars.

CHAPTER XXIV.

In the next place, we may conjoin with this the mythological conceptions in the Protagoras, and arrive at the same conclusion, considering in common with the Timæus, bow the opinions delivered to us concerning the mighty Jupiter, through the Protagorean fable, accord with the assertions about the demiurgus. The fable says, therefore, that Prometheus adorning the human race, and providentially attending to our rational life, that it may not perish by being merged in the furies of earth, and the necessities of nature, as some one of the Gods says, bound nature to the arts, extended these which are imitations of intellect, as it were to sportive souls, and through these excited our gnostic and dianoëtic power to the contemplation of forms. For every artificial production is effective of form, and adorns the matter which is the subject of it. The fable also adds, that Prometheus providentially attending to the arts gave them to souls, and that he received them from Vulcan and Minerva. For in these Gods the cause of all arts is primarily comprehended; Vulcan primarily imparting the fabricative power of them; but Minerva supernally illuminating their gnostic and intellectual power. Not only however, is the invention of arts necessary to souls in generation, but also a certain other science, the political, which is more perfect than the arts, and which is able to arrange and adorn them, and to lead souls through virtue to a life according to intellect. But as Prometheus was unable to impart this life to us, because the political science is primarily with the mighty Jupiter, but it was not possible (says the fable) for Prometheus to enter latently into the tower of Jupiter, (for the guards of Jupiter are terrible, defending him exempt from all partial causes,)— hence Jupiter sent the messenger Hermes to men, who brought with him prudence and shame, and in short the political science. Jupiter also ordered Hermes to impart similarly to all men these virtues, and to distribute to all souls the knowledge of things just, beautiful, and good, but not in a divided manner, as different arts are distributed to different persons. And some men indeed are judges of these things; but others are ignorant either of all, or of some of the arts.

In what is here said, therefore, Plato primarily refers to Jupiter the paradigm of the political science, as is evident from the words themselves. But he produces the progression of this science, and the communication and participation of the Hermaical series, and extends its essential, presence, which we participate in common, to all souls. For to distribute to all of them, is to insert in souls essentially a science of this kind. These things, therefore, being laid down, let us consider to whom we must say the political science especially pertains, and who it is that primarily established a polity in the universe, that formed divine to govern mortal natures, divided wholes from parts, and produced self-motive and intellectual natures more ancient than those that are deprived of the presence of intellect. Is it not the demiurgus, who is the cause to us of all these goods, who governs the whole world according to rectitude, binds it by the best analogies, establishes every polity in it, possesses and comprehends the laws of Fate, and extends the sacred laws of Adrastia, as far as to the last of things, and arranges and adorns by justice all celestial and sublunary natures? For he who introduces partial souls into the universe as into their habitation, and imparts to them a total polity which is the best of all polities, and is governed by the most excellent laws, is he who denominates these laws the laws of Fate, who defines the measures of Justice, and legally institutes all things, as Timæus says. Is it not therefore superfluous to endeavour to prove that he who possesses the first paradigm of the political science, is according to Plato the demiurgus?

If, however, these things are true, and according to the fable in the Protagoras it must be admitted that the political science first subsists in Jupiter, it is evident from what has been said, that the demiurgus of the universe is Jupiter. For to what other cause can we grant the primary form of the political science to belong, than to that which arranges and adorns the universe? If the polity in the heavens is the first and most perfect of all polities, as Socrates in the Republic says it is. Who likewise is he that produces all things, and co-arranges them when produced to each other, in order to the elegant disposition of the universe? If, therefore, the first and most perfect demiurgus of the universe is political, but the political science first subsists with Jupiter, being established with him on a sacred foundation, proceeds from thence to all secondary natures, and adorns and arranges both wholes and parts according to intellect, it is evidently necessary that the demiurgus of wholes should be the same with Jupiter, and that there should be one hyparxis of both, which administers every thing in the world according to rectitude, and circularly leads every thing confused and disorderly into order. For, says Timæus, it is not lawful for that which is best to effect any thing else than that which is most beautiful. How therefore is it possible that he who adorns and arranges wholes through Themis, and together with her produces all things, should not essentially possess in himself the whole of the political science?

How is it possible likewise that he should not be the first Jupiter, who definitely imparts to all things that which is divine, and weaves one polity from all things, but is exempt from all partial causes and the Titannic genera, and is guarded by his own undefiled powers, beyond the whole world? For the guards which surround him, obscurely signify his immutable order, and the undeviating defence of fabrication, through which being firmly established in himself, he pervades through all things without impediment, and being present to all his progeny, is according to supreme transcendency expanded above wholes. Moreover, the citadel of Jupiter, according to the rumours of theologists, is a symbol of intellectual circulation, and of the highest summit of Olympus, which all the wise suspend from the intellectual watch tower of Jupiter, to which he extends all the mundane Gods, imparting to them from thence intellectual powers, divine light, and vivific illuminations, and compressing all the profundities of the worlds by one most simple circulation, through which the summit also of the apparent worlds is denominated the period of sameness, and the most prudent and uniform circulation, as Timæus says, expressing the unical intellectual power of demiurgic conversion, and being allotted the same transcendency with respect to all the sensible world that the supreme summit of Jupiter possesses with respect to all the arrangement of the firmaments. These things may also be assumed by us as subservient to the proposed investigation, from the fabulous fictions in the Protagoras.

CHAPTER XXV.

We may, however, approach still nearer to the truth, and assume in the present discussion, the fable in the Politicus. For in this it will appear that Plato in a remarkable manner considers, the demiurgus of the universe to be the same with Jupiter, and even as far as to the very names asserts the same things as Timæus. The Elean guest, therefore, as we have before observed, assigns [in this dialogue] twofold circulations to the whole of this world, the one intellectual, and which elevates souls but the other proceeding into nature and imparting things contrary to the former. And the one indeed, being unapparent, and governed by diving providence, but the other apparent, and convolved according to the order of Fate. He also places twofold motive causes over these circulations. For every mutation and period require a certain moving cause. And prior to the causes that move the circulations, he asserts that there are as it were twofold ends of the periods, and assigns first effective causes of the motions, coordinate to the moving causes, and to the circulations themselves which differ from each other. Jupiter therefore moves, and circularly leads one of the periods, whether you are willing to call it intellectual, or providential, or in whatever other way you may denominate it, and he also supplies the world with life, and imparts to it a renovated immortality. But he preestablishes his father Saturn as the object of desire to, and the end of the whole of this circulation. For he leads back wholes, and converts them to himself.

Moreover, he extends happy souls to the watch-tower of his father, viz. those souls whose corporeal nature is obliterated, and whose circulation is to the incorporeal and the impartible. All the generation producing symbols likewise of these souls are amputated, and the form of their life is transferred to the intellectual summit. For these souls are also said to be the nurselings of Saturn, but to commit the government of themselves to Jupiter, and through him to be extended to the intelligible, and the Saturnian dominion. For the intelligible is nutriment, as it is said by the Gods themselves. And as Socrates in the Phædrus elevates souls through the circulation of the heaven to the supercelestial place, where souls are nourished, survey true beings, and the unknown order of the Gods, with the highest powers of themselves, and as he there says, intellectually perceive with the heads of the charioteers,—thus also the Elean guest circularly leads souls under Jupiter, to the Saturnian watch-tower, and asserts that such as have ascended are nourished by Saturn, and calls them the nurselings of the God. For every where indeed, the intelligible is perfective of, and has the power of filling an intellectual life, and the summit of intellectuals extends perfection. These souls likewise participate of the natures that are beyond, establish themselves in more elevated intellectuals, and ascend as far as to the unknown order, but remote from the good, and the one principle of all things. But the souls [that ascend through the circulation of the heaven] are extended to the first intellect, which is imparticipable, and the intelligible itself, and when they are there, and have established their life in the occult order as in a port, they ineffably participate of the union proceeding from the good, and of the light of truth.

With respect however to what remains respecting the twofold periods, as we have said, the world itself indeed moves itself, being moved according to its own nature, and giving completion to the order of Fate. But the first-effective cause of this motion of the world, and of its life, is the God who illuminates it with the power of being moved and of living, and is the mighty Jupiter. Hence also this period is said to be Jovian, so far as Jupiter is the cause of this apparent arrangement, just as Saturn is the cause of the intellectual and unapparent arrangement. It is better, however, to hear Plato himself discussing these things. That there are, therefore, twofold circulations of the universe, and that the God who moves it is the leader of the one, but of the other the world itself convolving itself, Plato here teaches us. But as was just now said, and which is the only thing that remains, the universe is at one time co-governed by another divine cause, again acquiring life, and receiving a renovated immortality from the demiurgus; but at another time, when he lays aside as it were the handle of his rudder, the world being left by itself, moves for a time by itself, so as frequently to proceed in an inverted order.

Again, however, that one of the periods, viz. the apparent, is Jovian, but that the other is referred to the kingdom of Saturn, Plato himself determines in what follows, subjoining these words, after the celebration of that life, and of the undefiled polity of the souls that are there, which is liberated from all corporeal pains, and the servitude about matter: “You have heard, Socrates, what was the life of men under Saturn; but you yourself have seen what the condition of the present life is, which is said to be under Jupiter.” And moreover, that of these two circulations, (since the apparent is under Jupiter) Jupiter is the cause and maker of it, is obvious to every one, and that again Jupiter is the power that moves the unapparent circulation, which is Saturnian, may be demonstrated from what is written. For it is necessary that these two Gods should either rule over each of these circulations, or that one of them should rule over the unapparent, but the other over the present circulation. If, however, Jupiter moves the universe according to this period, the world can no longer be said to convolve itself, and to govern every thing it contains. Nor will it be true neither that the whole is convolved by divinity with twofold and contrary circulations, nor again, that two certain Gods convolve it whose decisions are contrary to each other. For if Saturn indeed moves it according to one circulation, but Jupiter moves it according to a period contrary to that of Saturn, two Gods will move it according to contrary circumvolutions. If, however, these things are impossible, it is indeed manifest to every one that both the divine causes preside over the circulation according to the Saturnian convolution; Saturn indeed as the supplier of an intellectual life; but Jupiter, as elevating all things to the Saturnian empire, and establishing them in his own intelligible. And thus that period may be called Saturnian, in consequence of Saturn imparting the first effective cause of the whole [of an intellectual] life. But according to this more physical circulation, and which is known to every one, Fate and connate desire move the universe.

