Troublous Times in Canada: A History of the Fenian Raids of 1866 and 1870/Appendix
APPENDIX
editCHAPTER I.
THE BOOKER INVESTIGATION--RESULT OF THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY REGARDING THE CAUSE OP THE RETREAT AT RIDGEWAY.
The following is a report of the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry held at Hamilton on Tuesday, July 3rd, 1866, by order of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, on the application of Lieut.-Col. Booker, to examine and report on the circumstances connected with the engagement at Lime Ridge (or Ridgeway) on June 2nd:
The following officers composed the Court: President, Col. George T. Denison, Commandant Volunteer Militia, Toronto; members--Lieut.-Col. James Shanly, London; Lieut.-Col. G. K. Chisholm, Commanding Oakville Rifle Company, Oakville.
The letter of instructions from Col. P. L. Macdougall, the Adjutant-General of Militia, for the guidance of the Court, addressed to Col. Denison (the President), and also the letter from Lieut.-Col. Durie, by the authority of the Adjutant-General, on the same subject (also addressed to the President) were both read and duly considered by the Court previous to their entering upon the subject of inquiry.
Lieut.-Col. Booker having previously received due notice of the sitting of the Court and of the object of the inquiry, was permitted to be present, and he desired liberty of the Court to put in a written narrative of events as they occurred from the time he left Hamilton until he returned from Lime Ridge to Port Colborne.
The orders for the assembling of the Court were then produced and read, as follows:--
GOVERNMENT ORDERS.
On application of Lieut.-Col. Booker, the Commander-in-Chief directs the assembly of a Court of Inquiry at Hamilton, on Tuesday, the 3rd of July, 1866, to examine witnesses and report on the circumstances connected with the late engagement at Lime Ridge. President, Col. G. T. Denison; members, Lieut.-Col. James Shanly, and Lieut.-Col. G. K. Chisholm.
(Signed) P. L. MACDOUGALL, Colonel, A.G.M. WM. L. DURIE, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.M.
OTTAWA, 24th June, 1866. [A true copy].
TORONTO, 2nd July, 1866.
Sir,--In reply to your inquiries on Saturday last, I am directed to inform you that "the Court of Inquiry is to be closed," and that Col. Booker can produce any evidence he thinks proper. If the Court requires further evidence it may produce witnesses.
I beg to remain, Yours truly, WM. L. DURIE, Lieut.-Col., D.A.G.M.
COL. DENISON, President Court of Inquiry.
OTTAWA, June 23rd, 1866.
Sir,--I have the honor to instruct you that the Court of Inquiry of which you are named President, is ordered on the application of Lieut.-Col. Booker, in order to give that officer the opportunity of disproving the unfavorable imputations which have been cast upon him in the public prints. You will therefore be pleased to take all evidence which may be produced before the Court by Lieut.-Col. Booker, and you will also endeavor to procure all other evidence which may tend to elucidate the truth.
The opinion of the Court of Inquiry must, of course, be based on and sustained by such evidence only as is embodied in the written proceedings. I have the honor to be, sir,
Your very obedient servant, P. L. MACDOUGALL, Colonel, A.G.M.
COL. G. T. DENISON, President Court of Inquiry, Toronto.
The Court then considered the application of Lieut.-Col. Booker to put
in his narrative, and after due deliberation came to the conclusion that
they should comply with his request, and accordingly gave him permission
to put in his written statement.
Lieut.-Col. Booker then read and afterwards handed in to the Court the following statement of his connection with the operations of the troops under his command in the engagement at Lime Ridge:
NARRATIVE.
On the morning of the 1st of June, 1866, at the hour of 5.30, I received the following telegraphic message from Lieut.-Col. Durie, A.A.G.M.:
TORONTO, June 1st, 1866.
_To Lieut.-Col. Booker, Commandant:_
Call out your regiment for active service at once, and proceed by special train to Dunnville via Paris immediately. Complete your men to sixty rounds per man. Take spare ammunition with you. Ascertain enemy's position as you progress, who are reported to have landed at Fort Erie. In proceeding to Dunnville stop at Caledonia Station and take command of two volunteer companies (Caledonia and York) in readiness there. Better take cars with you for their transport.
If Port Colborne is occupied by the enemy, secure yourself at Dunnville and report to me.
By Order, (Signed) Wm. L. DURIE, Lieut.-Col., A.A.G.M.
And I proceeded to warn the Thirteenth Battalion, under my command,
for immediate active service. The members mustered rapidly at the
rendezvous, but as many came without overcoats or breakfasts, I caused
them to return home for breakfast and report again within the hour,
instructing them to bring their overcoats, and those who had them, their
haversacks with food. I cautioned them that I could not tell when nor
where they would have the next opportunity for a meal.
At about 7 a.m. the Commandant (Col. Peacocke) informed me that he also was under orders to leave. Shortly afterwards the manager of the Great Western Railway notified me that the cars were ready for transport.
The 13th Battalion, say 265 of all ranks, embarked at 9.30 a.m., and proceeded by way of Paris to Dunnville, taking up the York and Caledonia Companies (Captains Davis and Jackson), who reported 95 of all ranks.
On arrival at Dunnville, where we expected to remain during the night, we were met by the Reeve of the town, who provided the men with billets, and I reported our arrival to Col. Peacocke by telegraph. We were at dinner when I received the following telegram:
BY TELEGRAPH FROM CLIFTON, June 1st.
_To Commander Hamilton Volunteers, Dunnville:_
Go on to Port Colborne at once.
(Signed) G. PEACOCKE.
A few minutes sufficed to see all on the cars (which had been retained
at Dunnville for orders) en route for our destination, which we reached
at about 11 o'clock p.m. We found the Queen's Own of Toronto had
preceded us during the afternoon (say 480 of all ranks). The Queen's
Own had secured all the billets, and the command with me endeavored to
settle themselves as best they could in the cars for the night.
During the night, at my request, Major Skinner endeavored to secure a bread ration for the men: Some biscuits and bread were obtained, and that officer reported to me that the baker would prepare a batch of bread to be ready at 3 a.m. of the 2nd June.
I may now mention that, being the senior officer present, the entire command of the force at Port Colborne devolved on me. About midnight I received the following despatch by telegraph:
By TELEGRAPH PROM CHIPPAWA, 2nd June, 1866.
_To Officer Commanding at Port Colborne:_
I have sent Captain Akers to communicate with you. He will be with you at about half-past one. Send back the Great Western cars, if, after seeing Captain Akers, you think they are not wanted. If you get the ferry boat, send a detachment to patrol the river.
(Signed) G. PEACOCKE, Colonel.
Capt. Akers arrived punctually. On his arrival it appeared that
Lieut.-Col. Dennis and myself were in possession of later and more
reliable information of the position of the enemy than Colonel Peacocke
seemed to have had when Captain Akers had left him at midnight. It then
seemed necessary to inquire whether the original plan for a junction at
Stevensville, to attack the enemy, supposed to be encamped near Black
Creek, should be adhered to, when it appeared they were encamped much
higher up the river, and nearer to Fort Erie.
It was therefore proposed that the tug boat "W. T. Robb," whose Captain had expressed a desire to be of service, should patrol the shore of the lake as far as Fort Erie, and endeavor to communicate with Col. Peacocke's command. It was at the same time suggested that I should take my command down by rail to the railroad buildings at Fort Erie, and occupy and hold them until 7 a.m. If not communicated with before 7 a.m., to proceed to Frenchman's Creek, on the north side of which, it had been reported to me by an officer of Her Majesty's Customs at Fort Erie, that the Fenians were encamped not more than 450 strong; that they had during the day stolen 45 or 50 horses, and were drinking freely.
It was also suggested that in the event of my not being communicated with before 7 a.m. (and then being at Fort Erie), I should proceed to Frenchman's Creek and attack the enemy, if still there. This command, however, was to depend upon the approval of Colonel Peacocke.
In the meantime, and before I had received the telegram (No. 4) Lieut.-Col. Dennis and Captain Akers had left in the tug (in company with the Welland Field Battery, armed with short Enfields, under the command of Captain King) for Fort Erie, Captain Akers, at the last moment, leaving the final arrangement with me, which I took down as follows:
"_Memo_.--Move at not later than 5.30; 5 o'clock if bread be ready. Move to depot at Fort Erie and wait till 7. If not communicated with before 7, move to Frenchman's Creek. If 'No' by telegraph, disembark at Ridgeway and move to Stevensville at 9 to 9.30 a.m. Send pilot engine to communicate with Lieut.-Col. Dennis at Erie and with telegrams."
Soon after their departure I received Col. Peacocke's telegraph, as follows:
BY TELEGRAPH FROM CHIPPAWA, June 2nd, 3.50 a.m.
_To Commanding Officer, Port Colborne:_
Have received your message of 3 a.m. I do not approve of it. Follow original plan. Acknowledge receipt of this.
(Signed) G. PEACOCKE.
This negatived our proposed change of plan, and left me to follow the
instructions which I had received from Colonel Peacocke through Captain
Akers, namely:
"Move at not later than 5.30; 5 o'clock if bread be ready. * * * Disembark at Ridgeway and march to Stevensville at 9 to 9.30 a.m."
The bread ration having been secured, the train left Port Colborne soon after 5 a.m. en route for Stevensville. The only horse on the cars belonged to Major Skinner, 13th Battalion, who had kindly offered him for my service. I expressed a desire that the field officers of the Queen's Own would take their horses, but was met by the reply that they would be of no use in the woods where we should likely be, and that it was thought best not to take them.
I sent a pilot engine in advance of the train some ten or fifteen minutes, and instructed its driver, if possible, to communicate with Fort Erie. The train with the volunteers proceeded very slowly and cautiously, and arrived at Ridgeway without a sign of obstruction, after more than an hour from its departure from Port Colborne. At Ridgeway we formed battalions in column of companies, right in front.
Means of conveyance for my stores not being at hand. I thought best to distribute as much spare ammunition amongst the men as possible, and requested those who could do so to carry an extra ten rounds in their pockets. At this time it was reported to me that the Caledonia Rifle Company had no percussion caps, and but few rounds of cartridge. I supplied them from the spare ammunition of the 13th Battalion. I endeavored to procure a horse or team for my medical officers' stores, but without success, and failing means of transport, I returned tents and blankets to Port Colborne, relieving the cars from further waiting at Ridgeway.
After a little delay I requested Major Gillmor (as the Queen's Own was the senior battalion) to take the lead of the column, and as one of his companies was armed with the Spencer repeating rifle, that it should form the advance guard.
When the battalions were proved, and before forming the advance guard. I gave the order to the column, "With ball cartridge--load." I made inquiries from the inhabitants as to their knowledge of the whereabouts of the enemy. The reports were contradictory and evidently unreliable. To take proper precaution and keep my appointment at Stevensville was my obvious duty.
The column of route was formed as follows: Advance guard of Queen's Own; remainder of the battalion, Major Gillmor commanding; York Rifles. Captain Davis; the 13th Battalion, Major Skinner in command; the Caledonia Rifles (Captain Jackson), forming the rear guard. On the advance I was in the centre of the column, looking out for signs of the enemy. After proceeding about two miles the advance guard signalled indications of men moving in our front. The column (say 840 of all ranks) was hereupon halted on the road. I gave the horse on which I rode to the Orderly, in order that I might carefully examine with my field glass the country over which we were advancing. Soon after I observed loose horses moving about in the woods to our left front, but saw no men.
Before ordering the advance, flanking parties were thrown out to scour the woods, right and left. This duty was performed by companies of the Queen's Own. Proceeding in this order for some distance, a volley was fired upon our advancing men from behind the zig-zag fences in the open. Our volunteers accepted the challenge. The affair had commenced.
