The passing of Korea
by Homer Bezaleel Hulbert
Chapter 14, THE JAPANESE IN KOREA
660853The passing of Korea — Chapter 14, THE JAPANESE IN KOREAHomer Bezaleel Hulbert

CHAPTER XIV
THE JAPANESE IN KOREA

WE must now go back and inquire into important civil matters. We have seen that no strong attempt was made by the Japanese to secure reforms in the administration of the Korean government, and for this reason many of the best Koreans were dissatisfied with the way things were going. Therefore it was doubly unfortunate that on the i7th of June the Japanese authorities should make the startling suggestion that all uncultivated land in the peninsula, as well as other national resources, should be thrown open to the Japanese. This appears to have been a scheme evolved by one Nagamori, and broached by him so speciously to the powers in Tokyo that they backed him in it; but there can be no question that it was a grave mistake. There is no other point on which the Korean is so sensitive as upon that of his land. He is a son of the soil, and agriculture is the basis of all his institutions. The mere proposal raised an instant storm of protest from one end of Korea to the other. The Koreans saw in this move the entering wedge which would rive the country. It was the beginning of the end. This excessive show of feeling was not expected by the Japanese, and it is probable that their intentions were by no means so black as the Koreans pictured them. The very general terms in which the proposal was worded, and the almost entire lack of limiting particulars, gave occasion for all sorts of wild conjectures and, it must be confessed, left the door open to very wide constructions. The time was unpropitious, the method was unfortunate, and the subject-matter of the proposal itself was questionable.

The all-important matter of water supply and control, the difficulties of jurisdiction on account of the extra-territorial rights implied in the proposal, and other allied questions immediately presented themselves to the minds of Koreans, and they recognised the fact that the carrying out of this plan would necessarily result in a Japanese protectorate, if not absolute absorption into the Empire of Japan. The Japanese do not seem to have followed the logic of the matter to this point, or else had not believed the Koreans capable of doing so. But when the storm of protest broke it carried everything before it. The Japanese were not prepared to carry the thing to extremes, and, after repeated attempts at a compromise, the matter was dropped, though the Japanese neither withdrew their request nor accepted the refusal of the Korean government. It is a matter of great regret that the Japanese did not quietly and steadily press the question of internal reforms, and by so doing hasten the time when the Korean people as a whole would repose such confidence in the good intentions of the neighbour country that even such plans as this of the waste lands could be carried through without serious opposition; for it is quite sure that there is a large area of fallow land in Korea which might well be put under the plough.

During the weeks when the Japanese were pressing for a favourable answer to the waste-land proposition the Koreans adopted a characteristic method of opposition. A society calling itself the Po-an was formed. The name means "Society for the Promotion of Peace and Safety." It had among its membership some of the leading Korean officials. It held meetings at the cotton guild in the centre of Seoul, and a good deal of excited discussion took place as to ways and means for defeating the purpose of the Japanese. At the same time memorials by the same poured in upon the Emperor, beseeching him not to give way to the demands. The Japanese determined that these forms of opposition must be put down; so on the 16th of July the meeting of the society was broken in upon by the Japanese police, and some of the leading members were forcibly carried away to the Japanese police station. Other raids were made upon the society, and more of its members were arrested and its papers confiscated. The Japanese warned the government that these attempts to stir up a riot must be put down with a stern hand, and demanded that those who persisted in sending in memorials against the Japanese be arrested and punished. If the Korean government would not do it, the Japanese threatened to take the law into their own hands. The Japanese troops in Seoul were augmented until the number was fully six thousand.

The agitation was not confined to Seoul, for leading Koreans sent out circular letters to all the country districts urging the people to come up to Seoul and make a monster demonstration which should convince the Japanese that they were in dead earnest. Many of these letters were suppressed by the prefects, but in spite of this the news spread far and wide, and the society enrolled thousands of members in every province.

The effect of this was seen when, early in August, the Japanese military authorities asked for the services of six thousand Korean coolies in the north at handsome wages. The number was apportioned among different provinces, but the. results were meagre. Disaffected persons spread the report that these coolies would be put on the fighting line, and it was with the greatest difficulty that two thousand were secured. There were sanguinary fights in many towns where attempts were made to force coolies to go against their will. It was perfectly right for the Japanese to wish to secure such labour, but the tide of public sentiment was flowing strong in the other direction, because of the attempt to secure the waste land and because of the suspension of the right of free speech.