Jupiter, however, is the cause of this motion exemptly, who gives Fate and an adscititious life to the world. These things, therefore, being demonstrated by us, let us consider what the particulars are which are asserted of the God who moves the world according to the other period. And they are these; “that the world indeed at another time is conjointly governed by another divine cause, again acquiring life, and receiving a renovated immortality from the demiurgus.” It is obvious, therefore, to every one; that the Elean guest says, that the God who moves the universe according to the Saturnian period, supplies it with life, and imparts to it a renovated immortality, and that he clearly calls him the demiurgus. Hence, if it is Jupiter who conjointly governs that period, as has been demonstrated, he will be the demiurgus of the world, and the supplier of immortality. And what occasion is there to say much on the subject? For if the same God is the cause of life, and is denominated the demiurgus, again the Cratylus will present itself to us, and Jupiter according to this will be the same with the demiurgus. For life accedes to all things from Jupiter, as it is asserted in that dialogue. Moreover, in what follows, as Timæus calls the cause of the circulation of Fate, demiurgus and father, after the same manner the Elean guest denominates this cause, and also calls it the maker. “For the world,” says he, “revolves, remembering the doctrine of the demiurgus and father.” Properly, therefore, do we denominate the whole of this period Jovian, because the world moves and convolves itself; according to the doctrine of Jupiter, and the order imparted to it from him. Again, therefore, Jupiter is demiurgus and father. And here also the Elean guest preserves the same order of the divine names as Timæus. For he does not call him father and demiurgus, but on the contrary, in the same manner as Timæus, demiurgus and father; because the demiurgic peculiarity in him is more manifest than the paternal deity. These things, however, have been copiously investigated before; and it has been shown in what respect the demiurgic is different from the paternal genus, how they are complicated with each other, where the paternal subsists essentially, but the demiurgic according to cause, and where again, the demiurgic subsists essentially, but the paternal, according to participation.

CHAPTER XXVI.

It will remain, therefore, that we should make mention of what is written in the Laws concerning Jupiter. For perhaps in them also it will appear that Plato assigns the same order to the demiurgus and to Jupiter. As the equalities, therefore, according to which polities are adorned, are twofold, and the one polity indeed proposes the equal according to number, and proceeds through things which differ from each other according to an equal law; but the other embraces in all things, the equality which is according to desert; and also, since equality subsists according to ratio,—this being the case, each of these equalities exists in the providence of the world. For the essence of the soul, indeed, is primarily divided by its fabricator by the equality according to ratio; but it is also consummately filled with the remaining middles, and bound with them through the whole of itself. The several bodies [of the world] likewise, participate of a certain common essence, in the fabrication of things; and on this account they are allotted the equality which is according to number. But all things are arranged and adorned through the best of analogies, and the demiurgus according to this inserts both in wholes and parts, an indissoluble order in the universe, and an adaptation of them to each other.

This equality, therefore, the Athenian guest exhorts his citizens particularly to honour, in consequence of assimilating his city to the universe. He also says that it is a thing of this kind, but that it is not likewise easy for every one to perceive the most true and excellent equality; for it is the judgment of Jupiter. What therefore is the cause on account of which the Athenian guest asserts this analogy to be the judgment of Jupiter? What other cause can we assign than its contributing to the perfection of the world, and its power and dominion in the fabrication of wholes? For that which gives an orderly distinction to the genera of causes, contrives the most beautiful bond of them, and weaves together one order from wholes, is according to Timæus the power of this analogy. For it established soul in the middle (of the universe) analogous to intellect and a corporeal nature. For soul is the middle of an impartible and partible essence. And by how much it surpasses a partible, by so much it falls short of an impartible hypostasis. The power of this analogy, however, binds the soul from double and triple ratios, and connects the whole of it proceeding from and at the same time returning to (its principles,) by the primary and self-motive boundaries of equality. It likewise constitutes the corporeal series from the four first genera. And it adapts indeed the extremes to each other through the middles, but mingles the middles according to the peculiarity of the extremes. It reduces, however, all things to one world, and one indissoluble order connectedly comprehended in the universe. If, therefore, we acknowledge that this equality has dominion in the whole fabrication of things, the best of analogies is the judgment of the demiurgus, and according to the decision of him who generated wholes it is allotted that great dominion in the fabrication of the universe, which we have before shown it to possess. Hence if the same analogy is the judgment of Jupiter, as the Athenian guest says it is, it is obvious to every one that the nature of Jupiter is demiurgic. For it is not any thing else which judges of the dignity of this analogy than that which employs it in the arrangement of wholes. And to this the legislator establishing himself analogous, binds and in a particular manner adorns the city which is assimilated to the universe, by this analogy.

CHAPTER XXVII.

From these things, therefore, and from all that has been previously said, we confidently assert, following Plato and paternal rumours, that Jupiter is the demiurgus of the universe; and we may collect into one, the scattered opinions of the ancients on this subject; of whom, some, indeed, refer the paradigm of the world, and the demiurgic cause to the same order; but others divide these from each other. And some place all-perfect animal prior to the demiurgus; but others afford an hypostasis to it after the demiurgus. For if the demiurgus is, as has been said, the great Jupiter, and the paradigm proposed to the demiurgus in order to the generation of the world, is all-perfect animal, these are at the same time united to each other, and are allotted an essential separation. And animal itself, indeed, intelligibly comprehends in itself the whole Jovian series; but Jupiter the demiurgus of the universe intellectually pre-establishes in himself the nature of animal itself. For animal itself is the supplier of life to all things, and all things primarily live on account of it, and Jupiter being the cause of life, possesses, the paradigm and the generative principle of the essence of all animals. Justly, therefore, does Timæus, in Plato, having called the intelligible paradigm animal, conjoin the demiurgic intellect to the first intelligible animal; and through the all-perfect union of the demiurgus and father with it, he also arranges and adorns this universe. For Jupiter binding to himself the fabrication of the universe, and being an intellectual animal, is united to intelligible animal, and being allotted a progression analogous to it, constitutes all things intellectually, which proceed from animal itself intelligibly.

For, as we have said, the intelligible hypostases being triple, and one indeed, being allotted its hyparxis according to existence and the one being; but another according to intelligible life, and the middle centre of the intelligible breadth, where eternity, all life, and intelligible life subsist, as Plotinus somewhere says; and another according to intelligible multitude, the first plenitude of life, and the all-perfect paradigm of wholes,—this being the case, the three kingdoms of the intellectual Gods are divided analogous to the three intelligible hypostases. And one indeed, the mighty Saturn, being allotted an hyparxis according to the summit of intellectuals, and having a paternal transcendency, possesses a dominion analogous to the summit of the intelligible Gods, and the occult order. And as in that order, all things are uniformly, and are ineffably, and without separation united, thus also this God again converts to himself, and conceals in himself the natures that have proceeded from him, imitating the occult of the first summit. But again, the order which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, and is filled indeed, from the generative power of Saturn, but fills from itself the whole fabrication with vivific rivers, has the same order in intellectuals which eternity has in intelligibles, and the uniform cause of the life which is there. And as eternity proximately generates intelligible animal, which is also denominated eternal, through the participation of eternity, thus also the middle bosom of the intellectual Gods, unfolds the demiurgus of the universe, and the vivific fountain of wholes. But the third king, viz. the fabricator and at the same time father, is indeed co-ordinate to the remainder of the intelligible triad, viz. to all-perfect animal. And as that is an animal, so likewise is Jupiter. And Jupiter indeed is intelligibly in all-perfect animal; but all-perfect animal is intellectually in Jupiter. The extremities likewise of the intelligible and intellectual Gods are united to each other; and in them, separation is co-existent with union. And one of them, indeed, is exempt from fabrication; but the other is converted to the intelligible, is filled from thence with total goods, and is allotted a paternal transcendency through the participation of it. The maker, therefore, and father of the universe, who has firmly established in himself the uniform strength and power of all fabrication, who possesses and comprehends the primary cause of the generation of wholes, and who stably fixes in himself all things, and again produces them from himself in an undefiled manner, being allotted such an order as this among the intellectual fathers, is celebrated, as I may say, through the whole of the Timæus, in which dialogue, his prolific and paternal power is unfolded, and his providence which pervades from on high as far as to the extremities of the universe. He is also frequently celebrated by Plato in other dialogues, so far as it is possible to celebrate his uniform and united power, and which through transcendency is exempt from wholes.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

If however some one recollecting what is said in the beginning of the Timæus about him, viz. that it is difficult to discover him, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all men, should enquire in the first place, why since the Grecian theology ascribes such a name to the demiurgus, as we have before mentioned, Timæus says that he is ineffable, and established above all the indication which subsists in words. In the next place, if he should inquire why intelligible animal which is arranged above the demiurgus is both denominated, and is made known by many signs, but the demiurgus who has established his kingdom in an order secondary to that of all-perfect animal, and is an intellectual God, (all-perfect animal receiving an intelligible transcendency) is left by Timæus ineffable, as we have said, and unknown, perhaps we also, following Plato, may be able to dissolve all such doubts. For every order of the Gods originates from a monad, and presides over its proper series according to the first-effective cause. And such things indeed as are nearer to this principle are more total than those that are more remote from it. But more total natures are manifestly seen to be less distant from the monad, and conjoin things which are diminished according to essence to the natures that are prior to them. Every order of the Gods likewise is a whole united to itself through the whole, is allotted one indissoluble connexion, both in wholes and parts, and through the monad which collects every order into one, it is converted about itself, is suspended from this, and is wholly convolved according to it.