The Queen's Own, as skirmishers and supports, slowly advanced, pushing back the enemy. We were gradually changing our front to the right, when Major Gillmor wished me to relieve the Queen's Own and send out the reserves, as his men were falling short of ammunition, and that one company (No. 5) had none for their Spencer rifles. I at once directed the right wing of the reserve to deploy on the rear company to the right and to extend. Major Skinner commanded the 13th Battalion, and acted throughout out very gallantly. The movement was admirably executed. The York Rifles were on the left and No. 1 Company of the 13th Battalion on the right of the line. A hearty cheer was given by the Queen's Own when they saw the 13th advancing, who, with the company named, relieved the Queen's Own, supported by the left wing of the reserve, which was composed of the 13th Battalion. The Queen's Own then became the reserve. The 13th and York Rifles in advance, driving the enemy before them to the woods, cheered heartily and were answered by the yells of the Fenians. I felt anxious about our right flank, as with my glass I noticed the enemy throwing back his right into the woods. I requested Major Gillmor, who was in command of the reserve, to keep a sharp look-out for the cross roads on which the reserve rested, and to send two companies from the reserve to occupy and hold the woods on the hill to our right. He sent the Highland Company of the Queen's Own to perform that duty.
At this time (nearly 9.30 a.m.) two telegrams were brought to me by a gentleman from Port Colborne, one informing me that the column under Col. Peacocke could not move until 7 o'clock, and the other in the following words:
CHIPPAWA, June 2, 5.30 a.m.
_To the Officer Commanding, Port Colborne:_
Be cautious in feeling your way, for fear obstacles should prevent a junction. If possible open communication with me, and I will do the same.
(Signed) G. PEACOCKE.
At this unexpected information I was much disappointed. Major Gillmor
was then with me, and I showed it to him. I at once realized that the
force which I had expected about this hour at Stevensville could not
now render me assistance, and turning to Detective Armstrong (who
had accompanied us from Hamilton and obtained a horse at Ridgeway), I
desired him to convey to Col. Peacocke a message I wrote on the telegram
I had just received, to the effect that the enemy had attacked us in
force at 7.30, three miles south of Stevensville.
Immediately afterwards Major Gillmor reported that the Highland Company had been compelled to leave the woods on our right, as they had found the woods occupied by Fenians. Almost simultaneously cries of "Cavalry" and "Look out for cavalry" came down the road. I then observed men doubling down the hill. In the next few moments events succeeded each other very rapidly. As the cry came down the road, directions were given the reserves on the road to "Form square." At this crisis the fire of the enemy came heavily to our right flank, as well as into the front and rear of our force in advance. I saw nothing to justify the first impression that we were to be attacked by cavalry. I gave the word to "Re-form column," with the view of deploying, when to my surprise I found the rear of the reserve which had formed part of the square had dissipated, and moving down the road. Major Gillmor came and reported to me that the enemy was bringing up his reserves. I asked him how he knew. He replied that he saw them himself. I then inquired, "In what shape?" when he replied, "In column--in mass of column." I then ordered to retire. But the confusion had become a panic. The Thirteenth did all that men could do under the circumstances, and were the last in the retreat, which became general.
Many men were trodden down. I endeavored to rally the retreating mass, and gave orders to hold the woods on either side, and some little distance down the road was assisted by Surgeon Ryall (of the Thirteenth) and several men, but all of no avail. Bugler Clarke (of the Queen's Own) sounded "the halt" at my request several times. The horse was brought to me and I mounted and rode amongst the men. I entreated them to rally, and implored them to halt, but without effect. If I could form at Ridgeway I might refrain order. I there found Lieutenant Arthurs, of the Queen's Own, and other officers, attempting to rally and form companies. I called for "coverers" for the men to form. I was answered that the men could not find their officers. I then ordered the men to fall in so as to show a good front. The attempt was made, but without success, and I ordered the retreat upon Port Colborne, towards which place many had previously turned their steps. I requested a gentleman from Toronto (Mr. George Arthurs), who was present at Ridgeway, and mounted, to ride forward to Port Colborne and report that we were retiring, and to send help down the road for the stragglers. I saw that the colors of the Thirteenth were safe, and I moved off with the column. A short distance from Ridgeway I dismounted and walked with a member of the Queen's Own who was wounded, and kept the road afterwards for some time with him. A volunteer rode the horse into Port Colborne, where we arrived, much fatigued and distressed, at about 3 p.m. Nearly two miles from Port Colborne I was, with others, taken up by the second train which came down the road to meet us. The train took up several officers of the 13th and the Queen's Own.
At Port Colborne, through the kindness of Mr. Pring, the Collector of Customs, I was provided with the requisites for writing my despatches to the Major-General Commanding and to Colonel Peacocke. The drafts were perused by Major Gillmor; and one despatch was copied by Major Cattley of the Thirteenth and the other by a non-commissioned officer of the Queen's Own.
Shortly after returning to Port Colborne I received advice of ten companies of volunteers from Paris. Others arrived during the evening. Among the latter were the Home Guard of St. Catharines, under Lieut.-Col. McGiverin. I beg leave especially to thank that officer for the assistance he afforded, and for very generously dividing with my command the provisions lie had brought from St. Catharines with him for his own men.
Prisoners were being brought in in numbers, and every question was referred to me personally. I had no Major of Brigade, no aide, no staff, not even an office clerk of whose services I could at the moment avail myself, while farmers as scouts were coming in with their varied reports. I felt it due to the large force of volunteers under my command to request the Major-General Commanding to relieve me and send a professional soldier (one from whom I might take my orders) to assume the command.
When at Port Colborne I reported that the Thirteenth and Queen's Own were alike tired and hungry, and that if it were possible they should have a day's rest, and that those volunteers who had arrived during the day of the 2nd of June at Port Colborne should be sent forward first.
I pointed out that uncooked rations, which it was intended to serve out to the Queen's Own and the Thirteenth, would not benefit them, as they were without the necessary appliances to cook and make use of them. But it was not by my wish that the Thirteenth were detained at Port Colborne on the morning of the 3rd June, while the Queen's Own were ordered to march on to Fort Erie. I was anxious that both should be thoroughly refreshed, and I felt regret that the companions of the day previous should be separated, as they were equally able to proceed.
Then, either from misunderstanding, or perhaps that I was not sufficiently explicit, I found that I had been relieved from the command of my own battalion, and not of the general command only, as I had expected. I immediately communicated with Majors Skinner and Cattley that I had been relieved.
The history of my connection with the campaign, which resulted in the expulsion of the Fenians from the Niagara District, has now been detailed, from the moment I received orders until I was relieved from command. I submit to those to whom the inquiry of my conduct on the occasion may be entrusted, that the state of affairs which existed at Port Colborne on my arrival at 11 o'clock p.m. on Friday. 1st of June, will be better understood if the communications which previously passed between Colonel Peacocke and the officer commanding at Port Colborne were obtained. I have reason to believe that they will bear materially in explaining the plans proposed and under consideration before Captain Akers' arrival, and the propriety of the modification which, if Colonel Peacocke's approval were obtained, was to have been pursued.
I further submit the official despatches connected with the affair at Lime Ridge, published by authority in the _Canada Gazette_ of Saturday, 23rd June, 1866. Upon two points I expect inquiry will be directed, namely, to the capacity and care shown by me for the command entrusted to me, and my personal conduct on the field. On this latter point I ask for the evidence of those who are present.
That every precaution and every consideration for the comfort and advantage of my battalion which the circumstances did permit, I confidently assert were taken.
The volunteer force from Hamilton answered to the call for service with alacrity. The entire force which I had the honor to command was animated with the highest feelings of patriotism and zeal. All personal considerations gave way, all hardships were borne cheerfully and without a murmur. We had but one wish--to meet the enemy; and but one hope, to aid in his discomfiture; and if under the trying circumstances in which we were placed the result was not so triumphant as the devotion and heroism of the volunteers deserved, I trust that as their conduct cannot be impugned, the Court of Inquiry will, on appreciation of the facts, exonerate their commanding officer from the complete want of success of an attack which undoubtedly caused the enemy to abandon their plans of invasion and commence their retreat.
A. BOOKER,
Lieut.-Colonel.
The Court then proceeded to the examination of witnesses.
The first witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Major Chas. T. Gillmor, commanding the Second Battalion, or Queen's Own Rifles.
MAJOR GILLMOR'S EVIDENCE.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--When I relieved the Queen's Own and advanced the Thirteenth, did you report to me that your men were becoming short of ammunition?
Major Gillmor--On some one occasion I mentioned that one or two companies stated to me that they were short of ammunition.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--When the Thirteenth were in action, did you send out the Highland Company, at my request, to hold the woods to our right, and the road, from the reserve?
Answer--I did send out the Highland Company with orders as described, but I cannot say if it was before or after the Thirteenth went out.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--What did they report on their return?
Answer--I don't recollect their return. I believe them to be the last to leave the field.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you hear the cry of "Cavalry"?
Answer--Yes.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you see the Fenian reserves advancing after the cry of "Cavalry'"?
Answer--No.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you see that we were outflanked to the right?
Answer--No, I believe it was the reserve. I could not see the extreme right.
Question from the Court--On what do you ground your belief that they were not outflanked on the right?
Answer--Principally on the statements of the officers and men who were out skirmishing on the right.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you notice men coming down the hill to our front at a double, in front of the reserves, crying "Cavalry"?
Answer--No.
Question from the Court--When three companies of the Thirteenth were sent out to relieve the Queen's Own, had the movement been executed before the retreat was sounded?
Answer--No, so far as my knowledge extends. Both lines of skirmishers, Rifles and Thirteenth, came in together.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Was the endeavor made to bring the men out of square into column?
Answer--Yes. They did re-form column.
Question--Was the rear of the column or square now in retreat?
Answer--No. Not at that time.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Do you consider there was a panic when the retreat commenced?
Answer--I think the retreat was caused by a panic. After the column was re-formed I ordered the two leading companies again to extend and skirmish. They did so. I ordered the rest of the column, which at that time was composed of Queen's Own and Thirteenth mixed together, to retire, as they were exposed to a heavy fire on the front and right from the enemy's front and left. This order was being obeyed by the men with reasonable steadiness, when as I was standing in rear of the retiring column, I heard them cheer loudly and call out "reinforcements." I then saw some men in red, whom I believe were the left wing of the Thirteenth, and whom these men, I suppose, took to be reinforcements. When these men in red heard the cheer they broke and retired. Then the whole column became disorganized. This was about 9 o'clock a.m. The first shot was fired about half-past seven a.m.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you believe, when you saw my despatches to Col. Peacocke and Gen. Napier, that they were correct, and did you concur in the correctness of them when you were with me in the customs office at Port Colborne?
Answer--Yes, the general tenor of the report was correct, and I assented to it.
Question from the Court--Is there anything in Lieut.-Col. Booker's report, just read to you, that places the Thirteenth Battalion in a false position?
Answer--No.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Do you think the men could have been rallied after they had commenced the retreat?
Answer--The whole force could not have been, but I could have rallied two or three hundred men around me at any time during the retreat, had I been disposed to do so. Officers of both the Queen's Own and the Thirteenth were frantically exerting themselves to rally their men, but, knowing that I could not be relieved by Col. Peacocke, and fearing that the enemy might pass to our rear, I thought it wiser to conduct the retreat in as orderly a manner as I could.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Were you satisfied with my conduct on the field?
Answer--Col. Booker asked me the same question in Port Colborne, and I now give him the same answer that I did then, which was, that I could see nothing in his conduct to disapprove of, except with regard to the formation of the squares, which I thought at that time was a mistake, and I think so still.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--As you were not mounted, would you explain the reason why you did not take your horse with, you when you left Port Colborne?
Answer--I had my horse at the station at Port Colborne, when Mr. Magrath, the manager, told me that I could not get him off the cars at Ridgeway without breaking his legs, there being no platforms.
EVIDENCE OF CHARLES CLARKE.
The second witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Charles Clarke, a Government detective officer, by commission from Mr. G. McMicken, the stipendiary Magistrate at Windsor.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Were you with the volunteers in the affair at Lime Ridge on the 2nd June?
Answer--Yes.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you see the square disperse?
