United States – Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967: A Study Prepared by the Department of Defense/III. D. Notes

by the Pentagon

1.	Dillon priority tel. No. 5035 from Paris, June 24, 1954 (TOP SECRET).
2.	Smith tel. SECTO 636 from Geneva, July 17, 1954 (SECRET).
3.	Smith NIACT tel. SECTO 639 from Geneva, July 18, 1954 (SECRET).
4.	CIA Memorandum RSS 0017/66, p. 46 (SECRET/NoFornDis/Controlled Dis).
5.	Mackintosh, pp. 84–85.
6.	The declarations may be found, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documents Relating to British Involvement in the Indo-China Conflict 1945–1965, Misc. No. 25, Cmnd. 2834 (London: H.M.S.O., 1965), pp. 76 (Cambodia) and 79 (Laos).
7.	In a talk with the Cambodian Foreign Minister Sam Sary, Philip Bonsai suggested that it would not be possible to guarantee Cambodia's security by a Conference mechanism subject to communist veto. Bonsai said, however, that once a satisfactory cease-fire were concluded, one that did not prevent Cambodia from cooperating with other non-communist states in defense matters, "he was confident U.S. and other interested countries looked forward to discussing with Cambodian Government" the security problem. (Johnson priority tel. SECTO 627 from Geneva, July 16, 1954, SECRET.) When Sam Sary called a few days later on Smith in the company of Nong Kimny (Ambassador to Washington), the Under Secretary recommended that Phnom Penh, at the Conference, state its intention not to have foreign bases on its territory and not to enter into military alliances. At the same time, though, Cambodia would be free to import arms and to employ French military instructors and technicians. While Cambodia would thus perhaps not be free to join the contemplated SEATO, she might still benefit from it. Smith "assured the Cambodian Foreign Minister that, in our view, any aggression overt or covert against Cambodian territory would bring pact into operation even though Cambodia not a member. I took position that French Union membership afforded Cambodia adequate desirable means of securing through France necessary arms, some of which would be American, as well as necessary instructors and technicians, some of which might well be American trained." Nong Kimny "limited himself to statement that Cambodia relies heavily on U.S. for eventual protection against aggression and that Cambodia desires to emerge from current conference with maximum freedom of action re measures Cambodia may take to assure defense." Smith tel. SECTO 650 from Geneva, July 18, 1954 (CONFIDENTIAL).
8.	See Chauvel's report in Johnson's priority tel. SECTO 553 from Geneva, July 2, 1954 (TOP SECRET). Also: Lacouture and Devillers, p. 238.
9.	Dillon from Paris tel. No. 32, July 2, 1954 (TOP SECRET).

1.	Hans Morgenthau, in "The 1954 Geneva Conference: An Assessment" (America's Stake in Vietnam, New York: American Funds of Vietnam, 1956), says Chou was to Geneva what Metternich was to the Congress of Vienna of 1815.
2.	Aide-memoire delivered by Bonnet to Dulles and Eden June 26, in Dulles' Tel No. 4852 to American Embassy - Paris, 28 June 1954 (TOP SECRET)
3.	White House press release of 21 July 1954
4.	Quoted in Richard P. Stebbins, et al., The United States in World Affairs, 1954 (New York: Harper and Bros., 1956), p. 255
5.	Department of State press release No. 400, 23 July 1954
6.	OCB, Progress Report on United States Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Southeast Asia (NSC 5405), 6 August 1954 (TOP SECRET)
7.	NSC, Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East (NSC 5429), 4 August 1954 (TOP SECRET)
8.	Dulles to American Embassy, Paris, Tel No. 77, 7 July 1954 (SECRET)
9.	In its Progress Report of 6 August, OCB said there was need for "political action" to build a strong foundation in free Asia for the continued orientation of the countries there toward the Free World. "A test of such political action and orientation will be the elections in Laos and Cambodia during 1955, and in North and South Vietnam during 1956."
10.	This objective, stated in NSC 5429/1, was approved by the President. See NSC, Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East, 12 August 1954 (TOP SECRET)
11.	Ibid.
12.	Smith from Geneva Tel SECTO 666, 19 July 1954 (TOP SECRET)
13.	Dulles to Smith at Geneva, Tel TOSEC 576 NIACT, 19 July 1954 (TOP SECRET)

1.	Future elections in Vietnam are mentioned in Article 14 of the Vietnam Cease-Fire Agreements almost as a political aside.
2.	Bator, "One War — Two Vietnams," Military Review, XLVII, No. 6 (June, 1967), 87.