If, therefore, we assert these things truly, in each order a monad is allotted a transcendency with respect to multitude, analogous to the good. And as the unical cause of whole goods, and which is incomprehensible by all things, is exempt from all things, constitutes all things about itself, generates them from itself, and hastily withdraws the unions of all things to its own ineffable superunion, thus also the uniform and generative principle of every co-ordinate multitude, connects, guards and perfects the whole series of itself, imparts good to it from itself, and fills it with order and harmony. It is likewise that to its own progeny, which the good is to all beings, and is the object of desire to all the natures that originate from itself. Thus, therefore, the union of the intelligible father subsists prior to the whole paternal order; the one wholeness of the Synoches is prior to the connective order; and the first effective cause of life, to the vivific order.

Hence also, of every demiurgic series, which is suspended from the triad of the sons of Saturn, the monad which proximately fabricates wholes, and is established above this triad, comprehends in itself all the demiurgic Gods, converts them to itself, and is of a boniform nature. The one fountain likewise of all the demiurgic numbers, subsists, as I may say, with respect to all this order analogous to the one, and to the one principle of all things. Timæus therefore, indicating these things to us, asserts directly in the beginning of the generation of the world, that this monad which proximately fabricates wholes, is difficult to be known, and is indescribable, as having the same ratio as the ineffable and unknown cause of all beings. Whence likewise, I think, he calls the demiurgus the best of causes, and the father of this universe, as being allotted the highest order among the demiurgi, and convolving to himself, and producing from himself all the effective principles. That one however, Parmenides demonstrates to be perfectly unknown and ineffable; but Timæus says that it is difficult to discover the maker and father of the world, and impossible to speak of him to all men; which assertion falls short of the cause that flies from all knowledge, and all language, and appears to verge to the nature of things known and effable. For when he says that it is impossible to speak of him to, all men, he does not leave him entirely ineffable and unknown. And the assertion that it is difficult to discover him, is not the sign of a peculiarity perfectly unknown. For because the demiurgus has established a kingdom analogous to the good, but in secondary and manifold orders of it, he participates indeed of the signs of the good, but is allotted the participation in conjunction with an appropriate peculiarity, and a communion with beings adapted to him. And as he is good, but not the good itself, so likewise he is difficult to be known by the natures posterior to him, but is not unknown. He is also celebrated in mystic language, but is not perfectly ineffable. You may see however, the order of things, and the remission in them proceeding in a downward progression. For the good indeed, is exempt from all silence, and all language. But the genus of the intelligible Gods rejoices in silence, and is delighted with ineffable symbols. Hence also, Socrates in the Phædrus, calls the vision of the intelligible monads the most holy of initiations, as being involved in silence, and perceived intellectually in an arcane manner. But the vision of intellectuals is indeed effable, yet is not effable and known to all men, but is known with difficulty. For through diminution with respect to the intelligible, it proceeds from silence and a transcendency which is to be apprehended by intelligence alone into the order of things which are now effable.

If however, this be the case, all-perfect animal is much more ineffable and unknown than the demiurgic monad. For it is at once the monad of every paradigmatic order, and is intelligible, but not intellectual. How therefore, do we endeavour to denominate, and as it were unfold it, but thus magnificently celebrate the demiurgic cause? And how do we class this cause in the same rank with things ineffable? For this will not be acting conformably to Plato, who arranges animal itself beyond the demiurgus; but this will be giving an hypostasis to it in a secondary order of Gods, where it will be ranked, and will be effable and known more than the demiurgic monad. To which may be added, that to denominate that all-perfect animal most beautiful, but the demiurgus the best of causes, gives indeed the same analogy to these causes with respect to each other, as there is of the good with respect to the beautiful. And as the good is prior to the beautiful, (for the first beauty, as Socrates says in the Philebus, is in the vestibules of the good) so likewise the best is prior to the most beautiful, and the demiurgus is prior to all-perfect animal. For the best indeed, remarkably participates of the good, but the most beautiful, of beauty.

CHAPTER XXIX.

In addition to these things therefore, it must also be asserted by us, that the most beautiful and the best, are simply indeed related to each other according to order, as the good is to the beautiful. For the series of the whole of goodness is expanded above all the progression and arrangement of the beautiful. Every where, therefore, the best is prior to the most beautiful. And the one, indeed, with reference to an inferior order, will be the best, but the other with reference to a more excellent order, will be the most beautiful. I say for instance, that the most beautiful, as in intelligibles, will have this peculiarity; but the best as in intellectuals. And if the most beautiful, in supermundane natures, is a thing of this kind, the best will be said to be best as with reference to the Gods in the world. Hence, if the best of causes is the leader of the demiurgic series, and according to it is allotted a transcendency of this kind, but the most beautiful of intelligible animals preestablishes the illustrious power of beauty in a higher order, by what contrivance can it on this account be shown that intelligible and all-perfect animal is subordinate to the intellectual cause? And that the demiurgus is converted to that which is posterior to himself? Or how can it be said that animal itself is visible to him, and all-perfect animal, and that which is comprehensive of all intelligibles, if it is made to be comprehended by another? For thus the demiurgus will be more comprehensive than animal itself, if the former indeed being characterized according to the best, is expanded above the paradigm, but the latter being denominated as most beautiful is secondary to the demiurgic cause.

Moreover, as that all-perfect and intelligible animal is particularly considered by Timæus according to a formal nature, and not according to the union which is in it, and an hypostasis which is above all forms, he very properly grants that animal itself may be known and manifested by words, but considers the demiurgus as in a certain respect ineffable, and superior to knowledge. For both indeed, I mean the demiurgus and animal itself, participate of union, and prior to a formal essence, are contained in the one. And if you assume the unities which are in them, you must admit the unity of the paradigm to be intelligible, but the demiurgic unity to be intellectual, and that an intelligible hyparxis is nearer to the first one, which is unknown and incomprehensible by all things, than an intellectual hyparxis. But if you are willing to survey the forms of the paradigm by themselves, according to which it is said to be the paradigm of every thing in the world, and the goodness and union of the demiurgus, the former will appear to you to be known and effable; but the demiurgic cause will be seen to participate of the unknown and ineffable peculiarity of the Gods. For again, Timæus was in a remarkable degree in want of the demiurgus and father, as the producing cause of wholes, and the generator of the world. But to generate, to produce and provide are the peculiarities of Gods, so far as they are Gods. Hence also Timæus denominates the peculiarity of the demiurgus according to which he is a God, the cause of the generation of the universe, and the most proper principle of the arrangement of wholes. But he denominates the peculiarity of the paradigm to be that which comprehends the first forms, according to which the world also is invested with forms. For it is the image of the paradigm, but the effect of the demiurgus. It belongs, therefore, to the paradigm to be the first of forms, but to the demiurgus to be the best of causes, according to his goodness, and the hyparxis of essence. For, as we have said, to generate, to give subsistence to, and to provide for other things, especially pertain to the Gods, and not to the natures which are primarily suspended from them; but the latter are allotted through the former an abundance prolific of secondary natures. It appears tome that Socrates in the Republic indicating these things, does not say that the sun is the cause of generation, till he had declared him to be the progeny of the superessential principle of all things; just as Timæus does not begin the fabrication of the universe, till he had celebrated the goodness of the demiurgus of wholes. For each [i. e. the demiurgus and the sun] is a producing cause according to the good, the former indeed of the universe, but the latter of a generated nature; but not according to the intellect which is in than, or life, or any other form of essence; For these through the participation of the good constitute the natures posterior to themselves. And thus through these things we have answered the before-mentioned doubts.

CHAPTER XXX.

Of the problems pertaining to total fabrication, it now remains for me to relate what my opinion is respecting the Crater, and the genera that are mingled in it. For these also Timæus co-arranges with the demiurgic monad, in the generation of the soul. The demiurgus, therefore, mingles the elements of the hypostasis of souls; but the middle genera of being are mingled. The much-celebrated Crater, however, receives this mixture, and generates souls in conjunction with the demiurgus. Hence, in the first place, the genera of being must be admitted to be twofold. And it must be granted indeed, that some of them give completion to total hypostases, but others, to such as are partial; and that the hyparxes of first effective and united causes, are established in the intelligible Gods. For there essence subsists primarily in the summit of intelligibles, and motion and permanency are in the middle centre. For intelligible eternity abides in one, and at once both abides and is the occult cause of all life. Hence, Plotinus also calls eternity life which is one and total: and again, in another part of his works he calls it intelligible life. But the third from him, Theodorus, denominates it permanency. And both these opinions harmonize with each other; because permanency also is in. eternity, (for according to Timæus, eternity abides in one) and motion. For eternity is intelligible life, and that which participates of it is intelligible animal. Moreover, sameness and difference, are in the extremity of intelligibles. For whence does multitude originate, but from difference? And whence is the communion of parts with wholes, and the hyparxis of things which are divided in each other derived but from sameness? For that one participates of being, and being of the one. All the parts likewise of the one being pervade through each other in an unconfused manner; for at one and the same time sameness and difference are there occultly. And the whole intelligible breadth is allotted its hypostasis according to the first and most uniform genera. As essence likewise presents itself to the view in conjunction with the one, according to the first triad, so motion and permanency shine forth in the second, and sameness and difference in the third triad. And all things are essentially in the intelligible; just as life and intellect are there intelligibly. For since all beings proceed from intelligibles, all things preexist there according to cause. And motion and permanency are there essentially, and sameness and difference uniformly.