Answer--Yes. I was with the reserve in the ranks when the square was formed. A number of men, as they were coming in as the reserve, cried out, "Prepare to receive cavalry!" I should say it came from as many as fifty men. I saw the column re-formed. At this time a body of red-coats were coming around a curve in the road about two hundred yards in rear of the square. The Queen's Own and those of the Thirteenth began to cheer, supposing them to belong to the 47th Regiment coming to their relief. As soon as we ascertained that they were not the 47th, we supposed that they were two companies of the Thirteenth who had been driven in by main force, and the result was that we became panic-stricken, and we all broke. I saw several officers belonging to the Queen's Own and the Thirteenth attempting to rally the men. I saw Lieut.-Col. Booker attempting to rally the men, telling them to get into the bush on each side of the road, about four or six hundred yards from where they commenced to retreat. He got the bugler to sound the "halt" several times, and I heard the bugler say he was tired sounding the "halt." The men continued to retreat, except sixteen or seventeen of us, who got over the fence into the bush on our left, but had to leave because the main body continued their retreat towards Ridgeway. At Ridgeway I saw Lieut.-Col. Booker with four officers of the Thirteenth and one of the Queen's Own, each with a revolver in his hand, and Lieut.-Col. Booker had his sword, threatening to shoot the men if they did not stop. They broke through the line of these officers.
Question from the Court--When Lieut.-Col. Booker ordered the battalions that were retreating to get into the woods on each side of the road, what was your impression of his object?
Answer--He wanted to make a stand by getting-into the bush to repulse the Fenians, and it was a splendid opportunity, from the country being so open in front of the bush. I served nearly six years in India in the 40th Regiment, and during the affair in Candahar.
Question from the Court--Did you see Lieut.-Col. Booker on the field before and during the retreat?
Answer--Yes, several times.
Question from the Court--Did you observe anything in his conduct which appeared to you like shirking his duties?
Answer--No. On the contrary, I saw him urging on a company of the Thirteenth, which appeared to be dilatory.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Do you recollect the fact of our force being outflanked to our right?
Answer--Yes.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Was the firing from the Fenians more rapid than from our men?
Answer--Yes, much more so. Part of the time it was like file firing. I am since aware that they used both the Sharpe and Spencer rifles.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you receive a letter from Major Gillmor and other officers of the Queen's Own, complimenting you for your coolness and conduct at Lime Ridge?
Answer--I did.
EVIDENCE OF GEORGE ARTHURS.
The third witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Mr. George Allan Arthurs.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Were you at Ridgeway on the 2nd of June, and what did you see there?
Answer--I was there, and was at Ridgeway when the army was retreating. I there saw the bugler come from the field on Lieut.-Col. Booker's horse. My brother (Lieutenant Arthurs, of the Queen's Own) mounted the Colonel's horse and drew his pistol, and threatened to shoot the first man that did not do his duty. Lieut.-Col. Booker came up as my brother was checking the retreat. He mounted his own horse and rode back towards the field to consult with his officers. The retreat was checked so far by my brother that he "told off" a company of men composed of red coats and green coats. I did not see any exhibition on the part of Lieut.-Col. Booker of either cowardice or fear.
EVIDENCE OF JOHN DOUGLAS.
The fourth witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was John Douglas, Captain of No. 4 Company of the Queen's Own Rifles.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you, on the 2nd of June last, see me at Lime Ridge?
Answer--Yes, in front of your command, under fire.
Question from the Court--Did his conduct on this occasion attract your attention?
Answer--Yes. It struck me that he was not very careful of his own safety, he being in front of the column of the Queen's Own, and clothed in scarlet. He was directing the movements, with a field-glass in his hands. This was when the Queen's Own were in column, after part of the Thirteenth had gone out in skirmishing order. I saw no hanging back on the part of any officer or man up to that time.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--How did Col. Booker go from Ridgeway to Port Colborne?
Answer--I found Lieut.-Col. Booker on the last train going into Port Colborne. Major Gillmor and several officers of both regiments, with men of both regiments, were in the same train. The great bulk of the force had preceded them.
EVIDENCE OF LIEUTENANT ARTHURS.
The fifth witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Lieut. William Arthurs, of No. 4 Company of the Queen's Own.
Question by Lieut.-Col. Booker--Were you at Ridgeway as Lieut.-Col. Booker arrived there during the retreat on the 2nd of June, and what did you see?
Answer--Yes. I saw Col. Booker on the retreat, and he seemed no way flurried or excited, but quite cool and collected. He spoke to the men. He asked them to form on their coverers. Several companies were formed up and retreated in order.
EVIDENCE OF FRANCIS CLARKE.
The sixth witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Francis Clark. Bugle-Major of the Queen's Own Rifles.
Question from the Court--Did you sound the "halt" on the 2nd of June, by order of Lieut.-Col. Booker during the retreat?
Answer--Yes, repeatedly. He used his best endeavors to halt the men, and then he went forward amongst the men and asked them to halt and front and form. It had no effect, and he said, "Oh, God! what is this?" They still moved on. They retreated, red and green mixed together, as far as I could see, to the turn of the road.
EVIDENCE OF ALEXANDER MUIR.
The seventh witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Alexander Muir, a private in the Highland Company of the Queen's Own, a Lieutenant of Militia, and President of the Highland Company at that time in its civil organization.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Were you at Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June, and will you recite what you saw there?
Answer--After leaving the cars at Ridgeway, before marching, the whole force received orders. "With ball cartridge--load!" The column then advanced. After proceeding about two and a half miles. I perceived a number of horses (between twelve and fifteen in number) loose in an open near the corner of a bush, about three-quarters of a mile in front of the left side of the road. These having attracted my attention, I also perceived a number of men flitting among the trees, near to the horses. I cried out. "I see the Fenians--there are the Fenians!" My discovery was made known to Col. Booker, who, perhaps, from hearing my cry, came up to me. I was the left hand front rank man of the Highland Company, the rear company of the battalion. He gave the order to halt. He then asked me, "Where?" I pointed out to him where I saw the men and the horses. He had a field-glass which he then used. He tried to use it on horseback, but his horse was so restive that he could not use the glass. He then dismounted by my side. At this moment Major Gillmor came up. I directed him to the proper point to see them. Both Col. Booker and Major Gillmor seemed convinced that all was not right in the bush. The leading company of the column was then sent out to reconnoitre to the left in the direction of these horses, in skirmishing order, supported by the next company. The column remained at the halt. After the skirmishers had advanced to within a short distance of where the horses were, the bugle sounded the "retire" or the "incline" to the skirmishers, and the column was advanced. The near party of the advance guard halted at the same time the column halted, and just after the column was again put in motion, I saw several of them, if not all of them, with their hats on their rifles raised in the air and moving them, indicating thereby that the enemy was in sight. The column was again halted. At that moment a bullet came whistling from the direction of an orchard on our right front. This was the first shot, and came close to Capt. Gardner and myself. Here the Queen's Own were ordered to skirmish, and our company furnished the right company of the line of skirmishers, and in this order we advanced in a northerly direction. The firing commenced opposite the centre of the line of skirmishers immediately upon their advancing. We continued advancing and firing for some distance, perhaps three hundred yards at that time, when the order came for the Queen's Own to fall back on its supports. We had then been under fire for three-quarters of an hour. I distinctly heard Col. Booker's words of command, given with coolness and deliberation, as we were going into action. The Queen's Own were then relieved by the Thirteenth. The Thirteenth advanced in skirmishing order, appearing to take the ground which had previously been occupied by the Queen's Own, the enemy continuing their fire during the advance of the Thirteenth. The enemy had evidently been previously driven back by the Queen's Own. An order from Col. Booker now came to our company, which was then under cover of the school-house, acting in reserve, directing our company to take possession of the road to the right which led in the direction of Fort Erie, because the enemy was manoeuvring to outflank our right. Capt. Gardner was told it was an important position, and he then advanced our company till we came opposite a bush north of the road. He then ordered us to advance in skirmishing order through that bush, which we did. After passing through the bush we came to a wheat-field, on the opposite side of which we found the Fenians thickly posted opposite our front and to our right. When we entered the bush they had evidently been in the same bush at the farther side of it, and had retreated on our advance to the other side of the wheat field. We had reason to know this, because we found quantities of their ammunition, a company sheet roll, and a blank book, a roll book, also a Fenian drill book with the name of "Capt. George Sweeny, Company B, 19th Regiment, Irish Republic Volunteers, Cincinnati, Ohio." The roll book contained about 120 names, with the trades, residences and callings of the men. I have seen the list of Fenian prisoners captured and now in Toronto Jail, and I believe that some of the names are the same as those in the roll book. We commenced firing upon the enemy as soon as we saw them, and they began to retreat. They were about 200 yards from us. We fired here for some time, until an order came to advance from Capt. Gardner, and we leaped over the fence and entered the wheat field. We fired from this wheat field for some time. After entering the wheat field I saw the line of the Thirteenth Battalion to my left, below me, in skirmishing order, advancing towards the enemy. While they were thus advancing I distinctly saw the enemy retreating a long distance before them towards a bush in the rear. Suddenly they seemed to rally, and came down upon the line of the Thirteenth, yelling. At this moment I saw a wavering in the line of the Thirteenth. The Fenians advanced in a loose manner, but in great strength. Here the Thirteenth retreated at the double, but I did not hear the "retire" sounded for that purpose. As the Fenians rushed upon the Thirteenth, we from our positions gave them two or three volleys, which seemed to check them, and their left swerved inwards from us towards their own centre. While we were here in this position, Sergeant Bain, of our company, called out, "Retire, retire!" We then retired firing. I heard the bugle call to retire. When I came to the school-house I was surprised to see our forces marching back again towards Ridgeway. I turned round and saw the Fenians advancing from the orchard on the road at the same place where I saw our advance guard give the signal before the action commenced. I thought there were as many as 600 or 700 on the road, and more moving out of the orchard. I leaned my rifle over a fence and took my last shot at them with one arm (having previously sustained an injury in my shoulder while getting over a fence). Several of my comrades fired also. This drew fire upon us from them, and it was here that McHardy and White were wounded. On my return to the cross-road at the hotel nine-tenths of our force had passed on towards Ridgeway. I then saw Col. Booker and spoke to him. He was on foot. I heard "Halt! halt!" called, but no one seemed to notice it.
Question by Lieut.-Col. Booker--Are you satisfied we were outflanked on our right?
Answer--Yes.
Question by Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you see Col. Booker after this?
Answer--I saw him at Ridgeway.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--What was he doing?
Answer--He was standing in conversation with some one on the road.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--Did you see him afterwards, and where?
Answer--I saw him afterwards on the march to Port Colborne, after leaving Ridgeway.
Question--Did you see him afterwards, and where?
Answer--I saw him afterwards on the march to Port Colborne, after leaving Ridgeway. I became weak and exhausted and was taken into a house about 250 yards south by two of my comrades, where Dr. Neff, assisted by two others, set my left arm and left me alone. I became insensible, and in that state had lost all recollection of the fight. After I came to myself I heard a volley and ran to the door. I saw the Fenians surround the village. I ran to try to catch up to our force, which had all left, and they fired upon me. I had my arm in a sling, and my tunic flying from my right shoulder. I overtook the force after running for some distance (nearly a mile), and there again I saw Col. Booker in rear of the force. He offered me his horse. I declined the offer, because I thought it would pain me more to ride than to walk. Where the main road crosses the railway he dismounted and gave his horse to some one of the Thirteenth, with some orders to take to Port Colborne. He then took my arm and assisted me along the track until we got into the last train and went into Port Colborne.
Question from Lieut.-Col. Booker--How many rounds of ammunition had been issued to you previous to the engagement, and where issued?
Answer--I received five rounds at Toronto before leaving and thirty at Port Colborne--that was, I had thirty-five rounds.
RONALD McKINNON'S TESTIMONY.
The eighth witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Ronald Archibald McKinnon, at that time a cadet in the Military School at Toronto.
