Truth and Error or the Science of Intellection/Chapter 16

by John Wesley Powell

CHAPTER XVI

APPREHENSION

It has been shown that there is a faculty of the mind by which bodies are cognized as kinds, which has been called sensation. It has further been shown that there is a faculty of the cognition of bodies as forms, which has been called perception. It is now designed to demonstrate that there is a faculty of the mind by which bodies are cognized as forces, and this faculty I shall call apprehension.

A satisfactory term for this faculty is not found in the language. The term understanding has vaguely been used in this manner, but so many meanings for the term are in use that it cannot well be employed. The term apprehension also has several meanings, the most common of which is a synonym for fear, as when I affirm that I apprehend danger. I shall use the term apprehension as restricted solely to the judgment of force. Apprehension, then, is the name of the mental process of cognizing force in all its modes. In order that my argument may proceed I must have a term which will be taken with this meaning and with it alone. Whether I choose the term wisely or unwisely is another question.

Man is conscious of his own force, and he infers force of other bodies because of their effects when they impinge upon himself, being conscious of these effects. Then he discovers the forces of molar bodies in the change wrought by their impinging upon one another.

It has already been shown that man is primarily interested in the environment. The primitive man first becomes interested in what he supposes to be the environment of molar bodies by which he is surrounded. A vast multitude of these bodies are molar, and stellar bodies are at first supposed to be molar, while molecular bodies are unknown, and the world is supposed to be composed of molar bodies. Then human concepts are all of molar bodies and their properties.

In a judgment of apprehension, there are the same pentalogic elements that hitherto we have observed in judgments, namely, a consciousness of a sense impression, a choice of a concept, a consciousness of that concept, a comparison of one consciousness with the other, and a judgment which identifies or discriminates in affirming them to be alike or unlike as the case may be. The concept chosen is a concept of force. A judgment of apprehension must primordially follow a judgment of perception, just as a judgment of perception must primordially follow a judgment of sensation. This is the primordial order in which these judgments occur.

If we judge of external force in two bodies, before there can be a judgment of apprehension, there must be a plurality of judgments of perception as in perception there must be a plurality of judgments of sensation. When two bodies act upon each other a change occurs in both. In order that a judgment of their actions upon each other may be formed, there must be judgments of perception; the two bodies must be perceived. Then their action is inferred from the changes which they undergo; but it is impossible to have this judgment without the antecedent perceptions.

Let us consider a judgment of apprehension in what seems to be its simplest form. A pressure on self is experienced. Here there must be a sense impression which produces a consciousness, a discrimination, a choice, a recollection, and a consciousness of a concept out of which arises a judgment of simple sensation. Then we consider the cause as a form, and judgment of it is a perception. Then we consider it as a force in a process, and it is a judgment of apprehension. Thus a judgment of apprehension is one of a series of judgments, the first of sensation, the second of perception, and the third of apprehension.

We become expert in making judgments. Having made and verified them, cognition becomes recognition, and recognition seems to be a very simple process, for the pentalogic elements do not arise in the cortical consciousness. The fact is well known that judgments of intellection as well as judgments of action are made instantaneously with precision, when they have previously been made with halting labor, occupying much time; still we are compelled to the conclusion that judgments of apprehension can occur only after judgments of perception, and these only after judgments of sensation, although these several judgments all have pentalogic elements.

There seems to be in the mind or cortex a power by which logically antecedent judgments are cancelled after they have once been made, thus saving time and thought. This cancellation of the elements of judgment we have hitherto observed, and shall be reminded of it hereafter. This is the psychical phenomenon known as intuition.

Judgments of energy and work are primarily derived from muscular sensation or the sense of stress and strain. There is consciousness of stress when other bodies press upon us, and a consciousness of strain when our bodies press upon others. The consciousness is but a consciousness of change in self, but there is always an inference in a judgment. When I act I am conscious of the action as a cause, and infer the effect; when another acts upon me I am conscious of the effect and infer the cause. But here we do not pause to treat of the consciousness of strain, but only the consciousness of stress.