Again, in the middle genera of the intelligible and intellectual hypostases, the same things subsist secondarily and vitally. In the summit of them indeed, essence subsists. For Socrates in the Phædrus speaking about this order, characterizes the whole of it from essence. For the truly-existing essence which is without colour, without figure, and without contact, subsists after this manner. But in the middle centre there are motion and permanency. For there the circulation of the heaven subsists, as the same Socrates says; being established indeed undeviatingly, in one form of intelligence; but being moved in, and about itself; or father being motion and eternal life. But in the extremity of this order, sameness and difference are vitally established. Hence it is converted to the beginning according to the nature of sameness, is divided uniformly, proceeds into more numbers, and generates from itself more partial monads.

Again, in the third orders, the highest of the intellectual Gods possesses all things according to essence, and is the intelligible itself and true being in intellectuals, again recalling the separation which is in himself into undivided union. But the middle order subsists according to motion and at the same time permanency. For it is a vivific deity, abiding and at the same time proceeding, being established with purity, and vivifying all things by prolific powers. And the third progression subsists according to sameness, together with difference. For this separates itself from the fathers, and is conjoined to them through intellectual conversion. And it binds, indeed, at once the natures posterior to itself, to each other, according to the common powers of forms, and at the same time separates them by intellectual sections. But in this order, all genera and species first shine forth to the view; because it is especially characterized according to difference, being allotted the end of all the total hypostases. From this likewise it proceeds to all things, viz. to participated intellect, the multiform orders of souls, and the whole of a corporeal nature. For in short, it constitutes triple genera of the natures posterior to itself; some indeed, being impartible and the first; others being media between partible and impartible natures; and others being divided about bodies. And through these things it generates all the more partial genera of beings. That we may therefore again return to what has been before said, the genera must be admitted to subsist every where, yet not every where after the same manner; but in the highest orders of divine natures indeed, they subsist uniformly, without separation, and unitedly, where also permanency participates of motion, and motion of permanency, and there is one united progression of both. In the more partial orders, however, it must be admitted that the same things subsist in a divided manner, and together with an appropriate remission. For since the first and most total of forms are in the extremity of intelligibles, it is indeed necessary that genera should have the beginning of their hypostasis in intelligibles. And if the demiurgic cause is generative of all the partial orders, it comprehends the first genera of the hypostasis of them. As likewise the fountain of all forms subsists in this cause, though there are intelligible forms, so the genera of being preexist in it, though there are other whole genera prior to it. And the divine Jamblichus somewhere rightly observes that the genera of being present themselves to the view in the extremity of the intelligible Gods. The present theology likewise, following things themselves, gives a progression to these as well as forms supernally, from the intelligible Gods. For such things as subsist according to cause, occultly, and without separation in the first essences [i. e. in intelligibles] these subsist in a divided and partible manner, and according to the nature of each,in intellectuals. For from hence, all the divisible orders of beings are filled both with these genera, and with formal hyparxes. And on this account, the demiurgus also is said to comprehend all genera, and to have the fountain of forms, because he generates, all the partial rivers [of life] and imparts to them from himself by illumination all the measures of subsistence. Hence triple genera of all beings proceed from the demiurgus, some indeed being impartible, others partible, and others subsisting between these, being more united indeed than the partible, but more separated than the impartible genera; but subsisting according to the middle of both, and connectedly containing the one bond of beings. And the demiurgus indeed produces the intellectual essence, through the first and impartible genera; but the corporeal essence through the third and partible genera; and the psychical hypostasis which is in the middle of these, through the middle genera in beings. Moreover, he generates every intellectual and impartible nature from himself, and fills them with total generative power. But he constitutes the psychical essence, in conjunction with the Crater; and the corporeal essence, in conjunction, with total Nature.

CHAPTER XXXI.

That in this arrangement likewise we follow Timæus, any one may learn from the following considerations: The demiurgus producing the intellect of the universe, himself produces it from his own essence alone, unfolding it at once according to one union, in consequence, of constituting it eternally, and no mention whatever is here made of the Crater. But the demiurgus in arranging and adorning soul prior to body, mingles the genera, and energizes in conjunction with the Crater. And in fashioning the body of the universe, and describing the heaven, he fabricates it in conjunction with Necessity. For the nature of the universe, says Timæus, was generated mingled from intellect and necessity. And neither does he here assume the Crater in order to the arrangement of bodies.

But it has been abundantly shown by us elsewhere, that Plato calls physical production, a production through necessity, and does not, as some suppose, consider necessity to be the same with matter. It is evident, therefore, that the demiurgus produces the generation of bodies together with total Nature, mingles the partible genera in the first Nature, and thus produces bodies from intellect and necessity. For bodies receive from intellect indeed, good and union; but from necessity a progression which terminates in interval and division. He arranges and adorns, however, the self-motive essence of souls, in conjunction with the Crater. And neither intellect, nor bodies, require a cause of this kind. The demiurgus indeed is the common source of the triple genera. But the Crater is the peculiar cause of souls, and is co-arranged with the demiurgus and filled from him, but fills souls. And receiving from thence indeed the powers of prolific abundance, it pours them on souls according to the measures of their respective essences. To some of them likewise it orderly distributes the summits of the genera [of being], to others the middle progressions of the genera, and to others, the terminations of them. Hence the Crater is indeed essentially vivific, since souls also are certain lives, but it is the first-effective cause of souls, according to the peculiarity of hyparxis, and is the uniform and all-perfect monad, not of every life, but of that which is psychical. For from this Crater the soul of the universe subsists, and likewise the second and third genera of partible souls, and of those souls that are allotted a progression between these.

The whole number, therefore, of the psychical order proceeds from the Crater, and is divided according to the prolific powers which it contains. Hence the Crater is said to be the cause of souls, the receptacle of their fabrication, and the generative monad of them, and the like. For it is said to be so rightly, and conformably to the mind of Plato. If, however, the Crater is co-arranged with the demiurgus, and equally constitutes with him the genera of souls, it is indeed necessary that this Crater should be fontal, in the same manner as the whole demiurgus. Hence the Crater is the fountain of souls, but it united to the demiurgic monad. And on this account, Socrates also in the Philebus says, that in Jupiter there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect. For that which we at present denominate fontal, he calls royal; though the name of fountain when applied to souls is well known to Plato. For Socrates, in the Phædrus, says, that the self-motive nature is the fountain and principle of motion to such other things as are moved.

And you see that as a twofold divine monad prior to souls is delivered by theologists, the one being indeed fontal, but the other of a primary ruling nature, Plato likewise gives to the progeny of these twofold; appellations, assuming one name from the more total, but the other front the more partial monad. For the self-motive nature, is a fountain indeed, as being the offspring of the fontal soul, but it is a principle, as participating of the primary ruling soul. If therefore, the name of fountain, and; also of principle is assigned by Plato to souls, what occasion is there to wonder if we denominate the exempt monads of them, fountains and principles? Or rather from these things that is demonstrated. For whence is a ruling power imparted to all souls except from the ruling monad? For that which similarly extends to all souls, is necessarily imparted to them from one and the same cause. If therefore, some one should say it is imparted by the demiurgus, so far as he is the demiurgus, it is necessary that in a similar manner it should be inherent in all other things which proceed from the demiurgic monad. But if it proceeds from the definite and separate cause of souls, that cause must be denominated the first fountain and principle of them.

Moreover, that of these two names, the ruling is more allied to souls than the fontal, as being nearer to them according to order, Plato manifests in the same dialogue. For calling the self-motive nature the fountain and at the same time principle of the motion of the whole of things, he nevertheless frames his demonstration of its unbegotten subsistence from principle alone. For, says he, principle is unbegotten. For it is necessary that every thing which is generated should be generated from a principle. If therefore, demonstrations are from things proximate to the things demonstrated, it is necessary that principle should be more proximate to souls than fountain. Farther still, if every thing which is generated is generated from a principle, as Plato says, but souls are in a certain respect generated, as Timæus says, there is also a precedaneous principle of souls. And as they are the principles of things which are generated according to time, so after another manner principle subsists prior to souls, which are generated. And as they are unbegotten according to the generation of bodies, thus also the principle of souls is exempt from all generation. Through these things therefore, it is demonstrated by us, that the Crater is the fountain of souls, that after the fountain there is a primary ruling monad of them, and that this monad is more proximate to souls than the fountain, but is established above them, as being their prolific cause. And all these particulars we have demonstrated from the words of Plato.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Again therefore, let us return to the things proposed, and teach in a greater degree the lovers of the contemplation of truth, concerning this Crater. For the whole vivific deity having established in the middle of the intellectual kings the prolific cause of divine natures, and according to her highest, most intellectual and all-perfect powers, being occultly united to the first father, but according to more partial and secondary causes from them, being conjoined to the demiurgus, and establishing one conspiration together with him of the generation of the partial orders, Timæus mystically mentions those more ancient powers of the Goddess, and which abide in the first father. But with respect to those powers that are co-arranged with the demiurgus, and adorn together with him the natures in the universe, some of these he delivers more clearly but the whole of others through indication. For the secondary monads themselves of the Goddess are triple, as the wise assert, one of them being the fountain of souls, the second, being the fountain of the virtues, but the third being the fountain of Nature which is suspended from the back of the Goddess. The demiurgus therefore, also assumes these three hypostases to his own prolific production. And the Crater indeed, as we have said, is the fountain of souls, unically containing the whole and perfect number of them. And as the demiurgus is allotted a paternal cause with respect to the psychical generation, so the Crater is prolific, and is allotted the ratio and order of a mother. For such things as Jupiter produces paternally in souls, the fountain of souls produces maternally and generatively.