The cessation of Japanese efforts to push the waste-land measure did not put an end to agitation throughout the country, and the Po-an Society continued to carry on its propaganda, until on the 22nd of August a new society took the field, named the Il-chin Society. This was protected by the Japanese police, who allowed only properly accredited members to enter its doors.

MARTIAL LAW
Three Koreans shot for pulling up rails as a protest against seizure of land without payment by Japanese

This looked as if it were intended as a counter-move to the Po-an Society, and, as the latter was having very little success, a third society took up the gauntlet under the name of the Kuk-min, or " National People's " Society. The platforms promulgated by all these societies were quite faultless, but the institutions had no power whatever to carry out their laudable plans, and so received only the smiles of the public. During the summer the Japanese suggested that it would be well for Korea to recall her foreign representatives. The idea was to have Korean diplomatic business abroad transacted through Japanese legations. Whether this was a serious attempt or only a feeler put out to get the sense of the Korean government we are unable to say, but up to the end of the year the matter was not pushed.

The various societies which had been formed as protests against existing conditions stated some things that ought to be accomplished, but suggested no means by which they could be done. The difficulty which besets the country is the lack of general education, and no genuine improvement can be looked for until the people are educated up to it. For this reason a number of foreigners joined themselves into the Educational Association of Korea, their aim being to provide suitable textbooks for Korean schools and to help in other ways toward the solution of the great question. About the same time the Minister of Education presented the government with a recommendation that the graduates of the government schools be given the preference in the distribution of public offices. This had no apparent effect upon the government at the time, but this is what must come before students will flock to the government schools with any enthusiasm. Later in the year a large number of Koreans also founded an educational society. It made no pretensions to political significance, but went quietly to work, gathering together those who are convinced that the education of the masses is the one thing needed to put Korea firmly upon her feet. In the middle of October the Japanese military authorities sent Marshal Hasegawa to take charge of military affairs in Korea. He arrived on the i3th, and shortly after went to Wonsan to inspect matters in that vicinity. The news of considerable Russian activity in northeast Korea seemed to need careful watching, and the presence of a general competent to do whatever was necessary to keep them in check.

The laying of the last rail of the Seoul-Fusan Railway was an event of great importance to Korea. It adds materially to the wealth of the country, both by forming a means of rapid communication and by enhancing the value of all the territory through which it runs. It also gives Japan such a large vested interest here that it becomes, in a sense, her guarantee to prevent the country from falling into the hands of other powers. But, like all good things, it has its dangers as well.

Mr. Megata, the new Adviser to the Finance Department, arrived in the autumn, and began a study of Korean monetary and financial conditions. This should have been an augury of good, for Korean finance has always been in a more or less chaotic condition, but, as we shall see, it spelled worse disaster than ever.

Late in the year Mr. Stevens, the newly appointed Adviser of the Foreign Department, took up his duties, which, though less important than those of Mr. Megata, nevertheless gave promise that the foreign relations of the government would be handled exclusively in the interests of Japan.

The year 1905 gives us a complete picture of Japanese methods in handling an alien people. It has been said that Japan has much the same work to do in Korea that England has in Egypt. Let us see how far the methods of these two powerful governments coincide. It has been said, again, that up to the present time Japan has not been able to show what she can do in this line, because she has been so busy with the war, but we would ask the reader to note that an American gentleman who has resided many years in Formosa made the remark publicly that the methods used by Japan in Korea are precisely those that have been used in Formosa ever since the ChinaJapan war of 1894.

The whole Japanese army is made up of men of the upper middle class. No man of the lower classes can stand in the ranks of that army. It is generally known that the relative social grade of the Japanese soldier is much higher than in any other country. These are men who have imbibed the old Samurai spirit and who in just that proportion hold themselves above the lower classes. It is for this reason that such a remarkable change came over the face of affairs in Korea after the Japanese armies had passed and the thousands of adventurers and self-seekers followed in its train. Unlawful action by a Japanese soldier was almost unknown, and the Koreans were constrained to lay aside their old-time suspicion and receive them as harbingers of a new and better era. When, therefore, the heavy influx of low-class Japanese began, and they, on the strength of the prowess of Japanese arms, began to treat the Koreans as the very scum of the earth and to perpetrate all sorts of outrages, it was inevitable that a mighty reaction should take place. It has never been explained why the Japanese authorities did not hold back this tide of immigration until the war was over and proper steps could be taken to establish sufficient legal machinery to govern the ruffians properly.