Question--Were you present at Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June last, and in what capacity did you act?
Answer--I was present at the engagement at Lime Ridge, and acted as a volunteer officer with the Caledonia Rifle Company, though not regularly attached to that company.
Question--Did you see Lieut. Arthurs mounted on Lieut.-Col. Booker's horse?
Answer--Yes.
Question--Were you with Lieut. Arthurs, endeavoring to rally the men near Ridgeway?
Answer--Yes.
Question--Were you there when Lieut.-Col. Booker arrived from the field at Lime Ridge?
Answer--Yes.
Question--Was Lieut.-Col. Booker mounted when he returned from Lime Ridge to Ridgeway?
Answer--Yes.
Question--Were you with the rear guard of the column before the action?
Answer--Yes.
Question--When you saw Lieut. Arthurs mounted on Lieut.-Col. Booker's horse, was it previous to the arrival of Lieut.-Col. Booker mounted on his return from Lime Ridge?
Answer--I cannot say. But I know that after I saw Lieut. Arthurs on Lieut.-Col. Booker's horse I saw Lieut.-Col Booker ride back towards Ridgeway.
ROBERT BENHAM'S TESTIMONY.
Robert Benham, a private in the Thirteenth Battalion (Major Skinner's groom), was the ninth witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker.
Question--Did Lieut.-Col. Booker's orderly bring you back the horse which Col. Booker rode at Lime Ridge before the firing commenced?
Answer--Yes.
Question--During the retreat what became of the horse?
Answer--I was leading him away to Ridgeway when Quartermaster Stoneman said, "Get on the horse." I then mounted and rode him to Ridgeway, and there watered him. While I was watering him one of the officers of the Queen's Own Rifles came and asked me who owned the horse. I told him that the horse belonged to Major Skinner, but that Col. Booker had been using him. The officer then took the horse from me and mounted him. I saw him, while mounted, draw a pistol and endeavor to stop the men by threatening to shoot if they did not stop. I saw Col. Booker on the horse afterwards.
CAPT. HENERY'S EVIDENCE.
The tenth witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Capt. Henery, Adjutant of the Thirteenth Battalion (formerly a Sergeant-Major of the Coldstream Guards).
Question--Will you recite what from your own knowledge occurred from the time the Thirteenth were engaged at Lime Ridge until they retired, and how long they were in action?
Answer--At the commencement of the action, or rather just previously to the action, the Queen's Own were thrown out to skirmish, the reserve being composed of the Thirteenth Battalion, with the York and Caledonia Rifle Companies. Soon afterward the action commenced. The whole force continued to advance in this order. The reserve then halted, the skirmishers and supports continuing their advance. We remained halted only about three minutes before an officer of the Queen's Own came up and shouted, "Surgeons to the front." I then saw two officers in green running to the front. I then heard Major Gillmor tell Col. Booker to deploy the right wing of the Thirteenth Battalion and relieve the Queen's Own, because their ammunition had been expended. Col. Booker then gave the command to the Thirteenth Battalion to deploy the right wing on No. 3 Company, which was executed after advancing a few yards to enable them to deploy and avoid an obstacle in its way. This wing was then extended to skirmish and relieve the Queen's Own, from its left towards the right side of the road. The whole wing and supports were on the right side of the road. While this deployment was being executed, several companies of the Queen's Own came and formed in quarter distance column in rear, forming the reserve. The right wing then advanced and relieved the Queen's Own in a very steady manner, their supports being regularly posted. Then I advanced between the supports and skirmishers. I was not mounted. The support laid down after arriving at the orchard, under cover. I then left the supports and joined the skirmishers. They continued firing for some time, receiving the fire of the enemy. There was then a cry of "Cavalry!" from my right rear. I was on the road with the left of No. 2 Company on the line of skirmishers. I looked and saw two or three horses, and cried out that there was no cavalry. I heard no bugle blow the "retire." When I looked around I saw both red and green coats running to the rear from the line of skirmishers, in order, but not firing. I think this retreat was about one hour after the Thirteenth took the field. I think those of the Queen's Own who formed the reserve as we were deploying, came in about ten minutes after the firing commenced.
ROBERT MAUN'S TESTIMONY.
Robert Maun, a private in the 13th Battalion, was the eleventh witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker.
Question--Will you state what you saw at Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June?
Answer--I was on duty on the field hospital staff. There was a cry for the doctor from one of the companies of the Thirteenth, acting as a support in the orchard. I was sent to find the man, and did so. He had been wounded in the wrist. He was a rifleman, not one of the Thirteenth. I saw no other "green" soldier there. Just as we had finished dressing the man's hand I heard a cry of "Cavalry, cavalry! Look out for cavalry!" coming from the direction of the right of the skirmish line. I saw a company of Rifles in line with the skirmishers of the Thirteenth. I suppose they were the York Rifles. When I heard the cry of "Cavalry!" I was near the support of one of the companies, and then I also heard an order given to the reserve to "Form square!" I suggested to the doctor that we should go to the square formed on the road by the reserve. He came with me toward the square, but I cannot tell whether he got into the square or not. I was too late to get in. I threw myself under the bayonets of the front face of the square. This square was composed of the Queen's Own, and the color party of the Thirteenth was with them. A company of the Thirteenth came up at a steady "double." most of them at "the trail." but some of them at "the slope," and passing the right face of the square formed in rear of the Queen's Own. I then, finding a company of my own corps at hand, jumped up, fixed my bayonet, and joined them. It was then that I saw a few straggling men of the Thirteenth, mixed up with some Rifles, retiring from the direction of the skirmish line towards us. An order was then given by a voice, which I took to be Col. Booker's, to "Reform column," which was done. At this moment a rather too sharp fire came upon us, but it was rather high to do us much damage. I then heard an order to "Deploy on the rear company" in the same voice, which I took to be that of Col. Booker. At this time there was a company of the Thirteenth which formed the rear company of the reserve, the rest of the reserve being composed of the Queen's Own. When the order to deploy was given a heavy volley struck the column, and I heard a sound which I took to be that of men falling. The column swayed backwards, as I supposed, from the effects of the fire. The column broke immediately and commenced a retreat down the road. The main body of the Thirteenth were at this time in the field, and firing was going on more to the right. I went down the road with the retreat and felt a heavy fire from a wood on the left as we retired. I saw several of the enemy jumping a fence, as if they were intending to pursue the retreating column. I fired at them, and several others of our men also fired at them. After I had loaded my rifle I returned from the direction in which we had just come and met Col. Booker with the Thirteenth following the Queen's Own, or the retreating column. The Thirteenth were in a confused mass, and I heard several officers say to Col. Booker. "Let us stop them," or words to that effect, and prevent a rout. Col. Booker then said he would go on to the front and stop the men of the retreating column, and then ran out "at the double" and got in front of nearly all of the Thirteenth. He then faced about and, flashing his sword about, said. "For God's sake, men, don't make cowards of yourselves." I had followed him in search of the doctor, and so had the opportunity of witnessing this on the part of Col. Booker. I do not know the names of the officers who said to Col. Booker, "Let us try and stop them and prevent a rout." The men seemed to pay no attention to Col. Booker's entreaties for them to stop, but continued the retreat. A man of No. 1 Company, of the Thirteenth, who was shot through the thigh, demanded my attention, and I went to him. Dr. Ryall was with him attending to him. We got him on a waggon and took him down the road to Ridgeway. While going with this man I heard several officers (Col. Booker of the number) urging the men to stop and take to the woods, as there was good cover there. I think that Adjutant Henery was one of the officers who urged the men to do this. At this time I saw a number of the York Rifles obeying the order to take to the woods. They cried out, "Hurrah for old York! Let us take to the woods and we will give them hell." There was only about a dozen of them. I passed on with the waggon, and saw no more.
Question--Did you hear Lieut.-Col. Booker, when under fire, encouraging the reserves?
Answer--I heard him joking them about their politeness in bowing to the bullets that passed over their heads.
MAJOR GILLMOR RECALLED.
Question from the Court--Major Gillmor, state the companies of the Queen's Own who were first advanced as skirmishers, how armed, and the amount of ammunition issued to each man.
Answer--No. 5 Company were the entire skirmishers. There were about forty of them armed with Spencer rifles, and had under thirty rounds for each man. The remainder of the company were armed with the long Enfield rifle. Nos. 1 and 2 Companies were the other skirmishers. They were armed with the long Enfield. The whole regiment had an average of forty rounds of ammunition per man.
Question--How long were they under fire when the right wing of the Thirteenth were advanced to their relief?
Answer--I could not form any idea as to the time. The men armed with the Spencer rifles were relieved by another company long before the Thirteenth Battalion went out to skirmish.
Question--Who gave the order to "Form square"?
Answer--Lieut.-Col. Booker gave the caution to "Look out for cavalry!" and I gave the command to "Form square."
Question--Can you state what portion of the Queen's Own were undrilled recruits?
Answer--They were, as a rule, partially drilled, some men undrilled. Recruits were joining every week, and all the available men, drilled and undrilled, were in the field.
Question--What proportion of the whole battalion had not been exercised with blank cartridge?
Answer--With the exception of one or two days in May, when the whole battalion were out skirmishing, I am satisfied that half of the men had never fired a shot.
Question--What proportion of the men had never practised with ball cartridge?
Answer--The proportion was about the same, about half.
Question--What proportion of the regiment was composed of lads under twenty years of age?
Answer--I should say more than half of the regiment.
Question--Did you observe any difference in the demeanor of the lads and the other soldiers going into action?
Answer--No. Each were equally cool. I particularly noticed the companies that morning as they marched out to the skirmish, and all were equally cool. I may state here that this was the first occasion on which the whole regiment had an opportunity to skirmish as a battalion. I also wish to state that I saw the right wing of the Thirteenth extend and advance in skirmishing order, and that nothing could exceed the steadiness and regularity with which they advanced.
EVIDENCE OF W. T. URQUHART.
The thirteenth witness called by Lieut.-Col. Booker was Wm. T. Urquhart, assistant editor of the Hamilton _Spectator_, who was a private in No. 4 Company. Thirteenth Battalion.
Question--Do you recollect seeing Lieut.-Col. Booker after the fight at Lime Ridge, and where?
Answer--I do. I saw him on the rising ground immediately in rear of where the action took place.
Question--Were you exposed to a heavy fire?
Answer--We were.
Question--Were you one of the retreating column?
Answer--In the rear.
Question by the Court--What was Lieut.-Col. Booker doing at the time you noticed him?
Answer--He was trying to restore order.
Question--Where were you when the right wing went out to skirmish? And did your skirmishers relieve those in front of you?
Answer--We were on the right. I was in the company forming the support of the skirmishers on the right, and the skirmishers of our company in front relieved those of the Rifles in front of them. The Rifles retired in good order to the reserves. I certainly saw two companies come in, but I cannot speak as to the whole line.
Question--From the time your skirmishers were posted until the retreat, how much time elapsed?
Answer--I should think about an hour.
Question--What caused the retreat, in your opinion, and what succeeded?
Answer--We retreated because the bugle sounded "the retreat," and we were also ordered by Lieut. Routh, the officer in command of our company, who said shortly afterward that it was a mistake, as it should have been "the advance," and ordered us to "halt" and "front," and we did so accordingly. The skirmishers immediately came down upon us, who were all men of our battalion, and we all retreated together to the cross-road, near the place where we first deployed. Two or three companies of Rifles came down this cross-road from the right of the attack at this moment, and the whole became mingled together and the formation was immediately destroyed. Several attempts by officers of the Thirteenth and the Rifles were made to rally or re-form the men. I noticed Col. Booker and Adjutant Henery do this, and also Ensign Armstrong, who carried the colors. I saw Lieut. Arthurs endeavoring to stop the men, and also other Rifle officers whose names I am not acquainted with.
ADJUTANT HENERY RECALLED.
Question--State the names of the officers of the right wing of the Thirteenth Battalion who were present when that wing was ordered to skirmish?