Virtue however, energizes by itself, and adorns and perfects wholes. And on this account, the universe having participated of soul, immediately also participates of virtue. “For the demiurgus, says Timæus, having placed soul in the middle, extended it through the universe, and besides this surrounded the body of it externally with soul as with a veil, and causing circle to revolve in circle, constituted heaven one, alone and solitary, but through virtue able to converse with itself, and being in want of no other thing, but sufficiently known and friendly itself to itself.” At one and the same time therefore the world is animated, lives through the whole of its life according to virtue, and possesses from the virtues as its highest end, friendship with itself, and an all-perfect knowledge of itself. For it is itself sufficiently known and friendly to itself through virtue.

Moreover, nature also is consubsistent with the generation of body. For the demiurgus generates body through necessity, and fashions it together with its proper life. And on this account, shortly after, having constituted partial souls, he shows to them the nature of the universe, and the laws of Fate. For in consequence of possessing the cause of total Nature and Fate, he also exhibits these to souls. For the demiurgus is not converted to things posterior to himself, but primarily contains in himself the things which are exhibited, and unfolds to souls the powers of himself. Hence, the paradigm of all Nature, and the one cause of the laws of Fate pre-subsist in him. For the fountain of Nature, is called the first Fate by the Gods themselves. “You should not look upon Nature, for the name of it is fatal.” Hence also, Timæus says, that souls at one and the same time see the laws of Fate, and the nature of the universe, viz. they see as it were mundane Fate, and the powers of it. And the Elean guest in the Politicus, denominates the motive cause of the more physical circulation of the universe, Fate. For he says that “Fate and connate desire convolve the world.” And the same person likewise clearly acknowledges that the world possesses this power from the demiurgus and father. For he says that all the apparent arrangement and circulation are derived from Jupiter. It is demonstrated therefore, that according to these three causes of the vivific Goddess which are co-arranged with the demiurgus, the world is perfected by him, viz. according to the fontal Crater, the fountain of the virtues, and the first-effective cause of nature.

It is likewise manifest that again in these things Plato does not refuse to employ the name of fountain. For in the Laws he calls the power of prudence which is essentially inherent in souls, and which is productive of the virtues in us, the fountain of intelligence. And he also says, that two other fountains are imparted to us by nature, viz. pleasure and pain. As, therefore, we before demonstrated that souls are called the fountains of motions, on account of the one fountain of them, of which they participate, thus also when Plato calls the first progeny of Nature fountains, it is obvious to every one, that he will permit the exempt cause itself of them to be denominated a fountain. After the same manner, likewise, since he magnificently celebrates the essential power of virtue in us, as the fountain of intelligence, he will not be compelled to hear a name which does not at all pertain to his philosophy, if some one should be willing to denominate, the first monad of the virtues, a fountain. But where shall we have the name of fountain posited by him in the intellectual Gods? In the Cratylus, therefore, he says that Tethys is the occult name of a fountain, and he calls Saturn himself and the queen Rhea fluxions. For these divinities are rivers of the intelligible fountains, and proceeding from fountains placed above them, they fill all the natures, posterior to themselves with the prolific rivers of life. And the Crater itself likewise is fontal. The Gods, therefore, also denominate the first-effective causes of partial natures, fontal Craters. These things, however, we shall more fully investigate elsewhere. Let it be considered also, that we have here sufficiently examined the particulars concerning the demiurgic monad, according to the narration of Plato.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

In the next place, let us survey those causes and leaders of uncontaminated purity, and see if Plato any where appears to remind us of this order of Gods, and of the inflexible power proceeding from them to all the divine genera. For the. first-effective triad of the immutable order, is united to the triad of the intellectual kings and the progressions of the former are co-divided with the monads of the latter. And the summit of the triad, and as it were, the flower of the inflexible guard of wholes is united to the first intellectual king. But the middle centre of the triad, is in a kindred manner conjoined to the second intellectual king, proceeds together with him, and subsists about him. And the extremity of the whole triad is connected with the third intellectual king, is converted with him to the principle [of the intellectual order,] and together with him is convolved to the one union of the father of all the intellectual Gods. And after this manner, indeed, the three unpolluted guardians of the intellectual fathers, are monadically divided. But together with this division they have also an hypostasis united to each other. All of them, likewise, are in a certain respect in each of the fathers, and all of them energize about all. And after a certain manner indeed according to their proper hypostasis, they are divided from the fathers; but after another manner they are impartibly assumed with them, and at one and the same time they are allotted an equally dignified order with the father, and appear to possess an essence subordinate to them.

Such, therefore, being their nature, they preserve, indeed, the whole progressions of the fathers undefiled, but supply them with inflexibility in their powers, and immutability in their energies. They are suspended, however, from total purity. And if some of the ancients have in any of their writings surveyed in intellect that which always subsists with invariable sameness, which receives nothing into itself from subordinate natures, and is not mingled with things. inferior, they celebrate all such goods as these, as pervading to intellect, and other natures, from these Gods. For the oration in the Banquet of Plato, celebrates in a remarkable manner the immiscibility of the divine essence with secondary natures; and that which transcends the whole of things in purity and immutable power, arrives to the Gods through the guardian cause. And as the intellectual fathers, are the suppliers of prolific production, both to all other things, and to the inflexible Gods, thus also, the undefiled Gods, impart the power of purity, both to the fathers, and to the other divine orders. At one and the same time, therefore, the three unpolluted Gods subsist with the three intellectual kings, are the guardians of the fathers themselves, establish about them an immutable guard, and firmly fix themselves in them. Hence also, the Athenian guest, as he arranges and adorns his polity through the best analogy, through which, the demiurgus binds and constitutes the whole number [of the elements,] so likewise he appoints a guard to all the inhabitants of the region, that nothing, as much as possible, may be without defence; imitating in this the intellectual Gods themselves who guard all things by the undefiled leaders. And it appears to me that on this account he calls the rulers [of his polity] guardians of the laws, or [simply] guardians, because the inflexible guardians are consubsistent with the intellectual leaders of the whole Worlds.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

These arguments, however, will be more remote from that divine triad, and are referred to it from ultimate images. But perhaps omitting these, we may abound with greater conceptions, and more conducive to the investigation of the thing proposed, and speculating together with Plato the divine genera, we may discover how he also celebrates this order of Gods, and constitutes them together with the three kings that are now discussed, just as by other theologists also, we are mystically instructed in the truth concerning them. In the fable therefore of Protagoras, Plato indicating to us the exempt watch-tower of Jupiter, and the transcendency of his essence which is unmingled with all secondary natures, through which be is inaccessible and unrepealed to the partible genera of Gods, refers the cause of this to his immutable guard, and the defensive order by which he is surrounded. For on account of this, all the demiurgic powers indeed are firmly established in themselves. But all the forms [that are in him] are according to supreme transcendency exempt from secondary natures. And in short, the demiurgic intellect [through this order] abides after its accustomed manner. For the fable says that the guards of Jupiter are terrible to all things And on this account such [partible] genera of Gods (one of which also Prometheus is) cannot be immediately conjoined with the undefiled and Olympian powers of the demiurgus. If, therefore, Socrates himself in the form of a fable clearly delivers to us the guard about the demiurgus, is it not through these things evident that the guardian genus is consubsistent with the intellectual Gods? For as the Oracles say, that the demiurgic order is surrounded with a burning guard, thus also Plato says that guards stand round it, and defend inflexibly the summit of it exempt from all secondary natures.

But in the Cratylus, Socrates unfolding through the truth which is expressed in names, who Saturn is, demonstrates indeed his peculiar hyparxis, according to which he subsists as the leader of the total intellectual orders. He likewise unfolds to us the monad of the unpolluted order, which is united with Saturn. For Saturn, as he says in that dialogue, is a pure intellect. For, he adds, the koron of him, does not signify his being a boy, but the purity, and incorruptible nature of intellect. After an admirable manner therefore, the fabricator of these divine names, has at one and the same time conjoined the Saturnian peculiarity, and the first monad of the unpolluted triad. For the union of the first father with the first of the unpolluted Gods, is transcendent, and hence this inflexible God is called silent by the Gods, is said to accord with intellect, and to be known by souls according to intellect alone; because he subsists in the first intellect according to one union with it Saturn therefore, as being the first intellect, is defined according to its proper order, but as a pure and incorruptible intellect, he has the undefiled conjoined in himself. And on this account, he is the king of all the intellectual Gods. For as intellect he gives subsistence to all the intellectual Gods, and as a pure intellect, he guards the total orders of them. The two fathers therefore, [Saturn and Jupiter] are shown by the words of Plato to be co-arranged with the immutable Gods, according to union indeed, the first, but according to separation the third.

If you are willing however, to survey the one inflexible guard of them with respect to each other, according to which the third father is stably in the first, as being the intellect of him, and energizing about him, again direct your attention to the bonds in the Cratylus, of which indeed, partible lives, and the lives deprived of intellect, and which are stupidly astonished about matter, are unable to participate. But a divine intellect itself, and the souls which are conjoined to it, participate of these bonds according to an order adapted to them. For the Saturnian bonds, appear indeed to bind the mighty Saturn himself, but in reality, they connect about him in an undefiled manner the natures that throw the bonds around him. For a bond is the symbol of the connective order of the Gods, since every thing which is bound is connected by a bond. Again therefore from these things, the guardian good which extends from the connective Gods to the intellectual kings is apparent, since it unites, and collects them into one. For a bond guards that which is connected by it. But the immutable Gods inflexibly preserve their own appropriate orders. For the guardship of these Gods is twofold; the one indeed, being primary and uniform, and suspended from the triad of the connective Gods; but the other being co-existent with the intellectual kings, and defending them from a tendency to all secondary natures. For all the intellectual fathers ride on the unpolluted Gods, and are established above wholes, through their inflexible, undeviating, and immutable power.