It will be asked what specific evidence is there that Koreans were ill-treated. This question must be met and answered. The following are a few of the cases that have come within the notice of the writer and of other American residents in Seoul and other parts of Korea, and which can be thoroughly attested.

An American gentleman stood upon a railway station platform where a score or more of Japanese were waiting for a train. An aged Korean, leaning upon a staff, mounted the platform and looked about him with interest. It is likely that he had never before seen a railroad train. A half-naked Japanese employee of the road seized the old man by the beard and threw him heavily upon the station platform. The Korean arose with difficulty and picked up his cane to go. The Japanese then threw him backwards off the platform on to the rails, and then stood back and laughed, as did all the other Japanese. Apparently there was not a single Japanese in all that company who saw in this event anything but a good joke. The old Korean was too severely hurt to rise, but some of his Korean friends came and picked him up and took him away. The reader will wonder why the American gentleman did not interfere. Well, the fact is, he knew he would be uselessly sacrificing his own life. If he had raised a finger in the Korean's defence, the chances of his getting away without being killed would have been less than one in a hundred. At another station there is a little side-path where Koreans are forbidden to walk, but there is no sign whatever so to indicate. A Korean stepped out upon this walk, and was instantly attacked by three or four Japanese and pounded into insensibility. It was a day or more before he regained consciousness, and he was not able to leave his house for weeks.

The Japanese look upon the Koreans as lawful game, and the latter, having no proper tribunals where they can obtain redress, do not dare to retaliate. If they complain at Korean courts, the magistrate lifts hands of horror and asks how in the world he is to get anything out of the Japanese, and if he applies to a Japanese court he is usually turned away without a hearing. This is hard to believe, but the following facts go far to prove it.

A Korean brought in from the country some Korean money to exchange for Japanese money. He deposited his cash with the leading Japanese broker, taking the latter's note of hand, payable at sight to bearer. Two days later he came to have the note cashed, and the broker said he had already paid it, but had failed in the hurry of the moment to take the note. The Korean tried three times to place the matter before the proper Japanese authorities, but was thwarted each time, and when at last, by the aid of a foreigner, he got the case taken up, he was roundly scolded for obtaining foreign help,—but the money was paid. An American gentleman was served the same trick by the same broker, and, though the Japanese authorities granted that it was a perfectly clear case, he recovered the money only after nine months of hard work, and then without interest. A Korean bought a valuable business block from a Japanese, but when he went to claim it the Japanese tenant who had rented it from the former owner refused to leave, on the plea that he had no other place to go. Time and again the owner applied to the Japanese for redress, and it was only after a foreigner interfered and pressed the matter that the Japanese authorities were shamed into doing tardy justice.

The trouble has been that, however good may have been the plans of the highest men in Japan, they have not a sufficient body of agents who are broad-minded enough to carry out the plans in the spirit they are given. To illustrate this: in the building and repairing of the railroad it is found cheaper to use Koreans than Japanese. The head office orders the work to be done and says that Koreans must be treated properly. There it ends. The Japanese headmen of the working gangs go into the villages all along the way, and at the point of the revolver or sword compel Koreans by the hundreds to go and work at one-third of a day's wage. They have the option of making a money payment in lieu of work, but they have to pay, for each day that they get off, twice what they would have received. In this way one township handed over some twenty thousand dollars of blackmail, and for part of it they had to pay twelve per cent a month to money-lenders!

The Koreans have suffered especially in the matter of real estate. On the strength of Korea's promise to supply all the land necessary for Japanese military operations, the latter have gone in and seized the most valuable property in the vicinity of the largest towns in Korea. When the people ask for payment, they are told to go to their own government for payment. But the Japanese know that the government has no money and that the land is simply confiscated. But not only so ; men claiming to be connected vith the Japanese army go out into the country districts and seize any land they like, repeating simply the formula " This is for military purposes." The writer has been repeatedly asked to interfere in such cases of fraud. Koreans have come hundreds of miles to sell their farms to a foreigner for a few cents each, simply that they might be under a foreigner's name, and so escape wanton seizure. During the year 1905 there was no such thing as justice for the Korean either from the private Japanese or from the officials. The military put their hands upon eight square miles of the most valuable land near Seoul simply for the building of barracks and parade grounds for twelve thousand men, when experts affirm that one-sixteenth of that space would have been ample. That land could not be bought in open market for six million dollars, but the Japanese knew the government could not pay a proper price, so they gave two hundred thousand dollars, to cover the cost of removal only. And this is all the Koreans could ever hope to get. The most elementary laws of human right and justice have been daily and hourly trampled under foot. Hardly an effort has been made to carry out any reform that would better the condition of the Korean people.