The faculties of intellection, which we have called sensation, perception, and apprehension, are connate; that is, they are contemporaneous growths as concepts, but not contemporaneous judgments. The judgments of sensation must precede the judgments of perception, and these precede the judgments of apprehension. The last judgment formed may seem to follow upon the sense impression itself. It is the power which seems magical to the untrained psychologist; the power of reaching a conclusion by previously gained knowledge. It is the power which we call habit in another realm of psychology, as when the trained pianist strikes many notes simultaneously in rapid succession. Here we observe that the successions of the mind are more rapid than the fingers, for the successive acts of will for every finger are interpreted by simultaneous muscular acts. It is the power by which the intellect considers many judgments in such rapid succession that they appear to be simultaneous.

Heretofore, in discussing sensation, perception, and apprehension, the effect has been subjective and the cause objective, but in apprehension these relations of cause and effect are sometimes reversed, and the cause may be subjective and the effect objective. I am conscious not only when another strikes me, but I am conscious when I strike another. Here we have a consciousness of cause, and the effect is inferred. I am conscious of a flavor when I eat an apple, and I am conscious of an act performed by myself when I bite it. I was conscious of an effect of color when I saw it, and I was conscious of an effect upon myself when I touched it; I was conscious of an act when I turned my eye to it, and I was conscious of an act when I grasped it. Thus there is always an emotion connected with an intellection and there is always an intellection with an emotion. But we are not now considering emotions; we are considering intellections only. We cannot consider intellection without positing emotion. With this statement we go on to consider the subject of the intellections, our present purpose being simply to discover an epistomology for the intellections. In another book we shall treat of the epistomology of the emotions.

Here again we must call attention to another very important fact, viz., that the individual mind is only one of many minds, and that it is only one of a still greater number of bodies that there is myself and the environment, and that there is yourself and the environment, and that you are a part of my environment, and that I am a part of your environment. Thus every body in turn is a self with an environment. The wind acts on me, and I act on the wind, the tree acts on me, and I act on the tree; but the wind acts on the tree and the tree on the wind, and these actions are all processes. The action of the wind on the tree and the tree on the wind come into my judgment, and these processes are cognized; but the cognition of the action of the wind on the tree and that of the tree on the wind is inferred by their actions severally upon me. I see the leaves on the tree stir in the wind, but I am not conscious that the wind stirs the leaves. I am conscious that the light from the tree impinges upon my eye, and infer the tree and the wind with all the processes involved. Thus it is that the cognition of action and reaction between objects in the environment is a very complex process of reasoning, for cognition of the interactions of the objects of the environment are composed of a vast congeries of judgments.

Force must not be confounded with causation, although there can be no causation without force, nor can there be force without form, nor can there be form without kind; but abstractly causation and force are wholly disparate. A sledge impinges on a tree; the sledge strikes the tree and the tree strikes the sledge; action and reaction are equal, and in both vibrations are set up which are visible in the tree but invisible in the sledge, though none the less real. Now, when I consider action and reaction, I am considering force; but the sledge makes a visible indentation on the tree. When I am considering this indentation, I am considering an effect; perhaps the sledge changes some of the relations of its particles in crystallization; when I consider this effect upon the sledge I am considering causation. Suppose that, instead of striking the tree with a sledge, I strike it with an ax, then the blow produces a cut; and when I consider the difference between a cut of a sharp ax and the indentation of a sledge, I am compelled to consider differences of causation, and though the force of the blows are equal, the forms of the cause are unequal. The blow on the tree causes both vibration and indentation. Thus there are two effects, but only one blow. The blow on the sledge is vibration and crystallization; but there are two effects, but only one blow. When we consider the nature of the blow as action and reaction, we are considering force; but when we consider the effect we are considering causation. Action and reaction are simultaneous, cause and effect are sequent.

All intellection is abstraction; he who cannot accomplish and hold firmly an abstraction cannot psychologize.