Answer--Major Skinner. Capt. Grant. Lieut. Gibson, and Ensign McKenzie, of No. 1 Company; Capt. Watson and Lieut. Sewell, of No. 2 Company; and Lieut. Ferguson, of No. 3 Company.
Question--How long have you been connected with the regiment, and in what capacity?
Answer--As Drill Instructor and Adjutant, about four years.
Question--About what proportion of the Thirteenth Regiment was wholly undrilled at the time of the affair at Lime Ridge?
Answer--One man only, and the others were all drilled men.
Question--Had the whole battalion previously been exercised with blank cartridge?
Answer--Yes, but not frequently.
Question--Had they any practice with ball cartridge?
Answer--I think 180 men had previously had ball practice.
Question--Was a large proportion of the regiment composed of boys under twenty?
Answer--I think that about 120 were under twenty, and a large proportion of these were between the ages of 19 and 20 years of age.
Question--Did you observe any difference in the demeanor of the men when under fire?
Answer--No difference--all seemed equally steady.
Question--What number of rounds had the men of the Thirteenth when going into action?
Answer--Sixty rounds per man, with caps in proportion.
MAJOR SKINNER'S TESTIMONY.
Major Skinner, of the Thirteenth Battalion, was the next witness examined.
Question--Were you present at Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June last, when the right wing of the Thirteenth Battalion was sent out to skirmish?
Answer--Yes.
Question--State the orders given and by whom given for the movement, and what took place under your observation.
Answer--Col. Hooker said to me at some distance (about ten yards): "Major Skinner, you will skirmish with the right wing." I then advanced with the skirmishers. We went over a fence and across a field and over another fence into an orchard on the right side of the road. We went through that orchard up to another fence, and there remained for some time. While approaching this fence the enemy's shots passed over our heads. After remaining some time at this fence we found their shot getting closer. We then crossed that fence and passed over a field to another fence, where we halted and remained for some time. I passed to the right of the skirmishers of our battalion. I went there because I saw a number of men in green uniform on our extreme right towards our front, and knowing they were some of our men, told my men not to fire upon them. I cannot say that I saw any of the enemy. They fired upon us from under cover. We met a few skirmishers in green in the orchard. We passed through them.
Question--Before you deployed, what was the position of your regiment as regards the Queen's Own?
Answer--The Queen's Own were all away in front, and the York Rifles also.
Question--How long after the first shot was tired by the enemy was it until the Thirteenth were ordered to skirmish?
Answer--About ten minutes elapsed from the time the first shot was fired until some men of the Queen's Own came in, and we were ordered to relieve the skirmishers. I heard a call for the surgeon to go to the front about seven minutes before we were ordered to skirmish. At the same time Ensign McEachren was carried to the rear. After going to the right of our skirmishers and cautioning the men not to fire upon the men in green on our right. I went back again to the centre of our men. We remained there at this fence about a quarter of an hour, and the enemy getting our range, it became so hot that we again advanced. We ran across a field this time. The whole of No. 3 Company must have been on the left of the road. I was on the right of the road. We found a brick house, with a wooden addition to it. It was locked up with a padlock, and one of our men opened it. We went in, and opening the front door, used the house for cover, firing through the doorway. We were about 150 yards from the woods occupied by the enemy. Some one on the left of the road called out, "Don't you hear the bugle?" I said, "No. What does it say?" The reply I got was, "Retreat." I then looked around to the rear for the first time since we came out, and I saw our men at the right running in. I then heard some one on my left say, "Why, they are preparing to receive cavalry." I looked around and said, "Where is the cavalry?" implying that I saw none. I then ran across the road to the left and saw that the men were all running as fast as they could to the rear. I ran for a barn and remained there a few moments to get breath, and then ran for another fence. I saw a few of our men behind me, and the enemy pursuing them. Two of our men were shot here--Stewart and Powell. I then made for the road where we had previously deployed, expecting to find the reserve there. I found none. Our skirmishers were then comprising men of all of our companies, mixed with those in green. I suppose there were about 150 red coats and about 30 or 40 in green. I then asked for the commanding officer, but got no answer. I then asked for Col. Booker, and one man in the crowd cried out, "He is off, three miles ahead." I do not know who it was that said so. I then called for Major Gillmor, and got no reply. I then thought that I should do something, and I ran to the front of the retreating men on the road and told them to halt. They paid no attention to me. I called upon an officer of our battalion, who was on the right of the men retreating, to draw his sword and see if we could not stop them. We then again went to the front of our men, retreating backwards for a few minutes, when we got them to halt. A couple of boys of our regiment had their bayonets fixed, endeavoring to stop them, and before I could do further a number of men in green rushed past on the left and one of the boys disappeared, and then commenced, a further retreat of all present. No companies were formed for the retreat. I assisted to carry two boys who were wounded by getting doors and carrying them to Ridgeway. They were Rifles. When we reached Ridgeway there were about 150 of us, mixed red and green. We found no one of the force in Ridgeway when we arrived. It was half-past 10 o'clock when we reached Ridgeway. I remained there about three-quarters of an hour, the men continually leaving and going on towards Port Colborne. I left the village just as the Fenians were coming down the hill. I had about 50 men and officers with me. We took the road towards Port Colborne. At the turn of the road we halted and looked back, and saw a large column of about 400 of the enemy marching down the hill into Ridgeway. I wish to state that the whole regiment (Thirteenth) had sixty rounds each, and when the order to retreat was given we had not expended half of our ammunition.
Question--Is there anything of your own knowledge that you wish to state that it is important this Court should hear?
Answer--No.
ISAAC RYALL'S EVIDENCE.
Dr. Isaac Ryall, Surgeon of the Thirteenth Battalion, was the next witness examined.
Question--Were you present at Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June last, and in what capacity?
Answer--Yes, as Surgeon of the Thirteenth Battalion Question--State your position during the action, and what occurred under your observation.
Answer--I remained with my own battalion until the order was given by Col. Booker to skirmish and relieve the Queen's Own. The regiment at this time was standing on the road beyond the tavern. I followed the line of skirmishers behind No. 4 Company, which passed along the road to the schoolhouse and then advanced to a fence near an orchard. While here a man who was wounded came from the front. He was a rifleman, but I cannot say what corps he belonged to. I examined him and sent him to the rear. I then returned to my post. A few moments afterwards No. 4 Company were ordered to advance, and they went over the fence into the orchard. I then went down to the fence, with the orderlies to assist, and then passed down the fence until coming near the end of it. I cut across the angle to the main road, and there I saw Col. Booker with his bugler and an orderly. The Rifles in reserve were behind Col. Booker, who was between them and the line of skirmishers on the road. Immediately on reaching Col. Booker I heard an order or a cry (which was not from Col. Booker) to "Prepare for cavalry!" I looked around and could not see any cavalry. I then walked to the rear. I am quite positive that the first order to "Prepare for cavalry!" was not given by Col. Booker, because I was quite close to him at the time, and the word came from the front. An order was then given by Col. Booker to "Form square." which was done. I am not positive that this order was given by Col. Booker, but I think so. They did not seem to properly "form square." and in a few seconds they commenced retreating. The square I have referred to was composed of Rifles and the color party of the Thirteenth. My orderly (Robert Maun) was with me at this time. I did not see any of the Thirteenth come up and form in rear of the square. I was going to the rear and saw them commence running. I walked down the road, and the men passed me running. About a quarter of a mile from where the square was formed. I heard Col. Booker give an order, which I repeated twice, for the men to go into a wood on the left-hand side of the road. The order did not seem to be obeyed. I spoke to one man of the Thirteenth, and asked him why he did not obey the orders. He said he would go in if the others did, but he would not go in by himself. Immediately after I saw a man named Powell, of the Thirteenth, who had been wounded and was being assisted by two men. I examined him and found there was no necessity for immediate action, and then got him into a waggon and took him to a farmer's house beyond Ridgeway. I did not see Col. Booker again until I got about a mile or more from the Ridgeway Station, on the road south of the railway, he had been giving some stimulants to a sick soldier of the Thirteenth, who was mounted on his horse. The man 's name was Daniel Laker. I went on with the men. I saw the Rifles resting themselves by the roadside, and the Thirteenth passing them after leaving Ridge way. When we arrived at the point where the railway track crossed the main road, some of the men took the railway track and some followed the road. Col. Booker and I both followed the track, and a train shortly afterwards came up, upon which a number of men got; as many as it would carry. Col. Booker walked on or remained behind. It was only an engine and a baggage car. There were no passenger cars.
LIEUT. FERGUSON'S EVIDENCE.
The next witness examined by the Court was Lieut. John William Ferguson, of No. 3 Company, Thirteenth Battalion.
Question--Did you command No. 3 Company of the Thirteenth Battalion at the battle of Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June last?
Answer--Yes.
Question--State what took place that day under your own observation.
Answer--About ten or fifteen minutes after the firing commenced, Major Gillmor came back to the rear and told Col. Booker that his men were tired and their ammunition nearly expended, and asked Col. Booker to send out the right wing of the Thirteenth to relieve his men. Col. Booker then gave the order to the right wing of the Thirteenth to deploy on No. 3 Company, and this being done, an order was given to extend from the left. We then advanced over a fence through a field, and in the middle of the field we were halted by bugle call. In a few minutes "the advance" was sounded, and we continued advancing until we came under fire. The Queen's Own were then retiring in good order. We then commenced firing and advanced across a field. My company had to cross the road to the left side. Here I changed my front a little to the right, and saw the enemy about 100 yards off. I heard a bugle sound "the retreat," and I gave the command to "retire." We retired about forty yards in line into the original position, firing as we fell back. While retiring I heard the bugle sound the "advance." I then ordered my company to advance, but not to fire until they got where they were before, under cover. I again heard a bugle call which I did not know, but on inquiry was told it was "the alarm." I looked for the cavalry, but could see none. I let my men remain where they were. I then heard the bugle call "the assembly," followed by "the double." I then ordered the men to make for the square the shortest way they could, and they retired on the square. Three of them were wounded while retiring at this time. When I saw the enemy coming out of the woods I went after my men. I saw Major Skinner and Adjutant Henery making for the same point, that is, the square. When I reached where the reserve stood, scarcely any men were there. On my way down I saw one of the Queen's Own lying dead as I passed. Several ineffectual attempts were made to form up the men. At Ridgeway I saw Col. Booker on his horse forming up his battalion into column. They were falling into column of companies, right in front, facing towards Port Colborne, past Ridgeway. As soon as we had formed I heard Col. Booker give the command, "Form fours--right. Left wheel--quick march!" and the column moved off in the direction of Port Colborne. Col. Booker was in advance of the column until we came near a wood, when he told us to keep a sharp lookout for firing from the woods, and he passed back to the rear and towards Ridgeway. The main body of the Rifles was before us. I did not see Col. Booker again. I saw his horse pass by with a body on his back in red clothing. This was about four miles from Port Colborne.
CAPT. B. H. DAVIS' TESTIMONY.
Robert H. Davis, Captain of the York Rifles, was the next witness called.
Question--Were you present at the engagement at Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June last?
Answer--I was.
Question--State what position you held in the engagement, and what you know, of your own knowledge, what occurred.