If however, it be not only necessary that these two fathers should participate of this guardian order, but that the middle vivific deity of them should be allotted a monad of the immutable Gods coordinate to herself, it is indeed necessary that the first [guardianship] of the unpolluted leaders in the intellectual fathers, should be triadic, and should have the same perfect number with the three intellectual Gods. It is likewise necessary that the first of these leaders should be stably united to the first [of the intellectual kings]; but that the second should in a certain respect be separated from the second of these kings, together with a union with him. And that the third should now be entirely separated from the third king. And thus the unpolluted proceeds conformably to the paternal order, and is after the same manner with it triadically divided. The first of the unpolluted Gods likewise guards the occult nature of Saturn, and the first-effective monad which transcends wholes, and establishes perfectly in him the causes that proceed from, and again return to him. But the second, preserves the generative power of the queen Rhea, pure from matter, and undefiled, and sustains from the incursions of secondary natures her progression to all things, on which she pours the rivers of life. And the third preserves the whole fabrication of things established above the fabrications, and firmly abiding in itself. It likewise guards it so as to be inflexible, one, and all-perfect with respect to the subjects of its providential case, and expanded above all partial production.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Let us now then from this indefinite and common doctrine about these Gods, adduce the Grecian rumour concerning it, as delivered to us by Plato, and demonstrate that he as far as to the very names follows the theologists of the Greeks, just as in the mystic theory of the three kings, and the narration of the unpolluted Gods, he does not depart from their interpretation. For who that is in the smallest degree acquainted with the divine wisdom of the Greeks, does not know that in their arcane mysteries, and other concerns respecting the Gods, the order of the Curetes, is in a remarkable manner celebrated by them, as presiding over the undefiled peculiarity, as the leader of the goddess [[Rhea,] and as binding in itself the guardianship of wholes? These Gods therefore, are said to guard the queen Rhea, and the demiurgus of wholes, and proceeding as far as to the causes of partible vivification and fabrication, to preserve the Proserpine and Bacchus which are among these causes, exempt from secondary natures, just as here [i.e. in the intellectual order], they defend the vivifications of total life, and the first-effective monads of all-perfect fabrication. Not only Orpheus therefore, and the theologists prior to Plato knew this Curetic order, and knowing, venerated it, but the Athenian guest also in the Laws celebrates it. For he says, that the armed sports of the Curetes in Crete, are the principal paradigms of all elegant motion. And now, neither is he satisfied with having mentioned this Curetic order, but he also adds the one unity of the Curetes, viz. our mistress Minerva, from which the mystic doctrine also of theologists prior to him, suspends the whole progression of the Curetes. He likewise, surrounds them above with the symbols of Minerva, as presiding over an ever-flourishing life, and vigorous intellection; but beneath, he manifestly arranges them under the providence of Minerva. For the first Curetes indeed, as being the attendants of the intelligible and occult Goddess, are satisfied with the signs that proceed from thence; but those in the second and third orders, are suspended from the intellectual Minerval monad.

What then is it, that the Athenian guest says concerning this monad, which converts to itself in an undefiled manner the Curetic progressions? “The core (κορη) i.e. virgin, and mistress that is with us, being delighted with the discipline of dancing, did not think it proper to play with empty hands; but being adorned with an all-perfect panoply, she thus gave perfection to dancing.” Through these things therefore, the Athenian guest clearly shows the alliance of the Curetic triad to the Minerval monad. For as that triad is said to sport in armour, so he says that the Goddess who is the leader of them [i.e. of their progression] being adorned with an all-perfect panoply, is the source to them of elegant motion. And as he denominates that triad Curetic, from purity, so likewise he calls this goddess Core, as being the cause of undefiled power itself. For koron (το κορον) as Socrates says in the Cratylus, signifies the pure and incorruptible. Whence also the Curetes are allotted their appellation, as presiding over the undefiled purity of the Gods. And the monad of them is particularly celebrated as a mistress and as Core [a virgin] she being the supplier of an inflexible and flourishing dominion to the Gods. The word koron therefore, as we have said, is a symbol of purity, of which these Gods are the primary leaders, and according to which they are participated by others. But their being armed, is a symbol of the guardian power according to which they connect wholes, guard them exempt from secondary natures, and preserve them established in themselves. For what other benefit do men derive from arms except that of defence? For these are in a particular manner the safeguard of cities. Hence fables also ascribing to the unpolluted Gods an unconquerable strength, give to them an armed apparatus. Hence adorning the one unity of them with an all-perfect panoply, they establish it at the summit of the progression of these Gods. For the all-perfect precedes things which are divided according to parts, and the panoply exists prior to the partible distribution of guardian powers. And it appears to me that through these particulars Plato again asserts the same things as were afterwards revealed by the Gods. For what they denominate every kind of armour, this Plato celebrates as adorned with an all-perfect panoply. [For the Gods say,] “Armed with every kind of armour, he resembles the Goddess.” For the all-perfect in the habit of Pyrrhich arms, and the undefiled in power, pertain, according to Plato, to the Minerval monad; but according to the narration of the Oracles they pertain to that which is furnished with every kind of arms.

Farther still, rhythm and dancing are a mystic sign of this deity, because the Curetes contain the undefiled power of a divine life; because they preserve the whole progressions of it always arranged according to one divine boundary; and because they sustain these progressions from the incursions of matter. For the formless, the indefinite, and the privation of rhythm, are the peculiarities of matter. Hence, the immaterial, the definite, and the undefiled, are endued with rhythm, are orderly, and intellectual. For on this account, the heavens also are said to form a perpetual dance, and all the celestial orbs participate of rhythmical and harmonious motion, being filled with this power supernally from the unpolluted Gods. For because they are moved in a circle they express intellect, and the intellectual circulation. But because they are moved harmonically, and according to the first and best rhythms, they participate of the peculiarity of the guardian Gods. Moreover, the triad of the unpolluted leaders is suspended from the summit of the intellectual Gods. And that it proceeds from this summit, Plato himself teaches us, by placing the first cause of purity in Saturn the king of all the intellectual hebdomad. For purity (το κορον) is there primarily, as he informs us in the Cratylus, and the first-effective cause of purity, preexists unically in Saturn. For on this account also, the Minerval monad, is called Core (a virgin) and the Curetic triad is after this manner celebrated, being suspended from the purity in the intellectual father.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Concerning the undefiled leaders, thus much we have had to say, according to the narration of Plato. The monad therefore, now remains, which closes the number of all the intellectual hebdomad, and is the first arid uniform cause of all division, which must in the next place be discussed by us. The sections therefore, of the intellectual Gods which are celebrated by all the wise in divine concerns among the Greeks, and which obscurely signify the separations in those Gods, are effected in them through the seventh monad, which is the cause of division, and according to which they separate themselves from the Gods that are placed above them, proceeding into another order, are allotted a union exempt from subordinate natures, and by themselves have definite order and a progression bounded according to number. Plato however, allows indeed poets that are inspired by Phoebus, to signify things of this kind obscurely and mystically; but he excludes the multitude from hearing these things, because they believe without examination in the fabulous veils of truth. And this is, what Socrates reprobates in Euthyphron, who was thus affected in consequence of being ignorant of divine concerns. According to the divinely-inspired intellect of Plato therefore, transferring all such particulars to the truth concerning wholes, and unfolding the concealed theory which they contain, we shall procure for ourselves the genuine worship of a divine nature. For Socrates himself in the Cratylus, unfolds to us the Saturnian bonds, and their mystic meaning, and in a remarkable manner demonstrates that the visions of those ancient and illustrious men do not fall off from the truth.

After the same manner therefore, he will permit his friends to assume intellectual sections, and the power which is productive of these, according to divinely-inspired conceptions, and will suffer them to survey these together with bonds in the intellectual Gods. Farther still, the fable in the Gorgias, in a clearer manner separates the empire of Jupiter from the Saturnian kingdom, and calls the former the second from, and more recent than the latter. What is the cause, therefore, which separates these paternal monads? What intellectual power produced the intellectual empire from that which is exempt from it? For it is necessary that there should be with the Gods themselves the first-effective fountain of division, through which Jupiter also separates himself from the monad his father, Saturn from the kingdom of the Heaven, and the natures posterior to Jupiter, proceeding into an inferior order, are separated from his all-perfect monad.