Mark the action of the man who controlled the finances of the country, a Japanese. The country was flooded with counterfeit nickels, made largely by Japanese in Osaka, and brought over to Korea by the millions. The Korean currency fell to a ruinous discount, and Japanese merchants were suffering severely because of the rapid fluctuations of exchange. The Adviser determined that the Korean government should borrow several million yen from Japan, and with it make a new currency to substitute for the one in use. When it was learned that Korea was to pay six per cent for this money, Korean financiers came forward and said that they would lend their government the necessary money at a far lower rate. They did it to keep Korea out

VIEWS OF PICTURESQUE KOREA

(a) Pyeng-yang, looking down the Ta-dong River from the wall
(b) A pleasure-house on the wall of Su-wun

of debt to Japan, but the Adviser refused to allow it. The money must be borrowed from Japan at the higher rate. A few million dollars' worth of nickels were made in Japan, where the Japanese enjoyed the profit, which amounted to over fifty per cent, and the nickels were sent to Korea. The Adviser announced that on the ist of June, or about then, everybody who brought nickels would receive the new ones at par with the Japanese money, but would receive one new one for two of the old. As the old nickels were at a discount of 240, this would mean that anyone with capital could buy up old nickels at 240, and exchange them at 200.

Chinese and Japanese merchants leaped to do so, and the market was sucked dry of money. When the day of exchanging came, it was found that the supply of new nickels was entirely inadequate. So the exchange was put off for two months ; then for two months more. Meanwhile the Korean merchants were going to the wall because they could not meet their notes, owing to the tightness of the money market. Some of them were trying to save themselves by borrowing from Japanese usurers at six per cent a month. At this most painful juncture the Emperor proposed to lend some three hundred thousand dollars of his private funds to his suffering merchants; but when he sent his cheque to the Japanese bank, where his funds were deposited, the Japanese Adviser ordered payment stopped, and would not let him draw out his private funds even to help the merchants in their desperate straits. There is no language too strong in which to denounce this outrage.

In the northern city of Pyeng-yang the Japanese carried on enormous confiscations of land. They even enclosed with their stakes property belonging to American citizens, and when the owners complained to the Japanese Consul they were told that it would be all right, but that they had better not remove the stakes at present. Nor did the Americans dare to do so; for though they themselves would have been safe, their servants would have been seized by Japanese and cruelly beaten. A Korean in that town was ordered by a private Japanese to sell his house for a quarter of its value. He demurred at this, but was seized, dragged away to a neighbouring Japanese barracks, and given a severe beating. In his shame and anger at this disgrace he took morphine and killed himself. Almost before his body was cold the Japanese came and demanded that his widow sell the house at the price suggested. She replied that she would die first. How it ended the writer has never heard. A Korean boatman attempted to go under the bridge at Pyengyang while it was under construction. This was forbidden, but there was no proper sign to indicate the fact. The Japanese railway coolies threw him out of his boat. He clung to some timbers in the water, but the Japanese beat his hands with railroad bolts until his fingers were broken, and he fell off and drowned. Two days later the murdered man's father, having secured the body, brought it to the Japanese Consul and demanded justice. He was driven away with the statement that the Consul would have nothing to do with the case. The criminals were well known and could have been captured with ease.

In the city of Seoul, almost within a stone's-throw of the Japanese Consulate, a Korean widow came to the house of the writer and begged him to buy her house for five cents, and put his name on the door-post, because she had reason to believe that unless she sold the house for half price to a Japanese living next door he would undermine the wall of her house and let it fall upon her head. The Koreans say deliberately that time and again naked Japanese have run into Korean houses and shocked the Korean women outrageously, simply in order to make the owner willing to sell out at any price.

An American resident in one of the ports of Korea related to the writer the case of a Korean landowner who lost his property through the following piece of trickery. A Japanese employed a disreputable Korean to make out a false deed of the land and, armed with this, went to take possession. The real owner exhibited the true and incontestable deeds; but when the matter was referred to the Japanese authorities, the false deeds carried the day, and a man who had held the property for years was summarily ejected.