Answer--When the firing commenced I was in front of the Thirteenth, in column of reserve. I was sent out with my company alone, as a company in support of the left skirmishing company of the Queen's Own (that was Capt. Sherwood's company, Trinity College Rifles). I remained there until the skirmishers were called in, when I took my company to the rear in fours, and formed them up in rear of the reserve, which was then formed by the Queen's Own. After I had halted and fronted the company, I looked in front of the column and saw the Thirteenth were all out. I thought I was not in my right place, and I countermarched my company to the head of the column, taking, as I supposed, the ground I should have taken when I came in, namely, that held originally by the Thirteenth, to which I was attached. I had scarcely halted here when the order came for two more companies to extend, the leading company to take ground to the left. I went almost over the same ground from which I had just returned, and got to the left of the skirmishers already extended, when I extended my own company from the right, the company on my right being a Rifle company. When within about 500 yards of the enemy, we commenced firing and advancing. We crossed two fields on the other side of the cross-road called the Garrison Road. When I had formed my men by a fence to give them a direct fire into the enemy, I heard a bugle call which my sergeant said was "the retire." He said that it was a mistake, that it was "the advance" that was meant. In a few minutes "the advance" was sounded, and I took my company over the fence behind which they were lying and told them to get to the next one as soon as they could. When about half way across the field "the retire" was again sounded, followed by "the double." I looked along the line of skirmishers and saw them firing and retiring, and a good many running in. We retired, the men firing occasionally, until we reached the Garrison Road. I then closed the company on the centre and crossed the Garrison Road to the next field, then formed "fours right" and marched to where I had left the reserve. In the field on the Ridgeway side of the Garrison Road there was a small farm house on the hill close to the side of the Ridgeway road, and when I came up with the company to this house I saw a company of Rifles in close column of sections, kneeling to receive cavalry. I expressed my surprise at this, and moved my own company up the road. When I reached the fence alongside of the road I saw a good deal of confusion, and I asked generally what was the matter, and what they were going to do. Some officer told me that the order had been given to "Form square" on the leading company of the reserve. I did this with my company, and halted in rear of the column. The order was now passed from the front for the column to retire, and the attempt was made to retire, and in two minutes all was confusion.
Question--Have you any further information to give the Court respecting what occurred at the engagement at Lime Ridge?
Answer--I saw several officers of Rifles and infantry using all their exertions like good men to induce the men to rally and form up again, or to fight in any way. Among these officers were Major Skinner, Adjutant Henery, and Captain Gardner, of the Highland Company, Queen's Own. I had sixty rounds of ball cartridges on going into action, and the men expended between 15 and 20 rounds each.
CAPTAIN GARDNER EXAMINED.
The next witness called was Capt. John Gardner, of the Queen's Own.
Question--State the company you commanded at Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June last, and the particulars of the engagement which took place under your observation.
Answer--I commanded on that occasion No. 10 (or the Highland) Company of the Queen's Own. After leaving the cars at Ridgeway, the brigade was formed in quarter distance column, right in front, the Queen's Own leading, the York Rifles next, then the Thirteenth Battalion, with the Caledonia Rifles as the rear guard. After loading with ball cartridges. No. 5 Company of the Queen's Own (Capt. Edwards) was sent out as the advance guard. I believe that company was detailed for this duty because it was the only company that was armed with the Spencer rifle. I cannot say whether we were marching in column of companies or sub-divisions, but after the advance guard had got out a reasonable distance the column was moved on. After marching some distance we were halted, and then the skirmishers were thrown out. The whole brigade then advanced in this order, and halted once or twice to maintain their proper distance. Upon seeing what they took to be the enemy on the left, two additional companies were sent out. At this time Col. Hooker and Major Gillmor endeavored by the use of their glasses to ascertain where the enemy were. Then the skirmishers on the left stopped for a moment, when the bugle sounded "incline to the left." and some of them. I think, raised their hats upon their rifles, but did not obey the call, probably from not hearing the bugle call. A sergeant was sent out to tell them to incline more to the left. He had just reached them, when firing commenced by two or three shots being fired on the left of the road, and almost immediately the enemy opened upon us a regular volley from our front. Our men then returned the fire, continually advancing until they occupied the ground from which the Fenians first fired upon them. At this time eight companies of the Queen's Own were out. Nos. 9 and 10 were with the reserve on the road. At this time No. 9 Company was sent out to the right of the skirmish line, and my company as their support. I do not think I was two minutes supporting them, when I was ordered to reinforce the line by joining them. As soon as I did so. No. 9 Company moved into the wood on my right. I remained fifteen or twenty minutes in this open field, firing at the enemy who were under cover in the woods, the bullets coming like hail. I was then relieved by one of the companies of the Thirteenth Battalion, and I retired to the reserve on the road. None of my men were injured. I had just halted my company in rear of the column when Col. Booker came up to Major Gillmor and told him he wanted a company sent to our right, to prevent the Fenian left from flanking us. The column at this time forming the reserve was composed of companies in red and partly of companies in green. Major Gillmor looked at the column, and said to me. "Captain Gardner, take your company." At this time the column was standing at the crossing of the Ridge Road with the Garrison Road. I then faced my company to the right and marched along the Garrison Road in file, all the time exposed to the fire of the enemy, until we reached the wood on the right. I extended while marching towards the woods. I then ordered them to enter the woods in skirmishing order. We had no support, and so continued during the engagement. The enemy was in the woods in front of us, and on our approach retreated. On reaching the other side of the bush they retired, and we found on the ground they had been occupying several articles which I believe are still forthcoming. We remained on the edge of this field firing upon the enemy, who were in the bush opposite, and kept up their fire upon us. The field between us and the enemy was about 400 yards, varying in width. We continued here engaged with the enemy for some time, until we heard some cheering on our left front, along the enemy's line. I thought it was our men cheering and making a dash on the enemy. I then ordered my men to get over the fence and cross the field to the left, in the direction from which the cheering came. As soon as we came to the opening commanding a view of the field, we perceived that it was the Fenians who had cheered, and were advancing in large numbers towards our forces. Sergeant Bain, from an elevated position, saw the enemy coming down on them on a run, and cried out, "Retire, retire!" Then we made for the head of the column of reserve on the road. In reaching this point we had to pass through the fire of the advancing enemy the whole time. At first the fire passed over our heads, but as we neared the column it lowered, and bullets struck around us everywhere. My left sub-division alone came in with me. The right sub-division went with Ensign Gibson through the wood to the rear and around to our reserve, but I cannot particularize as to them. On crossing the fence next to the column I met Capt. Davis, of the York Rifles, and saw the column in the road standing in the form of three sides of a square, and a number of men standing loosely around. Some of the men in the square had their bayonets fixed and some had not. I here saw Major Gillmor, Capt. Otter, Capt. Morrison, Lieut. Bennett, Lieut. Beaven, Capt. Brown, Capt. Douglas, and perhaps others of the Queen's Own. I also saw Capt. Henery, Adjutant of the Thirteenth Battalion. Other officers of that corps might have been there, but I did not see them. Lieut. Ramsay came in with me, and stayed to the very last. Capt. Davis and myself organized a strong company of volunteers from this crowd, when Major Gillmor came up to me and said there was no use in sacrificing these men, as our main body was retreating towards Ridgeway. These men who remained in the rear kept up an incessant fire upon the enemy all the time they were standing there. The fire from the enemy suddenly ceased, and it was then that Capt. Davis and I endeavored to form up the company composed of volunteers to make a stand. Major Gillmor having expressed his opinion that it was no use to sacrifice these men, we all deliberately retreated towards Ridgeway. As we proceeded a few stray shots were at one time fired at us, but no further attack was made upon us.
Question--Have you any further information to give this Court respecting the engagement at Lime Ridge which you think may be of public interest?
Answer--No.
ENSIGN MACLEAN'S TESTIMONY.
The next witness called by the Court was Thomas A. McLean, Ensign of No. 6 Company of the Queen's Own.
Question--Were you present at the engagement at Lime Ridge on the 2nd of June?
Answer--I was. Whilst the column was advancing on the road from Ridgeway to Stevensville, the advance guard gave the signal that the enemy was in sight. I saw on the left what I took to be a small party of our men running towards the woods, at a distance of about half a mile. A detail of several companies from the Queen's Own were now sent out to skirmish, and our company (No. 6) went out as the right flanking party, being posted at right angles with the line of skirmishers, in skirmishing order. We advanced through a wood on our right, feeling for the enemy. We saw no one and were recalled in about fifteen minutes and sent out as a support to a company on the right of the road and towards the right of the skirmishing line. As we were advancing in this order fire was suddenly opened from the enemy in front along our line, which the skirmishers immediately returned. As soon as the fire opened the skirmishers doubled up to cover, and we were advanced to a wheat field and were ordered to lie down. We again advanced, the enemy retreating. In about twenty-five minutes the order came to relieve skirmishers. We at once doubled up, extending on the double, and relieved the company in front of us, who retired, and I suppose formed our support. Our company, on getting into the skirmish line, immediately fired and advanced at the double over two fields. Then there was a check for a short time, with a sharp fire on both sides. Then we advanced again, inclining rather to the left, and drove the enemy out of the orchard and from the barn and fences. We held the barn and orchard for some time. A company of the Thirteenth came up in extended order in our rear. They did not relieve us. They were from 50 to 60 yards in rear of us. One or two officers and two or three men came up to the line of skirmishers, and my men complained to me that those men of the Thirteenth behind us would shoot them, as they were firing over the heads of my company. I got up and asked them if they had come to relieve skirmishers, but got no answer. I turned around to my men and said. "Boys, peg away. They are not going to help us." They did not relieve us, but stayed at the fence in rear of us, and some of them fired from that position over the heads of my men, and some of them to the left. The firing continued for a little while after this, and I saw the Fenians advancing down the road. They were pushing forward their skirmishers and were advancing, as I thought, in a heavy column of companies. They continued their advance, and we received an order to retire. We then retired as skirmishers usually do in closing in on their supports. We came out, but found no support to close upon, and reached the open space where there was a large body of men formed into square. After reaching this open space I heard a cry of "Cavalry." but saw none. I heard a cheer from our square, and from some cause the rear of the square seemed to turn and go down the road. The square now seemed to dissolve, and the men formed a confused mixture of red and green down the road to Ridgeway. Some men halted in the rear and delivered their fire. Many of the officers used their endeavors to stop the retreat. I left the main body because I found that from the effect of a heavy fall I had just received I could not keep up with the column, and I therefore went into the woods on our right as we were retiring, and kept out of reach of the enemy. I advanced in line with their skirmishers as long as their fire lasted, from a half to three-quarters of a mile. I then stopped and laid down to watch the main body of the enemy pass along the road. I had a good position to see from, at a distance of about 400 yards. I noticed that every time our men fired it checked the enemy, as their long line of skirmishers would halt. The main body advanced, as I thought, in column of fours. I counted a number of fours, and then as they passed I gauged another party, and so on until all passed, and allowing for their advanced skirmishers and rear guard, I think there were 1,500 men, if they were marching in fours, as I believe they were. After they had all passed I made for a farm house. Shortly afterward I left for Col. Peacocke's column, who I heard was a short distance away, at New Germany. I arrived there at half-past 1 o'clock and reported myself to Col. Peacocke, who ordered me to stay with his force.
Question--Have you any further information within your own knowledge, of public interest, to convey to the Court respecting the engagement at Lime Ridge?
Answer--No.
REV. MR. INGLIS EXAMINED.
The next witness called by the Court was Rev. David Inglis, a Presbyterian minister.
Question--Were you present at the engagement at Lime? Ridge on the 2nd of June last?
Answer--I was.
Question--State your position on this occasion, and whatever part of the action or proceedings that came under your observation that may furnish any information to the Court.