Moreover, the demiurgus himself in the production of the genera posterior to himself, at one and the same time is the cause to them of union, and the source of their all-various divisions. For fabricating the soul one whole, he separates it into parts, and all-various powers. And in the Timæus where the demiurgus is said to do this, Plato himself does not refuse to call these separations, and essential divisions, sections. He likewise cuts off parts from thence, places them in that which is between these, and again separates parts from the whole, and thus the mixture from which he had cut off these parts, was now wholly consumed. Is it therefore any longer wonderful that the framers of fables should denominate the divisions of the intellectual leaders, sections, since even Timæus himself who does not devise fables, but indicates the essential progression of souls into multitude, uses as a sign the word section? And does not also Plato in the greatest degree accord with the highest of theologists, when he delivers to us the demiurgus glittering with intellectual sections? As therefore the demiurgus, when producing the essence of souls, constitutes it according to true being, when generating life, he generates it according to the life which is in real beings, and produces the intellect which is in souls according to the intellect which is in himself,—thus also when cutting the essence of the soul from itself, and separating it, he energises according to the sections and separations which are in the intellectual order, and according to the one and intellectual cause of them. According to Plato, therefore, there is a first monad of the total divisions in intellectuals, and together with the twofold triads, I mean the paternal and the undefiled, it gives completion to the whole intellectual hebdomad. And we, following Plato, and other theologists, concede the same things.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

Let us now, however, return to the beginning, and demonstrate that Parmenides delivers the same things concerning this intellectual hebdomad, and that he produces this hebdomadic aiōn (eternity) and the peculiarity of the Gods which is intellectual alone, in continuity with. the triple orders of the intelligible, and at the same time intellectual Gods. And, in the first place, let us survey what he says concerning the father of the intellectual Gods, and the undefiled power which is co-arranged with him. For after the threefold figure, and the order of the Gods which perfects all things, that which is in itself and in another, becomes apparent. These things, however, are demonstrated to be signs of the intellectual summit of the intellectual monads. For the first father of the Gods in this order, at one and the same time is allotted a paternal transcendency with respect to those posterior to him, and is the intellect of the first intelligibles. For every imparticipable intellect is said to be the intellect of the natures prior to itself, and towards them, from whom it is produced, it has an intellectual conversion, and in them as first-effective causes it establishes itself. Whence also the demiurgic intellect is the intellect of the natures above itself, and proximately indeed of its own father, from which likewise it proceeds, but eminently of the intelligible unities beyond [Saturn].

The first king, therefore, in intellectuals, is both an intellectual father, and a paternal intellect. He is, however, the intellectual father indeed of the Gods that proceed from himself; but he is the paternal intellect of the intelligibles prior to himself. For he is indeed intellectual essentially; but he has an intelligible transcendency in intellectuals; because he is also established analogous to the unknown order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, and to the occult order of the intelligible triads. And as they are expanded above the triadic hypostases of the Gods posterior to themselves, thus also the father of intellectuals, is a father expanded above the whole intellectual hebdomad, in consequence of being a paternal intellect. And analogously to the above-mentioned orders of Gods, he establishes himself in them, and is filled from them with paternal and intelligible union. On this account also, he is occult, shuts in himself the prolific powers of himself, and producing from himself total causes, he again establishes them in, and converts them to himself.

These things, therefore, Parmenides also indicating, magnificently celebrates this order by these twofold signs, and characterizes the first king and father of the intellectual Gods through these peculiarities. For he is in himself, and in another. For so far indeed as he is a total intellect, his energy is directed to himself, but so far as he is in the intelligibles prior to himself, he establishes in another the all-perfect intelligence of himself. For, indeed, this subsistence in another, is more excellent than the subsistence of a thing in itself; since, as Parmenides himself concludes, the subsistence of Saturn in another, pertains to him according to whole, but the subsistence of him in himself, according to parts. Where, therefore, does the another pre-exist? And to what order of the Gods prior to Saturn does it belong? Or is not this also divinely unfolded by our preceptor? For he says that this another, remarkably pertains to that order, according to which the power of difference first shines forth, being the progeny of intelligible and paternal power. Hence in the first triad the another was occultly, so far as power also had there an occult subsistence; but it particularly shines forth in the first order of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. For there the first difference, the feminine nature of the Gods, and the paternal and unvocal power subsist.

[Saturn therefore] who is the first of the intellectual fathers being intelligible, so far as he is a whole, establishes himself in the intelligible triads prior to himself, from which also he is filled with united and occult goods. And on this account he is said to be in another. With respect to those triads indeed, the another is occultly and according to cause in the intelligible [i. e. in the first triad] of intelligibles; but according to essence in the intelligible of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods. All intelligibles therefore are united; the intelligible indeed of the intelligible and intellectual Gods being united to the intelligible of the intelligibles prior to intellectuals; but the intelligible of intellectuals, to both. And the subsistence indeed in another, adheres to the difference which is according to unical number. But unical number is suspended from the occult union of the one being; on which account also it is unical.

Farther still, we also say, that there is a twofold conversion in those orders, the one indeed being towards themselves, but the other towards the causes of them, (for it neither was nor will be lawful for divine natures, to convert themselves in any respect to natures posterior to themselves). And the intelligible Gods generate all things stably; but the intelligible and intellectual Gods who illuminate imparticipable life, impart the original cause of progression to all things; and the intellectual Gods arrange and adorn wholes according to conversion. Hence, it is indeed necessary that the summit of intellectuals which pours forth from itself the whole and all-perfect form of conversion, should be characterized by both the convertive symbols, and should be at one and the same time converted to itself, and to the natures prior to itself. Hence, because indeed, it is converted to itself, it is in itself; but because it is converted to the intelligible orders beyond itself, it is in another. For the another is more excellent than the whole intellectual order. As, therefore, the summit of intelligibles primarily subsists according to the intelligible peculiarity itself, and is firmly established above wholes; and as the summit of intelligibles and intellectuals primarily unfolds the peculiarity of this order, subsisting according to divine diversity, and being to all things the cause of all-various progressions;—thus also the intelligible deity of intellectuals, exhibits from himself according to union the twofold forms of conversion, being indeed in another according to the more excellent form of conversion, but in himself according to the less excellent form. For to be converted to himself is inferior to the conversion to more excellent natures.

Again, therefore, the subsistence in another, is the illustrious prerogative of the intelligible and paternal peculiarity. For the another is intelligible, and difference was the power proceeding from the intelligible fathers, and from the natures firmly established in them. Hence, that which is comprehended in this power, and is filled from it, is paternal and intelligible. But the subsistence of a thing in itself is the proper sign of the unpolluted monad. For as we have before observed, the summits of the two intellectual triads are conjoined. And the monad of the guardian triad has eternally established itself in the paternal monad, and again establishes in, and converts to itself the natures which have proceeded from itself. And the first intellectual father is indeed father on account of himself, but on account of the unpolluted [monad,] he comprehends in himself the genera of himself, stably recalls them [when they have proceeded from him] to himself, and in his own allness contains the intelligible multitudes of intellectuals in unproceeding union with their monad.

The first leader, therefore, of the guardian order subsists in conjunction with the father. And the father indeed comprehends the unpolluted cause, but is comprehended by the first intelligibles. And as he is intelligibly established in them, so likewise he has established in himself, and constituted about himself, the one summit of the inflexible Gods. In the Parmenides, therefore, also the same God appears to us to be a pure intellect. Because, indeed, he is intellect, being extended to the intelligible place of survey, and on this account being in another, so far as he is wholly established in it. But again, because he is pure and immaterial, being converted to himself, and shutting in himself all his own powers. For the parts of this wholeness, are more partial powers, which hasten indeed to a progression from the father, but are on all sides established and comprehended by the wholeness. And the wholeness itself is a deity, connectedly containing in itself intelligible parts, being parturient indeed with intellectual multitude, generating all things stably, and again embosoming and collecting to itself its progeny, and as the more tragical fables say, absorbing and depositing them in itself For the progeny of it are twofold; some indeed, being, as it were, analyzed into it; but others being divided from it. And some abiding in it through the first unpolluted monad; but others proceeding according to the prolific cause of the intellectual Gods, surmounting the union of the father, and being the primary leaders of another order, and of the arrangement and ornament of secondary natures. The first order therefore of the intellectual Gods, is thus delivered to us by Parmenides.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

The second order however, after this, is that which comprehends the middle genera of wholes, is the cause to all things of progression and prolific power, and is in continuity with the first order of the intellectual Gods. What else therefore than life is every where in continuity with the intelligible and true being? For it is the medium between intellect and the intelligible, conjoining intellect to the intelligible, and expressing the intelligible power which collects together the one and being. As the intelligible therefore is to the one and hyparxis, so is life to power, and intellect to being. And as in intelligibles, the one is the object of desire, but being aspires after the participation of the one, and power collects being to the participation of the one, and the one to a communion with being, (for the one here is not imparticipable, and exempt from all power) so likewise the intelligible is the object of desire to intellect, but intellect is filled with it. And life binds indeed intellect to the intelligible, but unfolds the intelligible to intellect. Whence also, I think, those who are wise in all divine concerns, call the one and hyparxis intelligible. But that which is primarily being, they call the first intellect, conformably to this analogy. Life therefore, is the medium between being and intellect, in the same manner as power subsists between the one and being. And all these, viz. the intelligible, life, and intellect are primarily in intelligibles; but secondarily in intelligibles and intellectuals; and according to a third diminution, in intellectuals. In intelligibles however, being is according to essence; for there intellect is primarily according to cause. But in intellectuals, intellect indeed, is according to essence; but the natures prior to intellect, are according to participation. Since therefore, life is surveyed in a threefold respect, in intelligibles indeed according to cause; but in intelligibles and intellectuals, according to hyparxis; and in intellectuals, according to participation, it is indeed necessary that the life which is in the intellectual order, should both be life, and participate of the causes generative of life prior of itself. The one therefore of the intellectual Gods which is arranged in the middle, is not motion, but that which is moved. For prior to this, it has been demonstrated by Plato, that all life is motion. For soul is self-motive because it is self-vital. And intellect is on this account moved, because it has the most excellent life. The first vivific cause, therefore, of the intellectual Gods, is primarily allotted motion. If, however, it was the first-effective and highest life, it would be requisite to denominate it motion, and not that which is moved. But since it is life as in intellectuals, but is filled from exempt life, it is at the same time motion, and that which is moved. Very properly, therefore, does Parmenides demonstrate that the one in this order is moved, because it proceeds from the causes of all life that are placed above it, and is analogous to the middle centre of intelligibles, and to the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals. Hence also, Socrates in the Phædrus calls this middle triad Heaven; for the whole of it is life and motion. But that which is moved, is the middle in intellectuals, as being filled from it, [i. e. from the life in the middle triad of intelligibles and intellectuals;] since eternity also, which is arranged according to the intelligible wholeness, is all-perfect life, and all life, according to Plotinus. There, however, the middle is life according to cause; but in intellectuals, it is life according to participation; and in the order between these, it is life according to essence, proceeding indeed from intelligible life, (as Parmenides also manifests, characterizing both according to wholeness, though the wholeness in intelligibles is different from that which is in intelligibles and intellectuals, as we have before observed,) but producing after this, intellectual life. For that which is moved, is indeed entirely allied to the circulation of the Heaven, and to intellectual and intelligible life.