A bishop of the Methodist Church in America was travelling with two missionaries through the country near Seoul. They had to cross a railroad embankment that was in construction. They walked a few rods along the embankment, and because of this they were attacked by a gang of Japanese coolies, and the two missionaries were severely hurt. It was only by the merest good luck that any of them escaped with their lives. No punishment at all commensurate with the crime was inflicted. A Japanese refused to pay his fare on the American electric cars and was put off. He ran into a near-by Korean rice shop, turned the rice out of a bag, placed it on the track and lay down upon it. He defied the Korean motormen to ride over him. No one dared to touch him, for this would have been the signal for a bloody reprisal on the part of the Japanese who lived all about. When the Americans complain of such things, they are told by the Japanese authorities that they can be easily avoided by employing Japanese.

As the year advanced, the Japanese kept at work gathering in the material resources of the country. Fishing rights along the whole coast were demanded and given. No one who knows what Japanese fishermen are like will doubt for a moment that the Koreans will be driven from the fishing grounds. Then the coast-trading and riparian rights were seized, looking toward a complete absorption of the large coastwise and river traffic. Korean methods are slower and more cumbersome, and herein lies Japan's excuse for driving Koreans from the business.

The signing of the Treaty of Peace with Russia at Portsmouth was the signal for a still more active policy in Korea. The American people had been brought to believe that the Korean people were as unworthy of regard as the Japanese were above criticism, and steps were taken to arrange for the declaration of a protectorate over the peninsular kingdom.

It must be remembered that Japan had solemnly promised, at the beginning of the war, to preserve the independence of Korea, but it now appeared that that promise was made solely as a preparation for the act which was to follow. The seizure of Korea and the extinction of her independence has been called a logical outcome of events. Russia had agreed to recognise Japan's preponderating influence in Korea, but what had that to do with Japan's definite and explicit promise to preserve the independence of Korea? It was evidently only the removal of the last obstacle which stood in the way of the breaking of that promise. But Japan saw that it would be necessary to proceed with caution. The only way to secure a protectorate without a manifest breach of faith was, first, to secure the acquiescence of the Korean government. If Korea could be induced to ask Japan to assume a protectorate, all would go well. Here was the crux of the situation.

Early in the autumn of 1905 the Emperor was approached with this suggestion, but he repudiated it instantly. He recognised the predominance of Japanese power in Korea and acquiesced in the advisorships in the various departments, but when it came to turning over the whole government and nation bodily to Japan, without the least hope of a future rehabilitation of the national independence, he refused in the plainest terms. He saw very well that the Japanese were determined to carry the day, but he knew that if he held firm it could not be done without arousing the indignation of the world. He determined to lodge a protest at Washington, forestalling violent action on the part of Japan. The first clause of the treaty of 1883 between Korea and the United States says that if either of the contracting parties is injured by a third party the other shall interfere with her good offices to effect an amicable settlement.

It was .impossible to lodge this protest in Washington through the Korean Foreign Office, for that was in control of a person thoroughly " in the sleeve " of Japan. The only thing to do was to send a personal and private communication to the President of the United States, calling attention to Japanese wrongs in Korea, and asking the President to investigate the matter and render Korea what help he could.

That message was despatched from Korea in October at the hand of the writer, but the Japanese surmised what was being done. A Japanese spy on board the steamer at Yokohama discovered the exact hour when the message would arrive in Washington, and from that very hour events were hurried to their culmination in the Korean capital.

Marquis Ito was sent to Seoul with definite instructions. Korea was to be induced to sign away her national existence voluntarily. Many conferences took place between the Japanese authorities and the Korean Cabinet, but without result. The Koreans stood firm on the treaty of 1904, in which Japan guaranteed the independence of the country, and nothing could make them budge. Not one of the Cabinet consented. It was quite clear that stronger agencies would have to be used. Finally, after a very strenuous conference at the Japanese legation, the whole meeting adjourned to the audience chamber of the Emperor, and the curtain went up on the last scene of the tragedy. The Emperor and every one of his ministers stood firm. They would die sooner than acquiesce. Repeated exhortations and inducements were offered, but the Koreans were immovable. When this deadlock occurred, the scenes were shifted a little, and Japanese gendarmes and police suddenly appeared and surrounded the audience chamber and blocked every approach to the imperial presence. The Emperor, feeling sure that personal injury was determined upon, retired to a little anteroom. No sane person can deny that he had sufficient reason to fear. The strongest man in the Cabinet was the Prime Minister, Han Kyu-sul, and it was evident that only by segregating him and handling the Cabinet without him could the desired result be accomplished. When, therefore, the Prime Minister retired to the apartment where the Emperor was, supposably with the intention of conferring with him, he was followed by Japanese armed officials and detained in a side room. The Marquis there plead with him to give in, but he was firm. Leaving him there, practically in durance, the Marquis returned to the rest of the Cabinet, who were very naturally alarmed at the non-appearance of the Prime Minister. The moment must have been one of great suspense. Hedged in by armed Japanese, their official chief spirited away and perhaps killed, there is little wonder that another turn of the screw resulted in the defection of several of the Cabinet, and at last a paper was signed by a majority of the ministers present, after a clause had been added to the effect that at some future day when Korea is strong enough and wealthy enough to resume her independence it will be given back to her. The Foreign Minister signed this document, and the seal was attached. There is some question as to just how this last was done. Some say that the seal was purloined from the office by Japanese and the document was stamped by them. However this may be, we have here the picture of how the agreement was put through, and the reader and the world may judge for themselves how far it was voluntary on the part of the Korean government.