Answer--I left Ridgeway in the ammunition waggon, and was behind the main body, among the rear guard. A little before the firing commenced the rear guard halted, and the waggon in which I rode was brought up to the rear of the main body. After the firing commenced the rear guard passed us, and the waggon was then halted. Rev. Mr. Burwash and myself left the waggon and hastened to the rear of the Thirteenth. A cry was raised that one of the Queen's Own was wounded. "Where is the doctor?" We hurried on and met Dr. May with several men of the Queen's Own bearing Ensign McEachren from the field. They took him into a log house on the left side of the road, and Dr. May desired me to inform him that his wound was mortal. I told him so, and spent some time with him in religious service. I then left him with Rev. Mr. Burwash, whose parishioner he had been for some time previously, and went out to see if I could be useful elsewhere. It afterwards took up a position on a pile of stones on the road which gave me a view of the position of the troops. I think it was now about twenty minutes since the firing commenced that killed Ensign McEachren up to the time of my getting upon the pile of stones. At this time I observed a part of the Thirteenth out as skirmishers, and other portions of the same regiment in more compact bodies behind them. I think I saw a company of green coats out on the right of those companies of the Thirteenth that were skirmishing. At this time, on the main road near me, were formed up a body of men in green coats, composed, I should say, of three or four companies, and with these men were the colors of the Thirteenth Regiment, surrounded by a few men of that corps. The firing at this time from the enemy was very rapid. I left this place and went back to the hospital, and returned again in about half an hour. On my return I noticed that the firing of the enemy on our left had very materially slackened, but was kept up regularly, although not so rapidly as on the right. A bugle sounded near the colors of the Thirteenth produced an obvious commotion among the men. They were looking about them, very much as though they knew not what to do. After a short interval another bugle call sounded from near the centre of the reserve, where the colors were. The men in the reserve by command formed a square after this bugle sounded. It was not a perfect square. This was succeeded by another bugle call and words of command. The result of that was that these men who had "formed square" were getting back to their former positions. Then came a fourth bugle call. The effect of this was that the whole line of skirmishers and those in support of them, as well as those in the road near me, made a motion to turn around. At this moment a small number of men (about 25 or 30) broke from the ranks and ran down the road, leaving the remainder standing mostly faced to the rear. These men were all dressed in green. Immediately behind those that were running away came from six to eight in red coats, who ran after the others down the road. The skirmishers and supporters were all retiring. I then ran over to the hospital and told Dr. May that our men were retiring. He said he would take all the wounded men with him. Just afterwards I noticed a great rush of men to the rear. I had left the hospital to see how matters were, and to see if our men were still retiring, and had started to return, but the rush of men was so great that I could not get across to the hospital. This retreat continued, with the red and green mixed together. I passed down and got up on the ammunition waggon, and found that Dr. May was ahead of me with his patients. While on the waggon I noticed in the rear of the retiring column a number of men (between 100 and 200, I think), composed of red and green, seeming to be drawn up across the road in pretty good order. Down the road a short distance an attempt was made to rally or re-form the men, which was to a good extent successful. Before we came to Ridgeway there was a halt. A man in uniform came and took the horse which Col. Booker had been using. Shortly after this I saw Col. Booker on the horse coming towards Ridgeway. From all I saw and heard of the men. I can bear testimony that with very few exceptions there was no evidence of cowardice. They displayed good spirit, and were all eager to meet the Fenians on the following morning.
This concluded the evidence taken by the Court of Inquiry in regard to
the matter under consideration. After due deliberation, and a careful
sifting of all the testimony given, the following was given as the
result of the investigation, which received the approval of the Militia
authorities:--
OPINION.
The Court having duly considered the evidence brought forward by Lieut.-Col. Booker, as well as such evidence as the Court have considered necessary, with a view of the further elucidation of the truth, are of opinion:--
First--That so far as the courage and character of Lieut.-Col. Booker: with reference to his conduct in the command of the force engaged with the enemy at Lime Ridge on Saturday, the 2nd of June last, are affected, there is not the slightest foundation for the unfavorable imputations cast upon him in the public prints, and most improperly circulated through that channel and otherwise. On the contrary, the Court desire to express the further opinion that Lieut.-Col. Booker having, as will appear, fallen into an error, promptly exerted himself in person to repair the effects of that error, in a manner which can leave no stain upon his personal courage and conduct, subsequently to the period of actual conflict with the force opposed, and also that the disposition of his forces, the manner in which, before an unseen enemy whose strength was unknown to him, he planned his attack, and the desire and anxiety which he showed to carry out these plans to the best of his ability at points where it was his duty to be, have in conjunction with the statements of officers and others in evidence before the Court, led the Court to believe that at no period of that day could want of personal coolness be imputed to Lieut.-Col. Booker.
With reference to the circumstances connected with the late engagement at Lime Ridge, this Court are further of opinion that the entire force under command of Lieut.-Col. Booker, from the formation of the expedition to the time it came out of action, was under disadvantages with which Her Majesty's regular forces have seldom or ever, it is submitted, had to contend--in the want, of cavalry, artillery, commissariat arrangements, or even the requisite means of carrying with them cooked provisions, or supplying themselves with water in the country through which they were about to move, in a season when the heat rendered it especially needful that this last point should receive careful attention.
Further, that more than half of the two battalions forming the largest proportion of the whole force which left Port Colborne for Stevensville on the morning of the 2nd of June, was composed of youths not exceeding, and in many instances not having reached twenty years of age; that a large proportion of the force had been for a very short time accustomed to bear arms; that a somewhat less proportion had not even been exercised with blank cartridge, and that practice with ball cartridge was by very many of the rank and file of that force to be entered upon for the first time in their lives on that day.
That notwithstanding these disadvantages, the Court have, from the evidence produced, arrived at the conviction that no force could have commenced a march with the knowledge that they were advancing into a country occupied by an enemy whose numbers (exaggerated as they were afterwards known to be) were unknown to them, and whose position they might at any moment he called upon to attack, in finer spirits, or a more ready desire to show by obedience to command, that they were deserving of the confidence which their employment on the occasion showed was reposed in their courage, and in this respect no difference was perceptible between the mere tyros and the more seasoned men of the expedition.
This the Court find was the state of facts up to the time (which will be referred to in a later part of this opinion) on the arrival of the force under Lieut.-Col. Booker at Ridgeway, on the line of the Buffalo and Lake Huron Railway, and its being formed in open column of companies. The Court find that the order in which it advanced to form a junction with the brigade under Col. Peacocke, of Her Majesty's 16th Regiment, at Stevensville, was as follows:--
The 2nd Battalion (or Queen's Own Rifles) in front, the York Rifles (attached to the Thirteenth Battalion, of which it formed the leading company), the Thirteenth Battalion next, and last the Caledonia Rifle Company, forming the rear guard, the advance guard of the force being No. 5 Company of the Queen's Own, having forty Spencer rifles as part of their armament; and the Court are of opinion that Lieut.-Col. Booker, in advancing, used every precaution by extending companies to skirmish to the right and left of the road by which he was moving his force, which military rule and the nature of the country demanded; and that in the forward movement from Ridgeway, the manner in which it was conducted by Lieut.-Col. Booker and the officers of the force under his orders, was regular, and in accordance with the well-understood rules by which such duties are governed; and here the Court think it their duty to point to the fact that in Lieut.-Col. Booker his force had a commanding officer who, for the first time in his experience, found himself in command of a larger body than one weak battalion on parade; and that this officer, being without the assistance of any staff, and not even accompanied by a mounted officer or orderly to transmit his instructions, was placed in a position of unusual difficulty in the event of coming into contact with the enemy.
The Court have further found, from the evidence adduced before them, that the column under Lieut.-Col. Booker was proceeding in this order and had reached a point on the way leading from Ridgeway to Stevensville, at about two miles from the former point, when the advanced guard became aware that the woods on the right and left fronts of the line of advance were occupied by the enemy; and are further of opinion, that the movements then directed by Lieut.-Col. Booker and the subsequent disposition of the force at his disposal (up to a time to be subsequently mentioned), were in strict accordance with laid down principles, and such as at least to hold an enemy not greatly superior in numbers in check, if not to drive them back--and that the manner in which the movements directed were executed, the advance of the companies of the Queen's Own sent out to strengthen the skirmishers on the left, the advance of the right wing of the Thirteenth Battalion extended on the right of the road, and No. 10 Company of the Queen's Own rather to the right, was highly creditable to the officers and men, particularly as during the whole of these movements the force was under fire from an unseen enemy under cover of the woods, our troops being in open ground and exposed to the effects of such a fire, which fortunately, though well sustained, was not very effective.
The Court is of opinion that to this point the direction of the attack and the position of the attacking force was well and skilfully managed, and the enemy had been forced back to a considerable distance from the position when first encountered.
The Court find that at this time, and when everything looked favorable for the attacking force, there occurred an alarm, of the truth of which a moment's reflection on the part of the men with whom it originated, and who appear to have been some of the advanced skirmishers, would have shown the impossibility. It was to the effect that a force of cavalry was advancing upon our force, and instantly the cry of "Cavalry", spread with electric rapidity from the front to where the Colonel stood in reserve, with which part of the force Lieut.-Col. Booker as commanding officer remained, and thus assuming the cry to have its origin in the fact that that officer gave the order "Look out for cavalry!" squares were formed instantly to meet cavalry, both by the column and by the skirmishers within hearing of that order--a mistake which, being as quickly discovered, Lieut.-Col. Booker endeavored to remedy by the order to "Re-form column."
The Court, with respect to this part of the affair, are of opinion that to adopt the idle rumor that the enemy's force was partly composed of cavalry in a country where such an arm could be of scarcely any value in attack, or to assume, even for a moment, that a mounted corps which he could not see was advancing at such a rate as to render it necessary to give the words of caution which he used, was ill-judged, and was the first act which gave rise to the disorganization of his force, which then followed.
This Court further find that at this moment, and when the officer commanding had, as before mentioned, given the order to "Re-form column," he perceived that the column was rapidly falling back. The attempt to re-form not having been successful, the men became mingled together, and that the effect of the mistake just referred to became so perceptible in the disorganization of the column at a moment when, in the opinion of this Court, to have given the order to advance would have had the best effect in the encouragement of the force, and in a very short period would have effected the rout of the enemy. The officer in command (apparently hesitating as to whether he should advance or retreat) unfortunately gave the order to retire, and the bugles having taken it up at the advanced posts of the attack, our force began to fall back; and notwithstanding the exertions of the officers, who in every case shown in the evidence before the Court behaved in a very steady and energetic manner to rally their broken ranks, the column had retreated too far in the direction of Ridgeway before the advanced parties had all came in to render this possible. This being the state of the force at the time, the officer in command (finding it impossible to rally) with the concurrence of the next senior officer, whom he consulted, decided upon falling back on Port Colborne by the road over which he had advanced.
And the Court lastly finds, that the whole of the wounded and sick were brought with the retreating column, and that it reached Port Colborne suffering much from fatigue and hunger, but without further casualties than those which are already known in the official reports of the affair.
G. T. DENISON, Colonel. President.
J. SHANLY, Lieut.-Colonel.
GEO. K. CHISHOLM, Lieut.-Colonel.
Hamilton. 12th July, 1866.
THE FORT ERIE DISASTER.
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE CASE OK LIEUT.-COL. J. STOUGHTON DENNIS.
The appointment of a Court of Inquiry to investigate the charges made against Lieut.-Col. J. Stoughton Dennis was granted on the request of that officer himself. From the time that Lieut.-Col. Dennis hastily left his command battling with the Fenians on the streets of Port Erie, the men of the Welland Canal Field Battery knew him no more, as he never came back. Therefore their relations were strained. Most of the men of the Battery and the Dunnville Naval Brigade were pronounced in their denunciation of his conduct during the fight, and freely expressed their minds in this respect.
When Capt. King's wounds permitted his return home to Port Robinson from the hospital at Buffalo, a large number of people assembled to give him a welcome. In replying to their greetings, Capt. King incidentally made mention of the experience of his Battery in the battle at Fort Erie, and during his remarks voiced the sentiments of his men by publicly accusing Lieut.-Col. Dennis of cowardice. This charge came to the ears of Lieut.-Col. Dennis and he demanded a Court of Inquiry to investigate the matter. In the meantime a formula of six separate charges was filed against Lieut.-Col. Dennis, and His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief appointed the following officers as a Court of Inquiry, viz.:--Col. Geo. T. Denison, President; Lieut.-Col. James Shanly, and Lieut.-Col. S. B. Fairbanks.
The Court assembled in the City Hotel at Fort Erie, on the 8th of November, 1866, for the purpose of taking testimony. Among those who were notified to appear as witnesses were a number of men who had been engaged in the fight as members of the Welland Canal Field Battery and the Dunnville Naval Brigade, besides several citizens.