Apprehension is both presentative and representative, or inductive and deductive. If we look upon apprehension from the standpoint of its initial element, it is either presentative or representative; but if we look upon it from the standpoint of result as reason, it is inductive or deductive. The choice of a concept of deduction is always initiated by choice of another concept instead of a sense impression. This choice of a concept may be the one made in a presentative or other judgment, for judgments may follow judgments in extended succession, all initiated by one sense impression, but connected in the succession by links of recollection. From one point of view these may be called discursive judgments, and from another associated judgments. In waking hours the mind cannot cease to make judgments. If sense impressions are neglected, recollected concepts take their place. The mind may be turned loose to make excursions by steps of judgments into a field where fancy leads; but the path of the mind in making judgments may be directed by the will to the accomplishment of a purpose, in which case the judgments instead of being discursive are volitional. Representative judgments, therefore, are discursive or volitional.

I see a bird flit from one bough to another. If my mind is free to pursue my meditations, I may recall the bird that I saw yesterday, and this may recall a nest of blue eggs, and this may recall the blue scarf of my little daughter, and I may go on in this manner to make discursive judgments; but I may be watching the movements of the bird for the purpose of studying its habits, and my judgments may be controlled by my will. In experience we pass from presentative to representative judgments, back and forth, with instantaneous rapidity and great irregularity. So we pass from discursive to volitional judgments instantaneously and irregularly.

Judgments become cognitions only when they are verified. Judgments of sensation are verified by submitting them to other senses, and then they are subjected to perception for further arbitrament. Judgments of perception are submitted to apprehension for verification, but judgments of apprehension are verified by a faculty which we have hitherto not discussed. We must now set forth the office of apprehension in verifying judgments of perception.

Forms are not properly conceived until we know their function. We may have a vague concept of a form without knowing its function, but the elements of its structure are not fully grasped until we discover their relations to function. Thus our perceptions of form are not only verified by our apprehensions of function, but the observation by which it is discovered is often dependent upon the effort to apprehend function. An obscure stigma on the pistil of a plant might be wholly unobserved by the man who is not acquainted with the office of the pistil, but the botanist is sure to perceive it. The painter perceives muscles with certainty when he observes them in action. It is thus that perception is verified by apprehension.

In the human race, knowledge commences by the cognition of molar bodies; as culture advances knowledge is extended to stellar bodies in the direction of the vast, and to molecular bodies in the direction of the minute. On the other hand, knowledge has not only been extended into the vast and the minute, but it has also been extended into the compound and complex as exhibited in plants and animals. This distinction has long been recognized in a vague way by including certain sciences under the term natural history, and other sciences under the term physics. The real distinction between these sciences, however, is this: that the natural history sciences consider quantities or properties that can be measured. In ethronomy and astronomy we consider properties that can be measured, and ultimately arrive at classification; but in phytonomy and zoönomy we first consider properties that can be classified, and finally resort to their measurement. In geonomy the sciences are broadly grouped into two classes, namely, geography and geology; the geographic sciences are sciences of measurement, the geologic sciences are sciences of classification. Thus we have quantitative and classific sciences. This is the old distinction of metaphysics between quantitative and qualitative things when properties are considered as qualities. We have already seen in the chapter on qualities the nature of this error and are ready to rescue the term quality from the ambiguity into which it fell when it was considered as synonymous with class, kind, or category.

The so-called qualitative sciences, therefore, are more properly designated as the classific sciences. This broad distinction between the classific and the quantitative sciences deserves some further consideration. In the deductive sciences there must be some reason why we first look for quantity—why we come to study the ether, the stars, and geography quantitatively, and geology, plants, and animals classifically or categorically. We know absolutely nothing of kinds of ether, but only of the properties of ether as belonging to one kind. We know of no method by which we can change the particles of ether into kinds. We know of but few kinds of stars, and we know of no method by which we can change the kinds of stars. There are but few kinds of air and of water, and these differences are only varietal, not specific, and the elements of mathematical geography are established mainly beyond the interference of man. We wish to adjust our conduct to these established facts, and hence we wish to know the facts. I do not propose to change the rising and setting of the sun, but I do wish to measure the times when they may be expected and the length of the day and the night. I do not propose to change the gravity inherent between the several stars of the solar system, but I do wish to measure the force of gravity between star and star, that I may adjust my conduct to established facts when I make the ephemeris for the guidance of the navigator. I do not propose to change the atmosphere, but I measure it by determining its barometric quantities, the pressure of its winds, and the quantity of moisture which it contains. In the same way I measure the superficial extent of the sea and the depths at which the rocks are found, that I may adjust my conduct while navigating the sea to the facts therein discovered. Now, we could go on to illustrate these facts in a multitude of ways, and in an endless procession, and find in all those realms of science, which I have indicated by calling them physical or quantitative, that I am interested in quantities as a dweller upon the earth.