When this had been done, the Japanese authorities announced in Washington that Korea had voluntarily entered into an agreement granting Japan a protectorate over the country, and the American government, apparently without consulting with Korea as to the truth of the statement, recognised the validity of Japan's claim, and almost immediately removed the legation from Seoul, and at the same time informed the Korean legation in Washington that diplomatic business with Korea would thereafter be carried on through Tokyo. The petition of the Emperor arrived in Washington before action had been taken by the government, but, though its arrival had been announced to the President, it was not received until after action had been taken, when it was found to be too late. It is not our province to discuss here the question whether this action was in accord with the friendly relations that existed for so many years between Korea and America, but there can be no doubt whatever that

MIN YONG WHAN, PRINCE AND GENERAL

Who committed suicide in November, 1905, as a protest against the
destruction of Korean independence by Japan

the Koreans looked upon it as a distinct act of treachery. Even while the whole Korean people were convulsed by the highhanded act of Japan, and some of the very highest Korean officials were seeking oblivion of their country's wrongs in suicide, the American Minister in Seoul was feasting the Japanese who had compassed the destruction of Korean nationality. Can it be wondered at that the feeling of confidence which Korea reposed in the friendship of America should have experienced a sudden and sharp reaction. Americans of every class had been telling Korea for a quarter of a century that the American flag stood for fairness and honesty, that we had no purely selfish interests to subserve, but stood for right, whether that right was accompanied by might or not; but when the pinch came we were the first to desert her, and that in the most contemptuous way, without even saying good-bye.

The appeal of the Emperor to the President of the United States cited the fact that Korea has heretofore received many tokens of good-will from the American government and people, that the American representatives have been sympathetic and helpful, and that American teachers of all kinds have done valuable work. He granted that the government had not been what it should have been, and that many mistakes had been committed, but he urged that whatever the Korean people might think of their government, they were passionately attached to the real Korea, to their nationality ; that they had few things to be proud of, and that if their nationality and independence, which had been guaranteed by Japan, were swept away, there would be left no incentive for the people to advance. He acknowledged the need of Japanese supervision, and declared that the advice of Japan had been and would be followed along all lines that looked toward the betterment of conditions in the peninsula. He intimated that the acts committed by the Japanese during the past year did not warrant the giving to Japan of complete control in Korea, for it would make Japanese residents there all the more contemptuous of the private rights of Koreans. He urged that Japan would be doing herself an injury, in breaking her promise to preserve the independence of Korea, for it would make other powers rightly suspicious of Japan's good faith elsewhere in the Far East. In conclusion, he asked the President to bring to bear upon this question the same breadth of view and the same sympathy which had characterised his distinguished career in other fields; and if, after a careful investigation, the facts above enumerated and others that would come to light should seem to warrant him in so doing, he should use his friendly offices to prevent the disaster to Korea which seemed imminent. It will be noted that the Emperor asked that the President's action be based upon a careful examination of all the facts, and not upon mere hearsay. Whether Korea's side of the question was ever presented in detail to the American Executive may never be known, but the method of procedure adopted by the United States government does not warrant such a conclusion.

When future historians, looking back across the years, shall view with dispassionate eyes the contemptuous attitude and the precipitate action of the American government in this case which involves the very life of the Korean nation, they will scarcely be able to so word the facts as to bring added glory to the annals of the American people.

Min Yong-whan, the most cultured and public-spirited Oriental in the range of my acquaintance, after desperate efforts to secure a reversal of the forced action depriving Korea of her independence, committed suicide. His monument, and that of other patriots who followed his example, will ever stand before the Korean people as irrefragable proof that, whatever interested calumniators may say, it is as true in Korea as elsewhere that dulcit pro patria mori.