For some reason four members of the Welland Canal Field Battery who had been summoned to testify were not called upon for their evidence, which they considered a very strange proceeding as they were all present for that purpose, and had evidence to offer which would tend to substantiate Capt. King's allegations. Eight or ten witnesses were examined, when the Court proceeded to sum up the evidence and consider the charges _seriatim_. The result was that Lieut.-Col. Dennis was exonerated by the Court, although Col. Geo. T. Denison (the President) differed from his colleagues on several important points stated in the charges.
The following is the official report, published in General Orders, which contains the charges made, the findings and the remarks of His Excellency the Governor-General on the case:--
VOLUNTEER MILITIA. HEADQUARTERS, OTTAWA, 14th December, 1866.
GENERAL ORDERS No. 1.
The Court of Inquiry lately assembled at Fort Erie on application of Lieut.-Colonel Dennis, having presented its report, the Commander-in-Chief directs that the several charges preferred against that officer, with the opinion of the Court of Inquiry thereupon, be published for general information.
CHARGES.
1st Charge.--With having at Fort Erie on the afternoon of the 2nd June last, after having received information that an overwhelming force of the enemy was advancing on and was within a very short distance of that place, evinced an utter disregard for the lives and safety of the officers and men of the Welland Canal Field Battery, and the safekeeping of a large number of Fenian prisoners in charge of that corps and the Dunnville Naval Brigade, in this: that he ordered billets to be prepared for the Battery and told the officer commanding it that he should leave it and the prisoners in Fort Erie and go on himself to Port Colborne with the Dunnville Naval Brigade with the steamer "Robb," then lying at a wharf in Fort Erie.
2nd Charge.--With having at Fort Erie on the afternoon of the 2nd June last, after he had received information that a large and overwhelming force of the enemy was within a very short distance from his command, and that his command was in danger of being destroyed or captured, and after having himself seen that force approaching, recklessly and uselessly landed 5 officers and 68 men of the Welland Canal Field Battery and Dunnville Naval Brigade from the steamer "Robb," marched them along an exposed road, and posted them in a most dangerous position, where they were exposed to a front and flanking fire from the enemy, which course on his part resulted in disaster to his command, the serious wounding and maiming (some of them for life) of an officer and five men, and the capture by the enemy of four officers and thirty-two men of that command.
3rd Charge.--With having at Fort Erie on the afternoon of the 2nd June last, after having placed his command in the dangerous position described in Charge No. 2, and when a force of the enemy greatly superior in numbers to his command was within a very short distance from and advancing upon his left flank, and another force of the enemy far stronger than the one first herein mentioned was within a very short distance of and advancing against his front and preparing to flank his right, the whole force of the enemy being overwhelming and numbering 500 or 600 men, while his command only numbered 5 officers and 68 men, neither ordering a retreat to the steamer "Robb," which there was ample time to effect, and whereby his whole command might have been saved, nor allowing a fire to be opened on the enemy, but on the contrary, neglecting to give orders for a retreat, and directing that no order to fire should be given.
4th Charge.--With having, at Fort Erie, on the afternoon of the 2nd June last, after he had placed his command in the dangerous and exposed position described in the preceding charges, and given the order not to fire as therein mentioned, disgracefully, in the face of the enemy, and in order to secure his personal safety, deserted his command and left it without orders of any kind.
5th Charge.--With having, on or about the 4th June last, in a certain report of his proceedings addressed to Colonel Lowry, commanding the Niagara frontier, untruly, and knowing it to be untrue, stated that, having advanced to meet the enemy at Fort Erie on the 2nd June last, he did, in order to save the prisoners then on board the tug "Robb" and prevent the enemy from obtaining possession of that vessel, order the Captain of that vessel to cast off and get into the stream, and ordered his (Colonel Dennis') men (meaning his command, landed as aforesaid) to retreat and do the best they could to get away, each man for himself, when in reality he did not give such orders, and had at the time of which he alleges he gave them, deserted his command.
6th Charge.--That he was guilty of misconduct at Fort Erie on the afternoon of the 2nd June last, in this, that having received information that an overwhelming body of the enemy was then within a very short distance of and advancing against Fort Erie, and in fact seen that body himself, he should and might, instead of placing his command then at Fort Erie in the dangerous position described in Charge No. 2, have embarked it in the steamer "Robb," so protected that vessel with materials at hand that she would have been proof against the fire and weapons of the enemy, and dropping into the stream, held the enemy in check without any casualty to his command, and prevented them from escaping to the United States before the arrival of a force sufficiently strong to capture them.
The Court having proceeded to the examination of the evidence brought forward against the accused, as well as what he has offered in exculpation, and having duly considered the same, are of--
OPINION.
As to the 1st Charge.--That the allegation that Lieut.-Colonel Dennis, after having received information of the near approach of an overwhelming force, made arrangements for billetting his men at Fort Erie, thereby raising the inference that in so acting he evinced disregard for the lives of the officers and men of the party under his command, is not sustained. And that of the part of this charge attributing to Lieut.-Colonel Dennis an expressed intention (with or without such information as he is alleged to have had) of leaving a part of his command at Fort Erie and taking the steamer and remainder of the force to Port Colborne, there is not any evidence whatever in support.
As to 2nd Charge.--That this charge, based on the assertion not only that the accused officer was in possession of certain information, but had actual personal knowledge of the approach of a large and overwhelming force of the enemy, is not sustained by the evidence before the Court. On the contrary, with reference to the alleged knowledge of that fact, the Court is of opinion that the rumors which immediately before his party was disembarked to repel any attack on the village of Fort Erie, were, in so far as regarded the strength of the enemy's force, so much at variance with previously received information of a definite nature, as to be disbelieved not only by Lieut.-Colonel Dennis, but to some extent by the officers who have preferred the charges against him. And it appears to the Court that it was only after he had got his men into position, and after they had come into actual contact with the enemy, that the great superiority in numbers of the attacking force became a matter of certainty.
As to the 3rd Charge.--That this charge, being also grounded upon certain knowledge alleged to have been in the possession of Lieut.-Colonel Dennis at a particular time with respect to the great superiority of the enemy's force, and that whilst possessing that knowledge, and there being time to avail himself of the line of retreat alleged to have been open to him, he neglected to do so, is not sustained by the evidence before the Court. And with reference to the remainder of this charge as to the aforesaid officer not allowing a fire to lie opened upon the enemy, but on the contrary directing that no order to fire should be given, the Court are further of opinion that this part of the charge is not only not sustained, but is refuted by the evidence offered on behalf of Lieut.-Colonel Dennis.
As to the 4th Charge.--That with reference to the grave accusations contained in this charge, the Court are of opinion that throughout the whole of the affair, and up to the moment when he ascertained from personal observation that the enemy was on the point of cutting off his command by an overwhelming force, the dispositions of his party and the orders given by Lieut.-Colonel Dennis were carried out and given in a perfectly collected and regular manner, and that on the retreat of his force his position was not such as to warrant the use of the language in which this charge has been framed, nor did Lieut.-Colonel Dennis, as alleged, leave his force without orders, and that therefore not only is this charge not sustained, but this Court are further of opinion that the imputation contained herein against Lieut.-Colonel Dennis is by no means supported by the evidence.
As to the 5th Charge.--That as to this charge nothing which has transpired in the evidence offered before this Court having varied the report made by Lieut.-Colonel Dennis to Colonel Lowry, the officer commanding on the Niagara frontier, as published in the Gazette of the 23rd of June last, and finding that the statements therein contained are fully supported by evidence before the Court, this Court are further of opinion that this charge is not sustained.
As to the 6th Charge.--That with reference to the allegation of misconduct on the part of Lieut.-Colonel Dennis contained in this charge, the officers preferring it, having based that assertion on an opinion which they appear to have formed as to the course which ought to have been, but was not adopted by Lieut.-Colonel Dennis with the force at his disposal, the Court are of opinion that although subsequent events and results may have properly led to the conclusion that such a course might have resulted in the manner alleged in the charge, no charge of misconduct in not adopting such a course is sustained, first, because it does not appear from the evidence that at the time when it is alleged that this course might have been successfully adopted, the officer in command had foreseen occasion for it. And also because it is by no means clear to the Court that there was time after he became aware of the vicinity of the enemy to have taken the steps suggested in this charge.
(Signed) GEO. T. DENISON, Colonel, President.
J. SHANLY, Lieut.-Colonel.
S. B. FAIRBANKS, Lieut.-Colonel.
Fort Erie. 8th November, 1866.
Colonel Denison, the President, having been overruled by the majority of
the Court, has signed the proceedings as its President, and now
desires to express his dissent from the finding of the majority for the
following reasons:--
Second Charge.--That as to the first allegation, "that he had received information that a large and overwhelming force of the enemy was within a very short distance from his command, and that his command was in danger of being captured," it appears to be proved by the evidence that this fact is established. The evidence of Drill Instructor McCracken, Lieutenant McDonald, Henry Cole, Thomas Carlisle, Lieutenant Nimmo, and of Lewis Palmer, show clearly that messenger after messenger arrived with this information, that most of the officers and men were aware of it, and that the remonstrances of Capt King and Capt. McCallum show not only their appreciation of the danger, but also afford the strongest presumption that Lieut.-Colonel Dennis must have been aware of it before he marched his command off the dock. This is also further established by the admission of Lieut.-Colonel Dennis in his "Statement of Facts" submitted to the Court, that he himself, after hearing the report, saw at least one hundred and fifty of the enemy before landing his men, and his further statement of his having sent word to the "Robb" to secure the boat and prisoners in case he was overpowered, and his having withdrawn his men from Ramsford's Corner to a position near the "Robb," all prove the evidence of doubts in his mind as to whether he had sufficient strength in his command to successfully resist the force which he was informed was about to attack him. And as to the remainder of the second charge the evidence proves it conclusively.
Third Charge.--Colonel Denison also dissents from the finding of the Court upon the third charge, as he is of opinion that the third charge is proved, with the exception that the allegation that Lieut.-Colonel Dennis did not allow a fire to be opened on the enemy. On this point there is a certain amount of rebutting evidence, although the weight of evidence seems to support the charge.
(Signed) GEO. T. DENISON. Colonel. President.
Fort Erie, 8th November, 1866.
With respect to the foregoing charges and opinion, and to the evidence
generally taken by the Court of Inquiry, His Excellency directs the
publication of the following remarks:
1. Although the order for the assembly of the Court was general in its terms, the special memorandum of instructions furnished for the guidance of the President and members, stated that the Court was assembled to give Lieut.-Col. Dennis an opportunity of refuting charges which had been "made against his personal conduct on the 2nd June, at Fort Erie," and directed the reception of any evidence which might tend to elucidate the truth.
2. The only one of the above six charges which, strictly speaking, the Court was required to consider, was the 4th, which imputed disgraceful and cowardly conduct to the accused officer.
3. His Excellency approves of the opinion of the Court with respect to the 1st. 3rd. 4th. 5th and 6th charges.
4. With respect to the second charge. His Excellency is of opinion that Lieut.-Col. Dennis committed an error in judgment in removing the small force under his command, from the means of secure retreat afforded by the steamer, before he had ascertained with some degree of certainty the probable force of the enemy, of whose near approach he was informed; but if the accusation made against Lieut.-Col. Dennis in this charge be correct, that he did so remove his force from the shelter of the steamer for the purpose of attacking an enemy, whose numbers he knew to be overwhelming--the proceeding savours rather of rashness than of timidity. Had Lieut.-Col. Dennis been the coward which his accusers would have the public believe, he would in such a case have eagerly availed himself of the remonstrances which it is stated were made to him, to return with the men under his command to the deck of the steamer.
5. The first charge being one of imputed intention only, the fulfilment of which it was not attempted to establish, was not a proper charge for investigation by any Court.
6. The sixth charge is also an improper charge to have preferred or investigated. No Commanding Officer would be safe if his subordinates could be allowed to frame a charge of misconduct against him for not having adopted a particular course, which, judging deliberately after the event, his accusers might think to have been advisable. There is no pretence that the course which Lieut.-Col. Dennis is accused of misconduct for not adopting, was suggested to him and rejected.