In the quantitative sciences there are few kinds, but many of a kind. Induction is the discovery of a kind; deduction is the application of the laws of a kind to the individuals which are included in the kind. The quantitative sciences are deductive, for deduction predominates in their study. It is thus that the physical sciences, ethronomy, astronomy, and geography are quantitative and deductive, and that which interests us most in these realms of bodies is their quantities, for though it is impossible to change their kinds, it is possible to adjust ourselves advantageously to their quantities.

In geology, phytonomy, and zoönomy there are many kinds; thus there are many mineral species and few individuals of a species as compared with the individuals of air and water; there are also many kinds of plants and comparatively few of a kind. Deduction is based upon the law that what is true of one of a kind is true of all of a kind, but where there are many kinds and few individuals, attention must be given more to the discovery of the kinds than to the application of the laws to individuals; hence in these sciences our attention must relatively be occupied with the discovery of kinds and less occupied with the application of laws. But more: Man by culture undertakes to change kinds, forms, forces, causes, and concepts. By the arts of constructive or synthetic chemistry and metallurgy, he makes many new kinds. By a great variety of arts he makes many new forms, shaping the rocks, plants, and animal substances into a variety of tools, utensils, machines, and fabrics. In a vast multitude of ways he seeks to change the forms of bodies which he discovers in rocks, plants, and animals, and can accomplish his purpose only by changing the kinds.

So man tries to change the forces of nature into modes which he can control, and all of these changes which he brings about upon the face of nature depend upon his recognition of causes and the wisdom of his selection of the nature of the cause; while he is thus employed in changing the kinds of things in nature, he is forever building up and changing his concepts, and all of this change when resolved to its simplest statement is change of kinds. Thus in the geologic, phytonomic, and zoönomic realms, man is primarily interested in kinds and only secondarily in quantities; in the products of his cultural activities he is equally interested in kinds and quantities. It is here that induction and deduction meet on equal grounds, for the arts are equally inductive and deductive.

Presentative reasoning is thus chiefly classific and inductive, while representative reasoning is chiefly quantitative and deductive.

Now we see why bodies are symbolized as kinds rather than as forces, for forces are recognized as processes. We think of the force of a form rather than of the form of a force. All of the senses are under the control of and associated with muscles, so that we cannot taste an object without employing the muscles of the mouth, and when we designedly smell an object we must imbibe its vapor in the air through the action of our muscles by inhalation. We cannot touch an object without employing our muscles by extending the organs of locomotion, as hands or feet, though the object may touch us independently of our self-activity. So pressure is apprehended by us as stress or strain; the muscles of the ear are strained when we intently listen; the eye is especially under the control of a system of muscles, so that it becomes the special organ for the cognition of motion. We do not see motion chiefly because of the passing of the image across the retina, but because the eye, through its muscular apparatus, adjusts the point of vision of the image upon the retina to the moving body. Thus, while force is primordially cognized by the muscular sense, even motion comes to be cognized by the muscular sense when it adjusts the organ of vision to motion. This is one of the characteristics of vision which eminently adapts the sense to vicarious faculties.

We may now give a more adequate definition of apprehension. Apprehension is the process of forming a judgment about force, or its reciprocal, motion, and of verifying it so as to produce a cognition. The difference between a cognition of motion and of force inheres mainly in the method of verification. The various methods of verification are fundamentally dependent upon congruity of concepts. Again, apprehension as a process of intellection may be defined as the cognition of force.