Moreover, the permanency which is coordinate with this motion, is not one certain genus of being, as neither is motion. For beings indeed are naturally adapted to participate of the genera of being; but the superessential goods of the Gods, are expanded above the order of beings. If, therefore, Parmenides here, assuming the one itself by itself, surveys in this motion and permanency, he evidently does not attribute the elements of being to the Gods, but assigns to them peculiarities appropriate, all-perfect, and transcending wholes. And thus asserting that the one is moved and stands still, according to motion, indeed, he delivers the vivific hyparxis of the Gods, the generative fountain of wholes, and the leading cause of all things. But according to permanency, he delivers the unpolluted monad coordinated with motion, and which connectedly-contains the middle centres of the guardian triad. For as the summit of the guardian triad, is united to the first father, according to the first hypostasis, thus also the deity who contains the middle bond of the unpolluted leaders, is by a congeniality of nature consubsistent with the motive cause of all the Gods, which moves wholes, and is primarily moved from itself. And through this deity, the prolific power of this Goddess [Rhea] is firmly established in herself. Producing likewise, and multiplying all things, she is [through this deity] exempt from wholes, and inflexibly exists prior to her progeny. With respect, therefore, to motion here and permanency, the former indeed is the fountain of the life and generative power that proceeds to all things; but the latter, establishes the whole vivific fountain in itself, but is from thence filled with the prolific rivers of life. Parmenides, therefore, delivering to us these things, and the progression of them, demonstrates that that which is moved is generated from that which is in another, but that which stands still, from that which is in itself. For the first monad of the paternal triad constitutes the natures posterior to it. And after the Same manner, the highest of the unpolluted triad, and which is intelligible as in this triad, imparts at one and the same time the middle and last monad of the triad. Oh this account, also, motion here is better than permanency. For as a subsistence in another is according to cause more ancient than the subsistence of a thing in itself, so likewise that which is moved, is causally more ancient than that which is permanent. For the unpolluted Gods, are in power subordinate to the fathers, and are comprehended in them.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

The third, therefore, to the Saviour, as they say, and let us direct our attention to the demiurgic monad, unfolding itself into light together with the coordinate Gods it contains. In the first place, then, here also the communion of the one with other things is apparent, and we must no longer consider the one alone by itself, but according to its habitude towards other things. Because, therefore, the demiurgic order produces wholes from itself, and arranges and adorns a corporeal nature, it also generates all the second and ministrant causes of the Gods. For what occasion is there to say that the term other things, is a sign of a corporeal condition of being, since formerly the Pythagoreans thought fit to characterize an incorporeal nature by the one, but indicated to us the nature which is divisible about body, through the term others? In the second place, the number of the conclusions [in this part of the Parmenides] is doubled. For the one is no longer demonstrated to be alone same, or different, as it is to be in itself, and in another, or to be moved, and stand still, but it is demonstrated to be the same with itself, and different from itself, and to be different from other things, and the same with other things. But this twice appeared to us before to be entirely adapted to the demiurgic monad, both according to other theologists, and to Socrates in the Cratylus, who says that the demiurgic name is composed from two words. In the third place, therefore, the multitude of causes is here separated, and all the monads of the Gods present themselves to the view, according to the demiurgic progression. For the demiurgic order is apparent, the prolific power co-ordinate with it, the undefiled monad the cause of exempt providence, and the distributive fountain of wholes; and together with these, as I may say, all the orders about the demiurgus are apparent, according to which he produces and preserves all things, and being exempt from the things produced, is firmly established in himself, and separates his own kingdom, from the united empire of his father.

How, therefore, and through what particulars do these things become apparent? We reply, that the same with itself (for this Parmenides first demonstrates) represents to us about the nature of the one, the monadic and paternal peculiarity, according to which the demiurgus also subsists. Hence, likewise, the one is said to be the same with itself. For the another is in the demiurgus according to the transcendency of different causes; but the same, appears to be a sign of his proper, viz. of his paternal, hyparxis. For being one, and the exempt father and demiurgus of wholes, he establishes his proper union in himself. And in this one, Parmenides in a remarkable manner shows the uniform, and that which is allied to bound. But the same with other things, is the singular good of prolific power, and of a cause proceeding to, and pervading through all things without impediment. For the demiurgus is present to all things which he produces, and is in all things the same, which he arranges and adorns, pre-establishing in himself the generative essence of wholes. If, therefore, we rightly assert these things, bound and infinity subsist in him demiurgically. And the one indeed is in the sameness which is separate from other things, but the other is in the power which generates other things. For every where power is prolific of secondary natures. But the principle which subsists according to bound, is the supplier of an united and stable hypostasis.

Moreover, the different from other things, manifests his undefiled purity and his transcendency which is exempt from all secondary natures. For the first intellect was on this account pure and incorruptible, as Socrates says in the Cratylus, because it is established above coordination or communion with all sensible natures. For as some one of the Gods says, he does not incline his power to matter, but is at once exempt from all fabrication. But the demiurgic intellect receiving from thence total power, and a royal dominion, adorns indeed sensibles, and constitutes the whole of a corporeal nature. Together however, with prolific abundance, and the providential attention to secondary natures, he transcends his progeny, and abides in his own accustomed manner, as Timæus says, through the inflexible guard which subsists with him, and the power imparted to him from it, which is uncontaminated with other participants. Hence, through the never-failing supply of good, and providential energies, and the generation of subordinate natures, he is the same with them. For he is participated by them, and fills his progeny with his own providential care. But through his purity, undefiled power, and inflexible energies, he is separate from wholes, is disjoined from them and is imparticipable by other things. And as the first king of intellectuals is allotted his non-inclination to matter, through the guard which is united to him, and through the undefiled monad; and as the vivific goddess possesses her stable and inflexible power from the second cause of the guardian Gods; thus also the demiurgic intellect preserves a transcendency exempt from other things, and a union separated from multitude, through the third monad of the leaders of purity. For the cause of separate providence is a guard coordinate with the demiurgus, who hastens to produce all things, and to pervade through all things. But the guard which is the supplier of stable power is coordinate with the vivific deity, who is moved to the generation of wholes. And with the intellect that is multiplied according to intellectual conceptions [i. e. with Saturn,] the guard is coordinate, that imparts an undefiled union of the conversion of all his energies to himself. The monad, therefore, remains, which is arranged as the seventh of these intellectual monads, which is present with, and energizes with all of them, but particularly unfolds itself into light in the demiurgic order, and which Parmenides also producing for us together with the whole demiurgus, defines it in difference, in the same manner as he does the undefiled cause in the demiurgus. He says however, that this difference separates the demiurgic monad itself from itself. For we have before observed that this order is the supplier of separation to all the Gods. As therefore, the demiurgus is the same with himself, through the paternal union, after the same manner he is separated from himself and his father through this difference. Whence therefore, does he derive this power? From being in himself, says Parmenides, and in another. For these were indeed unitedly in the first father, but separately in the third. Separation therefore, preexisted there according to cause; but in the demiurgus it shines forth, and unfolds the power of itself.

That the cause however of division, is in a certain respect in the first father, Parmenides manifests in the first hypothesis, when he says, “that every thing which is in itself is in a certain respect a duad, and is separated from itself.” There however, the duad is occultly; but here it subsists more clearly, where also all intellectual multitude shines forth to the view. For difference is the progeny of the firmly-abiding duad which is there. This therefore separates the demiurgic intellect from the Gods prior to it, and divides the monads in it from each other. For if so far as it is in another, it is united to the intelligible of itself, but so far as it is in itself it is separated from it, because it proceeds according to each order of its own intelligible,—if this be the case, it is necessary that this difference should be the cause to it of separation from its father. All the intellectual monads therefore; have appeared to us to subsist coordinately with each other. And the subsistence indeed, in another is the sign of the father. But the subsistence in itself, is the sign of the first unpolluted monad. Again, motion is the sign of vivific goodness; but permanency of the inflexible power conjoined with motion. And sameness with itself, and with another, is the sign of the demiurgic peculiarity; but the being different from other things, is the sign of the guard about the demiurgus. And in the last place, the being different from itself, is the sign of the seventh intellectual monad, which is according to cause indeed, and occultly in the first father, but is allotted its hypostasis more clearly in the demiurgus. Parmenides likewise appears to me, when dividing the signs of fabrication, to have unfolded in the middles themselves, the peculiarities of the undefiled monad, and of the dividing monad, so far as they also are in a certain respect comprehended in the fabrication. For he shows in the first of the conclusions that the one is the same with itself; in the second, that it is different from itself; in the third, that it is different from other things; and in the fourth that it is the same with other things. For he co-arranges indeed, the dividing power with the paternal union; but connects with a transcendency separate from secondary natures, the providential cause of them. For in the Gods, it is necessary that union should exist prior to separation, and and a purity unmingled with secondary natures, prior to a providential inspection of them; through which likewise, being every where, they are no where, being present with all things, they are exempt from all things, and being all things, they are not any of their progeny.

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END OF VOL. I.

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1. For νοερων, it is necessary to read νοητων.
2. Morphe pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of superficies.
3. i. e. Of the father of Tantalus.